

Idea of  
Radical  
Media

/

Ideja  
radikalnih  
medija

**Idea of Radical Media /  
Ideja radikalnih medija**

**Idea of Radical Media /  
Ideja radikalnih medija  
reader / zbornik**

**Multimedijalni institut, Zagreb, 2013.**

editors / urednici: **Tomislav Medak & Petar Milat**

english proofreading / engleska lektura: **Jane Warrilow, Ivana Ivković**

publisher / izdavač:  
**Multimedijalni institut  
Preradovićevea 18  
HR-10000 Zagreb  
tel: +385-(0)1-4856400  
fax: +385-(0)1-485729  
email: mi2@mi2.hr  
http://www.mi2.hr**

design: **Ruta**

printing / tiskara: **Tiskara Zelina d.d.**

print run / naklada: **500**

**Multimedijalni institut  
ISBN: 978-953-7372-10-1**

This book is published within the project Aesthetic Education Expanded, a joint project by Multimedia Institute, Kuda.org, Berliner Gazette, Kontrapunkt and Mute. Project supported by the program Culture 2007 - 2013 of the European Union and by Balkan Incentive Fund for Culture of the European Cultural Foundation.



**Culture**

This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.



European  
Cultural  
Foundation

The publication is supported by the Ministry of Culture of Republic of Croatia and the Office for Education, Culture and Sport of the City of Zagreb.



Republika  
Hrvatska  
Ministarstvo  
kulture  
Republic  
of Croatia  
Ministry  
of Culture



# **Idea of Radical Media**

/

Ideja radikalnih  
medija

# Contents

8 Introduction

TRAJECTORIES OF CRITICAL MEDIA CULTURES:

16 **Clemens Apprich:**  
The Truth Games of Radical Net Cultures

42 **Eric Kluitenberg:**  
Charting Hybridised Realities: Tactical Cartographies for a  
Densified Present

SCREEN AND CAPTURE:

60 **Jodi Dean:**  
Communicative Capitalism: This is What Democracy Looks Like

74 **Matteo Pasquinelli:**  
The Number of the Collective Beast: The Substance of Value in  
the Age of the Institutions of Ranking and Rating

NEW MEDIA AND OTHER MEDIA:

94 **Branka Ćurčić:**  
What is Radical in 'Radical Media'?  
A Different, Surrealists Kind of Proposal

114 **Alessandro Ludovico:**  
Printed Radicality

132 **Anthony Iles:**  
Media, Secession and Recession

164 **Joanne Richardson:**  
Making Films Politically

PERIPHERY, OPPOSITION, APPROPRIATION:

192 **Vera Tollmann:**  
Screenshots of China's Internet: About Hybrid Video Tactics

218 **Katarina Peović Vuković:**  
The Dynamics of Culture. What Can We Learn from Raymond  
Williams?

236 **Ana Peraica:**  
Massive Spamming

# Sadržaj

7 Uvod

## PUTANJE KRITIČKIH MEDIJSKIH KULTURA:

15 **Clemens Apprich:**

Igre istine u radikalnim mrežnim kulturama

41 **Eric Kluitenberg:**

Kartiranje hibridiziranih stvarnosti: taktilne kartografije za zgusnutu sadašnjost

## EKRAN I UHVAĆENOST:

59 **Jodi Dean:**

Komunikacijski kapitalizam: tako izgleda demokracija

73 **Matteo Pasquinelli:**

Brojka kolektivne životinje: Supstanca vrijednosti u doba institucija rangiranja i rejtinga

## NOVI MEDIJI I DRUGI MEDIJI:

93 **Branka Ćurčić:**

Šta je radikalno u "radikalnim medijima"?  
Drugačiji, nadrealistički predlog

113 **Alessandro Ludovico:**

Tiskana radikalnost

131 **Anthony Iles:**

Mediji, secesija i recesija

163 **Joanne Richardson:**

Raditi filmove politički

## PERIFERIJA, OPOZICIJA, APROPRIJACIJA:

191 **Vera Tollmann:**

Pogled u svijet kineskog interneta: o hibridnim video taktikama

217 **Katarina Peović Vuković:**

Dinamika kulture. Što možemo naučiti od Raymonda Williamsa?

235 **Ana Peraica:**

Massive Spamming



# Uvod

**O** tvorili ste zbornik konferencije *Ideja radikalnih medija* koja je u organizaciji Multimedijalnog instituta održana 7.-8. lipnja 2013. u Zagrebu. Konferencija je nastala u kontekstu izložbe *Izgleđi Arkzina* i medijske akcije *Instaliranje javnosti* kojima smo željeli revalorizirati fenomen *Arkzina* dva desetljeća kasnije. *Arkzinov* izdavački i aktivistički rad anticipirao je i reflektirao taktičke medijske prakse koje su se početkom 1990-ih kristalizirale u susretu političkog trenutka - obilježenog postsocijalističkom tranzicijom, jugoslavenskim ratovima i alterglobalističkim otporom - s tehnološkom pojavom interneta.

No, cilj konferencije i zbornika postavljen je obuhvatnije. S jedne strane, željeli smo sagledati kako su se radikalne medijske prakse na planu umjetnosti, javne komunikacije i političkog rada djelatno artikulirale i diskurzivno reartikulirale kroz posljednja dva desetljeća. A, s druge strane, preispitati sam pojam radikalnih medija iz jedne šire historijske perspektive kao i kritičke perspektive sadašnjeg društvenog trenutka.

Do sredine devedesetih internet je već ušao u široku svakodnevnu upotrebu, otvarajući perspektivu radikalno demokratizirane javne komunikacije. Komunikacijske inovacije tijekom 20. stoljeća uvijek su budile nadanja da ćemo konačno dobiti dvosmjerni medij u kojem će se svatko moći obraćati najširoj javnosti. Međutim, te su nade uobičajeno ubrzo bivale iznevjerene konkretnom primjenom koja je redovito rezultirala upravo većom komercijalnom i političkom kontrolom nad medijskim prostorom. Ovog puta je trebalo biti drugačije. U tehnološkom pogledu distribuirano i u društvenom karakteru kolektivno ustrojstvo interneta nudilo je razloge za



# Introduction



You are leafing through the reader of the *Idea of Radical Media* conference, held June 7-8, 2013 in Zagreb and organized by the Multimedia Institute. The conference took place in the context of the exhibition *Prospects of Arkzin* and the media action *Installing the Public*, both revisiting the *Arkzin* phenomenon two decades later. *Arkzin* was a collective and a publication that emerged out of the Anti-War Campaign in the early 1990s and gave a theoretical and polemical voice to anti-nationalist positions. The publishing and activist practices of *Arkzin* anticipated and reflected the practices of tactical media that were crystallizing from a particular confluence of a political moment marked by the post-socialist transition, post-Yugoslav conflicts and alter-globalist contestations, and a technological moment of the rise of early Net.

However, the conference and the reader have a broader aim. On the one hand, we wanted to look back at the practical articulations and discursive re-articulations of radical media practices in arts, mass communication and political work over the last two decades. On the other, to reassess the notion of radical media from a broader historical perspective and the critical perspective of the current political moment.

By mid 1990s the internet was making its way into everybody's lives, beckoning with a prospect of a radically democratic form of public communication. Innovations in mass communication in the 20th century have always stirred the hopes that we would finally see a two-way medium where everybody would be able to speak to the broadest public. However, these hopes were always curtailed by their implementation, resulting in ever growing commercial and political domination over the media. This time it seemed it would be different. The technologically distributed and socially collective character of the internet gave reason to believe that finally we would stop hating the media, and start becoming the media.

vjeru da će ovo konačno biti trenutak kada ćemo moći prestati mrziti medije i prihvatiti se zadatka da postanemo mediji. U nekim aspektima to se doista i dogodilo. Internet je radikalno demokrati- zirao priliku za javni govor i pospješio mogućnosti političkog orga- niziranja. I dok je tako olakšavao razmjenu i koordinaciju u global- nim razmjerima, istodobno je poticao stvaranje novih oblika druš- tvenog organiziranja i angažmana u posve lokalnim razmjerima. Dapače, upravo je kritička oštrica internetskih praksi često bila u većoj mjeri vezana uz fizički prostor i stare medije kao tisak no što se to moglo pretpostaviti.

Međutim, mnogo toga se promijenilo od devedesetih. Budući da su tehnološke promjene uzdrmale društvene i ekonomske pretpostavke starih medija, logika kojom je tehnološki razvoj podčinjen primarno zakonitostima kapitalističkog tržišta i ekspanzije nalaga- la je da i tehnološki razvoj interneta krene drugim smjerom - od obećanja mnoštva neovisnih medijskih proizvođača na imperativ praćenja i komodifikacije ponašanja korisnika. Kao što su nedavna otkrića Edwarda Snowdena potvrdila, tehnologija demokratizacije pokazala se tehnologijom masovnog nadzora i betoniranja našeg pristanka na masovni nadzor.

Ni internetska tehnologija nije se pokazala narodnom tehni- kom, kao što tehnologije u vladajućim uvjetima to ni ne mogu po- stati bez kolektivnih praksi prisvajanja i podruštvljenja. Tu se ocrtava nedaća naše trenutačne situacije: u trenutku kada je kritička analiza i radikalna praksa isto tako urgentno potrebna kao i prije dvadeset godina, mi na potencijal radikalnih medija gledamo bitno skeptičnije.

Prilozi sabrani u ovom zborniku, iza kojih stoje neki od prota- gonista kritičke medijske prakse i diskursa proteklih dvaju desetlje- ća, pokušaj su da se rasvijetli upravo taj povijesni luk i promisli ta nedaća sadašnjeg trenutka.

And so - in some ways - it did happen. The internet democratized public speech and catalyzed capacities for political assembly in radical ways. As it enabled exchange and coordination on a global scale, it also helped new forms of social organization and contestation emerge on very local levels. In fact, the cutting edge of internet practices were more frequently related to physical space and paper than one would have thought.

However, much has changed since the 1990s. As technological changes have rattled at the social and economic foundations of old media, the iron logic that subordinates the technological development to the laws of capitalist market and expansion dictated that the technological development of internet be re-oriented so as to transform the promise of a multitude of independent media producers into the promise of massively commodifiable and monitored audience behavior. As recent Edward Snowden leaks have shown, the technology of democratization proved to be the technology of mass surveillance and the guarantee of our consent to mass surveillance.

This technology would turn out not to be people's technology after all, as technologies in governing social relations never tend to be without collective practices of re-purposing or socialization. And this prefigures the predicament of our present situation when we regard with more sobriety than ever before over the last two decades the transformative potential of radical media - at a moment when a critical articulation and a radical practice seem to be just as urgently called upon as they were twenty years ago.

The contributions in this reader, written by some of the protagonists of critical media practice and discourse over the last twenty years, are an attempt to understand this historic trajectory and reflect the predicament of the present moment.



# **TRAJECTORIES OF CRITICAL MEDIA CULTURES**

PUTANJE KRITIČKIH  
MEDIJSKIH KULTURA



# Igre istine u radikalnim mrežnim kulturama

## Ž

elimo li razumjeti radikalne medijske prakse u umjetnosti, komunikacijama i politici, moramo razmotriti neke od povijesnih procesa koji su potaknuli nastanak novih oblika javnog izražavanja, odgovarajući time na nove potrebe za političkom manifestacijom koje su se javile s novim društvenim pokretima. Osobito je pojava interneta na globalnoj razini sredinom 90-ih godina prošlog stoljeća otvorila nova polja antihegemonijskog djelovanja, omogućujući time čitav niz radikalnih medijskih praksi. Istražujući igre istine u radikalnim mrežnim kulturama toga doba, želio bih istaknuti neke od povijesnih i diskurzivnih genealogija progresivnih medijskih praksi u Europi. To bi moglo biti važno za našu trenutnu situaciju, s obzirom na to da su digitalne medijske tehnologije prodrle u gotovo sve aspekte svakodnevnog života, a uslijed toga su i kritičke reartikulacije njihova transformacijskog potencijala postale urgentnije nego ikada prije.

### Mrežne kulture kao polja znanja

Radikalne mrežne kulture nastale su nakon 1989. godine, uglavnom kao opozicija komercijalnom prisvajanju i državnoj regulaciji interneta koji je upravo krenuo prerastati u globalan medij. Kao eksperimentalna polja inovativnih oblika znanja težile su zaposjesti one slobodne prostore (političke, društvene i kulturne) koji su stvoreni uslijed tehnološke transformacije medijskog pejzaža: “Umjesto pukog kritičkog interpretiranja i teoretiziranja, praktičari [radi-



# The Truth Games of Radical Net Cultures



In order to understand the radical media-related practices in art, communication, and politics we have to trace back some of the historical developments that have unleashed new forms of public expression, thereby responding to new needs for political manifestation as they emerged with new social movements. In particular, the arrival of the internet on a global scale in the mid-1990s opened up new fields of counter-hegemonic agency, thus enabling a variety of radical media practices. By investigating the truth games of radical net cultures of that time, I would like to highlight some of the historical and discursive lineages of progressive media practices in Europe. This may be of importance for our current situation, considering that digital media technologies have penetrated almost all aspects of everyday life, and as a consequence, critical re-articulations of

its transformative potential have become more urgent than ever before.

## Net cultures as fields of knowledge

Radical net cultures emerged after 1989, largely in opposition to the commercial appropriation and state regulation of the internet, which was about to grow into a global medium (cf. Apprich/Stalder 2012). As fields of experimenting with the innovative forms of knowledge, they strove to occupy those free spaces (political, social, and cultural) that had been created through the technological changes in the media landscape: “[R]ather than just doing critical reading and theorising, [radical media] practitioners go on to develop participatory events that demonstrate the critique through an experiential process” (CAE 2001, p. 8). The critique that emerged as a consequence was at first located outside of the classical institutions such as universities, museums, galleries, party organisations, or cultural centres, and its aim was to open up new fields of knowledge.

kalnih medija] stvaraju participacijske događaje koji manifestiraju kritiku kroz iskustveni proces” (CAE 2001, str. 8). Tako nastala kritika isprva je bila locirana u klasičnim institucijama poput sveučilišta, muzeja, galerija, stranačkih organizacija ili kulturnih centara i trebala je otvoriti nova polja znanja. To se, između ostaloga, dogodilo zauzimanjem odmaka od tada hegemonijske ideje o kiberprostoru kao virtualnom paralelnom prostoru, kako su ga zamišljale znanstvena fantastika i kompjuterska kultura (usp. Bilwet 1995). “Kalifornijska ideologija” (Barbrook/Cameron 1997), o kojoj se u to vrijeme mnogo raspravljalo, dobar je primjer za to kako su cyberutopijske naracije o “posljednjoj granici” pratile tehnološke promjene. Uska isprepletenost tadašnje hipijejske kulture u San Franciscu i industrije visoke tehnologije u susjednoj Silikonskoj dolini dovela je do učinkovitog diskursa na osnovi kojega je izgrađena “Nova ekonomija” (usp. Turner 2006). Osobito je scenski časopis *Wired*, shvaćen kao središnji digitalni organ “virtualne klase” (Kroker/Weinstein 1994), bio predmet mrežne kritike, koja je pak uglavnom smatrana europskom stvari. Ona se očitovala u lokalnim medijskim centrima (kao što su bili Public Netbase u Beču, De Balie u Amsterdamu, Backspace u Londonu, Ljudmila u Ljubljani ili E-Lab u Rigi), na regionalnim festivalima medijske umjetnosti (npr. Ars Electronica u Linzu, Dutch Electronic Arts Festival u Rotterdamu, transmediale u Berlinu), u novinama (*Arkzin* u Zagrebu, *Mute* u Londonu), na internetskom radiju i na mailing-listama.

U svojoj knjizi o praksi mrežnih kultura toga vremena Inke Arns ističe kako su prije svega “male, manjinske, buntovne prakse, marginalne pozicije, male marginalne taktike, prije nego velike strategije u središtu” (Arns 2002, str. 6) bile one koje su znale ponuditi kritičke perspektive i alternativne prijedloge za masovne medije. Pritom valja imati na umu da je s mrežnim kulturama ponovo oživljen mrežni model koji se koristio već 70-ih i 80-ih godina prošlog stoljeća za opisivanje takozvanih “grassroots pokreta”. Međutim, mnoge od tih inicijativa ubrzo su okoštale u klasične strukture civilnoga društva, kao što je očito iz osnivačkog buma nevladinih organizacija (NGO-a) devedesetih godina. Mrežne kulture su se pak smatrale alternativom naspram takvih etabliranih institucija, iako su neki od njihovih protagonista proizašli upravo iz njih te su nerijetko primjenjivali i slične političke strategije. Ali ta okolnost ne smije nas navesti da zanemarimo činjenicu da je mrežnim kulturama uspjelo izgraditi vlastite platforme za proizvodnju i distribuciju znanja koje su proizvodile, kao i stvoriti nove javnosti ciljanim radom na umrežavanju: “Pritom se nije radilo o tehnicu kao takvoj [...], nego o njezinu umrežavanju u kulturnoj tehnologiji i društvenoj infrastrukturi, što je dovelo do kratkotrajnog procvata društvene imaginacije, do natjecanja utopija i distopija” (Lovink/Schultz

Net cultures were doing this, among other things, by detaching themselves from the then hegemonic idea of cyberspace as a virtual parallel space, such as imagined by science-fiction and computer culture (cf. Bilwet 1995). It is the then highly discussed “Californian ideology” (Barbrook/Cameron 1997), that may serve as an example of the way in which cyber-utopian stories of the “last frontier” accompanied the technological change. The close interrelation between hippie culture in San Francisco and high-tech industries in the neighbouring Silicon Valley gave rise to a powerful discourse, which served as a foundation for the “New Economy” (cf. Turner 2006). The scene magazine *Wired*, understood as the digital central body of the “virtual class” (Kroker/Weinstein 1994), became subject to a net critique, which was still largely associated with Europe. This critique originated from the local media centres (e.g. Public Netbase in Vienna, De Balie in Amsterdam, Backspace in London, Ljudmila in Ljubljana, or E-Lab in Riga), regional festivals of media art (e.g. Ars Electronica in Linz, Dutch Electronic Arts Festival in Rotterdam, transmediale in Berlin), magazines (e.g. *Arkzin* in Zagreb, *Mute* in London), internet radio, and mailing lists.

In her book on the net cultures of the time, Inke Arns claims that it was above all “the small, minority, resistant practices, the marginal positions, and the small tactics on the edge, rather than the large strategies in the centre” (Arns 2002, p. 6) that could offer critical viewpoints and alternative plans to the mass media. Thereby one should keep in mind that net cultures also led to a restocking of the network model that had already been used in the 1970s and

1980s to describe the so-called ‘grassroots movements.’ Many of these initiatives, however, soon got petrified in the classical structures of the civil society, as attested by the boom of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 1990s. But net cultures saw themselves as an alternative to such established institutions, even though some of their protagonists had actually come from them and often applied similar political strategies. Nevertheless, this circumstance should not make us overlook the fact that net cultures managed to build up their own platforms of production and distribution for the knowledge they generated, as well as create new publics through focused efforts invested in networking: “It was actually not the technology as such [...], but rather its networking into cultural technology and social infrastructure, that brought about a short flourishing of social imagination, a competition between utopias and dystopias” (Lovink/Schultz 2010, p. 6). At the time when the internet had not yet become a mass medium, yet its future potential could already be predicted, a discourse was released on the possibilities and also dangers of its technological evolution.

The net-related discourse of the 1990s took place to a considerable extent on and with the help of mailing lists.<sup>01</sup> These had emerged as early as the mid-1960s and were characterised primarily by three features: they were cheap, interactive, and thematically focused (cf. Medosch 1997). For Armin Medosch, it is for this reason that they can also be seen as the opposite of the *WWW* introduced in the mid-1990s: “Blinded by the multimedia possibilities of the Web, most users and content pro-

<sup>01</sup> Beside the mailing list *nettime* (see below), one could mention here e.g. *rhizome* (focusing on new art practices), *Syndicate* (exchange between Eastern and Western Europe), *Faces* (empowering and giving visibility to women in net cultures), and *7-11* (focusing on net art).

2010, str. 6). U vrijeme dok internet još nije bio masovni medij, ali se njegov potencijal već naslućivao, rasplamsao se zahvaljujući tome diskurs o mogućnostima, ali i opasnostima njegova tehnološkog razvoja.

Diskurs o mreži 90-ih godina odvijao se znatnim dijelom na mailing-listama i uz njihovu pomoć.<sup>01</sup> One su nastale već sredinom 60-ih godina i odlikovale su se prvenstveno trima karakteristikama: bile su jeftine, interaktivne i tematski fokusirane (usp. Medosch 1997). Za Armina Medoscha one stoga predstavljaju protutežu WWW-u, koji je uveden sredinom 90-ih godina: “Zasljepljena multimedijalnim mogućnostima Weba, većina korisnika i ponuđača sadržaja previđala je da internet nudi i druge mogućnosti, onkraj Weba, zakopane u starijim tehnološkim fazama razvoja, ali još uvijek upotrebljive i smislene, već prema polju primjene” (Medosch 1997). Osobito je Mailinglist-Management-System *Majordomo*, aktiviran 1992. godine i dostupan bez ograničenja, omogućavao jednostavno rukovanje: svaka poruka automatski bi bila poslana na sve pretplaćene primatelje, koji su na nju mogli i odgovoriti. Upravo su se po toj interaktivnosti mailing-liste razlikovale od pukih newslettera. Slično kao i interesne grupe, koje su prvenstveno postojale na mreži *Usenet*, mailing-liste su uglavnom grupirane prema specifičnim tematskim područjima, čime uspostavljaju “društvenu vezu” između sudionika: “Te prve umrežene zajednice mogu se u određenom smislu smatrati pretečama danas tako omiljenih društvenih mreža” (Smite 2012, str. 233). Za razliku od komercijalnih usluga Weba 2.0, mailing-liste su se ipak nalazile na neovisnim i decentraliziranim poslužiteljima, pri čemu su nositelji liste naposljetku u rukama imali i ključ za konfiguraciju dotične liste. Time su mogli mijenjati i temeljne funkcije: na primjer, hoće li unosi na listu biti odmah vidljivi (nemoderirani) ili ih najprije mora odobriti neki moderator (moderirani).

## Mjesto diskursa: *nettime*

Jedno od mjesta na kojima uporište našao diskurs radikalnih mrežnih kultura bila je mailing-lista *nettime*, koju su 1995. godine pokrenuli Pitz Schultz i Geert Lovink: “Tu se strastveno raspravljalo za i protiv tehnološkog determinizma, o ‘afirmativnim tehnoutopijama’ (Diefenbach) i o ‘virtualnoj klasi’ (Kroker), dekonstruirajući njihove argumentacijske figure” (Arns 2002, str. 36s). Središnji dio platforme *nettime* je međunarodna, anglofona mailing-lista *Nettime-l*, koja je 1997. imala oko 500 pretplatnika, do 2001. taj je broj narastao na 2.000, a danas broji čak 4.259 pretplatnika (stanje 20. lipnja 2013.). Uz nju postoje i liste na nizozemskom, rumunjskom i

01 Uz mailing-listu *nettime* (vidi niže) ovamo možemo ubrojiti, na primjer, *rhizome* (s fokusom na novim umjetničkim praksama), *Syndicate* (razmjena između Istočne i Zapadne Europe), *Faces* (jačanje vidljivosti žena u mrežnim kulturama) i 7-11 (s fokusom na mrežnoj umjetnosti).

viders overlooked the fact that the internet was offering additional possibilities, beyond the Web, buried in its older phases of technological development, yet still practicable and meaningful, depending on the field of application" (Medosch 1997). Thus, the mailing-list management system *Majordomo*, implemented in 1992 and freely accessible, was especially user-friendly: every e-mail was automatically forwarded to all the subscribed recipients and the subscribers could also post their answers. It was through this interactivity that mailing lists differed from mere newsletters. Similarly to newsgroups, primarily those in *Usenet*, mailing lists were mostly grouped around certain thematic fields, thus establishing a 'social link' between their participants: "These early networked communities can to some extent be considered as the predecessors of the social networks that are so popular today" (Smite 2012, p. 233). Contrary to the commercial services of Web 2.0, however, mailing lists were run on independent and decentralised servers, whereby the list owner eventually possessed the key to the configuration of the particular list. This allowed him or her to alter the fundamental functions: for example, whether the entries were visible on the list at once (unmoderated) or they first had to be approved and released by a moderator (moderated).

### ***Nettime* as a place of discourse**

A place where the discourse on the radical net cultures was based was the mailing list *nettime*, launched in 1995 by Pit Schultz and Geert Lovink: "Here one argued passionately for and against technological

determinism, about the 'affirmative techno-utopias' (Diefenbach) and the 'virtual class' (Kroker), deconstructing their figures of argumentation" (Arns 2002, pp. 36). The central segment of *nettime* has been its international, English-speaking mailing list *nettime-l*, which had around 500 subscribers in 1997, grew to 2000 subscribers in 2001, and today numbers as many as 4259 (as of June 20, 2013). *Nettime* also includes lists in Dutch, Romanian, and French, as well as its own announcement list, which all together comprise the "mailing lists for networked cultures, politics and tactics."<sup>02</sup> The beginnings of *nettime* go back to a meeting in Spessart near Frankfurt am Main: 16-19 March 1995, the first "Medien-ZK" took place there under the title "terminal theory of the 1990s – secret knowledge for all."<sup>03</sup> This ironical allusion to a supposedly arcane knowledge in the hands of a central committee should not conceal the fact that the organisers were very serious in their intent of building up critical net practices and discourses. This could also take place owing to the dissatisfaction about the direction that "critical theory" was taking in Germany (and also in the rest of Europe), which was experienced as backward: "In the early 1990s, neither the apocalyptic postmodernism nor the speculative doctrinal function seemed to reflect the fast growing techno-configurations" (Lovink 2004, p. 66). Instead of leaving the field completely to techno-liberalism of the US-American type, some people wanted to intervene into the majesty of "Wired ideology" with the help of positions that would ap-

02 Lists in Spanish and Portuguese are no longer active, and neither is the separate *nettime*-list for Southern Europe (<http://www.nettime.org>).

03 The meeting in Spessart was initiated by Andreas Kallfelz, who presided over Verein 707, known for active cultural mediation in Frankfurt am Main. As a part of festivities on its tenth anniversary, Pit Schultz and Geert Lovink organized the abovementioned event, with the participants including – beside Kallfelz, Schultz, and Lovink – Hans-Christian Dany, Jochen Becker, Florian Schneider, Verena Kuni, Felicia Herrschaft, Stefan Beck, Barbara Strebel, Florian Zeyfang, Ed van Meegen, Gereon Schmitz, Joachim Blank, Armin Haase, Ute Süßbrich, Janos Sugar, Dietmar Dath, Barbara Kirchner, Christoph Blase, Wolfgang Neuhaus, Ludwig Seyfarth, and Mona Sarkis (cf. Lovink 2004, p. 102).

02 Više nisu aktivne liste na španjolskom i portugalskom jeziku, kao ni zasebna *nettime* lista za južnoeuropski prostor (<http://www.nettime.org>).

03 Do sastanka u Spessartu došlo je na poziv Andreasa Kallfelza, koji je vodio Verein 707 u Frankfurtu na Majni, a bio je poznat po alternativnoj kulturnoj djelatnosti. Kao dio slavlja povodom desetgodišnjice njegovog postojanja Pit Schultz i Geert Lovink organizirali su navedenu manifestaciju, u kojoj su – uz Kallfelza, Schultza i Lovinka – sudjelovali Hans-Christian Dany, Jochen Becker, Florian Schneider, Verena Kuni, Felicia Herrschaft, Stefan Beck, Barbara Strebel, Florian Zeyfang, Ed van Megen, Gereon Schmitz, Joachim Blank, Armin Haase, Ute Süßbrich, Janos Sugar, Dietmar Dath, Barbara Kirchner, Christoph Blase, Wolfgang Neuhaus, Ludwig Seyfarth i Mona Sarkis (usp. Lovink 2004, str. 102).

04 Kao dio manifestacije “Club Berlin” Pit Schultz je u Veneciji organizirao trodnevnu radionicu na kojoj se nastavilo raspravljati o temama s prvog sastanka u Spessartu. Ovaj put su u raspravama sudjelovali David Garcia, Heath Bunting, Geert Lovink, Diana McCarty, Vuk Ćosić, Paul Garrin, Gereon Schmitz, Nils Röller, Suzana Milevska i Katja Reinert. Pit Schultz se kasnije kritički izrazio o “okupaciji” tehnološkog svijeta od strane etabliranog svijeta umjetnosti na Bijenalu u Veneciji (usp. Schultz 1998).

05 Ključna značajka platforme *nettime* bila je i praksa “kolaboracijskog filtriranja teksta” (*nettime*): Kao što je bilo uobičajeno u prvim godinama interneta, mailing-lista ili interesna grupa objavljivali su zanimljive tekstove koji su već ranije objavljeni na netu (primarni tekstovi) kako bi se zatim o njima raspravljalo

francuskom jeziku, kao i zasebna lista za najave, i sve one zajedno čine “mailing-listu za umrežene kulture, politike i taktike”.<sup>02</sup> Njezini počeci sežu u vrijeme sastanka u Spessartu, mjestu u blizini Frankfurta na Majni, gdje je od 16. do 19. ožujka 1995. održan prvi “Medien-ZK” pod naslovom “konačna teorija 1990-ih – tajno znanje za sve”.<sup>03</sup> Ironična aluzija na neko pretpostavljeno tajno znanje, koje se nalazi u rukama Centralnog komiteta, ne bi nas trebala zavratiti: organizatori su se itekako ozbiljno posvetili cilju izgradnje kritičkih mrežnih praksi i diskursa. To se dogodilo, između ostaloga, zbog nezadovoljstva usmjerenjem “kritičke teorije” u Njemačkoj (ali i u ostatku Europe), koja se doživljavala kao zaostala: “Ranih 90-ih godina činilo se da ni apokaliptična postmoderna ni spekulativna teorijska funkcija ne odražavaju tehnološke konfiguracije u brzom mijenjanju” (Lovink 2004, str. 66). Umjesto da se teren sasvim prepusti tehnoliberalizmu američkog tipa, željelo se pomoću pozicija mrežne kritike intervenirati u definitivni primat “*Wired*-ideologije”. Međutim, “pokušaj da se razvije zajednička medijska strategija mreža i izgrade autonomne komunikacijske strukture izvan komercijalne sfere i institucija” (Lovink/Schultz 2010, str. 10) isprva je propao, što se vjerojatno dobrim dijelom može objasniti tehnofobnom atmosferom toga vremena (usp. Schultz 2012, str. 76).

Nedugo nakon toga nekoliko se sudionika manifestacije u Spessartu ponovo susrelo na Bijenalu u Veneciji.<sup>04</sup> Sada naglašeno međunarodno usmjerenje pomoglo je projektu *nettime* da stekne veću vidljivost, što je naposljetku pobudilo zanimanje mrežnih aktivista izvan Europe. Iz e-mail korespondencije koja je uslijedila proizašao je krajem listopada 1995. *nettime* kao redovna mailing-lista i središnje mjesto diskursa na kojem se izražavala nelagoda oko tehnoliberalne kiberkulture kalifornijskoga tipa: “Od samog početka *Nettime* je utjelovljavao projekt ‘mrežne kritike’ kako bi se suprotstavio nepodnošljivoj lakoći časopisa *Wired*” (Lovink 2004, str. 75).<sup>05</sup> Pritom je zanimljivo da je poluslužbena mailing-lista<sup>06</sup> ostavila mjesta i za one pozicije koje je većina njezinih sudionika ustvari odbacivala. Tako je jedan od najaktivnijih dopisnika u prvo vrijeme bio američki kiberaktivist John Perry Barlow, koji je već 1990. s Mitchellom Kaporom osnovao *Electronic Frontier Foundation* (EFF).<sup>07</sup> Nekadašnji autor tekstova pjesama (između ostalih za *Graffiti*) obznanio je svoje tehnoliberalne pozicije na platformi *nettime*, a sudjelovao je i na nekoliko okupljanja u okviru konferencija i festivala.<sup>08</sup> Samo nekoliko tjedana nakon što je prisustvovao drugoj konferenciji *Next 5 Minutes* u Amsterdamu, napisao je *Deklaraciju o nezavisnosti kiberprostora* (Barlow 1996), koja započinje sljedećim riječima: “Vlade industrijskoga svijeta, vi umorni divovi od mesa i čelika, ja dolazim iz kiberprostora, novoga doma Uma. U ime budućnosti tražim od vas, koji pripadate prošlosti, da nas osta-

proach it critically. However, the “attempt at developing a common media strategy of networks and building up autonomous communication structures beyond the commercial sphere and the institutions” (Lovink/Schultz 2010, p. 10) at first failed, which was largely due to the technophobe climate of the time (cf. Schultz 2012, p. 76).

Shortly afterwards, some of the protagonists of Spessart met again at the Venice Biennial.<sup>04</sup> The now emphasised international orientation helped the *nettime*-project achieve more visibility, which eventually also attracted the attention of network activists outside Europe. The e-mail correspondence resulted in the launching of *nettime* as a regular mailing list late in October 1995, and it became the central place of discourse to express dissatisfaction with the techno-liberal cyber-culture of the Californian type: “From the very beginning, Nettime embodied the project of ‘network critique’ that was to counter the unbearable lightness of *Wired Magazine*” (Lovink 2004, p. 75).<sup>05</sup> It is, however, amazing that the half-official mailing list<sup>06</sup> allowed also for those positions which the majority of its subscribers actually rejected. For example, one of the most active contributors in the beginning was the American cyber-activist John Perry Barlow, who had as early as 1990 founded the *Electronic Frontier Foundation* (EFF) with Mitchell Kapor.<sup>07</sup> The former author of lyrics (e.g. for The Grateful Dead) publicly proclaimed his techno-liberal positions on *nettime* and also participated in various meetings which took place at conferences or festivals.<sup>08</sup> Only some weeks after visiting the second Next 5 Minutes conference in Amsterdam,

he wrote the *Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace* (Barlow 1996), which begins with the following words: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather” (ibid.). The manifesto, which was written in reaction to the censorship efforts following the US-American *Telecom Reform Act*,<sup>09</sup> was in complete correspondence with the techno-liberal narrative of the “digital revolution” and its (positive) effects on the personal, democratic, and economic development of an individual.

On *nettime*, this sparked off a fierce debate about the ongoing dominance of the American discourse. Barlow’s use of an inclusive “we”, which encompassed the entire “network community” as opposed to the representatives of the allegedly “old world,” met with bitter criticism: “Barlow’s *We* was not inclusive, and reeked of the techno elite’s belief in their own right to power” (McCarty 1997). Nevertheless, one should underline here that *nettime* was not simply a “European answer to *Wired*” (McKenzie Wark), especially as it relied on transatlantic exchange from the very outset. It was rather a conscious detachment from the affirmative position expressed by the representatives of the “Californian ideology.” Eventually, in order to pacify

04 As a part of “Club Berlin”, Pit Schultz organized a three-day workshop in Venice, in which the issues from the first meeting in Spessart were further discussed. This time, the discussion participants included, among others: David Garcia, Heath Bunting, Geert Lovink, Diana McCarty, Vuk Ćosić, Paul Garrin, Gereon Schmitz, Nils Röller, Suzana Milevska, and Katja Reinert. Later on, Pit Schultz expressed his criticism against the “occupation” of techno-underground by the established art world at the Venice Biennial (cf. Schultz 1998).

05 A defining feature of *nettime* was the practice of “collaborative text-filtering” (*nettime*): As it was common in the early years of the internet, interesting, often pre-existing entries were posted in the mailing list or the newsgroup (as primary texts) in order to discuss them (secondary texts). This “comment function” made it possible to arrange the discourse with the help of discussion threads, as it is known today from the internet forums.

06 What is meant is the original way in which *nettime* functioned: on the one hand, the list was unmoderated, which means that the posted content was not controlled; on the other hand, new

(sekundarni tekstovi). Ova “komentirajuća funkcija” omogućuje uređivanje diskursa prema nitima rasprave (takozvanim *threads*), kao što je poznato i iz internetskih foruma.

**06** Tu se misli na izvorni način na koji je *nettime* funkcionirao: s jedne strane, lista je bila nemoderirana, odnosno objavljeni sadržaji nisu se kontrolirali; s druge strane, nove prijave su se provjeravale, tako da nije svatko dobio pristup.

**07** Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) je još uvijek postojeća američka nevladina organizacija, koja se od svoga osnutka 1990. bavi građanskim pravima u kibernetičkom prostoru.

**08** Ova okupljanja u “stvarnom životu” događala su se redovito, prije svega u početnoj fazi platforme *nettime*: nakon Spessarta i Venecije (vidi gore) zajednica se sastala i na drugoj konferenciji MetaForum u Budimpešti (listopad 1995.), na drugoj konferenciji Next 5 Minutes u Amsterdamu i Rotterdamu (siječanj 1996.), na petoj Cyberconf u Madridu (lipanj 1996.), na trećoj konferenciji MetaForum u Budimpešti (listopad 1996.) i u okviru manifestacije “Hybrid Workspace” na izložbi dokumenta X u Kasselu (lipanj-rujan 1997.).

**09** *Telecommunications Act* iz 1996. bio je prva temeljna razrada američkog zakona o telekomunikacijama nakon 1934. godine. Taj savezni zakon potpisao je Bill Clinton i u njemu se po prvi put spominje internet kao dio javnog medijskog sektora. Međutim, s njime su bili povezani i pokušaji regulacije internet-ske komunikacije, što je izazvalo kritičke prigovore iz redova pokreta za zaštitu građanskih prava. Među njima je bio i onaj Johna Perryja Barlowa, koji je svoju “Deklaraciju o nezavisnosti”

vite na miru. Niste dobrodošli među nama. Vi ne vladate svijetom u kojem se mi okupljamo” (isto). Taj je manifest, napisan kao odgovor na pokušaje cenzure u okviru američkog zakona *Telecom Reform Act*,<sup>09</sup> u potpunosti odgovarao tehnoliberalnom narativu o “digitalnoj revoluciji” i njezinu (pozitivnom) učinku na osobni, demokratski i ekonomski razvoj pojedinca.

Na platformi *nettime* nato se rasplamsala žestoka debata o još uvijek dominantnom američkom diskursu. Barlowova uporaba inkluzivnog Mi, koje je obuhvaćalo cjelokupnu “mrežnu zajednicu” i istodobno je tu zajednicu suprotstavilo predstavnicima navodno “staroga svijeta”, naišla je na ogorčenu kritiku: “Barlowovo *Ja* nije inkluzivno i smrdi na uvjerenost tehn-elite u njezino pravo na vlast” (McCarty 1997). Ipak, u tom kontekstu valja napomenuti da *nettime* nije bio jednostavno “europski odgovor na *Wired*” (McKenzie Wark), osobito zato što je od samoga početka počivao na transatlantskoj razmjeni. Prije se može reći da se radilo o svjesnom odbacivanju afirmativne pozicije kakvu su iskazivali predstavnici “kalifornijske ideologije”. Kako bi se smirila bura u zajednici mailing-liste, naposljetku je čak jedan suradnik časopisa *Wired* pozvan na prvu “nezavisnu” *nettime*-konferenciju:<sup>10</sup> simpozij “The Beauty and the East” održan je od 21. do 23. svibnja 1997. u Ljubljani i okupio je 120 od tadašnjih 500 pretplatnika. Manifestaciju je organizirao Ljubljana Digital Media Lab (skraćeno Ljudmila), inicijativa koja je osnovana 1994. godine u svrhu potpore medijskoj umjetnosti i mrežnoj kulturi.<sup>11</sup> Na skupu je ubrzo postalo jasno da *nettime* nije više obična mailing-lista, nego se razvio u neku vrstu (društvenog) pokreta: “Ono što je započelo kao obična mailing-lista postalo je nešto više od toga, nešto nalik na pokret ili klasičan slučaj europske avangarde” (McCarty 1997). Međutim, kao takva avangarda *nettime* je imao problema s pronalaženjem rješenja za pitanja koja je postavljala mrežna kritika, a koja bi mogla dovesti do konsenzusa. Sa sve većim uspjehom pokreta mrežne kritike rasla su i očekivanja, osobito budući da je primjena “taktičkih medija” kao skupa praksi na razmeđu teorije, umjetnosti, kulture, aktivizma i medija postupno dolazila do svojih granica. Ova dezorijentiranost postala je očitom u Ljubljani: pitanja o mrežnoj umjetnosti i medijskom aktivizmu, kao i o specifičnoj ulozi kulturnih središta koja su nekada bila dio Istočnog bloka (kao što su Riga, Tirana, Novi Sad, Beograd ili sama Ljubljana), sve te teme izazivale su strastvene debate, a da se nije došlo ni do kakvog konkretnog rezultata (usp. Lovink 2004, str. 85s.).



the spirits in the mailing-list community, even a *Wired*'s employee was invited to the first 'independent' *nettime* conference:<sup>10</sup> "The Beauty and the East" took place from 21-23 May 1997 in Ljubljana and brought together 120 of the ca. 500 subscribers of the time. The event was hosted by Ljubljana Digital Media Lab (briefly Ljudmila), an initiative launched in 1994 to promote media art and network culture.<sup>11</sup> At the meeting, it soon became clear that *nettime* was no longer a simple mailing list, but had grown into a sort of (social) movement: "What began as a simple mailing list has become something more, something called a movement or a classical case of the European Avant-garde" (McCarty 1997). As such an avant-garde, however, *nettime* had problems with offering consensual solutions to the issues that were openly raised by the net critique. With the increasing success of the net-critical movement, expectations were raised as well, especially as the application of 'tactical media' as an ensemble of practices at the edge of theory, art, politics, culture, activism, and media gradually reached its limits. This lack of orientation came to light in Ljubljana: questions related to net art and media activism, as well as the special role of cultural centres that used to be a part of the Eastern Bloc (e.g. Riga, Tirana, Novi Sad, Belgrade, or Ljubljana itself), all these topics sparked off fierce debates without leading to a proper result (cf. Lovink 2004, pp. 85).

### The Manifesto of Piran

As the majority of conference participants had already left Ljubljana, a small *nettime* delegation

(with Peter Lamborn Wilson, Konrad Becker, Marleen Stikker, Pit Schultz, Geert Lovink, Diana McCarty, Dorian Burr, Steve Kurtz, and others) drove to Piran, a small town on the Slovenian Adriatic. The excursion was still under a strong impact of the rather fruitless conference in Ljubljana and eventually produced a manifesto that was presented on May 29 in the framework of Public Netbase, a Vienna-based media initiative:<sup>12</sup> At the very beginning it calls for an "Information War," which may on the one hand be understood as an ironic allusion to the former aimlessness of *nettime* as a mere community of discourse (contrary to the US-American Maker Culture), but has on the other hand also been critically reflected upon as a sign of the increasing militarization of language in the course of the so-called 'media wars' (in particular, the second war in Iraq and the Yugoslav wars). Beside the uneasiness about this new "serious situation," the manifesto is largely a critique of the commercialisation and institutionalisation of the internet, which had gradually set in by 1997. Thereby one can observe an interesting contradiction in its argument: on the one hand, the state is denounced as the regulatory instance, but on the other it is implicitly evoked – even to help repair the damage caused by capitalism. Insofar the answer of John Perry Barlow, whose *Declaration of Independence* was once again attacked in the manifesto, came immediately, as could only be expected: "Repara-

subscriptions were checked and not everyone had access to the list.

07 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a still existing NGO in the US, which has been dealing since its foundation in 1990 with civil rights in connection with cyberspace.

08 These meetings in 'real life' were taking place regularly, above all in the early phase of *nettime*: after Spessart and Venice (see above), the *nettime* community met, for example, at the second MetaForum conference in Budapest (October 1995), the second Next 5 Minutes conference in Amsterdam/Rotterdam (January 1996), the fifth Cyberconf in Madrid (June 1996), the third MetaForum conference in Budapest (October 1996), and in the framework of "Hybrid Workspace" at documenta X in Kassel (June-September 1997).

09 The Telecom Act of 1996 was the first fundamental treatment of telecommunication rights in the USA after 1934. The federal law was signed by Bill Clinton and was the first to mention the internet as part of the public media sector. However, it was followed by an attempt at regulating online communication, which provoked critical voices from the civil rights

(vidi gore) predstavio u okviru Svjetskog ekonomskog foruma u Davosu.

10 To znači da se nije radilo samo o popratnoj manifestaciji u sklopu drugih konferencija ili festivala, nego je skup organiziran isključivo od *nettimea* i za *nettime*. Do danas je to ostala jedina manifestacija tog tipa.

11 Platforma Ljudmila osnovana je kako bi se umjetnicima i kulturnim radnicima olakšao pristup novim medijskim tehnologijama. Prije svega je u prvim godinama postojanja nudila i pristup internetu po povoljnim cijenama. Kao i mnoge druge slične medijske inicijative nekadašnjeg Istočnog bloka, Ljudmila je bila financirana od Instituta Otvoreno društvo Georgea Sorosa, o čemu se također sporilo i raspravljalo na *nettime*-konferenciji u Ljubljani (usp. Baumgärtel 1997). Kao digitalni medijski laboratorij Ljudmila postoji i dalje, angažirajući se prevensveno na razvoju i širenju otvorene kulture i besplatnog softvera.

12 *Piranski Nettime-manifest* sastavio je "Bečki ad-hoc komitet" (između ostalih Konrad Becker, Pit Schultz, Geert Lovink, Critical Art Ensemble, Diana McCarty, Marko Peljhan i Peter Lamborn Wilson) i sadrži sljedeći tekst:

"Prošli tjedan Nettimeri su uživali u prostorno-vremenskom kontinuuu na slovenskoj obali u gradiću Piranu, gdje su dogovorene sljedeće točke:

- *Nettime* objavljuje informacijski rat.
- Prokazujemo pankapitalizam i zahtijevamo odštetu. Kiberpostor je mjesto gdje se događa vaš bankrot.
- *Nettime* pokreće križarski rat protiv podatkovnog barbarstva u virtualnoj svetoj zemlji.

## Piranski manifest

Kada je većina sudionika konferencije napustila Ljubljanu, malena *nettime*-delegacija (između ostalih Peter Lamborn Wilson, Konrad Becker, Marleen Stikker, Pit Schultz, Geert Lovink, Diana McCarty, Dorian Burr i Steve Kurtz) zaputila se u Piran. Iz tog izleta, koji je još uvijek bio pod snažnim dojmom neuspješne konferencije u Ljubljani, nastao je naposljetku manifest, koji je 29. svibnja predstavljen u prostorima bečke medijske inicijative Public Netbase.<sup>12</sup> U njemu se odmah na početku poziva na "informacijski rat", što s jedne strane valja shvatiti kao ironičnu aluziju na dotadašnju bescilnost platforme *nettime* kao puke diskurzivne zajednice (za razliku od američke kulture činjenja), dok s druge strane također kritički promišlja sve veću militarizaciju jezika tijekom takozvanih "medijskih ratova" (drugi rat u Iraku i ratovi na području bivše Jugoslavije). Nakon negodovanja zbog te nove "ozbiljnosti situacije" u manifestu se prije svega radi o kritici postupne komercijalizacije i institucionalizacije interneta nakon 1997. godine. Pritom se primjećuje zanimljivo proturječje u argumentaciji: s jedne strane, država se odbacuje kao instanca regulacije interneta, dok se s druge implisitno zaziva – i to ondje gdje se radi o nadoknadi štete koju je izazvao pankapitalizam. Razumljivo je da nije izostao ni odgovor Johna Perryja Barlowa, čija se *Deklaracija o nezavisnosti* ponovo napada u manifestu: "Nadoknada kome i za što? Osobno mi se čini da je pankapitalizam prirodno stanje stvari, osim ako postoje vlade koje su dovoljno autoritarne da nametnu planiranu ekonomiju. A to je, kako se čini, posvuda doživjelo neuspjeh. Koja je vaša alternativa?" (Barlow 1997). Iako u ovoj izjavi jasno dolazi do izražaja (neo-)liberalna ideja o navodnoj "prirodnosti" kapitalističkog privrednog sustava, Barlow je pogodio bolnu točku u debati ranih mrežnih kultura, a to je pitanje o ulozi države u postfordističkim, ali i postsocijalističkim društvima.

Upravo u zemljama nekadašnjeg Istočnog bloka, gdje je kapitalistička "strategija šoka" (Klein 2007) 90-ih godina bila u punom jeku, već su zarana uništene državne strukture, budući da su doživljavane kao okovi koji sprečavaju slobodan razvoj privatnog poduzetništva. Uvođenje slobodnog tržišta u tim su državama stoga mnogi shvatili kao direktan napad na društvo. U tom smislu neoliberalna transformacija tih država uopće se nije ticala postsocijalizma, nego prije daleko šire shvaćenog "post-socijetalizma" (Nowotny 2008). Tim pojmom bečki je filozof Stefan Nowotny opisao stanje u kojemu "demokratske revolucije" u Istočnoj Europi (dakle u Srednjoj i Južnoj Europi) nisu samo uzrokovale slom "realsocijalizma", nego je s njima možda nestalo i društvo kao takvo.<sup>13</sup> I u tom aspektu, dakle u nestanku svakog oblika društvene solidarnosti,

tions from whom and for what? It seems to me that pan-capitalism is the natural state of things unless you have sufficiently authoritarian governments to impose planned economies. The latter seem to have failed universally. What's your alternative?" (Barlow 1997). Even if this statement clearly expresses the (neo-) liberal idea of the alleged 'naturalness' of the capitalist economic system, Barlow hit another score in the debate on the early net cultures: namely, the issue of the role of the state, not only in post-Fordist, but also in post-socialist societies.

It was primarily in the former real-socialist countries, where the "shock strategy" of capitalism (Klein 2007) was in full impact during the 1990s, that the early state structures, seen as shackles impeding the free development of private enterprise, were demolished. Introduction of the free market in these countries was therefore seen by many as a direct attack on the society. Insofar the neoliberal transformation of these countries was not so much about post-socialism, but rather about the certainly more broadly understood "Post-Societalism" (Nowotny 2008). Viennese philosopher Stefan Nowotny has used this term to describe the state in which the "democratic revolutions" of Eastern Europe (including Central and Southern Europe) brought not only the "real socialism" to its fall, but perhaps also demolished the societies as such.<sup>13</sup> And at this point, that is, in the absence of any form of social solidarity, the Eastern European situation merged with the programme of "Californian ideology" into a source of neoliberal promises of freedom. It was to this ideological combination that the *Piran Manifesto* was directing its

attention with regard to the emergence of new forms of governance: "NGOs are the future oppressive post-governments of the world" (Vienna ad-hoc committee 1997). Because of this lack of state structures, even the scenes of media art and net cultures of Eastern Europe were depending on these NGOs, primarily on the Open Society Institute (OSI) financed by George Soros, which was at that time enjoying the "monopoly position" in the region: "Due to either insufficient or completely lacking alternative support – from the public or private sectors – George Soros' foundations in eastern Europe have become in many places the only source of financing for independent projects" (Arns/Broeckmann 1997, p. 19). Thus even the independent artistic and cultural production was eventually privatised, a situation that Boris Buden has interpreted as a form of control over the "utopian dimension of the society" (Buden 2007). According to him, the neoliberal hegemony does not consist only in ruling over the strategic sectors with the aim of securing the profit, but also in the ability to prevail over cultural and social criticism.

The question how to deal with that new form of governance, or which role the state should play in the arrangement of infrastructures, introduced a schism in the *nettime* community: on the one side, there was the social democratic position, which endorsed a "return to the state" and considered the anti-statism on *nettime*

movement. John Perry Barlow was one of those, and he presented his *Declaration of Independence* (see above) at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

10 This means that it was not a mere subsidiary event in the framework of another conference or festival, but was organised as a meeting of and for *net-time*. It has been the only event of this format ever since.

11 Ljudmila was founded in order to facilitate access to the new media technologies for artists and cultural workers. Especially in its early years, it served also as an independent internet provider, capable of offering cheap access to the internet. As many other, similar media initiatives in the former communist countries, *Ljudmila* was initially financed by George Soros' Open Society Institute, which was also discussed in a controversial manner at the *nettime* conference in Ljubljana (cf. Baumgärtel 1997). As a digital media lab, *Ljudmila* still exists, and is involved primarily in the development and distribution of Open Culture and Free Software.

12 The *Piran Net-time Manifesto* was put together by the "Vienna ad-hoc committee" (Konrad Becker, Pit Schultz, Geert Lovink, Critical Art Ensemble,

- Uzdižemo remapiranje bivšeg Istoka/ bivšeg Zapada i povratak geografiji.
- Poštujemo povratak "alt.kulture" i paganska softverske strukture ("To je normalno!").
- Deprivatizirajte korporacijski sadržaje, srušite virtualna ograđivanja dobara i zauzmite dvorce sadržaja!
- Usprotivite se institucionalizaciji mrežnih procesa.
- Odbijamo pronografiju na mreži osim ako je dobro napravljena.
- Još uvijek, i dan danas, odbijamo sheme koje bi nas trebale držati zaokupljenima i libertarijanske deklaracije o nezavisnosti.
- NGO-ovi su buduće tlačiteljske post-vlade svijeta
- Podržavamo eksperimentalne tehnologije prijena podataka.
- Sudjelujte u Nettime-ovom mirovinskom planu - zahtijevamo da nema rada nakon 40.
- Kritika slike je obrana uobrazilje.
- Nettime mogao bi biti Dreamtime (Vrijeme sna).

Pitanja možete uputiti sudionicima Nettimeove konferencije za medije, Public Netbase, Museum-squartier, Beč, 29.5.1997., 19:00" (Bečki ad-hoc komitet 1997).

13 To je sažeto izrazila nekadašnja britanska premijerka Margaret Thatcher u svojoj čuvenoj izreci: "There is no such thing as society" (Thatcher 1987). Ne postoji više društvo, nego samo još pojedinci, koji se po potrebi povezuju u obitelji kao najmanje i zasebne jedinice društva. Boris Buden je u vezi toga primijetio: "To da

istočno-europska situacija povezala se s programom "kalifornijske ideologije" kao izvorom neoliberalnih obećanja slobode. I upravo se na tu ideološku vezu misli u Piranskom manifestu kada se govori o nastanku novih oblika vladavine: "NGO-ovi su buduće tlačiteljske post-vlade svijeta" (Vienna ad-hoc committee 1997). U Istočnoj Europi su, uslijed nedostatka državnih struktura, i medijska umjetnost i mrežna kulturna scena bile ovisne o nevladinim organizacijama (NGO-ovi), prvenstveno o Institutu Otvoreno društvo (OSI), koji je financirao George Soros i koji je u to vrijeme uživao "poziciju monopola" u regiji: "Zahvaljujući nedostatnoj ili sasvim odsutnoj alternativnoj potpori – bilo iz javnog, bilo iz privatnog sektora – organizacije Georgea Sorosa u Istočnoj Europi na mnogim su mjestima postale jedinim izvorom za financiranje nezavisnih projekata" (Arns/Broeckmann 1997, str. 19). Tako su se naposljetku privatizirale i nezavisna umjetnička i kulturna produkcija, situacija koju je Boris Buden shvatio kao uspostavu kontrole nad "utopijskom dimenzijom društva" (Buden 2007). Prema njegovu mišljenju, neoliberalna hegemonija ne sastoji se samo u vladavini nad strateškim sektorima kako bi se osigurao profit, nego i u sposobnosti ovladavanja kulturnom i društvenom kritikom.

Pitanje kako postupiti s tim novim oblikom vladavine, odnosno kakvu bi ulogu trebala igrati država u osiguravanju infrastrukture, podijelilo je *nettime*-zajednicu: s jedne strane nalazila se socijaldemokratska pozicija, koja je zahtijevala "povratak državi" i u antietatizmu na mailing-listi *nettime* vidjela naprosto još jednu varijantu tehno-liberalizma, a s druge strane bila je tu ludistička pozicija, koja je u mreži prepoznala osnovu za novu ekonomiju darivanja te je kritizirala fetišizam države i rada, za koji je optuživala suprotnu stranu. Obje te pozicije vidljive su u raspravi koja se razvila kao reakcija na *Piranski manifest*: ondje je, između ostaloga, stajalo da treba odbaciti sve mjere za stvaranje novih radnih mjesta te da nitko stariji od 40 godina ne bi trebao raditi (vidi gore). Te zahtjeve oštro je napao Richard Barbrook, koji je zastupao socijaldemokratsku poziciju: "Odbacujući državne inicijative za zapošljavanje, manifest ustvari podržava društvenu bijedu koju neoliberalizam nameće našim sugrađanima. Njegovi potpisnici krivi su upravo za onaj oblik društvenog autizma kakav pokazuju kalifornijski ideolozi" (Barbrook 1997a). Na to je korisnik El Iblis Shah objavio isječak iz ludističkog manifesta *The Abolition of Work* američkog anarhista Boba Blacka, u kojemu se prije svega govori o ukidanju beskorisnog, odnosno kvantitativnog nadničarskog rada, dok bi se korisni, kvalitativni rad trebao transformirati u "zaigranu i kreativnu" djelatnost (usp. Black 1996). To je pak John Perry Barlow shvatio kao potvrdu svojih kiber-liberalnih ideja, koje su na platformi *nettime* uvijek nailazile na neodobranje: "Stvar je u tome, kao što sam već

merely as yet another variety of techno-liberalism; on the other side, there was the Luddite position, which saw the internet as the basis of a new gift economy and criticised the state and work fetishism of the opposite side. One can clearly identify the two positions, as well as their interaction, in the discussion that developed in the wake of the *Piran Manifesto*: among other things, it could be heard that one should reject the measures aimed at creating jobs and that nobody older than forty should work (see above). These demands were sharply criticised by Richard Barbrook, who endorsed the social democratic position: "By rejecting state employment initiatives, the manifesto is in effect supporting the social deprivation being imposed on our fellow citizens by neo-liberalism. Its signa-

tories are guilty of exactly the same sort of social autism displayed by the Californian ideologues" (Barbrook 1997a). This statement was followed by a post written by user El Iblis Shah, an excerpt from the Luddite manifesto *The Abolition of Work* by the American anarchist Bob Black, which mostly speaks of the abolition of useless work – that is quantitative wage labour – while the useful, qualitative work is to be transformed into a "game-like and craft-like" occupation (cf. Black 1996). This again, was understood by John Perry Barlow as a confirmation of his cyber-liberal ideas, which were repeatedly rejected on *nettime*: "The point, as I said before, is to eliminate the weird Industrial Era distinction between work and the rest of your life. Done right, it's all a form of play" (Barlow 1997b). Richard Barbrook considered his critique

thus confirmed, namely that "both leftist and rightist anti-statism" eventually obstructed any reasonable policy that would be based on the creation of infrastructures (Barbrook 1997b).

### The question of moderation

The controversies that evolved around the Piran manifesto not only brought to light the different positions within *nettime*, but also thwarted the hopes that the unstructured movement would gain a proper direction. Geert Lovink has thus concluded in retrospective that "the mixed reactions to the *Piran Manifesto* within the mailing list showed that *nettime* was neither a group nor a movement. It would never outgrow its character of a mailing-list community, despite all the efforts invested in developing it into something else" (Lovink 2004, p. 88). And that mailing-list community had yet to endure further tests. Especially the conflicts around the net-art project *name.space*, initiated by Paul Garrin,<sup>14</sup> which in September 1997 led to the decision that the list should be moderated, so that the incoming messages could be checked before being forwarded to the list. Pit Schultz explained the measure in the following way: "The phenomenon is [...] that a group of people, in a repetitive, communicative environment, begin to filter a field of possible 'communication acts' in a certain way, quasi machinic. [...] The pro-

Diana McCarty, Marko Peljhan, Peter Lamborn Wilson, and others) and contained the following text:

- "Last week Nettimers frolicked in the real space/ time continuum on the Slovenian coast in the town of Piran where the following bullets were established:
- Nettime declares Information War.
  - We denounce pan-capitalism and demand reparations. Cyberspace is where your bankruptcy takes place.
  - Nettime launches crusade against data barbarism in the virtual holy land.
  - We celebrate the re-mapping of the Ex-East/ Ex-West and the return to geography.
  - We respect the return to "alt. cultures" and pagan software structures ("It's normal!").
  - Deprivatize corporate content, liberate the virtual enclosures and storm the content castles!
  - Refuse the institutionalization of net processes.
  - We reject pornography on the net unless well made.
  - We are still, until this day, rejecting make-work schemes and libertarian declarations of independence.

društvo više ne postoji nije bio znanstveno objektivna uvid u stvarnost kakva je doista bila, nego politički program – poziv na uništenje svih oblika društvene solidarnosti kako bi se stvorio prostor za individualizam, privatno vlasništvo, osobnu odgovornost, obiteljske vrijednosti i tako dalje; to da društvo više ne postoji također znači da se privatna sfera sada može neograničeno širiti na račun javne” (Buden 2009, str. 229s).

14 Američki medijski umjetnik Paul Garrin osnovao je 1996. godine poduzeće *name.space* kako bi na taj način odgovorio na sve veću potrebu za internetskim adresama. Garrin je želio ukinuti monopol tvrtke *Network Solutions Inc.* u dodjeli top-level domena (TLD) i uspostaviti “Permanent Autonomous Network” s besplatnim TLD sustavom registracije. Iako su mnogi sumnjali u tehničku stranu projekta i također nije bilo sasvim jasno radi li se o umjetničkom eksperimentu ili o komercijalnom projektu, *name.space* je uspio isprovocirati međunarodnu debatu (npr. *The New York Times*, *The Economist*, *Die Zeit*) o praksi dodjele internetskih adresa. Garrinove osobne komunikacijske prakse na *nettimeu* (između ostaloga, počeo je obasipati listu “reklamnim materijalom” za *name.space*) nailazile na sve veće negodovanje te je u ljeto 1997. izbio prvi *flame war* (osobito između Paula Garrina i Gordona Cooka). Posljedica je bila ta da se lista otada moderirala (usp. Lovink 1998).

prije istaknuo, da se eliminira čudnovato razlikovanje industrijske ere između rada i ostatka čovjekova života. Ako se ispravno obavlja, sve je to jedan oblik igre” (Barlow 1997b), na što se Richard Barbrook smatrao potvrđenim u svojoj kritici da “i ljevičarski i desničarski antietatizam” naposljetku onemogućuju razumnu politiku koja će se bazirati na stvaranju infrastrukture (Barbrook 1997b).

## Pitanje moderiranja

Sporovi koji su nastali oko Piranskog manifesta nisu iznijeli na vidjelo samo različite pozicije unutar mailing-liste *nettime*, nego su i prigušili nadanja da će se tom nestrukturiranom pokretu uspjeti dati određeno usmjerenje. Tako je Geert Lovink bio prisiljen retrospektivno ustvrditi: “Miješane reakcije na Piranski manifest na listi pokazuju da *nettime* nije ni grupa ni pokret. Unatoč svim nastojanjima da se razvije u nešto drugo, ona nikada neće preći granice mailing-liste” (Lovink 2004, str. 88). Upravo ta mailing-lista morala je ubrzo izdržati daljnje kušnje. Osobito su sukobi oko projekta mrežne umjetnosti *name.space*,<sup>14</sup> koji je pokrenuo Paul Garrin, doveli u rujnu 1997. do odluke da će se lista moderirati, tako da će se ulazne poruke u budućnosti najprije provjeravati, a tek onda prosljediti na listu. Pit Schultz objasnio je ovu mjeru na sljedeći način: “Fenomen je [...] taj da skupina ljudi, u repetitivnoj i komunikativnoj sredini, počinje filtrirati polje mogućih ‘komunikacijskih činova’ na određeni način, gotovo strojno. [...] Proizvodnja ‘informacija’ duž granice šuma znači neprestano istančavanje društvenog konteksta, možda umjetnog, što neki nazivaju imanentnim, želim reći: s pravilima koja su očita i međuovisna na dinamičan način” (Schultz 2009, str. 48s). Takva interna kontrola proizvodnje diskursa regulirana je u internetskoj komunikaciji takozvanom “netiketom”, koja pored tehničkih standarda (u slučaju e-maila to je SMTP-protokol) praktički uspostavlja “društveni protokol”. Time se određuju pravila igre unutar kojih se mailing-lista konstituira kao “diskurzivna zajednica” tako što se određuje polje moguće komunikacije (od “otvorenog/nemoderiranog” pa sve do “zatvorenog/filtriranog”) i ustanovljavaju relevantni rituali (kao što je, na primjer, inicijacija novih sudionika na listi). Moderator djeluje kao sudac: s jedne strane, on mora bdjeti nad poštivanjem pravila i odvajati željene od neželjenih poruka (kao što je, na primjer, *spam*), ali se s druge strane mora ponašati što je moguće suzdržano – kako ne bi ometao tijek komunikacije. Ta “moć u odsutnosti” (isto, str. 47) stvara osnovu za samokontrolu diskursa, jer već sama mogućnost intervencije već regulira ponašanje sudionika na listi.

duction of 'information' along the borderline of noise means to constantly refine a social context, maybe an artificial one, what some call immanent, I mean with rules which are self-evident, and are interdependent in a dynamic way" (Schultz 2009, pp. 48). Such internal control over discourse production is normally regulated in online communication by the so-called 'netiquette', which beside the technical standards (in the case of e-mailing it is the SMTP protocol) basically supplies the "social protocol." This defines the rules of the game, within which the mailing list is constituted as a "discourse community" by demarcating the field of possible communication (from "open/unmoderated" to "closed/filtered"), and determines the corresponding rituals (such as the initiation of new participants). The moderator serves as a judge: on the one hand, he or she must take care that the rules are observed and separate desirable posts from undesirable ones (such as spam), while on the other hand, he or she must remain invisible as much as possible not to disturb the flow of communication. This "power-through-absence" (ibid., p. 47) creates a basis for self-control in the discourse, as the mere possibility of intervention already regulates the behaviour of the participants.

It is, however, an ambivalent relationship: Are the exclusion systems a necessary corrective in establishing a discourse, or is it the power of the discourse itself that produces the necessity of such exclusion systems? In case of *nettime*, the attempt at diminishing the "noise" in the list certainly resulted in a gradual "closing of the list": "In the ensuing consolidation phase (1998-99), *nettime* was transformed into a structured (and stric-

tly moderated) forum, in which political and cultural aspects of the evolution of technology and internet were discussed" (Lovink 2004, p. 66). Eventually, the project of net critique was joined by the "globalisation issue" (from Seattle to Genoa). This thoroughly altered *nettime* as an "organ of criticism". While in the early years the list was primarily defined by the wish to develop an alternative to the "Californian ideology," the collapse of the dot-com bubble brought the political-economic issues into focus. These subjects were now also discussed on newly created communication platforms, particularly the *Indymedia* network founded in the late 1990s. But even though *nettime* had lost its unique position as the place of discussion in a critical net debate, as a mailing list it was steadily growing and even today remains an important – if no longer central – node of radical net cultures. As such, *nettime* is also subject to various interpretations, especially as a result of a collaborative production of knowledge. Thus, Ted Byfield, who has been a moderator of *nettime* since 1998 together with Felix Stalder, recently indicated an inherent contradiction that was accompanying the mailing list from the very outset: "On the one side, there was Lovink's and Schultz's originally avant-garde vision of an expansive, alternative media project, and on the other a rather modest, flexible, and communitarian idea, which emerged on the actually existing list" (Byfield 2012, p. 43).

- NGOs are the future oppressive post-governments of the world.
  - We support experimental data transfer technology.
  - Participate in the Nettime retirement plan, zero work by age 40.
  - The critique of the image is the defense of the imagination.
  - Nettime could be Dreamtime.
- Questions can be addressed to the participants at the Nettime press conference, Public Netbase, Museumsquartier, Vienna, 29.5.1997, 19:00 hours" (Vienna ad-hoc committee 1997).

13 The former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed it succinctly: "There is no such thing as society" (Thatcher 1987). The society is no longer there, only individuals who, when needed, join into families as the smallest and isolated social units. Boris Buden has commented on that: "The fact that there is no such thing as society was not a scientifically objective insight into the reality as it truly was, but a political programme – a call to abolish all forms of social solidarity in order to make place for individualism, private property, personal responsibility, family values, etc.; that there was no such thing as

Pritom se ipak radi o ambivalentnom odnosu: jesu li sustavi isključivanja korektiv koji je nužan za uspostavu diskursa ili sama moć diskursa proizvodi nužnost takvih sustava isključivanja? U slučaju liste *nettime* pokušaj ograničavanja “šuma” u svakom je slučaju imao za posljedicu “zatvaranje liste”: “U idućoj fazi konsolidacije (1998.-99.) *nettime* je postao strukturiran (i čvrsto moderiran) forum na kojemu se raspravljalo o političkim i kulturnim aspektima tehnologije i razvoja interneta” (Lovink 2004, str. 66). Naposljetku je projekt mrežne kritike sustiglo “pitanje globalizacije” (od Seattlea do Genove) te se *nettime* kao “organ mrežne kritke” iz temelja promijenio: dok je u prvim godinama lista bila prvenstveno vođena željom da razvije alternativu u odnosu na “kalifornijsku ideologiju”, nakon sloma dot.com mjehura u središte debata dospjele su političko-ekonomske teme. O njima se sada raspravljalo na novonastalim komunikacijskim platformama, osobito na mreži *Indymedia*, osnovanoj krajem 90-ih godina. Ali čak i ako je *nettime* izgubio svoju jedinstvenost kao mjesto diskursa kritičke mrežne debate, postojano je nastavio rasti te još i danas predstavlja važno – iako više ne i središnje – čvorište radikalnih mrežnih kultura. Kao takav, *nettime* je ipak predmet različitih interpretacija, osobito zato što je lista naposljetku rezultat kolaboracijske proizvodnje znanja. Tako je Ted Byfield, koji je od 1998. godine zajedno s Felixom Stalderom jedan od moderatora liste *nettime*, nedavno uputio na imanentno proturječje koje je pratilo mailing-listu od samih njezinih početaka: “S jedne strane bila je tu izvorno avangardistička vizija Lovinka i Schultza o ekspanzivnom projektu alternativnih medija, a s druge prilično skromna, fleksibilna i komunitaristička ideja koja je nastala na samoj konkretnoj listi” (Byfield 2012, str. 43). Umjesto da samo žaluje za “junačkim vremenima” ranih godina, on promatra *nettime* kao “trajan i postojan resurs”, kao primjer za “obaviještajni rad otvorenog koda” (usp. Stalder/Hirsh 2002).

### Zrcalni stadij mrežnih kultura

Kao zaključak, moglo bi se reći da se radikalne mrežne kulture 90-ih godina mogu opisati na osnovi (najmanje) triju diskurzivnih polja: kao prvo, odlikovale su se vlastitom “teorijskom praksom”, koja se uglavnom odigravala izvan klasičnih (akademskih) institucija. Kao drugo, mrežne kulture su bile bitno određene razmjenom između Istočne i Zapadne Europe koju su omogućili pad “Željezne zavjese” i širenje novih mrežnih tehnologija. Kao treće, diskurs europskih mrežnih kultura distancirao se od “kalifornijske ideologije”, koja je shvaćana kao hegemonijska, pri čemu su upravo prve godine bile obilježene željom da se ispriča alternativna “istina”. Te



Instead of merely lamenting about the “heroic times” of the early years, he prefers to see *net-time* as an “ongoing and lasting resource,” an example of “Open Source Intelligence” (cf. Stalder/Hirsh 2002).

### The mirror stage of net cultures

In conclusion, one may say that the radical net cultures of the 1990s can be described on the basis of (at least) three fields of discourse: firstly, they were characterised by an autonomous ‘theory-practice’ that was mainly positioned outside of the classical (academic) institutions. Secondly, they were crucially determined by the exchange between Eastern and Western Europe, made possible by the fall of the ‘iron curtain’ and the expansion of new network technologies. Thirdly, the discourse of European net cultures saw itself opposed to the “Californian ideology,” which was experienced as hegemonic, whereby it was the early years that were especially marked by the wish to tell an alternative ‘truth’. Examples of this truth are, however, still games of power (cf. Foucault 2002, p. 671), especially as the rules of the game that must be set are themselves subject to negotiation between different interests. Nevertheless, behind these articulated differences – whereby one should always ask what the possibilities of articulation are (for example, access to the media technologies) – there is often a hidden, unarticulated consensus, which makes positions outside of the hegemonic field practically unimaginable. This refers both to the abovementioned ‘lack of alternative’ to the neoliberal

politics as it was propagated primarily in Central and South-Eastern European countries in the 1990s, as well as to the ‘organic ideology’ of the internet itself. Hence, as Oliver Marchart has stated referring to the techno-discourse of the time: “The economic and infrastructural basis of a communication medium – or hardware, as in some forms of techno-determinism – cannot be described independently of specific discourses, which make out an ‘ideology’ or a political encoding” (Marchart 1998, p. 12). So there is an intersection of the “Californian ideology” and the discourse of (radical) net cultures, as they both eventually believed in the subversive power of the new media technologies. It were the popular subversive figures of the net scene – the hacker and the media guerillero – that represented, for the setting of *Wired* (primarily for the start-ups of the dot-com era), the embodiments of hope in a new information economy, freed from the old burdens of industrial production.

Thus, the fields of knowledge in net cultures were grouped around a central myth, which was, among other things, set into the world by the adepts of Californian hippie capitalism: that the new information and communication technologies – above all the internet with its various applications (e-mail, Usenet, WWW, etc.) – were presented, so to say, as the main aspect of economic, social, and political transformations. Here the actual strength of net

society meant also that the private could spread without any limits at the cost of the public” (Buden 2009, pp. 229).

14 The American media artist Paul Garrin founded the enterprise *name.space* in 1996 as an answer to the growing need of internet addresses. Garrin wanted to break the monopoly of Network Solutions Inc. in the distribution of top-level domains (TLD) and established a “Permanent Autonomous Network” with a freely accessible TLD registration system. Although the technical side of the project was doubted by many, and it was also not quite clear whether it was an artistic experiment or rather a commercial enterprise, *name.space* managed to spark off an international debate (e.g. in *NYT*, *The Economist*, *Die Zeit*) on the practice of distributing internet addresses. On *nettime*, Garrin’s personal communication practices met with increasing dissatisfaction (for example, he began spamming the list with “ads” for *name.space*) and in summer 1997 the first “flame war” broke out (particularly between Paul Garrin and Gordon Cook). The consequence was that the list would thence be moderated (cf. Lovink 1998).

igre istine su, međutim, uvijek i igre moći (usp. Foucault 2002, str. 671), osobito zato što su pravila igre koja valja odrediti također predmet pregovora između različitih interesa. U pozadini tih izrečenih razlika – pri čemu se uvijek valja zapitati i tko uopće ima mogućnost izricanja (na primjer, pristup medijskim tehnologijama) – često se ipak skriva neizrečeni konsenzus, koji čini gotovo nezamislivima pozicije izvan polja o kojemu valja pregovarati, dakle hegemonijskog polja. To se odnosi kako na već spomenuti “nedostatak alternative” u odnosu na neoliberalnu politiku, onakvu kakva je 90-ih godina propagirana prije svega u zemljama Srednje i Jugoi- stočne Europe, tako i na “organsku ideologiju” samog interneta. Tako Oliver Marchart piše o tehno-diskursu onoga doba sljedeće: “Ekonomska i infrastrukturna osnova komunikacijskog medija – ili hardver, kao u nekim oblicima tehno-determinizma – ne može se opisati neovisno o specifičnim diskursima koji sačinjavaju neku ‘ideologiju’ ili politički kod” (Marchart 1998, str. 12). I tu se preklapaju “kalifornijska ideologija” i diskurs (radikalnih) mrežnih kultura, budući da su i jedni i drugi naposljetku vjerovali u subverzivnu moć novih medijskih tehnologija. Tako su i popularni subverzivni likovi mrežne scene – haker i medijski gerilac – za krugove oko časopisa *Wired* (prvenstveno za *start-upove* dot.com epohe) bili nositelji jedne nove informacijske ekonomije, oslobođene starog jarma industrijske proizvodnje.

Polja znanja mrežnih kultura su se, dakle, grupirala oko središnjeg mita koji su, između ostaloga, iznjedrili i adeпти kalifornijskog hipijevskog kapitalizma: naime, da će nove informacijske i komunikacijske tehnologije – prije svega internet sa svojim mnoštvom aplikacija (e-mail, Usenet, WWW itd.) – biti glavni čimbenik ekonomskih, društvenih i političkih promjena. Tu se pokazuje stvarna snaga mrežnog diskursa, naime njegova sposobnost da apsorbira kritiku koja je usmjerena protiv njega i ugradi je u vlastiti model. Jer naposljetku su se “subverzivna obećanja dana u vezi s novim tehnologijama rasprsnula, a mrežni model uspio se nametnuti kao vladajući” (Diefenbach 2012, str. 182). To ne znači da se “kalifornijska ideologija” naprosto proširila cijelim planetom, jedan na jedan. No ona je praktički definirala obzor mogućih struktura očekivanja i smisla unutar kojega se internet sada javlja kao “najaktualnija tendencija” društvenog, kulturnog i ekonomskog razvoja. Tako su i nedavni politički događaji (od trga Tahrir preko Puerte del Sol do parka Zuccotti i dalje) pokazali da predodžba o društvenoj promjeni još uvijek slijedi tehno-determinističku argumentaciju (npr. revolucija na Facebooku i Twitteru). Pritom je upravo mrežna kritika 90-ih godina od samog početka dovodila u pitanje puko izvođenje društvenih fenomena iz tehnoloških struktura, no naposljetku je ipak ostala podložna primatu “digitalne revolucije”. Taj

discourse comes to the fore, namely its ability to absorb the critique directed against it and to incorporate it into its own model.<sup>15</sup> Eventually, “the subversive promises given with regard to the new technologies got broken, while the net managed to assert itself as the dominant model” (Diefenbach 2012, p. 182). This does not mean that the “Californian ideology” simply spread all over the planet, one to one. It has however, virtually defined the horizon of the possible structures of expectation and meaning, within which the internet now appears as the ‘hottest tendency’ in social, cultural, and economic developments – and this continues to be the case as the most recent political events (from Tahrir Square to Puerta del Sol to Zuccotti Park and beyond) have likewise shown that the idea of social change still follows these techno-deterministic argumentations (e.g. Facebook and Twitter revolution). It was the net critique of the 1990s that chal-

lenged the mere derivations of social phenomena from technological structures from the outset, yet eventually remained bound to the primacy of the ‘digital revolution.’ This ‘mirror stage’ may also be the reason why the radical net cultures were all too easily overrun by the commercial internet service providers in the booming phase of the internet. Today, after the explosion of the dot-com bubble at the turn of the millennium and the resurrection of social networks, it is all the more important to recall the experiences of the early net cultures, lest we should again fall for the simple narrative of the ‘democratic net,’ so we could develop alternative perspectives with regard to the given state of the media.

15 This goes meanwhile so far that even the resistance against certain networks – be it globally operating concerns or local clientele – are organized in the form of networks, as in the case of “India against Corruption” (cf. Shah 2013).

Translation from German:  
Marina Miladinov and Hana Yoosuf



“zrcalni stadij” možda je i razlog tome što su radikalne mrežne kulture u prvoj fazi procvata odviše lako potisnute od komercijalnih internetskih usluga. Danas, nakon rasprsnuća dot.com-balona na prijelomu tisućljeća, društvene mreže zablistale su u novom sjaju i čini se da tek sada razvijaju svoj potencijal u potpunosti. Zato je tim važnije prizvati u sjećanje iskustva ranih mrežnih kultura, kako ne bismo ponovo nasjeli na jednostavnu naraciju o “demokratskoj mreži” nego razvijali alternativne poglede na postojeću medijsku svakodnevicu.

Prijevod s njemačkoga: **Marina Miladinov**



## Bibliography

- Agentur Bilwet. "Der große Treck gen Cyberspace." In: *Kursbuch Neue Medien. Trends in Wirtschaft und Politik, Wissenschaft und Kultur*, ed. Stefan Bollmann, pp. 230-238. Cologne: Bollmann, 1995.
- Apprich, Clemens/Stalder, Felix (Ed.). *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*. Bielefeld: transcript, 2012.
- Arns, Inke. *Netzkulturen*. Hamburg: eva, 2002.
- Arns, Inke and Andreas Broeckmann. "No Eastern Media-Normality." In: *ZKP4*, ed. Pit Schultz, Diana McCarty, Geert Lovink, and Vuk Ćosić, pp. 17-21. Ljubljana: Ljubljana Digital Media Lab, 1997.
- Barbrook, Richard and Andy Cameron. "Die kalifornische Ideologie." In: *Netzkritik. Materialien zur Internet-Debatte*, ed. Nettime, pp. 15-36. Berlin: ID-Archiv, 1997.
- Barbrook, Richard. "<nettime> Re: The Piran Nettime Manifesto," *nettime* (1997a), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00003.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Re: <nettime> Re: The Piran Nettime Manifesto," *nettime* (1997b), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00080.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Barlow, John Perry. "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" (1996), [http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet\\_censorship\\_bills/barlow\\_0296.declaration](http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration) (last accessed: January 31, 2010).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Re: <nettime> The Piran Nettime Manifesto Piran," *nettime* (1997a), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msg00152.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Re: <nettime> Piran / Zero Work," *nettime* (1997b), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00011.html> (last accessed June 30, 2013).
- Baumgärtel, Tilman. "'Beauty and the East' – Nettime-Treffen in Ljubljana. Von Onkel Soros' aufmüppigen Kindern," *Telepolis* (1997), <http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/3/3086/1.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Black, Bob. *The Abolition of Work* (1996), <http://www.to.or.at/bobblack/abolishw.htm> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Buden, Boris. "Kommentare zu Branka Ćurčić: Autonome Räume der Deregulierung und Kritik: ist eine Kooperation mit neoliberalen Kunstinstitutionen möglich?" *transversal* (2007), <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0407/buden2/de> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Society Lost." In: *Phantom Kulturstadt. Texte zur Zukunft der Kulturpolitik II*, ed. Konrad Becker and Martin Wassermair, pp. 227-233. Wieb: Löcker, 2009.
- Critical Art Ensemble. *Digital Resistance. Explorations in Tactical Media* (2001), <http://www.critical-art.net/books/digital> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Diefenbach, Katja. "Interview mit Katja Diefenbach." In: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ed. Clemens Apprich and Felix Stalder, pp. 177-182. Bielefeld: transcript.
- Foucault, Michel. "Die Wahrheit und die juristischen Formen." In: idem, *Dits et Ecrits. Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 669-792. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2002.
- Klein, Naomi. *Die Schock-Strategie: Der Aufstieg des Katastrophen-Kapitalismus*. Frankfurt a. Main: Fischer, 2007.
- Kroker, Arthur and Michael A. Weinstein. *Data Trash: The Theory of the Virtual Class*. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1994.
- Lovink, Geert. "Interview with Paul Garrin about Name.Space," *nettime* (1998), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9805/msg00058.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Dark Fiber. Auf den Spuren einer kritischen Internetkultur*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2004.
- Lovink, Geert and Pit Schultz. *Jugendjahre der Netzkritik. Essays zu Web 1.0 (1995-1997)*. Amsterdam: INC, 2010.
- Marchart, Oliver. *Die Verkabelung Mitteleuropas. Medienguerilla – Netzkritik – Technopolitik*. Vienna: edition selene, 1998.
- McCarty, Diana. *Nettime: the legend and the myth* (1997), <http://www.medialounge.net/lounge/workspace/nettime/DOCS/1/inf03.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Medosch, Armin. "Nettime oder die Kunst der Diskussion," *Telepolis* (1997), <http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/1/1107/1.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Nowotny, Stefan. "Filtered Inclusion: Postsocialism in the Neoliberal Ages." In: *Operation: City 2008. The Neoliberal Frontline: Urban Struggles in Post-socialist Societies*, pp. 12-14. Zagreb: Conference Newsletter, 2008.
- Schultz, Pit. "Panic Content. Introduction to ZKP3" (1998), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0105/msg00036.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Interview mit Pit Schultz." In: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ed. Clemens Apprich and Felix Stalder, pp. 75-79. Bielefeld: transcript, 2012.
- Shah, Nishant. *Whose Change Is It, Anyway? Towards a Future of Digital Technologies and Citizen Action in Emerging Information Societies*. The Hague: Hivos Knowledge Programme, 2013.

## Bibliografija

- Agentur Bilwet. "Der große Treck gen Cyberspace". U: *Kursbuch Neue Medien. Trends in Wirtschaft und Politik, Wissenschaft und Kultur*, ur. Stefan Bollmann, str. 230-238. Köln: Bollmann, 1995.
- Arns, Inke. *Netzkulturen*. Hamburg: eva, 2002.
- Arns, Inke i Andreas Broeckmann. "No Eastern Media-Normality". U: *ZKP4*, ur. Pit Schultz, Diana McCarty, Geert Lovink, i Vuk Ćosić, str. 17-21. Ljubljana: Ljubljana Digital Media Lab, 1997.
- Barbrook, Richard i Andy Cameron. "Die kalifornische Ideologie". U: *Netzkritik. Materialien zur Internet-Debatte*, ur. Nettime, str. 15-36. Berlin: ID-Archiv, 1997.
- Barbrook, Richard. "Re: The Piran Nettime Manifesto", *nettime* (1997a), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg0003.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Barbrook, Richard. "Re: The Piran Nettime Manifesto", *nettime* (1997b), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00080.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Barlow, John Perry. "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" (1996), [http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet\\_censorship\\_bills/barlow\\_0296.declaration](http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration) (pristup: 31. siječnja 2010.).
- Barlow, John Perry. "Re: The Piran Nettime Manifesto Piran," *nettime* (1997a), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msg00152.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Barlow, John Perry. "Re: The Piran / Zero Work," *nettime* (1997b), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00011.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Baumgärtel, Tilman. "'Beauty and the East' – Nettime-Treffen in Ljubljana. Von Onkel Soros' aufmüpfigen Kindern", *Telepolis* (1997), <http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/3/3086/1.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Black, Bob. *The Abolition of Work* (1996), <http://www.to.or.at/bobblack/abolishw.htm> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Buden, Boris. "Kommentare zu Branka Ćurčić: Autonome Räume der Deregulierung und Kritik: ist eine Kooperation mit neoliberalen Kunstinstitutionen möglich?" *transversal* (2007), <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0407/buden2/de> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Buden, Boris. "Society Lost". U: *Phantom Kulturstadt. Texte zur Zukunft der Kulturpolitik II*, ur. Konrad Becker i Martin Wassermair, str. 227-233. Wieb: Löcker, 2009.
- Critical Art Ensemble. "*Digital Resistance. Explorations in Tactical Media*" (2001), <http://www.critical-art.net/books/digital> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Diefenbach, Katja. "Interview mit Katja Diefenbach". U: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ur. Clemens Apprich i Felix Stalder, str. 177-182. Bielefeld: transcript.
- Foucault, Michel. "Die Wahrheit und die juristischen Formen". U: isti, *Dits et Ecrits. Schriften*, sv. 2, str. 669-792. Frankfurt na Majni: Suhrkamp, 2002.
- Klein, Naomi. *Die Schock-Strategie: Der Aufstieg des Katastrophen-Kapitalismus*. Frankfurt na Majni: Fischer, 2007.
- Kroker, Arthur i Michael A. Weinstein. *Data Trash: The Theory of the Virtual Class*. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1994.
- Lovink, Geert. "Interview with Paul Garrin about Name.Space", *nettime* (1998), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9805/msg0058.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Lovink, Geert. *Dark Fiber. Auf den Spuren einer kritischen Internetkultur*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2004.
- Lovink, Geert i Pit Schultz. *Jugendjahre der Netzkritik. Essays zu Web 1.0 (1995-1997)*. Amsterdam: INC, 2010.
- Marchart, Oliver. *Die Verkabelung Mitteleuropas. Medienguerrilla – Netzkritik – Technopolitik*. Vienna: edition selene, 1998.
- McCarty, Diana. *Nettime: the legend and the myth* (1997), <http://www.medialounge.net/lounge/workspace/nettime/DOCS/1/info3.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Medosch, Armin. "Nettime oder die Kunst der Diskussion", *Telepolis* (1997), <http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/1/1107/1.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Nowotny, Stefan. "Filtered Inclusion: Postsocialism in the Neoliberal Ages". U: *Operation: City 2008. The Neoliberal Frontline: Urban Struggles in Post-socialist Societies*, str. 12-14. Zagreb: Conference Newsletter, 2008.
- Schultz, Pit. "Panic Content. Introduction to ZKP3" (1998), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0105/msg00036.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Schultz, Pit. "Interview mit Pit Schultz". U: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ur. Clemens Apprich i Felix Stalder, str. 75-79. Bielefeld: transcript, 2012.
- Shah, Nishant. *Whose Change Is It, Anyway? Towards a Future of Digital Technologies and Citizen Action in Emerging Information Societies*. Haag: Hivos Knowledge Programme, 2013.

- Smite, Rasa. "Nachhaltige Netzwerke. Soziale Organisation im Fall früher Netzkulturen." In: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ed. Clemens Apprich and Felix Stalder, pp. 233-238. Bielefeld: transcript, 2012.
- Stalder, Felix and Jesse Hirsh. "Open Source Intelligence," *First Monday* (vol. 7) (2002), <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/961/882> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).
- Thatcher, Margaret. "Interview for Woman's Own magazine ('no such thing as society')" (1987), <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689>.
- Turner, Fred. *From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Vienna ad-hoc committee. "The Piran Nettime Manifesto," *nettime* (1997), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msg00147.html> (last accessed: June 30, 2013).

- Smite, Rasa. "Nachhaltige Netzwerke. Soziale Organisation im Fall früher Netzkulturen". U: *Vergessene Zukunft. Radikale Netzkulturen in Europa*, ur. Clemens Apprich i Felix Stalder, str. 233-238. Bielefeld: transcript, 2012.
- Stalder, Felix i Jesse Hirsh. "Open Source Intelligence", *First Monday* (sv. 7) (2002), <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/961/882> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).
- Thatcher, Margaret. "Interview for Woman's Own magazine ('no such thing as society')" (1987), <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689>.
- Turner, Fred. *From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
- Vienna ad-hoc committee. "The Piran Nettime Manifesto", *nettime* (1997), <http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msg00147.html> (pristup: 30. lipnja 2013.).





# Kartiranje hibridiziranih stvarnosti: taktilne kartografije za zgusnutu sadašnjost

*Ovaj tekst je proširena verzija eseja koji je izvorno objavljen pod istim naslovom na blogu Tactical Media Files (<http://blog.tacticalmediafiles.net>). U njemu istražujem zgusnute uvjete u hibridnim prosvjednim prostorima, koji su istodobno duboko utjelovljeni i intenzivno prožeti različitim medijskim tokovima zbog goleme prisutnosti mobilnih i bežičnih medija u javnom prostoru. Jedan od elemenata tih novih praksi masovnog prosvjeda – osobito taktika osvajanja javnih trgova i ulica – još*

*uvijek je nedostajao u obliku izvorne analize, iako naznačen u tekstu: radi se o ključnoj ulozi koju u tim prosvjedima igraju afektivne petlje povratne veze između utjelovljenog i medijski posredovanog (što možemo zamijetiti i u prosvjedima na trgu Taksim u Turskoj). Prisutnost nesvjesne, početne vezivne sile, koja je intenzivno afektivna, predstavlja i pokretačku silu u pozadini tih "okupljanja" i važan element u zacrtavanju obzora njihove političke učinkovitosti.*

**U**sred istraživanja o nasljedima "taktičkih medija" – fuzije umjetnosti, politike i medija koja je već sredinom devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća prepoznata kao osobito produktivna mješavina za kulturni, društveni i politički aktivizam<sup>01</sup> – dogodila se 2011. godina. Istraživanje je izvorno započelo kao proširenje rada na *Tactical Media Files*, internetskom dokumentacijskom resursu o taktičkim medijskim praksama širom svijeta<sup>02</sup> koji je izrastao iz fizičkih arhiva čuvenog niza festivala o taktičkim medijima po imenu Next 5 Minutes (1993.-2003.) na Međunarodnom institutu za društvenu povijest u Amsterdamu. Nakon što smo ponovo učinili dostupnim dobar dio povijesti taktičkih medija na internetu, naše je pitanje kao urednika tog resursa bilo sljedeće: koje bi moglo biti aktualno značenje ovog termina, kao i s njime povezanih promišljanja i praktisi?

Prije 2011. godine to je bilo itekako goruće pitanje. Serija festivala Next 5 Minutes završena je s izdanjem 2003., nakon godine koja je započela 11. rujnom 2001. i okupila lokalne aktiviste na sastanci-

01 Usp. David Garcia & Geert Lovink, "The ABC of Tactical Media" (svibanj 1997.), dostupno na: <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?objectnumber=37996>


02 <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net>

Eric Kluitenberg

# Charting Hybridised Realities: Tactical Cartographies for a Densified Present

*This text is an expanded version of the essay originally published under the same title at the Tactical Media Files blog (<http://blog.tacticalmediafiles.net>). The text explores the densified conditions of hybrid protest spaces that are simultaneously deeply embodied and intensely permeated by a variety of media flows because of the massive presence of mobile and wireless media in public space. One element of the new practices of popular protest - in particular the tactics of occupation of public squares and streets - was still missing in the original analysis, even though it was hinted at in the text: the crucial role that affective feedback loops between the embodied and the mediated play in these protests (as can be witnessed once again in the Taksim Square protests in Turkey). The presence of the non-conscious, the incipient connective force of affective intensity is both a driving force behind these 'assemblies' as well as an important delimitation of the horizon of their political efficaciously.*

Eric Kluitenberg  
Charting Hybridised Realities

 In the midst of an enquiry into the legacies of Tactical Media – the fusion of art, politics, and media which had been recognised in the middle 1990s as a particularly productive mix for cultural, social and political activism<sup>01</sup>, the year 2011 unfolded. The enquiry had started as an extension of the work on the *Tactical Media Files*, an on-line documentation resource for tactical media practices worldwide<sup>02</sup>, which grew out of the physical archives of the infamous Next 5 Minutes festival series on tactical media (1993 – 2003) housed at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. After making much of tactical media's history accessible again online, our question as editors of the resource had been what the current significance of the term and the thinking and practices around it might be?

Prior to 2011 this was something emphatically under question. The Next 5 Minutes festival series had been ended with the 2003 edition, following a year that had started on September 11, 2001, convening local activists

01 See: David Garcia & Geert Lovink, *The ABC of Tactical Media*, May 1997, a.o.: <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?objectnumber=37996>

02 <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net>

ma koji su održani na šest kontinenata pod nazivom Tactical Media Labs.<sup>03</sup> Dva su pitanja bila u fokusu četvrtog i posljednjeg izdanja festivala Next 5 Minutes: kako se polje medijskog aktivizma diversificiralo otkako je prvi put nazvano “taktičkim medijima” sredinom 90-ih godina? I koje bi moglo biti političko značenje i učinkovitost simboličkih intervencija taktičkih medija usred semiotičke iskvarenosti medijskog pejzaža nakon terorističkih napada 11. rujna?

Taj “slom simbola” iz očitih je razloga bio u samom središtu pozornosti tijekom četvrtog i posljednjeg izdanja festivala. Poznato je da je Naomi Klein u brznoj reakciji na užasne događaje 11. rujna ustvrdila kako je aktivistička poluga simboličke intervencije kontaminirana i onesposobljena nakon nadmoćne simboličke snage terorističkih napada i njihove medijacije u stvarnom vremenu na globalnoj razini.<sup>04</sup> Napadi su iza sebe ostavili “potpuno izmijenjen semiotički pejzaž” (Klein), u kojemu je uobičajene taktike kulturološke subverzije (*cultural jamming*) “pomela” simbolička snaga terorističkih zvjerstava. Stoga “mi” (pri čemu se Klein poziva na imaginarnu zajednicu društvenih aktivista) sada moramo preći sa simbola na bit. Ono što je Klein previdjela u toj reakciji, izrečenoj u stanju “šoka i zastrašenosti” bilo je, međutim, to da je semiotički pejzaž, iako uistinu znatno izmijenjen (i iskvaren) uslijed napada 11. rujna, ipak ostao semiotički pejzaž – simboli su još uvijek jedina poluga i ulaz u širu javnu domenu, medijski posredovanu u stvarnom vremenu.

Stoga se pitanje o diversifikaciji terena i praksi medijskog aktivizma (ili aktivizama), iako se to možda tada činilo malo vjerojatnim, naposljetku pokazalo daleko važnijim. Doprinos sloma simbola uslijed 11. rujna i rasprave o semiotičkoj iskvarenosti bio je “naprosto” u dodatnom sloju kompleksnosti. U društvu prožetom medijskim tokovima, društveni aktivizam nužno je morao postati medijskim aktivizmom i stoga djelovati u znatno složenijem i antagoniziranijem okolišu. Međutim, diversifikacija medijskog i informacijskog pejzaža također je podrazumijevala potrebu za radikalnom diversifikacijom aktivističkih strategija kako bi se mogle uhvatiti u koštac sa sve hibridiziranim okolnostima.

Navest ćemo samo nekoliko novih problema. Praćenje povreda ljudskih prava širom svijeta te osiguranje njihove javne vidljivosti i debate ostala je primarna zadaća mnogih praktičara na području taktičkih medija, kao što je to bila od najranijih dana aktivizma s video kamerom. No sada su na scenu stupili novi problemi vezani uz privatnost u umreženim medijskim okruženjima, povezani s režimima nadzora nad informacijama koji jamče sigurnost i tajnovitost. Kritičke medijske umjetnosti proširile su se u raznim smjerovima, osvajajući nove terene od znanosti o životu i bio-inženjeringa preko “aktivističke robotike” (*contestational robotics*) pa sve do in-

03 Dokumentacija o događajima koje organizira Tactical Media Labs dostupna je na: <http://www.n5m4.org>

04 Naomi Klein, “Signs of the Times”, *The Nation* (5. listopada 2001.) Dostupno u arhivi: <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?objectnumber=46632>

gatherings named as Tactical Media Labs across six continents.<sup>03</sup> Two questions were at the heart of the fourth and last edition of the Next 5 Minutes: How has the field of media activism diversified since it was first named 'tactical media' in the middle 1990s? And what could be political significance and efficacy of tactical media's symbolic interventions in the midst of the semiotic corruption of the media landscape after the 9/11 terrorist attacks?

This 'crash of symbols' for obvious reasons took centre stage during this fourth and last edition of the festival. Naomi Klein had famously claimed in her speedy response to the horrific events of 9/11 that the activist lever of symbolic intervention had been contaminated and rendered useless in the face of the overpowering symbolic power of the terrorist attacks and their real-time mediation on a global scale.<sup>04</sup> The attacks left behind an "utterly transformed semiotic landscape" (Klein) in which the accustomed tactics of culture jammers had been 'blown away' by the symbolic power of the terrorist atrocities. Instead 'we' (Klein appealing to an imaginary community of social activists) should move from symbols to substance. What Klein overlooked in this response in 'shock and awe', however, was that while the semiotic landscape had indeed been dramatically transformed (and corrupted) in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it still remained a semiotic landscape – symbols were still the only lever and entry point into the wider real-time mediated public domain.

Therefore, as unlikely as it may have seemed at the time, the question about the diversification of the terrain and the practices of media activism(s) was ultimately

of far greater importance. What the 9/11 crash of symbols and the semiotic corruption debate contributed here was 'merely' an added layer of complexity. In a society permeated by media flows, social activism necessarily had to become media activism, and thus had to operate in a significantly more complex and contested environment. The diversification of the media and information landscape, however, also implied that a radical diversification of activist strategies was needed to address these increasingly hybridised conditions.

To name but a few of the emerging concerns: witnessing of human rights abuses around the world, and creating public visibility and debate around them remained a pivotal concern for many tactical media practitioners, as it had been right from the early days of camcorder activism. But now new concerns over privacy in networked media environments, coupled with security and secrecy regimes of information control entered the scene. Critical media arts spread in different directions, claiming new terrains as diverse as life sciences and bio-engineering, as well as 'contestational robotics', interventions into the space of computer games, and even on-line role playing environments. Meanwhile the free software movement made its strides into developing more autonomous toolsets and infrastructures for a variety of social and cultural needs – adding a more strategic dimension to what had hitherto been mostly an interventionist practice. In a parallel movement on-line discussion groups, mailing lists, and activity on various social media platforms started to coalesce slowly into what media theorist Geert Lovink has de-

03 Documentation of the Tactical Media Labs events can be found at: <http://www.n5m4.org>

04 Naomi Klein, "Signs of the Times", in *The Nation*, October 5, 2001. Archived at: <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?object-number=46632>

tervencija u prostor kompjuterskih igara ili internetskih okruženja za igru uloga. U međuvremenu je pokret za besplatan softver uznapredovao u smjeru razvoja autonomnijih alatki i infrastruktura za niz društvenih i kulturnih potreba – dodajući izrazitije stratešku dimenziju onome što je do tada bila uglavnom intervencionistička praksa. U paralelnom procesu su se internetske grupe za diskusiju, mailing liste i djelovanje na čitavom nizu društvenih medijskih platformi počeli stapati u nešto što je medijski teoretičar Geert Lovink nazvao “organiziranim mrežama”.<sup>05</sup> Naposljetku, tu je i nagli razvoj tehnologija za bežični prijenos, pametnih telefona i drugih bežičnih mrežnih klijenata, koji su doveli do paradoksalne premoći medijski posredovane i utjelovljene prostorne logike, što se najbolje očituje u višeslojnom konceptu “hibridnog prostora”.<sup>06</sup>

Naše je pitanje stoga bilo sasvim opravdano: kako bi termin “taktički mediji” mogao pokriti takav diversificirani, heterogeni i hibridizirani skup praksi na smislen način? Postalo je jasno da će biti potrebne sofisticiranije kartografije kako bi se uopće započeo kartirati taj intenzivno hibridizirani pejzaž.

## Digitalna konverzija javnog prostora

Ako su događaji 2011. godine nešto pokazali, onda je to činjenica da je zlokobna tvrdnja Critical Art Ensemblea da su “ulice mrtvi kapital”<sup>07</sup> opovrgnuta i poništena zadivljujućim povratkom uličnih prosvjeda, kakvi god bili njihovo dugoročno političko značenje i nuspojave. Ti prosvjedi na ulicama i trgovima, od prosvjeda protiv budžetskih mjera štednje u južnoj Europi preko raznih ustanaka u arapskim zemljama sjeverne Afrike i Bliskog istoka, do prosvjeda Occupy u SAD-u i sjevernoj Europi, nipošto se ne odvijaju u fizičkim prostorima zato što odbacuju semiotičku iskvarenost medijskog prostora. Naprotiv, ulice i trgovi poslužili su kao platforma za digitalno i umreženo umnožavanje prosvjeda kroz mnoštvo distribucijskih kanala, ulančavajući čitav spektar alternativnih i matičnih, radiotelevizijskih i mrežnih medija.

Ono što je ostalo vjerno izvornom značenju termina “taktički mediji” oslanjalo se na uvid Michela de Certeaua da “taktike slabih” djeluju u prostoru strateške moći tako što pribjegavaju veoma hitrim izmještanjima i privremenim intervencijama,<sup>08</sup> stvarajući time trajan nomadski pokret i dajući glas onima koji ga nemaju putem “svih medija koji su potrebni” (Critical Art Ensemble). Međutim, radikalna disperzija bežičnih i mobilnih medijskih tehnologija značila je da su se medijski posredovani i utjelovljeni javni prostori počeli sve više stapati, stvarajući novu, hibridiziranu logiku za društveni aktivizam. Kako smo vidjeli u frapantnom nizu osvajanja

05 Geert Lovink i Ned Rossiter, “Dawn of the Organised Networks”, *Fibreculture Journal* 5 (2005.), <http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-029-dawn-of-the-organised-networks/>

06 Usp. moj članak “The Network of Waves”, kao i tematski broj o hibridnom prostoru otvorenoga časopisa *Journal for Art and the Public Domain* (Amsterdam, 2006.), <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?objectnumber=48405> (čitavi broj dostupan je preko poveznice u članku).

07 Critical Art Ensemble, *Digital Resistance* (New York: Autonomedia, 2001.), <http://www.critical-art.net/books/digital/>

08 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (University of California Press, 1984.).

scribed as 'organised networks'.<sup>05</sup> Or finally the rapid development of wireless transmission technologies, smart phones and other wireless network clients, which introduced a paradoxical superimposition of mediated and embodied spatial logics, best be captured in the multilayered concept of Hybrid Space.<sup>06</sup>

Our question was therefore entirely justified, to ask how the term 'tactical media' could possibly bring together such a diversified, heterogeneous, and hybridised set of practices in a meaningful way? It had become clear that more sophisticated cartographies would be necessary to begin charting this intensely hybridised landscape.

### A digital conversion of public space

If the events in 2011 have made one thing clear it is that the ominous claim of Critical Art Ensemble that "the streets are dead capital"<sup>07</sup> has been declared null and void by an astounding resurgence of street protests, whatever their longer term political significance and fallout might be. These protests staged in the streets and squares, ranging from anti-austerity protests in Southern Europe to the various uprisings in Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East, to the Occupy protests in the US and Northern Europe, have by no means been staged in physical spaces out of a rejection of the semiotic corruption of the media space. Much rather the streets and squares have acted as a platform for the digital and networked multiplication of protest across a plethora of distribution channels, cutting right across the spectrum of alternative and mainstream, bro-

adcast and networked media outlets.

What remained true to the origin of the term 'tactical media' was to build on Michel de Certeau's insight that the 'tactics of the weak' operate on the terrain of strategic power through highly agile displacements and temporary interventions,<sup>08</sup> creating a continuous nomadic movement, giving voice to the voiceless by means of 'any media necessary' (Critical Art Ensemble). However, the radical dispersal of wireless and mobile media technologies meant that mediated and embodied public spaces increasingly started to coincide, creating a new hybridised logic for social contestation. As witnessed in the remarkable series of public square occupations in 2011, through the digital conversion of public space the streets have become networks and the squares the medium for collective expression in a transnationally interconnected but still highly discontinuous media network.

### Horizontal networks / lateral connections

One of the remarkable characteristics of the various protests is not simply the adoption of similar tactics (most notably occupations of public city squares), but the conscious interlinking of events as they unfold. Italian activists of the Unicommons movement physically linked up with revolting students in Tunisia, Egyptian bloggers and occupiers of Tahrir Square linked up with the 'take the square' activists in Spain, who in turn expressed solidarity and even co-initiated transnational actions

05 Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter, "Dawn of the Organised Networks", in; *Fibreculture Journal*, Issue 5, 2005. <http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-029-dawn-of-the-organised-networks/>

06 See my article "The Network of Waves", and the theme issue Hybrid Space of Open — *Journal for Art and the Public Domain*, Amsterdam, 2006; <http://www.tacticalmediafiles.net/article.jsp?object-number=48405> (the complete issue is linked as pdf file to the article).

07 Critical Art Ensemble, *Digital Resistance*, Autonomedia, New York, 2001. <http://www.criticalart.net/books/digital/>

08 Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, University of California Press, 1984.

javnih trgova 2011. godine, digitalnom konverzijom javnog prostora ulice su postale mrežama, a trgovi medijem kolektivnog izražavanja u transnacionalno povezanoj, ali još uvijek izrazito nekontinuiranoj medijskoj mreži.

### **Horizontalne mreže / lateralne veze**

Jedna od upadljivih karakteristika tih raznih prosvjeda nije samo usvajanje sličnih taktika (prvenstveno osvajanja javnih gradskih trgova), nego svjesno povezivanje događaja tijekom njihova odvijanja. Talijanski aktivisti pokreta Unicommons fizički su se povezali s prosvjedujućim studentima u Tunisu, egipatski blogeri i osvajači trga Tahrir povezali su se s aktivistima pokreta “zauzimanja trgova” u Španjolskoj, a oni su se pak solidarizirali i čak zajednički preuzeli inicijativu s aktivistima pokreta #occupy u SAD-u i drugdje. To je prvi put da se nova organizacijska logika transnacionalnih horizontalnih mreža, koja je teorijski prikazana u ključnom djelu sociologije Saskije Sassen *Territory, Authority, Rights*, ali i drugdje, tako jasno očitovala u aktivističkim praksama kroz čitav niz radikalno disperziranih geografskih sklopova.

Horizontalne mreže zaobilaze tradicionalne, vertikalno integrirane hijerarhije lokalnog / nacionalnog / međunarodnog kako bi stvorile specifične prostorno-vremenske, transnacionalne poveznice zajedničkih interesa, ali i afektivnih veza. Uglavnom su te veze i poveznice još uvijek izvaninstitucionalne i velikim dijelom neformalne, a zbog svoje radikalno disperzne konstitucije i “afektivnog” ustroja izrazito su nestabilne. Političke institucije još nisu ni počele sastavljati adekvatan odgovor na te novonastale političke konstelacije (osim tradicionalnih represivnih instrumenata strateške moći kao što su deportacije, uhićenja i zabrane). S obzirom na strukturalne nejednakosti koje daju zamah raznim prosvjednim strujama, dugoročnija učinkovitost takvih mjera izrazito je neizvjesna. Čini se da su institucionalne poveznice trenutno uglavnom ograničene na anti-institucionalnu borbu prosvjednika i na represivne geste strateških vlasti. Istinski izazovna propozicija koju nude te nove, transnacionalne poveznice je, međutim, način na koji zaobilaze ugniježđene hijerarhije vertikalno integriranih struktura moći te stvaraju horizontalnu konfiguraciju društvene organizacije. One povezuju zapanjujući spektar lokalnih skupina, mjesta, mreža, zemljopisnih odrednica i kulturnih konteksta i senzibiliteta, po prvi put ozbiljno shvaćajući umreženi prostor kao novu “pograničnu zonu” (Sassen) gdje će se izgraditi nove konstelacije lateralne, transnacionalne politike.



with #occupy activists in the United States and elsewhere. It is the first time that the new organisational logic of transnational horizontal networks that has been theorised for instance in the seminal work *Territory, Authority, Rights* by sociologist Saskia Sassen, has become so evidently visible in activists practices across a set of radically dispersed geographic assemblages.

Horizontal networks bypass traditional vertically integrated hierarchies of the local / national / international to create specific spatio-temporal transnational linkages around common interests, but also around affective ties. By and large these ties and linkages are still extra-institutional, largely informal, and because of their radically dispersed make up and their 'affective' constitution highly unstable. Political institutions have not even begun assembling an adequate response to these new emergent political constellations (other than traditional repressive instruments of strategic power, i.e. evictions, arrests, prohibitions). Given the structural inequalities that fuel the different strands of protest the longer term effectiveness of these measures remains highly uncertain. The institutional linkages at the moment seem mostly limited to anti-institutional contestation on the part of protestors and repressive gestures of strategic authority. The truly challenging proposition these new transnational linkages suggest, however, is their movement to bypass the nested hierarchies of vertically integrated power structures in a horizontal configuration of social organisation. They link up a bewildering array of local groups, sites, networks, geographies, and cultural contexts

and sensitivities, taking seriously for the first time the networked space as a new 'frontier zone' (Sassen) where the new constellations of lateral transnational politics are going to be constructed.

### **Charting the layered densities of hybrid space**

Hybrid Space is discontinuous. It's density is always variable, from place to place, from moment to moment. Presence of carrier signals can be interrupted or restored at any moment. Coverage is never guaranteed. The economics of the wireless network space is a matter of continuous contestation, and transmitters are always accompanied by their own forms of electromagnetic pollution (electrosmog). Charting and navigating this discontinuous and unstable space, certainly for social and political activists, is therefore always a challenge. Some prominent elements in this cartography are emerging more clearly, however:

- **connectivity:** presence or absence of the signal carrier wave is becoming an increasingly important factor in staging and mediating protest. Exclusive reliance on state and corporate controlled infrastructures thus becomes increasingly perilous.
- **copyright:** copyright these days comes in many guises. Besides the continued forms of overt repression (arrests, confiscations, closures) of media outlets, new forms are the excessive application of intellectual property rights regimes to weed out unwarranted voices from the

## Kartiranje slojevitih gustoća hibridnog prostora

Hibridni prostor je nekontinuiran. Njegova gustoća neprestano se mijenja, od mjesta do mjesta i od trenutka do trenutka. Prisutnost nosača signala može se prekinuti ili ponovo uspostaviti u bilo kojem trenutku. Pokrivenost nikada nije zajamčena. Ekonomija bežičnog mrežnog prostora redovito je sporna, a transmiteri su uvijek popraćeni specifičnim oblicima elektromagnetskog zagađenja (elektro-smoga). Kartiranje i navigiranje tog nekontinuiranog i nestabilnog prostora, barem za društvene aktiviste, stoga ostaje trajni izazov. Ipak, u toj kartografiji mogu se sve jasnije prepoznati određeni elementi kao što su:

- **konektivnost:** prisutnost ili odsutnost vala nosača signala postaje sve važnijim čimbenikom u organizaciji i medijskom posredovanju prosvjeda. Isključivo oslanjanje na infrastrukturu pod nadzorom države i korporacija stoga postaje sve opasnijim.
- **cenzura:** danas se cenzura javlja u raznim oblicima. Osim kontinuiranih formi otvorene represije (uhićenja, konfiskacije, zatvaranja) medija, novi oblici uključuju ekstremne primjene prava na intelektualno vlasništvo kako bi se neovlašteni glasovi iskorijenili iz medijskog pejzaža, kao i vrlo učinkovite oblike dezinformiranja i poplave informacija, nešto što je itekako dovelo u pitanje političku učinkovitost projekta kao što je WikiLeaks.
- **blokada:** veliki informacijski vatrozidovi i blokade informacija očiti su oblici cenzure, koji su naveliko korišteni tijekom arapskih prosvjeda i uobičajena su praksa u Kini, a sada se šire Europskom unijom (pod krinkom antipiratskih zakona). Ta praksa potiče na još istančanije razumijevanje i primjenu tehnika zaobilaznja internetske cenzure, što bi trebalo postati uobičajena praksa za suvremene aktiviste.<sup>09</sup>
- **ekonomija pozornosti:** pozornost je veoma tražena roba u informacijskom društvu. Ali pozornost je i nestalna. (Medijski) aktivisti trebaju postati majstori u privlačenju i preusmjeravanju javne pozornosti, pri čemu je nužno zadržati agilnost i mobilnost.
- **upravljanje javnom imaginacijom:** strateški operateri nastoje upravljati javnim mnijenjem. Aktivisti se ne mogu osloniti na tu strategiju. Oni nemaju sredstava za zadržavanje i održavanje javnog mnijenja u prilog svojim privremenim ciljevima. Umjesto toga, aktivisti bi se trebali usredotočiti na “upravljanje javnom imaginacijom” – neprestano podsjećajući na to da je drugačiji svijet moguć.

09 Koristan priručnik nalazi se na stranici: <http://www.flossmanuals.net/by-passing-censorship/>

media landscape, but also highly effective forms of dis-information and information overflow, something that has called the political efficacy of a project like WikiLeaks emphatically into question.

- **circumvention:** Great Information Fire Walls and information blockages are obvious forms of censorship, widely used during the Arab protests and common practice in China, now also spreading throughout the EU (under the guise of anti-piracy laws). These necessitate an ever more sophisticated understanding and deployment of internet censorship circumvention techniques, an understanding that should become common practice for contemporary activists.<sup>09</sup>
- **attention economies:** attention is a sought after commodity in the informational society. It is also fleeting. (Media-) Activists need to become masters at seizing and displacing public attention. Agility and mobility are indispensable here.
- **public imagination management:** strategic operators try to manage public opinion. Activists cannot rely on this strategy. They do not have the means to keep and maintain public opinion in favour of their temporary goals. Instead activists should focus on ‘public imagination management’ – the continuous remembrance that another world is possible.
- **affective linkages:** not the content but the moment of connection establishes the affective link - the vibration of the phone, the flow of incoming messages and feeds, the flash of an image passing by, the resonance of the human mike. The affective link does not reside in the message conveyed *through* this linkage, but much rather must be understood to be coextensive with it.

## Beyond semiotic corruption

While both Manuel Castells and Paulo Gerbaudo in their recent and important books on the ‘movement(s) of the squares’<sup>10</sup> emphasise the importance of emotions in the constitution of these massive popular assemblies, they both fail to address the other dimension that informs these protests and is in my view crucial to their understanding. This ‘other’ dimension is the presence of the non-conscious in the protests and the affective linkages and feedback loops between the embodied and the mediated in these densely hybridised protest spaces. Already while writing the network notebook on the legacies of tactical media I noticed this presence of something beyond consciousness in the excitement of the protests, a certain gaze into infinity, an ecstasy that made me think if the word ‘jouissance’, understood as an orgasmic moment, a ‘coming in public’, but at the time I could not yet quite put a finger on it.

I think this ‘beyond’ that I noticed, again and again in the pictures, the video’s, the comments of protestors, the witnessing by activists and participants, or even the affected audience not present in the protests themselves, can best be understood in terms of affective intensity, as a non-conscious and never to be conscious intensity impinging on the body, described by philosopher Brian Massumi, first and foremost in his famous essay “The Autonomy of Affect” (2002).<sup>11</sup> Affect and emotion both belong to the wider realm of ‘feelings’, but emotions are the capture and conscious qualification of affective intensity and thereby also their radical closure.

09 A useful manual can be found here: <http://www.floss-manuals.net/bypassing-censorship/>

10 Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (2013) / Paulo Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets* (2012).

11 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2002. In particular: “The Autonomy of Affect”, pp. 23 - 45.

- **afektivne veze:** afektivne veze ne uspostavljaju se kroz sadržaj, nego kroz trenutak povezivanja – vibraciju na mobitelu, prijev poruka i vijesti, bljesak neke slike u prolazu, odjekivanje “ljudskog mikrofona”. Afektivna veza ne počiva u poruci koja se *prenosi* tom vezom, nego je treba shvatiti kao nešto što traje dokle traje veza.

## Onkraj semiotičke iskvarivosti

Iako i Manuel Castells i Paulo Gerbaudo u svojim nedavno objavljenim i važnim knjigama o “pokretu/pokretima trgova”<sup>10</sup> ističu važnost emocija u uspostavi tih masovnih popularnih sklopova, ni jedan ni drugi ne obraćaju pozornost na drugu dimenziju koja određuje takve prosvjede, a prema mojem je mišljenju ključna za njihovo razumijevanje. Ta “druga” dimenzija je prisutnost nesvjesnoga u prosvjedima i afektivnim vezama, kao i petlja povratne veze između utjelovljenoga i medijski posredovanoga u tim gusto hibridiziranim prosvjednim prostorima. Još dok sam pisao mrežne zabilješke o nasljeđu taktičkih medija zamijetio sam tu prisutnost nečega onkraj svijesti u uzbuđenju na prosvjedima, određeni pogled u beskonačnost, ekstazu koja me podsjetila na riječ *jouissance* shvaćenu kao orgazmički trenutak, “svršavanje u javnosti”, ali u to vrijeme nisam je sasvim uspijevao definirati.

Mislim da se to “onkraj” koje bih uvijek iznova zamijetio na fotografijama, na videu, u komentarima prosvjednika, u svjedočenju aktivista i sudionika, pa čak i afektivno zahvaćene javnosti koja nije bila prisutna na samim prosvjedima, najbolje može shvatiti kao afektivni intenzitet, nesvjestni intenzitet koji se nikada neće moći osvijestiti, ali koji ima utjecaja na tijelo: ono što je opisao filozof Brian Massumi, prvenstveno u svom čuvenom eseju “The Autonomy of Affect” (2002.).<sup>11</sup> I afekt i emocija pripadaju širem području “osjećaja”, ali emocije su sažetak i svjesna kvalifikacija afektivnog intenziteta i stoga ga također radikalno zaokružuju.

Afekt je neposredno utjelovljen, to su impulsi koji djeluju na to tijelo, koje ih registrira, ali uvijek izvan svijesti, i prije i onkraj nje. Dvije karakteristike koje Massumi prikazuje ovdje su osobito relevantne: (1) brzina afekta i (2) semantička otvorenost afekta.

- 1 Brzina:** Impulsi koje tijelo registrira mogu se mjeriti, na primjer u promjenama galvanskog otpora kože (uobičajena tehnika u mjerenju reakcija ispitnih subjekata na reklamne kampanje) unutar 0,2 do 0,3 sekunde, iz čega se može izvući prosjek od 0,25 sekundi. Međutim, za oblikovanje svjesne reakcije na impulse koji utječu na tijelo potrebno je barem pola sekunde. Massumi to naziva “nedostajućom polovicom sekun-

<sup>10</sup> Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (2013.) / Paulo Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets* (2012.).

<sup>11</sup> Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.), osobito poglavlje “The Autonomy of Affect”, str. 23-45.

Affect is directly embodied, impulses acting on and registered by the body but eternally outside of consciousness, both before and beyond. Two characteristics that Massumi describes are of particular relevance here: (1) the speed of affect, and (2) the semantic openness of affect.

1 **Speed:** The impulses registered by the body can be measured, for instance in changes in galvanic skin resistance (a common technique for measuring responses of test subjects to advertisement campaigns), within 0.2 to 0.3 seconds, which can be averaged at 0.25 seconds. The formation of a conscious response to impulses impinging on the body, however, takes at least 0.5 seconds. Massumi calls this 'the missing half second'. This implies that affect operates at twice the speed of consciousness.

2 **Semantic openness:** Affect is not semiotically ordered - it connects the heterogeneous in all kinds of unexpected and unpredictable ways: "it vaguely but insistently connects what is normally indexed as separate", Massumi asserts. This semantic openness of affect played a crucial role in overcoming a vast array of ideological, material, cultural, and political differences in the 'movement(s) of the squares', especially in the early stages of mobilisation. Because affect is not semiotically ordered it can also not be semiotically corrupted.

Affect flows not just from the images or through the sounds, but also via the close proximity of bodies, the haptic, the smells, the exchange of bodily fluids - affect is radically synaesthetic. The extreme densities of intensely hybridised spaces create a layered multiplicity of affective feedback loops between the embodied and the mediated, which helps to explain their sudden and often unexpected eruption into public.

The semantic openness of affect, however, also delimits the horizon of the politics of affect. Because affect connects the heterogeneous and incongruous so 'insistently' and 'vaguely' it can only bring about a temporary link and temporary forms of association. This severely inhibits the political efficacy of the formations that emerge out of these affective linkages. This may explain why these affective formations are so ineffective in engaging the strategic formations of political and economic power.

### **A perverse subjectivity**

The immersion in extended networks of affect that now permeate both embodied and mediated spaces introduces a new and inescapable corruption of subjectivity. Critical theory already taught us that we cannot trust subjectivity. However, the excessive self-mediation of protestors on the public squares has shown that a deep desire for subjective articulation drives the manifestation in public. The dynamic is underscored further by upload statistics of video platforms such as youtube that continue to outpace the possibility for the global popu-

de”. To podrazumijeva da afekt djeluje dvostruko brže od svijesti.

- 2 **Semantička otvorenost:** afekt nije semiotički uređen – on povezuje heterogene elemente na najrazličitije neočekivane i nepredvidive načine: “on nejasno, ali ustrajno povezuje ono što se obično svrstava u različite kategorije”, kako tvrdi Massumi. Ta semantička otvorenost afekta odigrala je ključnu ulogu u prevladavanju širokog spektra ideoloških, materijalnih, kulturoloških i političkih razlika u “pokretima trgova”, osobito u ranim fazama mobilizacije. Budući da afekt nije semiotički uređen, ne može se niti semiotički iskvariti.

Afekt ne dolazi samo od slika ili kroz zvukove, nego i putem fizičke bliskosti tijela, haptičkog doživljaja, mirisa i razmjene tjelesnih tekućina – afekt je radikalno sinestetička kategorija. Ekstremna gustoća intenzivno hibridiziranih prostora stvara uslojeno mnoštvo afektivnih petlji povratne veze između utjelovljenog i medijski posredovanog, što pomaže objasniti iznenadnu i često neočekivanu erupciju afekta u javnosti.

Međutim, semantička otvorenost afekta također određuje obzor politike afekta. Budući da afekt povezuje heterogeno i nespojivo na tako “ustrajan” i “nejasan” način, on može stvoriti samo privremenu poveznicu i privremene oblike udruživanja. To ozbiljno ometa političku učinkovitost formacija koje nastaju iz tih afektivnih veza, što može objasniti zašto su one tako neučinkovite u borbi protiv strateških formacija političke i ekonomske moći.

### **Izopačena subjektivnost**

Uranjanje u proširene mreže afekta koje danas prožimaju i utjelovljene i medijski posredovane prostore vodi u novu i neizbježnu iskvarenost subjektivnosti. Već nas je kritička teorija naučila da ne možemo vjerovati subjektivnosti. Međutim, pretjerano samoposredovanje prosvjednika na javnim trgovima pokazuje da duboka želja za subjektivnom artikulacijom tjera na manifestaciju u javnosti. Tu dinamiku dodatno potiče statistika video platformi kao što je YouTube, iz koje je vidljivo da količina materijala trajno nadmašuje mogućnost globalne populacije da sve to doista vidi i doživi.

Umjesto da odbacimo tu subjektivnost, valja je prigrliti. To zahtijeva zauzimanje novog stajališta “onkraj dobra i zla”, onkraj kritike i pokoravanja. Konceptija “izopačene subjektivnosti” može premostiti naizgled nepremostivi jaz između dobrovoljnog pokoravanja raznim oblicima korporacijske, državne i društvene prisile s jedne strane te vitalno važne društvene i političke kritike i anga-

lation to actually see and witness these materials.

Rather than dismissing this subjectivity it should be embraced. This requires a new attitude 'beyond good and evil', beyond critique and submission. The conception of a 'perverse subjectivity' is able to straddle the seemingly impossible divide between willing submission to various forms of corporate, state and social

coercion, and vital social and political critique and contestation.

It's maxim here: Relish your own commodification, embrace your perverse subjectivity, in order to escape the perversion of subjectivity.

Amsterdam, June, 2013.

žmana s druge. Moto je ovdje sljedeći: Uživaj u vlastitoj komodifikaciji i prigri svoju izopačenu subjektivnost kako bi izbjegao izopačenje subjektivnosti.

Amsterdam, lipanj 2013.

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**



# **SCREEN AND CAPTURE**

# EKRAN I UHVAĆENOST



# Komunikacijski kapitalizam: tako izgleda demokracija

**T**ijekom posljednjih triju godina – ustvari, tijekom čitavog razdoblja konsolidacije neoliberalnog kapitalizma – participacijski mediji nude brzu, laku, univerzalnu demokraciju: može se uključiti svatko tko posjeduje mobitel ili ima pristup internetu. Svatko ima glas – a internet nam omogućuje da ga se čuje. U tom kontekstu demokracija postaje marketinški slogan – sredstvo produžetka za AT&T, T-mobile i Microsoft. Kada je povezana s novim medijima, demokracija znači laku politiku koju svatko može shvatiti (jer nije sporna ni antagonistička) i koja je osobito privlačna ponuđačima mobitela, prijenosnih računala, softvera i platformi za društvene medije. Imperativ da se spojimo i sudjelujemo istovjetan je s imperativom da kupimo, kao i da se stavimo na raspolaganje trgovcima koji će iskoristiti naše podatke za pridobivanje kupaca i prodaju.

Tu konvergenciju višestruko povezanih medija, neoliberalizma i demokracije nazivam *komunikacijskim kapitalizmom*. Komunikacijski kapitalizam je materijalna ideološka formacija. U komunikacijskom kapitalizmu vrijednosti koje se ističu kao središnje u demokraciji poprimaju praktični, materijalni oblik u umreženim komunikacijskim tehnologijama. Ideali pristupa, glasa, uključenosti, rasprave i sudjelovanja praktično se realiziraju putem globalnih telekomunikacija. Promjene u informacijskim i komunikacijskim mrežama, povezane s digitalizacijom, personalizacijom, lokalizacijom i brzinom (računalnih procesora i konektivnosti), kao i kapacitetom memorije/pohrane, utječu na kapitalizam i demokraciju, ubrzavajući i potencirajući svaki od njih dok se zajedno konsolidiraju u novu jedinstvenu formaciju.

# Communicative Capitalism: This is What Democracy Looks Like



Over the last thirty years or so – in fact, throughout the period of neoliberal capitalism’s consolidation – participatory media has offered quick, easy, universal democracy: anyone with a mobile phone or access to the internet can make her voice heard. Everyone has a voice – and the internet lets us all express them. In this setting, democracy is a marketing slogan – the means of extension for AT&T and T-mobile and Microsoft. When linked to new media, democracy tags a politics lite that anyone can get behind (it’s not controversial or antagonistic) and that is especially attractive to purveyors of mobile phones, notebook computers, software, and social media platforms. The injunction to get connected and participate is an injunction to buy, as well to make oneself available to marketers to one’s data available for capture and sale.

I designate this convergence of multiply interlinked media, neoliberalism, and democracy *communicative capitalism*. Communicative capitalism is a material ideological formation. In communicative capitalism, the values heralded as central to democracy take practical, material form in networked communications technologies. Ideals of access, voice, inclusion, discussion, and participation are practically realized through global telecommunication. Changes in information and communication networks associated with digitalization, personalization, localization, speed (of computer processors as well as connectivity), and memory/storage capacity impact capitalism and democracy, accelerating and amplifying elements of each as they consolidate the two into a new formation.

Our setting is one of the convergence of communication and capitalism in a formation that incites voice, engagement, and participation only to capture them in the affective networks of mass personalized media. These networks have a weird, contradictory effect. On the one hand, social media networks (and com-

Naš kontekst je konvergencija komunikacije i kapitalizma u formaciju koja potiče izražavanje, angažman i sudjelovanje isključivo kako bi ih uhvatila u afektivne mreže personaliziranih masovnih medija. Te mreže imaju čudan, proturječan učinak. S jedne strane, mreže društvenih medija (kao i komunikacijski kapitalizam općenito) proizvode zajedničku, kolektivnu informacijsku i komunikacijsku mrežu kojom kruže afekti i ideje. S druge strane, te mreže pretpostavljaju i intenziviraju takav individualizam da se naširoko popularizirane ideje i problemi više ne shvaćaju toliko u okviru samosvjesnog kolektiva, nego prije kao virusi, mase, trendovi, momenti i rojevi. Kanalizirana kroz mobilne mreže i optičke kablove na ekrane i stranice za pristup, pohranu, pozivanje podataka i prebrojavanje, današnja je komunikacija uhvaćena u kapitalističke zatvorene krugove koje proizvodi i potencira.

Ta zarobljenost u kapitalističkim zatvorenim krugovima preduvjet je za mogućnost transformacije komunikacijske proizvodnje. Budući da je suvremeni kapitalizam komunikacijski, demokratska retorika pristupa, transparentnosti, izražavanja, rasprave, refleksije i sudjelovanja jača stisak kapitalizma nad umreženim društvima. Tako problemi koje ta demokracijska retorika prepoznaje i rješenja koja nudi kanaliziraju političku energiju u aktivnosti koje potenciraju uvjete nejednakosti koje ona navodno dovodi u pitanje. Remeti-lački događaji i intenzivne debate su prilike za ekonomiju – poticatelji rejtinga, prigoda za stručne komentatore da se izjasne, za mišljenja da se iznesu i stave u opticaj – baš kao i za politička nastojanja.

Ostvarenje demokracije u komunikacijskom kapitalizmu *troši* njezinu uporabnu vrijednost. Kada je komunikacija primarna komponenta proizvodnje i cirkulacije kapitala, ona gubi svoju sposobnost djelovanja kao primarno sredstvo vladavine naroda. Demokracija je pogodan milje za neizbježne participacijske medije i stoga je nesposobna izraziti želju i potrebu naroda za ekonomskim osnovama kao što su hrana, krov nad glavom, obrazovanje, rad i zdravlje (da ne spominjemo ekonomsku jednakost, ekološku održivost i okončanje eksploatacije).

Danas neizbježni refren kako je internet dobar za demokraciju štiti agresivnu preraspodjelu bogatstva u neoliberalnom kapitalizmu. Dvije značajke komunikacijskog kapitalizma – promjena u formi naših iskaza od poruka prema doprinosu i refleksivna zamka zatvorenih krugova poriva – pomoći će nam da objasniti kako je to moguće. Nakon što sam utvrdila te značajke, preći ću na oblike eksploatacije i eksproprijacije koji su specifični za komunikacijski kapitalizam. Dok je industrijski kapitalizam eksploatirao radnu snagu (radnička privreda), komunikacijski kapitalizam eksploatira komunikaciju. Ponovo želim istaknuti da komunikacijski kapitalizam materijalizira demokratske ideale kako bi ojačao i podržao

municative capitalism more generally) produce a common, a collective information and communication mesh through which affects and ideas circulate. On the other, these networks presuppose and intensify individualism such that widely shared ideas and concerns are conceived less in terms of a self-conscious collective than they are as viruses, mobs, trends, moments, and swarms. Channeled through cellular networks and fiber optic cables, onto screens and into sites for access, storage, retrieval, and counting, communication today is captured in the capitalist circuits it produces and amplifies.

This entrapment in capitalist circuits is the condition of possibility for communication's transformation of production. Because contemporary capitalism is communicative, democratic rhetorics of access, transparency, voice, discussion, reflection, and participation strengthen the hold of capitalism in networked societies. Thus, the problems this democratic rhetoric identifies and the solutions it entails channel political energies into activities that reinforce the conditions of inequality it ostensibly contests. Disruptive events, intense debates, are economic opportunities – ratings drivers, chances for pundits to opine and opinions to be expressed and circulated – as much as they are political exercises.

Communicative capitalism's realization of democracy *eats up* democracy's use value. When communication is a primary component of the production and circulation of capital it loses its capacity to function as a primary means for the rule of the people. Democracy is the ambient milieu of inescapable participatory media and thus unable to express the

people's desire and need for economic basics like food, shelter, education, work, and health (not to mention economic equality, ecological sustainability, and the end of exploitation).

The now inescapable refrain that the internet is good for democracy protects neoliberal capitalism's aggressive redistribution of wealth. Two features of communicative capitalism – the change in the form of our utterances from messages to contributions and the reflexive trap of the circuits of drive – help account for how this is the case. After setting out these features, I discuss the forms of exploitation and expropriation specific to communicative capitalism. Whereas industrial capitalism exploited labor (the industry of workers), communicative capitalism exploits communication. Again, I claim that communicative capitalism materializes democratic ideals so as to strengthen and support global capital. What we have now – discussion, inclusion, opportunities for dissent – is democratic. But democracy is inadequate for an emancipatory egalitarian politics.

### Streets not screens

Before I go into the details of communicative capitalism, I want to address recent protests which seem an obvious counter to my claims regarding the trap of new media. Don't the uprisings in Brazil, Turkey, and Egypt, not to mention the global Occupy Movement, indicate that networked social media are powerful forces for egalitarian people's struggles and that democracy is a powerful political ideal? I have two responses – yes and no.

globalni kapital. Ono što danas imamo – rasprava, jednakost, mogućnosti neslaganja – jest demokratsko. No demokracija nije dovoljna za emancipacijsku i egalitarističku politiku.

## Ulice umjesto ekrana

Prije nego što uđem u pojedinosti komunikacijskog kapitalizma, željela bih komentirati nedavne prosvjede koji, kako se čini, očitopovrgavaju moje tvrdnje o zamki novih medija. Ne upućuju li ustanci u Brazilu, Turskoj i Egiptu, da i ne spominjemo globalni Occupy pokret, na to da su umreženi društveni mediji moćna snaga u egalitarističkoj borbi naroda, i da je demokracija moćan politički ideal? Na to imam dva odgovora – da i ne.

Da, demokracija je moćan politički ideal, osobito za one među nama koji je rado projiciraju u energiju koju drugi imaju, a mi izgleda nemamo. Ipak, trebali bismo pritom zastati, budući da se naš entuzijazam prema političkoj promjeni stapa s entuzijazmom prema medijima koje koristimo kako bismo sudjelovali u tim događajima, sažimajući i izmještajući ih tako da ti mediji – osobito Facebook i Twitter – ustvari postaju glavna priča, a ne narod koji se bori ili umire na ulicama. Sažmu li se događaji koji se odvijaju u priču o društvenim medijima, gubimo iz vida ekonomsku jednakost koja je ključna za revolucionarnu situaciju. Zarobljavamo borbu protiv neoliberalizma unutar okvira demokratskog scenarija. To nam dopušta da uvjerimo sami sebe u to da su umreženi participacijski mediji prvenstveno u našem interesu, da služe ciljevima jednakosti, da je revolucionarna promjena ostvariva pomoću brzog tehnološkog rješenja (za to postoji aplikacija), da umreženi mediji nisu oblik atrakcije i distrakcije i da su naše komunikacijske prakse zabave najbolje političke prakse. Dopušta nam da ustrajemo u poricanju činjenice da je popratna pojava naše zabavljenosti medijskim mrežama najveći porast ekonomske nejednakosti u povijesti svijeta. I zato, da, demokracija je moćan politički ideal, ideal materijaliziran u tehnologijama društvenih medija koji nam dopuštaju da prikrijemo svoju trenutnu političku nemoć i zamislimo da smo aktivni sudionici u politici.

Ne, revolucije i prosvjedi nisu pokazatelji da su društveni mediji moćna snaga u borbi naroda za jednakost. Naprotiv, oni se odvijaju u turbulentnom informacijskom i komunikacijskom okolišu u kojem su informacije i komunikacija oružje i sila baš kao i okvir i okoliš. Borbe oko toga što one znače i što će biti sljedeće još uvijek traju. Što se tiče pokreta Occupy Wall Street, neki su tvrdili kako je njegov najvažniji element uporaba društvenih medija. To je pogreška koja prijeti deradikalizacijom pokreta čija važnost proizlazi iz



Yes, democracy is a powerful political ideal, particularly for those of us who like to project it onto the energies that others have that we seem to lack. We should hesitate, though, as our enthusiasm for political change merges into an enthusiasm for the media we use to participate in the events, condensing and displacing the events such that the media – particularly Facebook and Twitter – become the story, not the people fighting or dying on the street. When the unfolding events are condensed into a story about social media, we lose sight of the economic inequality crucial to the revolutionary situation. We contain a struggle against neoliberalism within a democratic script. This lets us convince ourselves that networked participatory media are primarily in our interest, that they serve egalitarian ends, that revolutionary change is available through a quick technological fix (there’s an app for that), that networked media are not a form of capture and distraction, and that our communicative entertainment practices are the best political ones. It lets us persist in our denial of the fact that accompanying our distraction in the media nets has been the greatest increase in economic inequality in world history. So, yes democracy is a powerful political ideal, one that is materialized in social media technologies that let us cover over our current political impotence and imagine ourselves as active political participants.

No, revolutions and protests are not indications that social media are powerful forces for egalitarian people’s struggles. Rather, they unfold in a turbulent information and communication environment where information and communication are weapons and forc-

es as well as setting and environment. The struggles over what they mean and what will come next are ongoing. With respect to Occupy Wall Street, some argued that what’s most significant about the movement is the use of social media. This is a mistake that works to deradicalize the movement whose significance comes from its break with “clicktivism.” Rather than remaining inside in front of their screens, people went outside. They experienced working directly, face-to-face together with strangers for a political purpose. The movement was a collective realization that circulating petitions on the internet is inadequate as a political practice.

Social media are not powerful forces specifically for egalitarian people’s struggles, particularly when they occlude antagonism. Anyone can use them – states, capitalists, nationalists, fascists. Appeals to social media as essentially or necessarily media that enable the people to shape the world they want posit a rather fantastic moment of unity and security in what is actually a turbulent field. That is, they put in place a language of connection and cooperation, as if conservatives, neoliberals, and states didn’t use social media, as if networked communications were somehow outside the purview of dominant power. The language of unity and security displaces our attention from nefarious and conservative media practice – as if only old media could be manipulated, as if all our contemporary communicative pleasures were innocent.

njegova raskida s “klikativizmom”. Umjesto da ostanu unutra, ispred svojih ekrana, ljudi su izašli na ulice. Iskusili su što to znači djelovati direktno, licem u lice i zajedno s neznancima, radi političkog cilja. Pokret je bio kolektivno osvještavanje da su peticije koje kruže internetom neadekvatan oblik političke prakse.

Društveni mediji nisu moćne snage upravo kada se radi o borbi naroda za jednakost, osobito kada blokiraju antagonizam. Bilo tko ih može koristiti – države, kapitalisti, nacionalisti, fašisti. Pozivanje na društvene medije kao bitne ili nužne medije koji ljudima omogućuju da stvore svijet kakav žele uspostavlja fantazmatski moment jedinstva i sigurnosti u ono što je zapravo u previranju. Drugim riječima, instaliraju jezik povezanosti i suradnje – kao da konzervativci, neoliberali i države ne koriste društvene medije, kao da je umrežena komunikacija na neki način izvan vidokruga dominantne sile. Jezik jedinstva i sigurnosti odvlači našu pozornost od opasne i konzervativne medijske prakse – kao da su samo stari mediji ti koje je moguće manipulirati, kao da su svi naši suvremeni komunikacijski užici nedužni.

## Temeljne značajke

Evo dviju ključnih značajki komunikacijskog kapitalizma. Kao prvo, u komunikacijskom kapitalizmu poruke su doprinosi. Matematički model komunikacije koji su razradili Shannon i Weaver zamišlja poruke kao usmjerene na izazivanje reakcije kod slušatelja. U komunikacijskom kapitalizmu stvari stoje drugačije. Sada su poruke doprinosi sadržaju koji cirkulira, a ne akcije koje izazivaju reakcije. To je poput pomaka s prvenstva uporabne vrijednosti poruke na prvenstvo njezine razmjenske vrijednosti, odnosno njezine sposobnosti da cirkulira, da bude proslijeđena, izbrojena. Za razliku od poruke, koju treba razumjeti, doprinos samo treba dodati. Baciti svoju kartu. Pridonijeti vlastitim mišljenjem ili idejom bilo kojoj raspravi koja se već u tom trenutku odvija. Ta aditivna značajka doprinosa ovisi o temeljnoj komunikacijskoj jednakopravnosti. Kao doprinos, svaka je poruka komunikacijski jednaka bilo kojoj drugoj. Nijedno mišljenje ili sud nisu vredniji od drugih (svaki od njih broji se kao jedan komentar na mome blogu ili jedan status na Facebooku ili jedan *tweet*). Činjenice, teorije, sudovi, mišljenja, fantazije, šale, laži – sve to cirkulira bez ikakve razlike. I opet, kao doprinosi oni su jednaki; svi oni dodaju “nešto” tijekom komunikacije. Nije bitno što je rečeno, nego sama činjenica da je nešto rečeno – argumentiralo se, postavljalo pitanja, ljudi su se pridružili... pa se onda može dalje komentirati, dodavati nizu, intenzivirajući time protok doprinosa. Što se više mišljenja izrazi i čuje, demokracija je

## Basic features

Here are two key features of communicative capitalism. First, in communicative capitalism messages are contributions. As developed by Shannon and Weaver, the mathematical model of communication conceives messages as aimed toward eliciting a response in a hearer. Under communicative capitalism, things are different. Now, messages are contributions to circulating content, not actions that elicit responses. It's like a shift from the primacy of a message's use value to the primacy of its exchange value, that is, to its capacity to circulate, to be forwarded, counted. Unlike a message, which needs to be understood, a contribution is just to be added. One adds one's two cents. One contributes one's opinion or idea to whatever discussion is going on. This additive feature of the contribution depends on a fundamental communicative equivalence. As a contribution, each message is communicatively equal to any other. No opinion or judgment is worth more than any other (they each count as one comment on my blog or one update on Facebook or a single tweet). Facts, theories, judgments, opinions, fantasies, jokes, lies – they all circulate indiscriminately. Again, as contributions they are equal; each adds "something" to the flow. What matters is not what was said but that something was said – points were made, questions were raised, people showed up . . . and then new comments can be made, additions to the stream, intensifying the circulation of contributions. The more opinions voiced, the more voices heard, the more democratic – and it doesn't matter what they say because each contribution is communicatively equivalent to any other.

The second component of communicative capitalism I want to emphasize is reflexivity. The contemporary setting of electronically mediated subjectivity is one of infinite doubt, ultimate reflexivization. There's always another option, link, opinion, nuance, or contingency that we haven't taken into account, some particular experience of some other who could be potentially damaged or disenfranchised, a better deal, perhaps even a cure. We never have a real answer or conclusion. Everything can be contested, re-examined. Reflexivity, then, involves a kind of looping, a turning back in – if one doesn't like an outcome, one can criticize the process, and then the process of questioning the process, the language of the process of questioning, *ad infinitum*.

Psychoanalysis uses the term "drive" to designate this repetition. In drive, enjoyment (*jouissance*, the intense pleasure-pain that makes life worth living) comes from missing one's goal, from the repeated yet ever failing efforts to reach it that start to become satisfying on their own (like watching cat videos). In this reflexive environment, even the fact that my blog posts are boring, that the arguments in my little segment of the blogipelago have an intensity far beyond merit, that the escapades of celebrities feeding the mainstream media are trivial, even all these facts are known and discussed. Most of the time, the content (presidential, disastrous, financial) of repetitive intensities doesn't matter; it's a mass of virtually indistinguishable yet rapidly circulating differences and modulations that insure that nothing changes.

veća – ali nije bitno što se kaže, jer svaki je doprinos u komunikacijskom smislu jednakopravan bilo kojem drugom.

Druga komponenta komunikacijskog kapitalizma koju želim istaknuti je refleksivnost. Suvremeni kontekst elektronski posredovane subjektivnosti obilježen je beskonačnom sumnjom i krajnjom refleksivizacijom. Uvijek postoji još neka opcija, još neki link ili mišljenje, nijansa ili okolnost koju nismo uzeli u obzir, neko specifično iskustvo nekog drugog koji bi mogao biti potencijalno oštećen ili obespravljen, bolja alternativa ili možda čak lijek. Nikada nemamo pravi odgovor ili zaključak. Sve se može dovesti u pitanje, iznova preispitati. Refleksivnost, znači, podrazumijeva neku vrstu petlje, okret natrag prema unutra – ako nam se ne sviđa ishod, možemo kritizirati proces, pa zatim proces preispitivanja procesa, jezik procesa preispitivanja i tako u beskonačnost.

Psihoanaliza koristi termin “poriv” kako bi označila takvo ponavljanje. U porivu užitek (*jouissance*, intenzivni užitek-bol koji čini život vrijednim življenja) dolazi od promašivanja cilja, od opetovanih i uvijek neuspješnih nastojanja da ga se dosegne, koja počinju pružati osebusno zadovoljstvo (poput gledanja video spotova s mačkama). U tom refleksivnom kontekstu čak i činjenica da su moji prilozi na blogu dosadni, da su argumenti u mojem malom segmentu blogopelaga intenzivni preko mjere, da su eskapade estradnih zvijezda koje pune srednjostrujaške medije trivijalne – sve te činjenice su poznate i o svima se raspravlja. Većinu vremena sadržaj (visoka politika, katastrofe, financije) tih repetitivnih intenziteta uopće nije važan – to je masa doslovce nerazlučivih, ali rapidno kružećih razlika i modulacija koje jamče da se ništa neće promijeniti.

Demokracija slijedi taj zatvoreni krug poriva. Mi kružimo i kružimo, promašujemo ciljeve, ali uvijek dobivamo nešto zadovoljstva – neki od nas uživati će u tome što su podijelili svoj gnjev zbog poraza; drugi će možda uživati u prežvakavanju svih faza svoga neuspjeha, uvijek iznova raspravljajući o tome gdje su pogriješili; treći će željeti uroniti u detalje nekog procesa radi analize kao takve, ne obazirući se na ishod. Demokratski poriv, dakle, ime je za refleksivnost u kojoj smo zapeli, koju ne možemo izbjeći, ali koja se istodobno ne može shvatiti kao nešto što nam daje ono što želimo, budući da nam umjesto toga daje nešto drugo, nekakav trenutni užitek. Mi prosvjedujemo. Govorimo. Žalimo se. Potpisujemo peticije i prosljeđujemo ih svim svojim prijateljima. U refleksivnom zatvorenom krugu komunikacijskog kapitalizma demokratski poriv je uhvaćenost našeg političkog angažmana u umreženim medijima tako da se osjećamo aktivnima, angažiranima, iako naše akcije i angažmani ustvari utvrđuju kapitalizam umjesto da ga potkopavaju.

Democracy follows this circuit of drive. We circle round and around, missing our goals, but still getting a little satisfaction – some of us might enjoy sharing our outrage over a setback; others might enjoy rehashing all the steps of our failure, arguing over where we went wrong; still others want to delve into the particulars of a process for its own sake, with little regard for the outcome. Democratic drive, then, names the reflexivity in which we are stuck, which we can't avoid, but which at the same time can't be understood as giving us what we want even as it gives us something else instead, some kick of enjoyment. We protest. We talk. We complain. We sign petitions and forward them to everyone and all our friends. In the reflexive circuit of communicative capitalism, democratic drive is the capture of our political engagements in networked media such that we feel active, feel engaged, even as our actions and engagements reinforce rather than undermine capitalism.

### Exploitation

The structure of contemporary communication networks enables new modes of exploitation. One, network exploitation, involves stimulating the production of a large field in order to produce one winner. I call this network exploitation. The idea comes from Albert-László Barabási's work on complex networks and powerlaws. A complex network is characterized by free choice, growth, and preferential attachment (for example, academic citation networks). Complex networks distribute items in the network according to a powerlaw (that is, exponen-

tially). The item in first place or at the top is twice as popular as the item in second place, which is twice as popular as the one in third and so on such that there is very little difference among those "at the bottom" but massive differences between top and bottom. So lots of novels are written; few are published; fewer are sold; a very few become best-sellers. The idea appears in popular media as the 80/20 rule, the winner-take-all or winner-take-most character of the new economy, and the "long tail."

In these examples, the common is the general field out of which the one emerges. Exploitation consists in efforts to stimulate the creative production of the field in the interest of finding, and then monetizing, the one. For example, thousands of bloggers blog, replacing paid journalists. One or two will be raptured up so that they can make a living. Or thousands make videos for YouTube, one or two become internet celebrities capable of supporting themselves. A Chinese example is Qidian.com. Qidian has 1.6 million novelists – an army of young people hunched over computers. Ninety percent of the authors don't make a penny. Three to five percent make decent wages. Only one has a large salary. For every one Liu Lianzi, whose best-selling multi-volume novel became a highly rated television drama, there are a million writers whose mental labor is physical labor. Qidian dot.com exemplifies a primary condition of labor under neoliberal capitalism. Now, rather than having a right to the proceeds of one's labor by virtue of a contract, ever more of us win or lose such that remuneration is treated like a prize. In academia, art, writing, architecture, entertain-

## **Eksploatacija**

Struktura suvremenih komunikacijskih mreža omogućuje nove načine eksploatacije. Jedan od njih, mrežna eksploatacija, uključuje stimulaciju proizvodnje jednog velikog polja ne bi li se proizveo jedan jedini pobjednik. To nazivam mrežnom eksploatacijom. Ideja je došla iz rada Alberta-Lászla Barabásija o kompleksnim mrežama i zakonu potencije. Kompleksna mreža obilježena je slobodnim izborom, rastom i preferencijalnom vezom (primjer su akademske mreže citiranja). Kompleksne mreže distribuiraju stavke u mreži prema zakonu potencije (odnosno eksponencijalno). Stavka na prvom mjestu ili na vrhu dvostruko je popularnija od stavke na drugom mjestu, koja je dvostruko popularnija od stavke na trećem i tako dalje, tako da postoji veoma malo razlike među onima “na dnu”, ali goleme razlike između vrha i dna. Tako se, na primjer, napiše mnogo romana, malo ih se objavi, još manje proda, a veoma ih malo postane bestselerima. Ta se ideja javlja u medijima u obliku pravila 80/20, nove ekonomije tipa “pobjednik odnosi sve” ili “pobjednik odnosi većinu” i “dugačkog repa”.

U ovim primjerima zajedničko je općenito polje iz kojega ispliva jedan. Eksploatacija se sastoji u nastojanjima da se stimulira kreativna proizvodnja polja u interesu pronalazjenja tog jednoga i njegove monetizacije. Na primjer, tisuće blogera piše blogove, zamjenjujući time plaćene novinare. Jedan ili dvojica bit će uzneseni u visine tako da će od toga moći živjeti. Ili: tisuće snimaju video za YouTube, ali jedno ili dvoje postat će internetske zvijezde koje će se od toga moći održavati. Kineski je primjer Qidian.com. Qidian ima 1,6 milijuna romanopisaca – čitavu vojsku mladih ljudi koji grbe leđa nad računalom. Devedeset posto autora ne zaradi ni novčića. Tri do pet posto pristojno zaraduje. Samo jedan od njih ima veliku plaću. Na svaku Liu Lianzi, čiji je roman u nastavcima postao bestseller i zatim vrhunski popularna televizijska drama dolazi milijun pisaca čiji mentalni rad ostaje samo fizički rad. Qidian.com primjer je primarnog uvjeta rada u neoliberalnom kapitalizmu. Umjesto da imamo pravo na plodove vlastitog rada po nekom ugovoru, sve više nas pobjeđuje ili gubi u toj mjeri da se naknada za rad tretira kao nagrada. Na polju znanosti, umjetnosti, književnosti, arhitekture, zabave i dizajna, a u SAD-u i na sve većem broju drugih područja (obrazovanje, tehnologija) ljudi ne samo da su sretni ako dobiju posao, nađu namještenje ili dobiju plaću, nego se sve više zadataka i projekata odvija u obliku natječaja, što znači da oni koji obave posao ne budu plaćeni ako ne pobijede. Oni rade, ali samo za priliku da budu plaćeni. Takva eksploatacija pridonosi eksproprijaciji mogućnosti za dohodak i plaćeni rad, budući da nas se sve više potiče da radimo besplatno kako bismo dobili priliku za plaćeni rad.

Druga vrsta eksploatacije je eksploatacija našeg vremena, pozornosti pa čak i najplemenitijih političkih ciljeva. Treba vremena kako

ment, design, and, in the US, increasing numbers of different areas (education, technology), people not only feel fortunate to get work, to get hired, to get paid, but ever more tasks and projects are conducted as competitions, which means that those doing the work are not paid unless they win. They work but only for a chance at pay. Such exploitation contributes to the expropriation of opportunities for income and paid labor, as more of us are encouraged to work for free in order to have a chance at paid labor.

A second kind of exploitation is the exploitation of our time, attention, even our best political commitments. It takes time to post and write and time to read and respond. Our attention isn't boundless. Our time is finite. We can't respond to every utterance, click on every link, read every post. We have to choose even as the possibility of something else, something wonderful, lures us to search and linger. Demands on our attention, injunctions for us to communicate, participate, share – ever shriller and more intense – are like so many speed-ups on the production line, attempts to extract from us whatever bit of mindshare is left. When we do respond, our contribution is an addition to an already infinite communicative field, a little demand on someone else's attention, a little incitement of an affective response, a digital trace that can be stored – and on and on and on. We pay with attention and the cost is focus.

This cost is particularly high for left political movements. Competition for attention – how do we get our message across – in a rich, tumultuous media environment too often and easily means adapting to this environment and

making its dynamic our own, which can result in a shift in focus from doing to appearing, that is to say, a shift toward thinking in terms of getting attention in the 24/7 media cycle and away from larger questions of building a political apparatus with duration. Infinite demands on our attention – demands we make on each other and which communicative capitalism captures and amplifies – expropriate political energies of focus, organization, and duration vital to communism as a movement and organized struggle. It's no wonder that communicative capitalism is participationist: the more participation in networked media environments, the more traces to hoard and energies to capture and divert.

To conclude, communicative capitalism celebrates and relies on constant, nearly inescapable injunctions to participate, to express, to be part of a common that is expropriated from us rather than shared by all of us. It enjoins us to share in an illusion, to embrace a fantasy that extreme inequality is accidental rather than essential to the capitalism of global communication networks. Democracy by itself is incapable of combatting this. In communicative capitalism, democracy meets its limits. The means of discussion is produced for profit, increasing the exploitation of the producers. It is also amplified in a web of mass distraction where more information – necessary for involvement in governance – makes it harder and harder to sustain attention on issues that matter. The media that connect us accelerate our disconnection.

So, communicative capitalism is democratic – and democracy now is the political form preserving the capitalist system.

bi se pisalo i objavljivalo na internetu, a treba vremena i za čitanje i odgovaranje. Naša pozornost nije neograničena. Naše vrijeme je konačno. Ne možemo odgovoriti na svaku izjavu, kliknuti na svaki link, pročitati svaki post. Moramo birati čak i kada nas mogućnost nečeg drugog, nečeg divnog, mami da tražimo dalje i zadržimo se. Zahtjevi za našom pažnjom, nalozi da komuniciramo, sudjelujemo, dijelimo – koji postaju sve nametljiviji i intenzivniji – nalik su na neprestana ubrzanja pokretne vrpce; to su pokušaji da se iscijedi iz nas svaka mrvica preostale pažnje. Kada doista odgovorimo, naš doprinos je dodatak već ionako beskonačnom komunikacijskom polju, malen zahtjev za pažnjom nekog drugog, malen poticaj na afektivnu reakciju, digitalni trag koji se može pohraniti – i tako sve dalje i dalje i dalje. Plaćamo pažnjom, a pod cijenu usredotočenosti.

Ta je cijena osobito visoka za ljevičarske političke pokrete. Natjecanje za pažnju – kako prenijeti poruku – u bogatom i burnom medijskom okolišu prečesto i odviše lako znači prilagodbu tom okolišu i usvajanje njegove dinamike, što može rezultirati pomakom žarišta s akcije na privid, odnosno pomakom prema razmišljanju u okvirima privlačenja pažnje u medijskom ciklusu 24/7 i udaljevanja od širih pitanja izgradnje političkog aparata koji će trajati. Beskonačni zahtjevi za našom pažnjom – zahtjevi koje postavljamo jedni drugima, a komunikacijski kapitalizam ih hvata i potencira – oduzimaju političkoj energiji fokusiranost, organiziranost i trajnost koje su ključne za komunizam kao pokret i organiziranu borbu. Nije čudo da je komunikacijski kapitalizam participacijski usmjeren: što je više sudjelovanja u umreženim medijskim okolišima, to je više tragova koji se mogu akumulirati i energija koje se mogu uhvatiti i skrenuti.

Da zaključim: komunikacijski kapitalizam potencira i koristi neprestane, gotovo neizbježne naloge da sudjelujemo, izražavamo se, budemo dio nečeg zajedničkog što nam se oduzima umjesto da to svi dijelimo. On nas tjera da budemo dio iluzije, da prigrlimo fantazmu da je ekstremna nejednakost sekundarna, a ne ključna značajka kapitalizma globalnih komunikacijskih mreža. Demokracija je po sebi nesposobna boriti se protiv toga. U komunikacijskom kapitalizmu demokracija se suočava sa svojim ograničenjima. Sredstvo rasprave proizvodi se za profit, povećavajući eksploataciju proizvođača. Također se uvećava u mreži masovne distrakcije, gdje više informacija – nužnih za uključivanje u vlast – čini sve težim održati pažnju na onim stvarima koje su doista važne. Mediji koji nas povezuju ubrzavaju prekid naših veza.

Prema tome, komunikacijski kapitalizam jest demokratski – a današnja demokracija je politička forma koja čuva kapitalistički sustav.

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**





# Brojka kolektivne životinje: supstanca vrijednosti u doba institucija rangiranja i rejtinga

**S**


*uvremeni oblici društvene komunikacije, a ustvari i aktivizma, urođeni su izravno u istu onu mašinsku sferu koja je model proizvodnje i uvećanja vrijednosti - a to je internet. U ovom članku nisam se usredotočio na formu mreže kao na sredstvo proizvodnje, razmjene, komunikacije ili organizacije, nego kao na sredstvo valorizacije. Hegemonija novih institucija rangiranja i rejtinga pred našim je očima: ekonomija*

*referenci na sveučilištu, ekonomija prestiža u Googleovu PageRank algoritmu, geopolitički utjecaj međunarodnih agencija za rejting i natjecateljstvo u svijetu umjetnosti redom funkcioniraju prema kolektivnom, mrežno zasnovanom i vrtložnom stvaranju vrijednosti. Politička kritika tih mašinskih institucija rangiranja i rejtinga, koje kolektivno tvore novu "brojku životinje", još uvijek nedostaje.*

## Polje vrijednosti i kolektivna životinja

1. *Dvoglava koncepcija vrijednosti kod Marxa.* Neki autori tvrde kako kod Marxa (1867.) nalazimo dvoglavu koncepciju vrijednosti. U zanimljivoj knjizi *More Heat than Light*, na primjer, Mirowski (1989.) je pokazao kako je Marx crpio iz dvaju modela koji su bili zajednički znanosti njegova vremena kako bi opisao tajnu stvaranja vrijednosti. Kod Marxa će se pojaviti – da tako kažemo – termodinamička mjera vrijednosti i gravitacijska mjera vrijednosti, mjera nadahnuta Carnotom i mjera nadahnuta Newtonom, metrička i topološka, jedna zasnovana na konjskim snagama, a druga na polju sila, jedna zasnovana na vremenu rada, a druga na društveno nužnom radu, jedna više supstancijalna, druga više relacijska. Očito nijedan od tih dvaju modela ne odgovara savršeno krvi i mesu živoga rada: o tom pitanju još i danas se raspravlja i još uvijek se u njemu koprcamo kao u luđačkoj košulji. Kako izmjeriti ekonomsku vrijednost, osobito višak vrijednosti rada? Ne postoji jednostavan konsenzus

# The Number of the Collective Beast: The Substance of Value in the Age of the Institutions of Ranking and Rating


 Contemporary forms of social communication and in fact also activism are immersed right in the same machinic sphere that is the model of value production and amplification - namely the internet. This essay does not focus on the network form as means of production, exchange, communication or organisation but as a means of valorisation. The hegemony of the new institutions of rating and ranking are in front of our eyes: the reference economy of the university, the prestige economy of Google's PageRank algorithm, the geopolitical influence of international rating agencies and the art world competition all function according to a collective, network-based and vortical generation of value. A political critique of these machinic institutions of rating and raking that are collectively generating the new "number of the beast" is still missing.

## The field of value and the collective beast

1. *The bicephalous conception of value in Marx.* Some authors argue that in Marx (1867) we find a bicephalous conception of value. In his interesting book *More Heat than Light*, for instance, Mirowski (1989) shows how Marx drew from two models common to the science of his time to describe the arcane of the genesis of value. In Marx, there would appear – so to speak – a thermodynamic measure of value and a gravitational measure of value, a measure inspired by Carnot and a measure inspired by Newton, a metric one and a topological one, one based on horsepower and the other on the field of forces, one based on working time and the other on socially necessary labour, a more substantial one and a more relational one. Clearly none of the two models fits perfectly the flesh of living labour: the issue is still debated today and we are still struggling within it like in a strait-jacket. How to measure economic value and in particular labour surplus value? There is no easy consensus about the answer to this crucial

za odgovor na to ključno pitanje. Zanimljivo je da je inovativni rez koji je donijela Foucaultova biopolitika bio, kako tvrdi Deleuze (1986.), u uvođenju moći kao polja sila, kao *apstraktnog društvenog stroja* koji je smijenio stare modele moći i političke ekonomije, utemeljene na industrijskim termodinamičkim strojevima. U intervjuu s Negrijem Deleuze (1990.) je jednom primijetio kako je model stroja istodobno model društva:

Svaka vrsta društva odgovara određenom tipu stroja – jednostavni, mehanički strojevi odgovaraju suverenim društvima, termodinamički strojevi disciplinarnim društvima, a kibernetički strojevi i računala društvima nadzora. No sami strojevi ništa ne objašnjavaju – potrebno je analizirati kolektivne aparate kojih su strojevi tek jedna komponenta.

U odnosu na polja medijske teorije i marksizma, moje temeljno pitanje je sljedeće: koji model stroja nesvjesno primjenjujemo u svome pogledu na društvo i svome shvaćanju vrijednosti? Vratimo se na Marxovu ambivalentnost. Iako je istina da je njegov tekst ambivalentan, a svako čitanje znanstvenog podteksta filozofije uvijek je fascinantno, perspektiva prirodnih znanosti nije ta iz koje bismo trebali početi čitati političku ekonomiju ili raspravljati o naravi tehnologije ili vrijednosti. Jedna od grešaka Mirowskog (kao i njegova druga Georgescu-Roegenova, pionira škole negativnog rasta) jest ta što on vjeruje da uvijek postoji neki znanstveni model koji potajno utječe na ekonomsku teoriju. Općenito, s gledišta političke metode, Marxa ne smijemo čitati kao gramatiku koja će dogmatski opisati društvene borbe *a posteriori*, nego obrnuto: kao ključ pomoću kojega ćemo shvatiti kako su društvene borbe oblikovale Marxove koncepte *iznutra*.

2. *Zapadna tradicija mjerljivosti Bitka*. Problem biti vrijednosti je, dakle, u filozofskom i političkom smislu, problem njezina mjerenja. Mogli bismo reći da matematika i ekonomija postoje upravo zato što uvijek postoji nešto što izmiče mjerljivosti. Politička ekonomija naprosto je pokušaj da se pripitomi suvišak, da se uhvati u koštac s viškom i zarobi ga. Kapitalizam oduvijek pokušava nadzirati bit živog rada te u tu svrhu primjenjuje različite mjerne naprave u različitim razdobljima. Ti mjerni strojevi su strojevi Deleuzea i Guattarija koje uvijek zaboravimo navesti, a to su *strojevi druge disjunktivne sinteze bilježenja* ili *registracijski strojevi*, koji prekidaju tijekom *proizvodnje želje* te upisuju kodove i brojke kako bi ekstrahirali *višak vrijednosti protoka*. Za samog Marxa kaže se da pripada sasvim zapadnoj i aristotelovskoj tradiciji mjerljivosti Bitka zbog njegova nastojanja da znanstveno izračuna višak vrijednosti (Hardt i Negri 2000: 355). Me-

question. Interestingly, the innovative rupture represented by the Foucauldian biopolitics was, according to Deleuze (1986), the introduction of power as a field of forces, as an *abstract social machine* that replaced the old models of power and political economy based on the industrial thermodynamic machines. In an interview with Negri, Deleuze (1990) once noticed how a model of machine is at the same time a model of society:

Each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermodynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies. But the machines don't explain anything, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one component.

Addressing both the fields of media theory and Marxism, my basic question is: which model of machine do we unconsciously apply to our view of society and our understanding of value? Let's go back to Marx's ambivalence. Although the ambivalence of the Marxian text is true, and each reading of the scientific subtext of philosophy always fascinating, it is not from the perspective of hard sciences that we should start reading political economy or discuss the nature of technology or value. One of the mistakes of Mirowski (and his companion Georgescu-Roegen, pioneer of the school of degrowth) is to believe that there is always a scientific model secretly influencing economic theory. In general, from the point of view of the political method, Marx must

not be read as a grammar book to dogmatically describe social struggles *a posteriori*, but on the contrary to understand how social struggles have shaped Marx's own concepts *from within*.

2. *The Western tradition of the measurability of the Being.* The problem of the substance of the value is also, philosophically and politically, the problem of its measure. We could say that mathematics and economics exist precisely because there is always something that escapes measurability. Political economy is but the attempt to domesticate excess, to come to terms with surplus and capture it. Capitalism has been trying to control the substance of living labor by applying, in different ages, different devices of measurement. These measuring machines are the machines of Deleuze, of Guattari that we always forget to cite, that is the *machines of the second disjunctive synthesis of recording, or registration machines*, that cut the flow of *desiring production* and inscribe codes and numbers to extract the *surplus value of flow*. Marx himself is said to belong to the very Western and Aristotelian tradition of the measurability of the Being for his attempt to scientifically calculate surplus value (Hardt and Negri 2000: 355). However, Marx's formulas are not formulas of economic equilibrium, but on the contrary formulas that, going beyond Hegelian logic, show the inherent asymmetry of capital and try to identify its internal crisis, its disproportion, its dismeasure, as in the case of the famous formula of the law of the falling rate of profit (Marx 1894). There are schools of Marxism, like Autonomist Marxism, that do not believe in Marx's idea of an *objective crisis*

đutim, Marxove formule nisu formule ekonomske ravnoteže, nego naprotiv, formule koje, nadilazeći Hegelovu logiku, pokazuju inherentnu asimetriju kapitala i nastoje identificirati njegovu unutarnju krizu, njegov nesrazmjer i njegovu neumjerenost, kao što je slučaj s čuvenom formulom zakona opadajuće stope profita (Marx 1894). Postoje marksističke škole, kao što je autonomistički marksizam, koje ne vjeruju u Marxovu ideju *objektivne krize* kapitala i bave se njegovom *subjektivnom krizom*. Talijanski *operaismo*, na primjer, ističe *autonomiju rada* za razliku od *autonomije kapitala*. Upravo su suvišak društvenoga tijela i bezmjernost živog rada bili ono što je izbacilo iz kolosijeka industrijsku revoluciju, stvorilo globalnu povijesnu "traumu" Oktobarske revolucije te gurnulo evoluciju kapitalizma u smjeru postfordizma, informacijske revolucije i financijskog kapitalizma. Ono što kapital nastoji izmjeriti, nadzirati i zarobiti upravo je kolektivna moć stvaranja vrijednosti.

3. *Status političke ekonomije u pet suvremenih filozofskih škola*. Po pitanju mjere i bezmjernosti – da se malo konceptualno našalimo – mogli bismo podijeliti suvremene interpretacije političke ekonomije u pet filozofskih škola: puritance, promatrače sata, autonomiste, svingere i akceleracioniste. *Puritanci* su oni koji ne izučavaju ekonomiju, osobito ne Marxove ekonomske koncepte, iz straha da ne počine grijeh "ekonomizma" (Badiou), ili pak oni koji smatraju da je ekonomska disciplina samo reinkarnacija stare kršćanske teologije, od čijeg prokletstva, kako se čini, nije moguće pobjeći (Agamben). U hipotetsku "desnicu" mogli bismo ubrojiti *promatrače sata*, drugove vjerne navodno inherentnoj racionalnosti ekonomije, koji računaju višak vrijednosti sa satom u ruci i jedino unutar zidova tvornice, a na isti način računaju i prava i plaće radnika (uglavnom su to ortodoksni marksisti). S druge strane, od 60-ih godina nadalje *autonomisti* smatraju da suvišak živog rada nadilazi svaku mjeru ekonomske racionalnosti, da je cijela metropola prostor proizvodnje i da subjektivnosti imaju pravo na samoodređenje iznad svakog kodificiranog prava (to su *operaismo* i autonomistički marksizam općenito). *Svingeri* su oni koji, danas više nego ikada prije, podržavaju monetaristički obrat u marksizmu, hegemoniju protoka novca nad proizvodnjom, svodjenje vrijednosti na cijenu i neprekinuti krug rada i novca (djelomično su to Harvey, kartalisti i cirkulacionisti, itd.). Naposljetku, na hipotetskoj "ljevici" imamo postmoderne akceleracioniste, koji predviđaju da će kapitalizam skončati u hipertrofičnoj eksploziji (Deleuze i Guattari u nekim ulomcima, Baudrillardov katastrofizam, Viriliova dromologija, neki autori u novijim izdanjima časopisa Collapse, pa i sam *operaismo*, koji se može smatrati dijelom akceleracionističke obitelji po svojoj ideji *antagonističke tendencije*).

of capital and address a *subjective crisis* of capital. Italian *operaismo*, for instance, has been always underlining the *autonomy of labour* against the *autonomy of capital*. It was the excess of the social body, the dismeasure of living labor, that set the industrial revolution out of joint, that generated the global historic 'trauma' of the October revolution, that pushed the evolution of capitalism towards post-Fordism, the information revolution and finance capitalism. What capital attempts to measure, monitor and capture is precisely the collective power of value generation.

3. *The status of political economy in five contemporary schools of thought.* On the question of measure and dismeasure – to make few conceptual jokes – we could divide the contemporary interpretations of political economy into five schools of thought: puritans, clock-watchers, autonomists, swingers, accelerationists. *Puritans* are those who do not study economy and specifically Marxian economic concepts for the fear to commit the sin of "economicism" (Badiou) or those who recognise economic disciplines as a mere reincarnation of the old Christian theology from whose damnation no escape seems possible (Agamben). In a hypothetical 'right-wing' we could count the *clock-watchers*, loyal comrades to the supposed inherent rationality of economy, which calculate surplus-value watch in hand and only within the factory walls and in this way they calculate also rights and wages for workers (mostly orthodox Marxists). On the other hand, since the '60s the *autonomists* recognise the excess of living labor beyond any measurement of economic rationality, the entire me-

tropolis as a productive space and the self-determination of subjectivities before any codified right (that is *operaismo* and Autonomist Marxism in general). The *swingers* are those who, today more than ever, support a monetarist turn in Marxism, the hegemony of the circulation of money over production, the reduction of value to price and the continuous loop between labour and money (partially Harvey, chartalists and circuitists, etc..). In a hypothetical 'left-wing', finally, we find the post-modern *accelerationists* which forecast the end of capitalism in its hypertrophic explosion (Deleuze and Guattari themselves in few passages, Baudrillard's catastrophism, Virilio's dromology, some authors of the recent journal *Collapse*, and also *operaismo* itself can be considered within the accelerationist family for its notion of *antagonistic tendency*).

4. *Gattungswesen: Marx's collective beast emerges again.* So far I tried to summarise: the questions of value, measure and excess, that all together compose the problem of the collective power and affecting also the definition of 'the common'. As presented in *Commonwealth* by Hardt and Negri (2009), the notion of 'the common' is originated within the crisis of Marx's measure of value and within the problem of the very unit of such a measure. The production of the *social factory*, the metropolis as an expanded productive space, is said to be *out of measure* and Time can no longer be the unit of measure of such a production (Hardt and Negri 2009: 317). Hardt and Negri then go back to the Marxian idea of capital as an accumulation of social relations and they call "the common" such a production of social relation

4. *Gattungswesen: Marxova kolektivna životinja ponovo iskršava.* Do sada sam pokušao sažeti pitanja vrijednosti, mjere i suviška, koja zajedno sačinjavaju problem kolektivne moći i također utječu na definiciju “zajedničkoga”. Taj pojam, onako kako su ga Hardt i Negri predstavili u knjizi *Commonwealth* (2009.), proizlazi iz krize Marxova mjerenja vrijednosti i iz problema same jedinice takvog mjerenja. Proizvodnja *društvene tvornice*, metropole kao proširenog mjesta proizvodnje, smatra se nečime *bez mjere* te Vrijeme više ne može biti jedinica mjere za takvu proizvodnju (Hardt i Negri 2009: 317). Hardt i Negri se zatim vraćaju Marxovoj ideji kapitala kao akumulacije društvenih odnosa te nazivaju “zajedničkim” takvu proizvodnju društvenih odnosa koju zatim zarobljava kapital. U rukopisima mladog Marxa iz 1844. godine (1932.) nalazimo sličnu (no spornu) ideju: to je *Gattungswesen*, čovjek kao rodno biće. Rodno biće je glavna značajka čovjeka zbog njegove društvene naravi ili, ako vam je tako draže, zbog njegove dimenzije političke životinje. Kako ističe Nick Dyer-Witheford (2004.), *Gattungswesen* kod Marxa proistječe iz koncepta otuđenja, a kritizirali su ga kao odviše humanistički ili naturalistički (ipak, upravo tu Marx kaže da je “priroda čovjekovo neorgansko tijelo”). Danas bismo to mogli preformulirati i usvojiti *Gattungswesen* kao koncept posthumanizma, homologan s Foucaultovim poljem sila, tijelom-bez-organa Deleuzea i Guattarija (koji su također pronašli nadahnuće u tom ulomku) i idejom da mnoštvo postaje mašinsko. Mogli bismo prigrliti *Gattungswesen* kao koncept *društvenog čudovišta*, ali čudovišta koje je okrenuto budućnosti umjesto da proizlazi iz *nesvjesnog načela prirode*. Slično tome, ideja zajedničkoga nastoji pokazati da je kolektivna životinja u središtu suvremenog kapitalizma u formi rodnog bića, ali takvoga koje nije unaprijed dano, nego ga tek treba konstruirati. Specifični aparati mjerenja, nadzora i zarobljavanja nužni su kako bi se takva životinja pripitomila. Kada smo već kod društvenog čudovišta, moramo razumjeti način na koji kapital uspijeva zarobiti takvu mrežu odnosa, takvo polje sila, odnosno način na koji danas uspijeva nametnuti *brojku kolektivnoj životinji*.

### **Prilog topologiji polja vrijednosti: novi aparati rangiranja i rejtinga.**

5. *Topološki modeli polja vrijednosti.* Valja uvesti nove empirijske modele vrednovanja (što je drugo ime za registracijske strojeve Deleuzea i Guattarija) kako bi se razumjele metamorfoze kapitala pod pritiskom društvenih snaga posljednjih desetljeća. Ponovo slijedeći Foucaulta, Deleuzea i Guattarija, predlažem da se polje ekonomskih sila opiše na *topološki*, a ne *kvantitativni* način kao što to još



that is subsequently captured by capital. In the 1844 manuscripts the young Marx (1932) introduced a similar (yet controversial) idea: *Gattungswesen*, the human as a species-being. The species-being is the main feature of the human for its social nature or, if you prefer, for its dimension of political animal. As Nick Dyer-Witheford (2004) reminds, the concept of *Gattungswesen* emerges in Marx from the concept of alienation and it has been criticised for being too much humanist or naturalist (nevertheless it is right here that Marx states “Nature is man’s inorganic body”). Today we could re-elaborate and adopt *Gattungswesen* as a concept of post-humanism, homologous with Foucault’s field of forces, Deleuze and Guattari’s body-without-organs (who found inspiration also in this passage), and the becoming machinic of the multitude. We could embrace *Gattungswesen* as the concept of a *social monster*, yet of a monster facing the future and not emerging from of an *unconscious principle of nature*. Similarly the idea of the common attempts to show the collective beast at the centre of contemporary capitalism under the form of a species-being, but as a species-being to be constructed, not already given. Specific apparatuses of measure, control and capture are necessary to domesticate such a beast. Evoking the social monster, we have to understand how capital is able to capture such a net of relations, such a field of forces, how it is able to impose today *a number to the collective beast*.

**For a topology of the field of value: the new apparatuses of ranking and rating.**

5. *Topological models of the field of value.* New empirical models of valorisation (that is another name for Deleuze and Guattari’s registration machines) must be introduced to understand the metamorphoses of capital under the pressure of the social forces of the last decades. Also following Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, I propose to describe the field of economic forces in a *topological* and not in a *quantitative* way as orthodox political economy and clock-watchers still do. The institutions of ranking and rating are apparatuses used to measure the field of value, but of course also to control and capture the field of social relations that produce this very value. I propose here four examples: the reference economy of the university, the attention economy of the internet, the prestige economy of the art world and the geopolitical influence of international rating agencies. They all function as networks of valorisation, as multi-armed giant octopuses immersed in the waters of different oceans. For reason of clarity I suggest to distinguish between *ranking*, that is a machinic and objective form of measure, and *rating*, that is a political and subjective form of measure, but actually all these models can be considered different incarnation of the same machinic diagram of the social field.

6. *Distinction between ‘machinic’ ranking and ‘political’ rating.* By *ranking* I mean a position in a certain range according to an *objective* procedure, a method, an algorithm (as it happens in the evaluation of academic journals, in the re-

uvijek čine ortodoksna politička ekonomija i promatrači sata. Institucije rangiranja i rejtinga su aparati koji se koriste za mjerenje polja vrijednosti, ali, dakako, i za nadziranje i zarobljavanje polja društvenih odnosa koji proizvode upravo tu vrijednost. Predlažem ovdje četiri primjera: ekonomiju referenci na sveučilištu, ekonomiju pozornosti na internetu, ekonomiju prestiža u svijetu umjetnosti i geopolitički utjecaj međunarodnih agencija za rejting. Svi oni djeluju kao mreže za vrednovanje, kao goleme hobotnice s obiljem pipaka uronjene u različite oceane. Radi jasnoće predlažem razlikovanje između *rangiranja* kao mašinskog i objektivnog oblika mjerenja i *rejtinga* kao političkog i subjektivnog oblika mjerenja, ali ustvari se svi ti modeli mogu smatrati različitim inkarnacijama istog mašinskog dijagrama društvenog polja.

6. *Razlika između “mašinskog” rangiranja i “političkog” rejtinga.* Pod *rangiranjem* podrazumijevam položaj na određenoj rang-listi prema nekom *objektivnom* postupku, metodi ili algoritmu (kao što je slučaj s vrednovanjem znanstvenih časopisa u rezultatima Googleove tražilice ili s izračunom broja sljedbenika na Facebooku i Twitteru). Pod *rejtingom* podrazumijevam položaj na ljestvici prema nekom sustavu *subjektivne* procjene, koja se zasniva na priznanju, povjerenju i potpori osoba s kojima je uspostavljena kompleksna mreža odnosa (vidi svijet umjetnosti i osobito međunarodne agencije za rejting koje nude svoje procjene investitorima u tkanju puko političkih odnosa i čudovišnih sukoba interesa). Definiram prvi dijagram kao *mašinski* jer uključuje uporabu kodificiranih postupaka, a drugi kao *politički* jer uključuje drevno političko umijeće izgradnje konsenzusa, povjerenja i društvenih saveza na osnovi neformalnih odnosa. Ustvari su prema definiciji Deleuzea i Guattarija oba slučaja mašinski sistemi, budući da miješaju automatizme s društvenim odnosima. Slično Marxu (1867.), kod kojega su strojevi uvijek zauzimaju apstraktne odnose prema prethodnoj podjeli rada, neki algoritmi za rangiranje ipak se *formalno* ugrađuju u prethodno *neformalne* strukture rejtinga (usporedi način na koji društveni mediji mapiraju, prevode i ubrzavaju naše stvarne društvene odnose).

7. *Razlika između društvenih mreža i institucionalnih aparata.* Ono što želim čim jasnije istaknuti jest cjelokupno društveno polje *kolektivne životinje*, odnosno prošireni, fluidni i raznoliki prostor metropole. Očito su globalna digitalna mreža i njezini društveni mediji najbolji primjer za ilustraciju goleme mreže za proizvodnju i registraciju *vrednujućih društvenih odnosa*. U manjim razmjerima, ali sa znatnim ekonomskim utjecajem, možemo navesti slučaj svijeta umjetnosti, koji je također utemeljen na mrežama koje su ne-

sults of the Google search engine or in the calculation of the number of followers on Facebook and Twitter). By *rating* I mean the position along a scale according to a system of *subjective* assessments, based on recognition, trust and support by persons with whom a complex network of relations has been established (see the art world and especially the international rating agencies, which offer their assessments to investors within a fabric of pure political relations and monstrous conflicts of interest). We define the first diagram as *machinic* because it implies the use of codified procedures, and the second diagram as *political* because it implies the ancient political art of building consensus, trust and social alliances on the basis of informal relations. Actually both cases are machinic systems, according to the definition of Deleuze and Guattari, as they mix automatisms with social relations. Similarly to Marx (1867), where machinery always occupies the abstract relations of a previous division of labour, some ranking algorithms happen to be *formally* installed on previous *informal* structures of rating (see also how social media map, translate and accelerate our real social relations).

7. *Distinction between social networks and institutional apparatuses.* What I want to highlight as much as possible is the whole social field of the *collective beast*, that is the extended, fluid and manifold space of the metropolis. Obviously, the global digital network and its social media are the best example to illustrate the giant network for the production and registration of *valorising social relations*. On a smaller scale, but with a significant economic im-

pact, we can introduce the case of the art world that it is also based on networks that are informal, fluid, non-hierarchical and not necessarily institutional. This mesh of social relations constitutes also the substance of institutions that are apparently granitic: if universities and rating agencies show all the rigidity of institutional hierarchies and political power, their ontological constitution is not so different from that of the metropolis: they are in other words a condensation of social relations.

Model 1). *The reference economy of university: an example of institutional and machinic mediation.* It was in the German university of the end of the 19th century where a ranking system for academic publications was introduced by tracing and calculating the number and the matrix of bibliographic citations. More citations, the greater the 'academic' importance of a given text (this model will also inspire Google's PageRank algorithm). As it is well known, every university researcher today is still captured in this measuring apparatus that determines her/his career and her/his gradient of competition. This ranking system crosses and shapes universities also on a global scale: along with other indexes, it is also used to measure their 'prestige' and their 'global value'. As you know, especially reading the recent Anglo-American chronicles, such a network of valorisation has a deep impact on the social status of a given university, on the tuition fees and thereafter directly on student debt. Student debt could be defined as the reversal of the cognitive pyramid of ranking, reproducing its segmentations and economic hierarchies like a mirror.

formalne, fluidne, nehijerarhijske i ne nužno institucionalne. Ta mreža društvenih odnosa također čini bit institucija koje su naizgled čvrste poput granita: ako sveučilišta i agencije za rejting pokazuju svu krutost institucionalnih hijerarhija i političke moći, njihova ontološka konstitucija nije odviše različita od one metropole: svi su oni, drugim riječima, rezultat kondenzacije društvenih odnosa.

Model 1). *Ekonomija referenci na sveučilištu: primjer institucionalne i mašinske medijacije.* Sustav rangiranja znanstvenih publikacija uveden je na njemačkim sveučilištima krajem 19. stoljeća, a sastojao se u praćenju i izračunu broja i matrice bibliografskih navoda. Što je njihov broj bio veći, veća je bila i “znanstvena” važnost danog teksta (taj model poslužit će i kao inspiracija za Googleov PageRank algoritam). Kao što je poznato, svaki sveučilišni znanstvenik je danas uhvaćen u taj mjerni aparat, koji određuje njegovu karijeru i poziciju u natjecanju. Taj sustav rangiranja prožima i oblikuje sveučilišta i na globalnoj razini: uz druge indekse, također se koristi za mjerenje njihove “prestiznosti” i “globalne vrijednosti”. Kao što se osobito vidi iz recentnih anglo-američkih kronika, takva mreža vrednovanja ima velik utjecaj na društveni status dotičnog sveučilišta, na školarinu koju se može tražiti, a time i neposredno na studentski dug. Studentski dug mogao bi se definirati kao drugo lice kognitivne piramide rangiranja, budući da reproducira njezinu segmentaciju i ekonomske hijerarhije kao u zrcalu.

Model 2). *Ekonomija pozornosti na internetu: primjer društvene i mašinske medijacije.* Algoritam Googleove tražilice rođen je primjenom starog njemačkog modela koji se koristi za “mjerenje” znanstvenih publikacija na svaki dokument u hipertekstu interneta. U osnovi Googleov PageRank algoritam automatski računa “vrijednost” svake mrežne poveznice i odlučuje o važnosti i vidljivosti dotičnog dokumenta ovisno o broju i kakvoći poveznica koje na nj upućuju. Googleov PageRank algoritam može se smatrati maksimalno empirijskim dijagramom akumulacije vrijednosti u kognitivnom kapitalizmu (Pasquinelli 2009. i 2011.) i akumulatorom onih *vrednujućih informacija* koje je već Alquati (1963.) zamijetio na djelu u Olivettijevoj kibernetskoj tvornici. Općenitije gledano, internet danas konačno pokazuje svoju cjelokupnu dimenziju “društvene proizvodnje” u ekonomiji pozornosti društvenih mreža kao što su Facebook i Twitter, gdje se osobni prestiž računa na sličan način kao kod Googleova PageRank algoritma, na temelju “lajkova” i “pratitelja”.

Model 2). *The attention economy of the internet: an example of social and machinic mediation.* The algorithm of the search engine Google was born applying the old German model used to 'measure' academic publications to each document of the web hypertext. Basically Google's PageRank algorithm automatically calculates the 'value' of each web link and decides the importance and visibility of a given document depending on the number and quality of links pointing to it. Google's PageRank algorithm can be taken as the most empirical diagram of the accumulation of value in cognitive capitalism (see Pasquinelli 2009, 2011) and as an accumulator of that *valorising information* that already Alquati (1963) traced at work in the cybernetic factory of Olivetti. More in general, internet today finally shows its whole dimension of 'social production' in the attention economy of social networks like Facebook and Twitter, where in a similar way to Google's PageRank algorithm the personal prestige is calculated precisely on the basis of number of 'likes' and 'followers'.

Model 3). *The prestige economy of the art world: an example of social and political mediation.* At closer inspection, the attention economy that the internet has made visible has always been at the heart of the spectacular economy of mass media and especially of the art world. The work of art functions today as a *unique irreproducible signifier* whose value is accumulated and measured within a complex social matrix. In this network of valorisation surrounding the artwork very codified roles are

connected to each other: authors, curators, critics, gallerists, collectors, exhibitions, magazines, museums and eventually the audience. It is enough to browse the main art journals to see how contemporary art is a careful social engineering more concerned about the delicate hierarchy of name dropping that aesthetic issues. Compared to the impassive algorithms of digital networks and the rigid university indexes, the art world, like all the spectacular world of commodities, is organised around vortices of valorisation that appear much more fluid and informal.

Model 4). *The trust economy of rating agencies: an example of institutional and political mediation.* At a geopolitical level the rating agencies show mechanisms very similar to those that we have tried to explain at other scales. From the recent chronicles of the global crisis we see that the fate of public debt is in the hands of private rating agencies, the armed wing of giant financial interests, that in this way influence the destiny of entire countries. We could say that the political and institutional apparatuses engineered by these organisations represent most clearly the machinic substrate of the economy of debt, since the degree of speculation on debt depends on the amount of trust that is numerically assigned to a given company or country. Moreover it is the media amplification of the rating announcements from these agencies (AAA, AA, A+, etc.) and the related mass hysteria, that makes these agencies machines of political and biopolitical governances. These agencies are

Model 3). *Ekonomija prestiža u svijetu umjetnosti: primjer društvene i političke medijacije.* Kada bolje pogledamo, vidjet ćemo da je ekonomija pozornosti, koju je internet učinio vidljivom, oduvijek u srcu spektakularne ekonomije masovnih medija i osobito svijeta umjetnosti. Svijet umjetnosti danas funkcionira kao *jedinstveni i neponovljivi označitelj* čija se vrijednost akumulira i mjeri unutar složene društvene matrice. U toj mreži vrednovanja koja okružuje umjetničko djelo postoje izrazito kodificirane i međusobno povezane uloge: umjetnici, kustosi, kritičari, galeristi, kolekcionari, izložbe, časopisi, muzeji i naposljetku publika. Dovoljno je prelistati glavne umjetničke časopise da se vidi kako je suvremena umjetnost precizan društveni inženjering, kojemu je više stalo do fine hijerarhije slavnih imena nego do estetskih pitanja. U usporedbi s neosjetljivim algoritmima digitalnih mreža i krutim sveučilišnim indeksima, svijet umjetnosti, kao i spektakularni svijet robe, organiziran je oko vrtlogâ vrednovanja koji se čine daleko fluidnijima i neformalnijima.

Model 4). *Ekonomija povjerenja u agencijama za rejting: primjer institucionalne i političke medijacije.* Na geopolitičkoj razini agencije za rejting pokazuju mehanizme koji su veoma slični onima koje smo nastojali objasniti na drugim razinama. Iz recentnih kronika globalne krize vidimo da je sudbina javnog duga u rukama privatnih agencija za rejting, oružanog krila golemih financijskih interesa, koje na taj način utječu na sudbinu čitavih zemalja. Mogli bismo reći da politički i institucionalni aparati koje te organizacije izgrađuju veoma jasno predstavljaju mehanički supstrat ekonomije dugovanja, budući da stupanj spekuliranja dugom ovisi o količini povjerenja koje se numerički dodjeljuje određenoj tvrtki ili državi. Štoviše, upravo su medijsko potenciranje objava rejtinga iz tih agencija (AAA, AA, A+, itd.) i s njime povezana masovna histerija ti koji takve agencije pretvaraju u strojeve za političko i biopolitičko upravljanje. Agencije su očito privatni akteri, ali njihov utjecaj osjeća se širom javne sfere jezika i performativnog djelovanja: zanimljivo je pritom da kada dospiju u pravne nevolje i kada ih neke vlade tuže te agencije štite svoje odluke o rejtingu na osnovi Prvog amandmana američkog Ustava, a to je *sloboda govora*.

8. *(Apstraktni) strojevi uvijek smjenjuju društvene strojeve.* Ovi mehanizmi za rejting i rangiranje, kao novi oblik biopolitičke kontrole i proizvodnje novih subjektivnosti i društvenog natjecanja, smje-

clearly private actors but their influence plays across the public sphere of language and performative acts: funny enough, when they are into legal troubles and sued by some governments, they protect their rating decisions with the First Amendment of United States constitution, that is as *freedom of speech*.

8. *(Abstract) machines always replace social machines*. These rating and ranking mechanisms, as a new form of biopolitical control and production of new subjectivities and social competition, replace the traditional discipline of time of the Fordist industrial metropolis. I do not mean to introduce here an opposition between the temporal field of Fordism and the social field of post-Fordism, both being branches of the same law of surplus value, of the same machinic evolution. The paradigm of cognitive capitalism must be compared with these models of vortical accumulation, measurement and governance of social relations. As the machines described by Marx in a chapter of *Capital*, these measuring systems do not invent anything new, but they occupy and map a network of pre-existing social relations and behaviours. The econ-

omies of social production clearly exist well before the rating and ranking systems come to overcode, measure, control and capture them. Also the machine of debt comes to overcode these relations.

9. *The factory of indebted man is cognitive and machinic*. These models of ranking and rating are the same that describe, in a reverse fashion, the networks of debt of financial capitalism and keep alive the apparatuses of subjectification and competition of neoliberalism. We could say that the degree of trust measured and projected by the rating agencies run politically specular to the sense of guilt which is the basis of the debtor-creditor economic relationship (see Lazzarato 2011 on 'the factory of the indebted man'). This new apparatuses of debt did not replace the apparatuses of cognitive capitalism, but it is a very cognitive and machinic capitalism to provide facilities and devices for the governance of debt and the measure of value. It is a cognitive and machinic capitalism that allows debt and all the tricks of financial capitalism to become pervasive and persistent, chasing us wherever we go.

njuju tradicionalnu disciplinu vremena u fordističkoj industrijskoj metropoli. Nije mi namjera ovdje uvoditi opoziciju između temporalnog polja fordizma i društvenog polja postfordizma, budući da su oba ogranci istog zakona viška vrijednosti, iste mašinske evolucije. Paradigmu kognitivnog kapitalizma valja usporediti s tim modelima vrtložne akumulacije, mjerenja i upravljanja društvenim odnosima. Kao strojevi koje je Marx opisao u jednom poglavlju *Kapitala*, ovi sustavi mjerenja ne izmišljaju ništa novo, nego zauzimaju i mapiraju mrežu već postojećih društvenih odnosa i oblika ponašanja. Ekonomije društvene proizvodnje postojale su daleko prije nego što su došli sustavi rejtinga i rangiranja kako bi ih prekodirali, izmjerili, nadzirali i obuhvatili. I stroj dugovanja dolazi kako bi prekodirao te odnose.

9. *Tvornica zaduženog čovjeka je kognitivna i mašinska.* Ovi modeli rangiranja i rejtinga isti su oni koji opisuju, samo obrnuto, mreže dugovanja u financijskom kapitalizmu i održavaju na životu aparate subjektifikacije i kompeticije u neoliberalizmu. Mogli bismo reći da stupanj povjerenja koji mjere i projiciraju agencije za rejting u političkom smislu zrcali osjećaj krivice, koji je osnova ekonomskog odnosa dužnika i kreditora (usp. Lazzarato 2011 o “tvornici zaduženog čovjeka”). Ti novi aparati dugovanja nisu zamijenili aparate kognitivnog kapitalizma, no kapitalizam mora biti upravo kognitivne i mašinske naravi kako bi imao mogućnosti i sredstva za upravljanje dugom i za mjerenje vrijednosti. Upravo je kognitivni i mašinski kapitalizam taj koji omogućuje da dugovi i svi drugi trikovi financijskog kapitalizma postanu sveprisutni i trajni te da nam budu za petama kamo god krenuli.

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**



## Bibliography

- Alquati, Romano (1963). "Composizione organica del capitale e forza-lavoro alla Olivetti". *Quaderni Rossi*, n. 3, 1963.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1986). *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1990) 'Le devenir révolutionnaire et les créations politiques'. Interview with Antonio Negri. *Futur Antérieur*, n. 1, 1990. As 'Contrôle et devenir' in: Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers 1972-1990*. Paris, Minuit, 1990. Translation: 'Control and Becoming'. In: *Negotiations 1972-1990*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
- Deleuze, Gilles e Guattari, Félix (1972). *L'Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Vol. 1*. Paris: Minuit.
- Dyer-Witford, Nick (2004). "1844/2004/2044: The Return of Species-Being". *Historical Materialism*, vol. 12, n. 4, 2004.
- Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2009). *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Lazzarato, Maurizio (2011). *La Fabrique de l'homme endetté: essai sur la condition néolibérale*. Paris: Édition Amsterdam.
- Marx, Karl (1932). *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844*. In: *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA1)*, Berlin.
- Marx, Karl (1867). *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vol. 1*. Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner.
- Marx, Karl (1894). *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Vol. 3*. Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner.
- Mirowski, Philip (1989). *More Heat than Light. Economics as social physics: Physics as nature's economics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pasquinelli, Matteo (2009). "Google's PageRank Algorithm: A Diagram of Cognitive Capitalism and the Rentier of the Common Intellect". In: Konrad Becker, Felix Stalder (eds), *Deep Search*, London: Transaction Publishers: 2009.
- Pasquinelli, Matteo (2011). "Capitalismo macchinico e plusvalore di rete: note sull'economia politica della macchina di Turing". Uninomade, November 2011, online: [www.uninomade.org/capitalismo-macchinico](http://www.uninomade.org/capitalismo-macchinico)

## Bibliografija

- Alquati, Romano. "Composizione organica del capitale e forza-lavoro alla Olivetti", *Quaderni Rossi* 3 (1963.).
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Foucault* (Pariz: Minuit, 1986.).
- Deleuze, Gilles. "Le devenir révolutionnaire et les créations politiques", intervju s Antoniom Negrijem, *Futur Antérieur* 1 (1990.). Objavljeno kao "Contrôle et devenir" u: Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers 1972-1990* (Pariz: Minuit, 1990.).
- Deleuze, Gilles i Guattari, Félix. *L'Anti-Oedipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Vol. 1* (Pariz: Minuit, 1972.).
- Dyer-Witheford, Nick. "1844/2004/2044: The Return of Species-Being", *Historical Materialism* 12/4 (2004.).
- Hardt, Michael i Negri, Antonio. *Imperij* (Zagreb: Arkzin i Multimedijalni institut, 2003.).
- Hardt, Michael i Negri, Antonio. *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009.).
- Lazzarato, Maurizio. *Proizvodnja zaduženog čovjeka: esej o neoliberalnom stanju* (Zagreb: Bijeli val, 2013.).
- Marx, Karl. *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844. U: Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA1)* (Berlin, 1932.).
- Marx, Karl. *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Band 1* (Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner, 1867.).
- Marx, Karl. *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Band 3* (Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner, 1894.).
- Mirowski, Philip. *More Heat than Light. Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature's Economics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989.).
- Pasquinelli, Matteo. "Google's PageRank Algorithm: A Diagram of Cognitive Capitalism and the Rentier of the Common Intellect". U: Konrad Becker, Felix Stalder (ur.), *Deep Search* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009.).
- Pasquinelli, Matteo. "Capitalismo macchinico e plusvalore di rete: note sull'economia politica della macchina di Turing". *Uninomade* (studenti 2011.), [www.uninomade.org/capitalismo-macchinico](http://www.uninomade.org/capitalismo-macchinico)

# **NEW MEDIA AND OTHER MEDIA**

# NOVI MEDIJI I DRUGI MEDIJI



# Šta je radikalno u “radikalnim medijima”? Drugačiji, nadrealistički predlog

**G**odine 1932, beogradski nadrealisti su pisali da su njihov rad i koncepti, često osporavani, borbene i da ne pristaju da napuste jedno takvo neposredno sredstvo kao što bi bilo objavljivanje svojih eksperimenata. Ali, taj *imperativ objavljivanja* nije išao ruku-pod-ruku sa uobičajenim imperativom radikalne inteligencije – objavljivati po bilo koju cenu, bez reflektovanja samog proizvodnog procesa tog objavljivanja. Umesto objavljivanja kao socio-političke tematizacije, da li nešto što nosi naziv “radikalni mediji” umesto toga može da se misli kao socijalna materijalizacija auto-teorizacije?

Praksa objavljivanja i praksa medija, generalno i svakako, pripada praksama informisanja javnosti, stoga, pripada javnoj, državnoj sferi. Potkrepljeno rečima nadrealista: “*Ljudi pišu... Činjenica je da jedni to smatraju [pisanje] kao vrhunac svega onog što ljudstvo preduzima, kao svoju, skoro mističnu misiju u svetu. Ljudi pišu [i objavljuju] za nas*”; dakle, dvostruko pripadanje: javnoj sferi, i često i fetišizmu pisanja (kao autorski profesionalizam takođe?). Odmah potom moglo bi da se doda – u pitanju je podešavanje prema dominantnom moralu, mišljenju, ideologiji, ukusu – tj. u pitanju je siguran put u državnu sferu. *Cena masovnog apela je konformizam prema masovnom moralu*. Zsigurno, postoji nešto što bi se moglo okarakterisati kao *kritičko* u medijima, uglavnom i najviše nešto što referiše na objavljivanje kritičkog sadržaja – kritičkog u smislu promocije opozicionog stava naspram dominantnog mišljenja/mnjenja dominantnih liberalnih medija, na primer. Ali, to lako može da sklizne u tematizaciju problema objavljivanjem kritičkog sadržaja, što i dalje pripada i ne propituje kategorije reprezentacije i deskripcije opštih socio-političkih okolnosti i kulturnih dešavanja – tj. i dalje pripada i

# What is Radical in 'Radical Media'?

## A Different, Surrealists Kind of Proposal

● In 1932 the Belgrade Surrealists wrote that their work and concepts, often disputed, are militant and that they don't accept abandoning of such immediate means like the *publishing* of their experiments. But this imperative to *publish* doesn't really comply with the usual radical intelligentsia imperative – to publish at any cost, without thinking through the very production process of publishing. Instead of thinking of publishing as a form of socio-political thematization could something named 'radical media' be thought of as a social materialization of auto-theorization?

Publishing, and media-practice in general, certainly belongs to the practice of information/informing of the public, therefore, it belongs to the public state sphere. As Surrealists would say: "*People write... It is the fact that some consider [writing] as a peak of what hu-*

*mankind undertakes as its almost mystical role in the world. People write [and publish] for us*"; which is a twofold belonging: to the public sphere and frequently to the fetishism of writing (as authorial professionalism as well?). Immediately it could be added – it is an adaptation to the dominant morality, opinion, ideology, taste – i.e. a way into the state sphere. *The price of mass appeal is the conformity to mass morality.* For sure, there's something which could be characterized as *critical* in media, mostly and usually referring to the publishing of a critical content – critical in terms of promoting oppositional attitude towards the dominant opinion of dominant liberal media, for example. But, that could easily slip into a thematization of the problems through critical content, which still belongs to and doesn't question categories of representation and description of general socio-political conditions and of cultural goings-on – i.e. still belongs and doesn't leave the state sphere. As a thematization rather than a problematization, it is then *an uncritical critique of uncritical critique. An objectivist realism.* The politics of

ne pravi korak dalje od državne sfere. Kao tematizacija pre nego problematizacija, u pitanju je onda *nekritička kritika nekritičke kritike*. *Objektivistički realizam*. Politika takve prakse je tada objektivizovana državom i javnom sferom i pridodata odgovarajućem registru: registru efikasnosti, rezultata, modela – plana. Tada takvoj politici, odnosno *političkom* u ovom slučaju, može da se pristupi samo kroz intelektualnu kompozitnu celinu, na primer, političke ekonomije, kao deskripcije generalnih socio-političkih i ekonomskih okolnosti.

Ono što treba da bude u pitanju, umesto socio-političke tematizacije problema u vidu objavljivanja kritičkog sadržaja, je propitivanje samih uslova proizvodnje medija/izdavačkog procesa. Auto-kritika/auto-teorizacija. Odgovor na gore postavljenu diskusiju je pitanje: Šta je medij koji u sebi ne sadrži sopstvenu kritiku? Dupliranje odgovora (uz sav rizik upadanja u registar objašnjavanja time) bi dovelo do konstatacije da je to medij podređen političkim i ideološkim uslovima svoje konstitucije, na način da uvek reprodukuje te uslove iznova, bez dostizanja njihovih granica koje se tada probijaju. Čak i kritički mediji/izdavaštvo kakve znamo pate od uredničkih *policy*-ja, što u stvari znači da pate od striktno i rigorozno podele rada – rada razdvajanja. Pozicije u uredničkoj konstelaciji su čvrste i retko razmenjive, osim u slučaju propulzivnosti u okviru socijalnih merdevina u kretanju ka višim, prominentnim pozicijama i funkcijama u državnoj sferi. Jasno je da takva podela implicira podelu na intelektualni i manuelni rad u okviru samog intelektualnog rada, uspostavljaajući političku i ideološku strukturu tih proizvodnih odnosa. Posedovanje *tajne znanja* reprodukuje ideološke odnose i subordinira nadzorom, kontrolom, edukacijom i paternalizacijom; kao znanje koje intelektualizira (profesionalizuje takođe?) i služi razdvajanju razvlašćenjem. U okviru takve podele i razdvajanja rada, ispostavljanje zahteva, na primer, za jednakim nadnicama/platama i za njihovom jednakom distribucijom može da predstavlja mali korak napred. Ali onda opet, korak napred i ka – čemu? Korak ka planu, u socijalizaciju rada. Mali korak koji je bitan ukoliko iskoračenje ne vrši konstipaciju odluke da se prekine sa podelom rada, kao političkog imperativa svih tih praksi. Subjektivni skok koji tada ne sme skliznuti u objektivizovani oblik *politike u eksteriornosti*, tj. u nekritičku kritiku nekritičke kritike. U proizvodnju koja traži *scenu* na svakom drugom mestu osim u sopstvenoj auto-teoretizirajućoj praksi.

Nakon opisivanja praksi sa kojima je susret čest i neminovan, na ovom mestu sledi jedan drugačiji primer prakse, kao drugačija vrsta predloga. Prema “radikalnim medijima”? Ne bih znala reći. U svakom slučaju, idemo u tridesete godine XX veka.





*...sav naš bes refleksije kojom raščinjavamo, rastavljamo, prekidamo splet laži, tj. splet misli današnjice... [nasuprot potčinjavanju zahtevima i pozivima jedne epohe]...*

*U pitanju je, međutim, ne jedno prefarbanje, no jedno korenito menjanje, jedna dijalektizacija čitavog sistema mera.*

*Mi se pozivamo na taj užasan pritisak na tok misli koja se misli.*

Dakle, imperativ da se objavljuje, ne kao socio-politička tematizacija, već kao problematizacija samog procesa objavljivanja i auto-kritika sopstvene pozicije i prakse. U tom smislu, jedna od važnih praksi beogradskih nadrealista je objavljivanje njihovih eksperimenata u knjigama i časopisima, kao što bi to bio časopis "Nadrealizam danas i ovde", koji je imao tri objavljena broja u periodu od 1930. do 1932. godine.

Njegova dinamika objavljivanja neredovno objavljivanog časopisa, stoga časopisa koji nema status formalnog časopisa i izdavačke prakse, ukazuje na bar dve stvari i pozicije. S jedne strane, da li bi se moglo reći da je časopis predstavljao medij ili organ (sredstvo, kako bi nadrealisti rekli) grupe? I s druge, pre nego direktno oslikavajući materijalne uslove njihove izdavačke prakse, sadržaj i dinamika objavljivanja časopisa ukazuju na neprestano prisutnu tenziju o tome da li objavljivati svoje eksperimente ili uopšte ne. U tom smislu, nadrealisti bi često govorili da što se takve prakse tiče, da im to *ne služi na čast. Ako je danas najefikasniji oblik našeg delanja izražavanje naše misli putem publikacija, onda treba učiniti sve što zavisi od nas da taj način delanja bude zaista efikasan a to znači svestan i pošten. A prva stvar koju imamo da izjavimo u ime tog poštenja je ta da se ovde ne radi o jednostavnom i shematičnom dovođenju u sklad nadrealizma sa današnjim tezama dialektičkog materijalizma, već o aktivnoj i živoj izgradnji svesti koja učestvuje u menjanju sveta.*

[Međuigra1] Iako je insistiranje na nauci, na naučnom pristupu, imalo posebno značenje za nadrealiste – pre svega, istorijski materijalizam i neophodnost *njegovog kretanja između ostalih nauka* – na ovom mestu i za njih, kategorije časti, morala, poštenja jesu političke kategorije. [kraj međuigre1]

Stoga je promišljanje sopstvene izdavačke prakse koincidiralo sa i deo je njihovog umetničkog i teorijskog rada kao kontinuirane auto-kritike same te prakse.

Reći da je objavljivanje organ, sredstvo donošenja pred publiku rada nadrealističke grupe (takođe u smislu samo-promocije) je nedovoljno i verovatno pogrešno, jer su negovali poseban koncept Grupe, nadrealizma kao grupe, koju su videli kao jednu od glavnih mesta ograničenja razvoja njihove prakse. Na tom novom nivou tenzije, nadrealisti se nisu bavili pitanjem organizacije, s obzirom na to da *nikada nisu želeli da daju neverovatna obećanja i predloge,*



Meeting of the editorial board



Meeting of the editorial board

na primer, za pravolinijsku i direktnu promenu društva. Oni su se pre bavili klackalicom između nadrealizma kao grupe i kao pokreta, gde grupa/-isanje stoji kao znak slabosti samog pokreta. Grupa je značila *monopolisanje delovanja u jednom pravcu, delovanja u ime jedne ideje, pod jednim imenom*. Grupa je označavala zatvoren pokret, u nastojanju da izvrši moralnu disciplinu nad svojim članovima, gde je neprestana opasnost prisutna, za nadrealizam, da bi mogao da postane permanentan put do uspeha ambicioznih intelektualaca-karijerista. Kao istorijska formacija, grupa je prolaznija od pokreta, i ona ima za cilj da omogući formiranje *unutrašnjeg pokreta*, do stepena gde on, prevazilazeći svoj okvir, postaje *otvoren pokret* – pokret u kom svako ima pravo da učestvuje (bez obzira na intelektualne klasifikacije). Stoga, i kao grupa i kao pokret, nadrealizam je prolazan, gde je *trajanje nadrealističkog pokreta, dakle, u obrnutoj srazmeri sa brzinom njegovog širenja*. Njegov potpuni uspeh izjednačuje se s prestankom nadrealizma – njegovo konačno napuštanje i napuštanje, kroz unutrašnji pokret, bilo kakvog oblika individualističke identifikacije. Kraj podele rada – i u sadržaju i u formi njihovih eksperimenata.

Očigledno, u toj debati, nadrealistički pojam pokreta i njegovog napuštanja nije imao nikakve veze sa direktno političkim, društvenim ili bilo kojim drugim oblikom *masovnog pokreta*. Niti je nadrealizam imao tendenciju da zatvori i drži okamenjenim u individualističkim autorskim pozicijama one koji su radili u okviru njega. Niti je, s druge strane, pretendovao da svojim sopstvenim sredstvima koja odgovaraju jednoj sasvim drugoj upotrebi, zameni sredstva prilagođena za direktno društveno dejstvovanje. *Niko od nas ni jednog trenutka nije mislio da će nadrealizam postati pokret u onom smislu u kome je to moderni pokret proleterskih masa, niti u onom smislu u kome je to slobodno zidarstvo*.

Štaviše, u svojoj teorijskoj, umetničkoj i izdavačkoj proizvodnji, bili su jasni što se tiče “efekata” tih praksi. Nadrealizam se nije bavio edukacijom, nije se bavio neposrednim delanjem za ostvarenjem potreba i za poboljšanje materijalnih uslova života. Bilo je jasno da njihova spisateljska praksa i izdavaštvo ne uzima direktnog učešća u direktnom rešavanju socijalnih problema, niti je uzimanje u obzir objektivnih socio-ekonomskih okolnosti moglo predstavljati bilo šta drugo do *ogledala bede*. Pisati o tome, stoga edukovati i vaspitavati o uslovima te bede, ne bi značilo ništa drugo do staviti ispred *bednih ljudi* ogledalo njihove bede, što svakako nije celina i određenje njihove subjektivnosti. U tom smislu, nadrealisti nisu brkali samu realnost, ono što jeste, sa shvatanjem realnosti, tj. sa onim kako se to bivanje kome predstavlja – nisu brkali *materijalne* uslove i *materijalistički* pristup.

such practice is then objectified by the state and its public sphere and assigned to a certain record/register, for example, of efficiency, result, model – a plan. Then such a politics, or *the political* in this case, can be approached only through the intellectual composite totality of, for example, political economy, as a description of general socio-political conditions.

What should be put into question, instead of the socio-political thematization of problems acting as critical content, are the very conditions of production of media/publishing process. Auto-criticism/auto-theorization. The answer to the above discussion is a question: What are the media that don't contain their own critique? Retorting to that answer (with the risk of dropping into the register of explaining) would lead us to state that it is the media that are subordinated to the political and ideological conditions of their constitution, in the way that they always reproduce those conditions anew, without reaching their limits and then breaking through them. Even the critical media/publishing as we know them suffer from editorial policies which are actually subject to strict and rigorous division of labour – labour of disjunction. Positions in the editorial constellations are fixed and rarely exchangeable, except in the cases when someone is climbing the social ladder to reach higher, more prominent positions and functions within the state-sphere.

Clearly this implies a division of the intellectual from the manual labour within the intellectual labour by the work of constructing political and ideological structures in those production relations. Possessing *the secret of knowledge* reproduces the ideological relations

and subordinates by supervision, control, education and paternalization; as a knowledge which is intellectualizing (and professionalizing?) and serving the separation by dispossession. Within that division and disjunction of labour to make a claim, for example, for equal wages and their egalitarian distribution might be a small step forward. But then again, step forward and towards – what? Step into a plan, into socialization of labour. A small step which is important only if it by making that step doesn't constipate the decision to end with the division of labour as a political imperative of all of those practices. A subjective leap which then mustn't slip into the objectified pole of *politics in exteriority*, i.e. into uncritical critique of uncritical critique. Into production which seeks *the scene* everywhere else except in its own auto-theorizing practice.

After demarcating practices that we inevitably frequently encounter, here follows another kind of practice, another kind of proposal. Towards 'radical media'? I can't really tell. But, we go back into the 1930s...

*...all our anger of reflection with which we are uncovering, dissolving, terminating that reticulum of lies, i.e. reticulum of thoughts of today... [contrary to the submitting to the demands and calls of an epoch]...*

*This is, nevertheless, instead of mystification, a radical change, a dialectisation of the whole system of measures.*

*We adduce ourselves to that horrible pressure, of stream of thought which is then thought through.*

*...Oni se plaše misli: kod Marxa o paranoji ili o želji, ili o nadrealizmu, nisu ništa pročitali, prema tome, misle oni, to su problemi o kojima ne može marksistički da se govori...*

[Međuigra2] Na ovom mestu ne sme se zaboraviti na nadrealistički negativan, subverzivan i destruktivan efekat *na savremeno stanje konsenzualne misli*. Na efekat njegovog razbijanja bez pedagogije, ekspanzijom njihove pobude za *unutrašnjim pokretima*, ka singularnosti misli i singularnosti politike. [kraj međuigra2]

Polemike sa savremenima kao jedno od sredstava njihove teorijske i spisateljske proizvodnje, neizostavno su uključivale sopstvenu auto-kritiku – ne samo zbog promašene kritike njihovih oponentata (na koje su redovno odgovarali sredstvima koja su za njih jedino moguća i odgovarajuća samom predmetu: *fizičkim ili intelektualnim šamarima*). U tom smislu, postavili bismo pitanje: šta nije u redu s vredanjem jednog univerzitetskog profesora?, već i zato što je auto-kritika bila *sredstvo koje ih je vodilo dalje* u pokušajima rastvaranja nadrealističke grupe u pokret (sa svojim specifičnim značenjem pokreta). Auto-kritika kao osnova konstantnog ulaganja iznova, kao pokušaj da se reflektuje nastojanje ka izgradnji mesta-proizvodnje – *novi početak*. Auto-kritika/-teorizacija bila je neopходna jer je postojao osećaj, kako su govorili, *afektivnog tereta koji donosi svaki napredak u poznavanju stvarnosti*. Afektivni teret spoznaje objektivnih okolnosti.

S pravom se može postaviti pitanje da li konstantno insistiranje na kritici/auto-kritici kao auto-teorizaciji zapravo zamrzava i usporava samu proizvodnju. S pravom, kritika/auto-kritika kao auto-teorizacija stvara distancu i prekid sa proizvodnjom bez mišljenja samog proizvodnog procesa, i stoga, deluje kao socijalna materijalizacija auto-teorizacije. Auto-kritika kao auto-teorizacija kao ne-proizvodnja? Bez nastojanja da se na ovom mestu oslabi nadrealistička pozicija auto-kritičke prakse i bez njenog opravdavanja da bi se odgovorilo na zahtev publike i čitalaca (o objektivnom uvidu u celinu njihove prakse), njihova praksa i objavljeni sadržaj sadržali su: teorijsku naučnu analizu, poeziju, automatsko pisanje (uz neposredno i istovremeno propitivanje njegove podrazumevane poetike), slikarstvo, fotografe, kolaže, psihoanalitičke metode, kolektivnu analizu snova, *dijalektičke nadrealističke konsekvence izvučene iz psihoanalitičkog saznanja, ankete o želji sa drugim nadrealistima i ne-nadrealistima*, itd. i sve to skupa jasno društveno determinisano. Štaviše, nadrealisti su predložili *auto-kritiku auto-kritike*, koja zapravo unosi novu dinamiku u usporavanje generalnog imperativa da se proizvodi po bilo koju cenu, odnosno, da se proizvodi bez auto-teorizacije.

So, the imperative to *publish*, not as a socio-political thematization, but rather as a problematization of the publishing process itself and auto-critique of one's own position and practice. In those terms, one of the important practices of Belgrade's Surrealists is publishing their experiments in books and magazines, such is the magazine *Surrealism Today and Here*, with its only three issues appearing in the period 1930-1932.

Its dynamics of an irregularly published magazine, therefore not having a status of formalized magazine and publishing practice, points to at least two things. On the one side, could it be said that this was a medium of and an organ (a means, as Surrealists would put it) of the group? And from the other, rather than depicting direct material conditions of their publishing, it points to the constantly present tension of whether to publish their experiments at all. Hence, they themselves would often say of this practice that it *doesn't serve to their honor. If today the most efficient form of our action is enunciation of our thought through publishing (and that doesn't serve to our honor) then we should do our best that this form of action be really efficient, and that means conscious and honest. And the first thing we have to say in the name of that honesty is that we are not talking here about simple and schematic bringing into harmony of Surrealism with today's thesis of dialectical materialism, but rather about active and lively (re-)building of consciousness which takes part in the changing of the world.*

[Interlude1] Although insisting on science, on a scientific approach, — most of all historical materialism and necessity that it *moves between other sciences* —

had special meaning for Surrealists, here and for them the categories of honor, morality and honesty are political categories. [end of Interlude1]

Therefore, re-thinking their publishing practice coincides with and is a part of their artistic and theoretical work as a continuous auto-criticism of that very practice.

To say that publishing is an organ, a means of bringing to the public the work of the Surrealist group (also in terms of self-promotion) is insufficient and probably wrong, since they had a specific notion of the Grouping, of Surrealism as a group, which they saw as one of the main constraining elements of the development of their practice. On that new level of tension, they didn't deal with the question of organization, since they *never wanted to give unlikely promises and propositions*, for example, for linear and direct transformation of the society. They rather dealt with a seesaw, a swing between Surrealism as a group and as a movement, where grouping stands for the sign of weakness of the very movement. The group meant *monopolizing of acting in one direction, in the name of one idea, under one name*. The group for them meant a closed movement, in its attempt to perform moral discipline over its members, where the constant danger is detected, that of Surrealism becoming a permanent way to success of ambitious intellectual careerists. Rather, the group is more temporary than the movement, and its aim would be to enable the creation of *an inner-movement*, to the extent in which, by overcoming its boundaries, it becomes *an open movement*, the movement in which anyone has the right to take part in (no



— Qu'est-ce qui précède les catastrophes  
— C'est la grande bêtise.  
Društveni život u 1930 godini  
Nemoguće

"I feel that you've terribly spoiled your language. You don't have purity nor fact in speaking. You are mixing with coachman and servants, and they are brutal. Don't be in the company with them. They could be felt sorry for, but one shouldn't speak with them."

Prof. MIODRAG IBROVAC



Ibrovac as snotty



Ibrovac as Byzantine



To come on line, will they?  
Neither when one's young nor gray.



Ibrovac as ideologist



Ibrovac at the masquerade



Ibrovac as counsellor



Ibrovac as line after line



Ibrovac as a dead man



matter their intellectual qualifications). Therefore, as both group and movement, Surrealism is temporary, *where its duration is in inverse proportion with celerity of its expansion*. Its final point is the very cessation of the Surrealists movement – its final abandonment and abandonment, through an inner movement, of any form of individualist identification. The end of division of labor – in both content and form of their experiments.

Obviously, in that debate, the Surrealists' notion of the movement and its dissolution has nothing to do with any direct political, social or any other kind of 'mass-movement'. Neither had Surrealism tended to close-down and keep petrified in individualist authorial positions those who worked within it, nor, on the other hand, pretended to replace by its own means, which were used in a different way, the means appropriate for direct social action. *None of us at any point thought that Surrealism would become a movement in the sense of movement of proletarian masses, nor in the sense of freemasonry.*

Even more, in their theoretical, artistic, and publishing production, they were mindful of the 'effects' of that practice – Surrealism is not about education; not about direct acting towards an accomplishment of immediate needs and improvement of material conditions of living. It was clear that their writerly practice and publishing didn't directly take part in the direct solving of social problems, just as an insight into the objective socio-economic condition couldn't represent anything else than a *mirror of misery*. Writing about it, therefore educating about conditions of that misery, wouldn't represent anything else than putting

in front of *miserable people* a mirror of their misery, which certainly is not the totality and determination of their subjectivity. In those terms, they're not confusing the very reality of what is with the comprehension of that reality, i.e. with how it is presented to whom – not confusing *material conditions* and *materialistic* approach.

*...They are afraid of thinking: they didn't read anything about paranoia or desire, or about Surrealism at Marx's writings, therefore, they think, those are the problems which couldn't be spoken of in a materialistic way...*

[Interlude2] Here, it shouldn't be forgotten about Surrealists' negative, subversive and destructive effect on *the contemporary state of consensual mind*, as they put it. Effect produced by destruction without pedagogy, by expansion of their urge for *the inner movements* towards singularity of thought and singularity of politics. [end of Interlude2]

Polemics with contemporaries as one of the means of their theoretical and writerly production inevitably included their own auto-criticism – not only because of failed criticism of their opponents (to which they regularly responded by the only means possible and adequate for them: *by physical and intellectual slaps* – speaking in those terms, what's wrong in offending a university professor?), but also since auto-criticism was actually a *means for leading them further/forward* in their attempts of dissolving the Surrealistic group into a movement (with their specific notion of the movement). The auto-critique as a basis for constant committing/investing-anew, as an attempt to re-

Nadalje, takva auto-kritika auto-kritike njihove prakse uple-  
na je u samu formu te prakse, istovremeno kao predmet i sredstvo  
te kritike. Nastojali su da propitaju da li mogu da postoje “nove for-  
me” izražavanja koje nisu ni poezija niti proza, kao potraga za pro-  
cesom angažovanja koji bi mogao da se odvija bez bilo kakvog “me-  
dija” ili “forme” (bez bilo kakvog “modela“?). Najpre, ta potraga je  
pokrenuta sumnjom u sveobuhvatnost diskurzivne misli. Kao što je  
to slučaj u eksperimentu pod nazivom “Snovi na poslu; Istinski de-  
lirium u kretanju“:

*Naše interesovanje za intelektualni život je tako veliko da mi pomišlja-  
mo na delirijum tek u prisustvu delirantnih pojmova. Ali diskurzivna  
misao i njen prevod, reči, nisu jedini izraz mentalne aktivnosti [...] Za  
delirium mi imamo dakle druga sredstva a ne samo konceptualnu  
misao.*

U tom smislu, njihovo razumevanje poezije kao forme ekspresije/  
izričaja, trebalo bi shvatiti u njenoj osnovi *kao jednu kompenzaciju  
potiskivanja želje, to jest jedan naročit simptom ludila, tog inadekvat-  
nog rešenja sukoba između čovekovih želja i spolnog sveta*. Ali ovde ne  
bi trebalo da nas zbuni pozivanje na “svrsishodnost” poezije, koja  
bi mogla da ukazuje na efekte poezije van samog polja umetnosti –  
jer često nije ni tretirana kao umetnička forma. Pre je tretirana kao  
specifična “materijalizacija” unutrašnjeg pokreta, unutrašnjeg-  
“govora” onoga što drugačije nije moguće izreći, kao komunikacija,  
kao različito od diskurzivnosti koja je smatrana individualiziraju-  
ćom i dominirajućom.

U njihovoj potrazi za “novom formom” izražaja/izričaja u okvi-  
ru eksperimenata i promišljanja procesa objavljivanja, jedan od  
beogradskih nadrealista, Vane Bor, tvrdio je da su razočarani proči-  
tanim knjigama, generalno, i predložio je razmišljanje *o knjigama  
koje postoje u našoj imaginaciji, ali koje kao mogućnost postoje i neza-  
visno od nje*. Kao jedna od mogućih “materijalnosti” opisanog, mo-  
gao bi biti predlog *da se ispišu sadržaji tih neverovatnih i nenapisanih  
knjiga* – i tada je ispisao i dao predlog za jedan.

Potom je pozvao književne kritičare i teoretičare literature da  
kažu da li je taj novi način izražavanja poezija ili proza (očigledno  
referišući na njihovu profesionalnu vokaciju i krutu žanrovsku ori-  
jentaciju).

Kao jedan, u jednom trenutku, od najglasnijih proponenata  
nadrealista za napuštanje prakse objavljivanja njihovih eksperime-  
nata, dodao je da je zapravo *poetičnost nedovršenog* reakcionarna jer  
smatra ne-realizaciju za poetičniju od same realizacije. Verovatno  
bi se moglo postaviti pitanje da li ovo stoji u opoziciji sa dinamiz-  
mom-usporavanja proizvodnje, u smislu davanja prednosti realiza-

flect on trying to (re-)build a production place – *a new beginning*. Auto-criticism/theorization was necessary since there was a feeling of, as they said, *an affective burden which is brought upon us by every step ahead in the understanding of reality*. Affective burden of cognition of objective circumstances.

Rightfully, one could ask if constant insisting on the criticism/auto-criticism as auto-theorization is actually freezing and slowing-down production. Rightfully, criticism/auto-criticism as auto-theorization makes a distance and a break with the production without thinking through the very production process, therefore acts as a social materialization of auto-theorization. Auto-criticism as auto-theorization as non-production? Without attempting to diminish Surrealists' auto-critical practice nor attempting to justify it by giving in to the audience and readers' demand (for an objective insight into the totality of their practice), their practice and published content contained: theoretical scientific analysis, poetry, automatic writings (with immediate questioning of its implied poetics), painting, photograms, collages, psychoanalytic methods, collective analysis of dreams, *dialectic Surrealists' consequences drawn from the psychoanalytical notions, inquiries about desire with other Surrealists and non-Surrealists*, etc. and all of that clearly socially committed. Even more, Surrealists proposed *an auto-critique of auto-criticism*, which actually brings new dynamism in slowing-down general imperative to produce at any cost/without auto-theorization.

Furthermore, the auto-critique of auto-criticism of their practice is included in the very

form of that practice, acting simultaneously as a subject matter and a means of critique. Surrealists questioned if there could be 'new forms' which are neither poetry nor prose, as a quest for a process of engagement which could proceed without any 'medium' or 'form' (without any 'model?'). That search was initiated by the doubt in the comprehensiveness of the discursive thought. As a passage from the experiment *Dreams at work: A true delirium in movement* states:

Our interest in intellectual life is so big that we think of delirium only in absence delirious concepts. But discursive thought and its translations, words, are not the only expression of mental activities [...] For delirium we have, therefore, different means and not only conceptual thought.

In those terms, their understanding of poetry as a form of expression/enunciation has to be basically understood as a *compensation for the repression of desire, i.e. as one specific symptom of madness, of that inadequate solution of the conflict between desires and reality*. But we shouldn't be confused here with this 'purposefulness' of poetry, implying effects other than artistic – since often it wasn't treated as an artistic form at all. Rather, it is treated as a specific 'materialization' of the inner movement, of inner 'speech' of that which cannot be enunciated differently, as communication, as something different from the discursiveness which often could be seen as individualistic and dominating.

ciji po svaku cenu nasuprot ne-realizaciji. Ali zapravo ne. Predloženi sled: auto-kritika (auto-kritike) kao auto-teorizacija kao ne-proizvodnja, nije puka negacija same neproblematizovane proizvodnje, već je pre sled, linija koja ukazuje na njen redundantni i uzaludni karakter. Dodatno, time se ukazuje na “mesto” van date dihotomije, izvan dijalektike, limita – probijajući ih, izvan i prema novom “mestu” proizvodnje. Ova velika tenzija između realizacije i ne-realizacije, objavljivanja i neobjavljivanja, kroz auto-kritiku/-teorizaciju, takođe opisuje same limite opisane prakse, samog objavljivanja/medija, onemogućujući njeno ponavljanje kao nereflektovane i neproblematizovane proizvodnje ikada više.

[Međuigra3] Kako pozicija nadrealista nije bila vezana za pitanje organizacije, kao što je rečeno, *nikada nisu hteli da daju neverovatna obećanja i predloge*, stoga nisu nudili bilo kakav model, na primer, za angažovanje i model/formu izricaja, tako ni ovaj tekst ne nudi bilo kakav model za izdavačku praksu/medije/ili koncepciju časopisa, osim što pravi jasnu distancu od neproblematizovane proizvodnje kroz tematizaciju, a pre za problematizaciju-u-okviru auto-teorizacije. [kraj međuigre3 i kraj teksta]





In their search of 'the new form' of enunciation within their experiments and reflections on the publishing process, one of the Belgrade's Surrealists, Vane Bor, claimed that they're disappointed by the books read in general and made a proposal to think of *books as existing in imagination, but which also could exist outside of it*. As one of possible 'materializations' of that could be a proposal to write down the tables of content of those unwritten books – and then he wrote one down,

After writing that *contents* down he asked the literary critics to give their judgment if that new form of enunciation is actually prose or poetry (obviously referring to their professional vocation and stiff genre orientation).

As, at one moment, one of the loudest proponents among Surrealists of abandoning the practice of publishing of their experiments, he added that *poetics of the unfinished* is actually reactionary because it holds non-realization as more poetic than realization. One could arguably pose the question if this actually stands in opposition to the dynamic of slowing down the production, in terms of giving advantage to the realization over non-realization at any cost. But it doesn't. The proposed sequence of auto-criticism (auto-critique) as auto-theorization as

non-production is not a mere negation of the production that is left unquestioned, but it is rather a *sequence* that points to its redundant and futile character. Additionally, it also points to 'a place' beyond this dichotomy, beyond dialectics, beyond those limits by transgressing them, beyond and towards a new 'place' of production. This great tension between realization and non-realization, publishing and non-publishing, through auto-criticism/-theorization, also demarcates the limits of the described practice, of publishing/media itself, suspending the repetition of a production left unquestioned all over again.

[Interlude3] In the same way as the Surrealists position was not about dealing with the question of organization - as said, they *never wanted to give unlikely promises and proposals*, and so they never offered a model, for example, for engagement and model/form for enunciation - so this text also won't offer a model for publishing practice/media/or magazine. It only draws a clear distance from the unquestioned production in thematization, and advocates problematization-within-auto-theorizing. [end of Interlude3 and of the text]







# Tiskana radikalnost

## S

tatična i nepromjenjiva tiskana stranica rijetko se u našem desetljeću doživljava kao jedno od glavnih oruđa političkih i radikalnih strategija, budući da ljudi neprestano gledaju u ekran nekolicine osobnih sprava u trenucima kada ih ne privlače druge (a većina ih se ažurira u stvarnom vremenu). Međutim, postoji nekoliko kulturoloških elemenata koji još uvijek igraju ključnu ulogu u cirkulaciji kulture. Jedan od njih je i priznavanje tradicionalnih medijskih formi, čak i ako su digitalizirane u svojoj estetici i sadržaju. Bliskost s tim formama zasniva se na metaboliziranim “sučeljima” (svi smo mi kulturološki “urođenici” kada se radi o radiju, televiziji i tisku) koja ih čine gotovo nevidljivima, osobito kada su prenesene u digitalnu domenu te nude sadržaje na prilično neposredan način. A budući da instinktivno priznajemo te forme, mi im i “vjerujemo” te stoga vjerujemo i njihovu sadržaju.

### 1. **Novine kao (lažan) politički imaginarij**

“Laž je početak nove priče. Zato i volimo Umjetnost.”

Oscar Wilde

Forma novina (još uvijek) je jedna od najprepoznatljivijih. Današnji oblik novina tek se neznatno promijenio u odnosu na 19. stoljeće (osim što su ubačene slike i boje) te su one stoga postale svakodnevnim predmetom za čitav niz generacija, uspostavivši se kao estetski standard i definirani kulturološki predmet sa specifičnim sučeljem. Iz tog razloga umjetnici i aktivisti koriste novine kao prepoznatljiv informacijski okoliš i istodobno kao predmet iz svakodnevice: od

# Printed radicality



The static and unchangeable printed page seems to be hardly considered in years 2010s as a key tool for political and radical strategies, as human beings are constantly looking at a few personal screen-based devices when not attracted by other ones (most of them updated in real time). But there are a few cultural elements which are still playing a decisive role in the circulation of culture. Among them the recognition of traditional media forms, even if being digitized in both aesthetics and content. The familiarity with those forms is based on metabolized 'interfaces' (we're all culturally "natives" when it comes to radio, tv, and print) that makes them almost invisible especially when translated in the digital realm, delivering the content in a quite direct way. And since we recognize those forms instinctively, we "trust" them, and so we trust their content.

## 1. Newspaper as (fake) political imaginary

"A lie is the beginning of a new story. That's why we love Art."

Oscar Wilde

01 <http://www.nga.gov/exhibitions/warholinfo.shtm>

02 [http://www.sarahcharlesworth.net/series-all.php?album\\_id=1449341](http://www.sarahcharlesworth.net/series-all.php?album_id=1449341)

The form of the newspaper is (still) one of the most recognizable ones. The modern form of newspapers has only slightly changed since the 19th Century (except for the inclusion of pictures and colors), so becoming a daily object for quite a few generations, and establishing itself as an aesthetic standard and a defined cultural object with its specific interface. That's why artists and activists have used newspapers as a recognizable information environment and a daily object at the same time: from the Andy Warhol's *Headlines* series<sup>01</sup>, to *Modern History* series by Sarah Charlesworth<sup>02</sup>, tracking the use of the same picture on different front pages. But a specific manipulation of newspapers (and the conventional ecosystem surrounding them) has been used by artists and activists to foster ideas. The 'fake' newspaper, or accurately reproducing a real newspaper

ciklusa *Headlines* Andyja Warhola<sup>01</sup> do ciklusa *Modern History* Sarah Charlesworth,<sup>02</sup> koji prate uporabu iste slike na različitim naslovnicama. No umjetnici i aktivisti također koriste specifičnu manipulaciju novina (i konvencionalnog ekosustava koji ih okružuje) kako bi promicali razne ideje. “Lažne” novine, koje vjerno oponašaju stvarne, ali mijenjaju njihov sadržaj, oduvijek su bile sredstvo kojim se dovodilo u pitanje spontano povjerenje koje poklanjamo tom specifičnom mediju. Ali dok je proizvodnja i distribucija lažnih primjeraka (koji se kasnije razotkriju kao reklamni letci) kako bi se privukla pozornost javnosti itekako stara praksa, koja potječe još s kraja 19. stoljeća<sup>03</sup>, svjesna uporaba lažnih novina kao politička strategija novijeg je datuma. Osobito 70-ih godina 20. stoljeća nalazimo nekoliko učinkovitih primjera, koji su se javili s usponom ljevičarskih političkih pokreta. Jedan potječe iz “kreativnog autonomizma”, koji je nastao 1977. u Italiji, a stvorio ga je list *Il Male*,<sup>04</sup> koji je vodio nekoliko kampanji pomoću novinskih “patki” (koje su bile istodobno uvjerljive i nadrealističke) napravljenih u formatu glavnih talijanskih novina i smještenih uz kioske, što je povremeno izazivalo prilično oštre reakcije i dosta uličnih rasprava. Istih godina ostvarene su još dvije akcije (službeno još uvijek anonimne). U Poljskoj je 1979. raspačavana lažna verzija novina *Trybuna Ludu* tijekom posjeta pape Ivana Pavla II. (Karola Wojtyła) domovini, s naslovnicom na kojoj je glavna vijest bila “Vlada dala ostavku, Wojtyła okrunjen za kralja”. U Francuskoj je pak određenom broju pretplatnika anonimno poslan lažni *Le Monde Diplomatique*, koji je sadržavao veoma satirične komentare o masakru pripadnika organizacije Rote Armee Fraktion u zatvoru Stammheim<sup>05</sup>. Jedan od novijih slučajeva koje su ostvarili umjetnici je čuveno “specijalno izdanje” *The New York Timesa*<sup>06</sup> skupine The Yes Men (u suradnji sa Steveom Lambertom i The Anti-Advertising Agency te anonimno sponzorirano), koje je izašlo u New Yorku 12. studenoga 2008. Bilo je to nekoliko tisuća primjeraka lažnog “specijalnog izdanja” *The New York Timesa*, datiranog u bliskoj budućnosti (4. srpnja 2009.). Donosilo je isključivo pozitivne vijesti, što je kratko vrijeme djelovalo uvjerljivo zbog izbora Baracka Obame za američkog predsjednika. Format, fontovi i grafički dizajn *The New York Timesa* brižljivo su reproducirani (uključujući uobičajene reklame, također satirički izmijenjene), tako da je većina javnosti bila uspješno obmanuta. Velika mreža dobrovoljaca dijelila ga je besplatno po gradu, čak i pred sjedištem *The New York Timesa*, bez ikakvih zakonskih posljedica. Tim projektom izražen je javni imaginarij, nada koju je stvorio taj povijesni događaj, historiciziran na sasvim stabilan i lako prepoznatljiv način, bez većih medijskih kompromisa. Skupina je proizvela još nekoliko lažnih novina, jedne od njih u obliku *International Herald Tribunea*. Umjetnik Paolo Cirio je pak 2011. godine na-

01 <http://www.nga.gov/exhibitions/warholinfo.shtm>

02 [http://www.sarahcharlesworth.net/series-all.php?album\\_id=1449341](http://www.sarahcharlesworth.net/series-all.php?album_id=1449341)

03 <http://www.historicpages.com/linfake.htm>

04 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Il\\_Male](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Il_Male)

05 P. Alferj i G. Mazzone, *I Fiori di Gutenberg* (Arcana, 1979.)

06 <http://theyesmen.org/hijinks/newyorktimes>

changing its content, has always been able to question the spontaneous trust we have in this specific medium. If making fake copies and distributing them in order to attract the public's attention (but then revealing themselves as advertising flyers) is a remarkably old practice dating back to the end of 19th century<sup>03</sup>, the conscious use of those fakes as a political strategy is more recent. Especially in the 1970s there are a few effective examples emerging with the rise of leftist political movements. One stemming from the "Creative Autonomism" movement in Italy in 1977 is the one made by *Il Male*<sup>04</sup>, which conducted a few campaigns through fake journalistic 'scoops' (all being simultaneously plausible and surrealist) rendered in the major Italian newspapers' layouts and attached at newsstands, generating sometimes quite harsh reactions and a lot of discussions in the street. In the same years other two actions (still officially anonymous) were accomplished. In 1979 in Poland, a fake of the newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* was distributed during Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła)'s visit to his homeland, sporting the banner headline "Government Resigns, Wojtyła Crowned King." And in France a fake *Le Monde Diplomatique* was anonymously distributed to a certain number of subscribers, featuring very satirical comments on the Rote Armee Fraktion's Stammheim Prison bloodbath<sup>05</sup>. More recent cases, realized by artists are the famous *The New York Times Special Edition*<sup>06</sup> by The Yes Men (in collaboration with Steve Lambert and The Anti-Advertising Agency, and anonymously sponsored) took place in New York City on November 12, 2008. There were several thousand copies of a fake *New*

*York Times* "Special Edition" set in the near future (July 4, 2009). It featured only positive news, briefly plausible after Barack Obama's election as U.S. President. *The New York Times* layout, fonts and graphic design were painstakingly reproduced (including the usual advertisements, satirically changed as well), so the majority of the public was easily fooled. A large network of volunteers distributed it for free in the city, even in front of the *New York Times* headquarters, without any legal repercussion. What was expressed here was the public imaginary, the hope this historical event generated, historicized then altogether in a stable and very recognizable way, without the major media daily compromises. The group produced another few fakes, one of them in the form of the *International Herald Tribune*. Artist Paolo Cirio, instead, made a website (and workshop/action) in 2011, centered on Italian newspapers, inviting people to invent their own story. Then it can be composed as a headline sheet with the newspaper logo of choice, entirely through the project website, printed out and attached (during the night) close to local newsstands.<sup>07</sup>

The use of fake newspapers in political campaigns has proven not to be a thing of the past. The classic strategy of purchasing a front page ad, designed to look just like the real front page has been used many times, as it very carefully was in 2013 by the Liberal Party in British Columbia, disguising the ad as neutral information and so generating a whole media case about its visually disguising ethics with polarized reactions.<sup>08</sup>

03 <http://www.historicpages.com/lincfake.htm>

04 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Il\\_Male](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Il_Male)

05 Alferj, P. and Mazzone, G. (1979) *Fiori di Gutenberg*, Arcana

06 <http://theyesmen.org/hijinks/newyorktimes>

07 <http://www.paolocirio.net/work/inveritas/inveritas.php>

08 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2013/05/01/bc-liberals-newsper-ad.html>





**Le Ultime Notizie**

**la PADANIA**  
RENZO BOSSI CANDIDATO A REGGIO CALABRIA VINCERA!  
OGGI EDIZIONE SPECIALE NELLA TUA EDICOLA DI FIDUCIA  
Da mmh il 10-17  
Il PDF - Foto Edicole

**Il Messaggero**  
BANCA VATICANA USATA PER RICICLAGGIO TRAFFICO DI ARMI  
OGGI EDIZIONE SPECIALE NELLA TUA EDICOLA DI FIDUCIA  
Da ilPapa il 10-17  
Il PDF - Foto Edicole

**Gazzetta del Sud**  
DOLCE E GABBANA RICICLANO SOLDI DELLA MAFIA SICILIANA  
OGGI EDIZIONE SPECIALE NELLA TUA EDICOLA DI FIDUCIA  
Da argh il 10-17  
Il PDF - Foto Edicole

**LA STAMPA**

# inVeritas

*Fai Notizia! Crea il tuo strillone e diffondilo nelle edicole italiane!*

Cosa & Perché | Come & Dove | 6 Novembre | Materiale | [Parlane](#) | [f](#) [t](#) [e](#) [g+](#) [b](#)

Ogni cittadino è invitato a creare liberamente la notizia che vuole diffondere. Con InVeritas.net si generano strilloni di quotidiani in formato A3 pronti da stampare in pochi secondi. Successivamente, il cittadino, singolarmente o in gruppo, può divulgare la notizia, disseminando gli strilloni nelle vicinanze delle edicole.

**Inizia subito! Scegli il quotidiano adatto alla tua notizia:**

La Repubblica  Corriere della Sera  Il Giornale  La Stampa  Leggo  
 L'Unità  La Padania  Libero  Il Manifesto  Il Foglio  Secolo d'Italia  
 Il Giorno  Il Sole 24 Ore  Italia Oggi  Il Secolo XIX  Il Riformista  
 Il Mattino  Il Gazzettino  La Gazzetta del Sud  Il Messaggero  Il Tirreno

# la Repubblica

# SCRIVI QUI

# LA NOTIZIA

# CHE VIUOI

In Veritas, project by Paolo Cirio, 2011. "In Veritas", projekt Paola Cirija, 2011.

pravio mrežnu stranicu (i radionicu/akciju) usredotočenu na talijanske novine, na kojoj je pozvao ljude da izmisle vlastitu priču. Zatim bi se ta priča mogla urediti kao naslovnica s prepoznatljivim obilježjima novina po izboru, i to kompletno na mrežnoj stranici projekta, otisnuti i pričvrstiti (noću) u blizini lokalnih kioska.<sup>07</sup>

Uporaba lažnih novina u političkim kampanjama pokazala se kao sredstvo koje još ne pripada prošlosti. Klasična strategija kupovine reklame na naslovnici koja je dizajnirana tako da izgleda baš kao prava korištena je mnogo puta. Liberalna stranka Britanske Kolumbije vrlo je brižljivo to učinila 2013. godine, pri čemu je prikazala reklamu kao neutralnu informaciju i na taj način potaknula čitavu medijsku raspravu o etici vizualnog prikrivanja, s polariziranim reakcijama.<sup>08</sup>

Još se konkretnija politička novinska prevara dogodila 2011. godine, kada je policija otkrila mrežu prekršitelja koji su ilegalno proizvodili i distribuirali lažne primjerke dviju vodećih moldovskih novina, *Ziarul de Gardă* i *Timpul*, pokušavajući manipulirati javno mnijenje pred izbore objavljivanjem negativnih članaka o prozapadnoj koaliciji na vlasti.<sup>09</sup>

## 2. Plagiranje (od tiska do digitalne forme i obrnuto)

Može se smatrati da lažne novine podrazumijevaju neku vrstu “plagiranja”, što se uglavnom odnosi na (zlo)uporabu “standardiziranog” vizualnog formata. To je postalo tehnički izvedivo s razvojem mehaničke reprodukcije tiska, a još više s digitalnom (re)produkcijom, koja se odvija precizno i munjevito. No plagiranje sadržaja daleko je starija stvar i sam koncept plagijata postojao je već u Rimskom Carstvu. Ustvari, prvi ga je upotrijebio rimski pjesnik Marcijal, žaleći se na to da drugi pjesnik “otima” njegove stihove, zbog čega ga je nazvao “*plagiarius*”, što doslovce znači “otmičar”. Evo stihova kojima je izrazio svoje osjećaje:

Fama refert nostros te, Fidentine, libellos  
non aliter populo quam recitare tuos.  
si mea vis dici, gratis tibi carmina mittam:  
si dici tua vis, hoc eme, ne mea sint.  
(Kruži, Fidentine, priča da moje recitiraš knjige  
Kao da one su tvoj, tobože, vlastiti rad.  
Ako mi ime navedeš, bez naknade dat ću ti pjesme.  
Tražiš li za sebe stih – kupi ga! Postat će tvoj!)<sup>10</sup>

U povijesti su postojali brojni, više ili manje poznati slučajevi književnog plagijata, ali tek su malobrojni javno priznati (poput TV-se-

07 <http://www.paolocirio.net/work/inveritas/inveritas.php>

08 <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2013/05/01/bc-liberals-newspaper-ad.html>

09 [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=17&nav\\_id=74384](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=17&nav_id=74384)

10 Jack Lynch, “The Perfectly Acceptable Practice of Literary Theft: Plagiarism, Copyright, and the Eighteenth Century,” *Colonial Williamsburg: The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation* 24/4 (zima 2002./2003.), str. 51-54. Hrvatski prijevod: Marko Valerije Marcijal, *Epigrama*, prev. Marina Brčko (Zagreb: Matiča hrvatska, 1998.), 48.



In 2011 there was a real political newspaper scam, when police identified a network of infringers who had been illegally producing and distributing fake copies of *Ziarul de Garda* and *Timpul*, two of Moldova's leading newspapers, trying to manipulate the public opinion ahead of elections by publishing negative articles about the pro-Western ruling coalition.<sup>09</sup>

## 2. Plagiarism (from print to digital and vice-versa)

Newspaper fakes can be considered to incorporate some form of 'plagiarism,' mostly related to (mis)using a 'standardized' visual form. This has been technically feasible since the mechanical reproduction of print, and even more with the lightning-fast speed and accuracy of digital (re)production. But the plagiarism of content is much older, and the very concept of plagiarism dates back to the Roman Empire. In fact the first time it was used by Roman poet Martial, complaining that another poet was "kidnapping" his verses, so he called him "plagiarius", which literally means "kidnapper." These were the verses it used to express his feelings:

Fama refert nostros te, Fidentine, libellos  
non aliter populo quam recitare tuos.  
si mea vis dici, gratis tibi carmina mittam:  
si dici tua vis, hoc eme, ne mea sint.

(Fame has it that you, Fidentinus,  
recite my books to the crowd as if none other  
than your own.  
If you're willing that they be called mine, I'll send  
you the poems for free.  
If you want them to be called yours, buy this one,  
so that they won't be mine.)<sup>10</sup>

There are plenty of more or less famous cases of literary plagiarism in history, but only some of them were publicly admitted (like the tv series *Roots*, admittedly plagiarized by its author in some passages from the novel *The African* published nine years before). In contemporaneity, plagiarism seems easier than ever, especially taking advantage from 'big data' sources like Wikipedia, and so critical artworks have been developed consequently. Stéphanie Vilayphiou is an artist and designer investigating how free software can deeply question the fixity of the printed page once it's digitized, and the whole discourse about defensive copyright practice historically consolidated. She uses various transformative software to create controversial versions of literature classics. Specifically, in her net art piece *The Map or the Territory*<sup>11</sup> she selected a controversial book, Michel Houellebecq's *The Map and the Territory*, which became renowned and very discussed in France for its evident quotes from Wikipedia, never acknowledged by the author nor by the publisher. She took the book's digitized text and wrote a software filter which looks for each sentence (or part of it) in the millions of digitized texts contained in Google Books, finding the same sequences of words in other books. Visually the book entirely transforms then in a sequential digital collage of quotations (whose original authoritative printed context is still maintained in the background), definitively losing even the last bit of originality. Vilayphiou elegantly embodies her sharp irony within a functional (digital) mechanism, exploiting Google's industrial collection of texts and smartly expanding the mediating properties of

09 [http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=17&nav\\_id=74384](http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2011&mm=05&dd=17&nav_id=74384)

10 Lynch, Jack (2002) "The Perfectly Acceptable Practice of Literary Theft: Plagiarism, Copyright, and the Eighteenth Century", in *Colonial Williamsburg: The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation* 24, no. 4 (Winter 2002-3), pp. 51-54

11 <http://bcc.stdin.fr/LaCarteOuLeTerritoire/>

**WINNER**  
**LOTTO 649**  
 Desmond Lawrence  
 Feb. 16 • Ajax  
 benefit you. Visit [ModernOLG.ca](http://ModernOLG.ca)

**24 hrs**  
**TORONTO**  
 Monday, March 26, 2013  
 Vol. 110 No. 93

**How tidy is your desk?**  
**CAREER** Your desk offers vital information about your personality and motivation.  
**PAGE 24**




**Pushing the feds for funding**

**NEWS** First Nations groups and opposition parties call on feds to budget money for education on reserves.  
**PAGE 9**

**Canadian driver wins Grand Prix**

**SPORTS** Toronto's James Hinchcliff gets his first IndyCar Series victory at the Honda Grand Prix of St. Petersburg.  
**PAGE 25**



weather forecast **The Weather Network**

today | tomorrow

5° / -1° | 6° / -2°

A front page ad by the Liberal Party of British Columbia in the *24 Hours* newspaper.

**24 hrs**  
**VANCOUVER**  
 Wednesday, May 1, 2013

**PAID ADVERTISEMENT**

Reklama Liberalne stranke Britanske Kolumbije preko čitave naslovnice novina *24 sata*.



**ELECTION** Premier Christy Clark's campaign to control spending and grow the economy for a Debt-Free BC is gaining traction with BC families.

Ipsos Reid | BC Televised Leaders' Debate Poll for Premier

Question: Which leader looked and sounded most like a Premier?	<b>PREMIER CHRISTY CLARK 44%</b>	<b>JANE STERK 5%</b>
	<b>ADRIAN DIX 32%</b>	<b>JOHN CUMMINS 4%</b>

# I stole from Wikipedia but it's not plagiarism, says Houellebecq

BY JOHN LICHFIELD IN PARIS WEDNESDAY 08 SEPTEMBER 2010

Send Recommend 293 Tweet 110 Share Print | Email | A.A.A

### News in pictures



### Arts & Ents blogs



Mais ce qui semble intéresser le plus Heidegger, selon Claude Piché, est la modalité du recouvrement comme dissimulation : un phénomène a déjà été découvert, mais étant maintenant **partiellement recouvert**, il est visible seulement comme ...



Un troisième, tournant également la tête vers la droite, paraissant brandir un objet de sa main gauche, tient de l'autre main un quatrième personnage, plus petit, un **peu tassé sur lui-même**. Sur ce dernier, un cinquième qui empiète sur la ...

87 Over het politico-esthetisch belang van het 'inter' en de grenzen tussen kunst, filosofie en politiek. Catherine DEDYCKER "Loving in a world of desire". Kunst in de consumptiewereld: een case-study van **Damien Hirst**. 111.

Le monde leur **semblait sur le point** de s'écraser. La Seconde Guerre allait éclater quelques jours plus tard. Par la suite, Neruda recevait une lettre du Président Aguirre Cerda dans laquelle il le remerciait de la qualité des gens qu'il avait ...

Ceux-ci ne jugent pas utile **d'émettre une objection** à l'égard du dispositif prévu, car si le futur roi Henri IV, protestant de son état, avait dit que Paris valait bien une messe, la paix au Proche-Orient pouvait justifier que la France mangeât son ...

**Son visage était rougeaud** et ses cheveux noirs comme jais étaient peignés en arrière. Dans son uniforme de British Airways, il avait l'air d'un majordome (butler). En fait, il était chef de cabine sur le vol qui l'emmenait de ...

JunaMess

My life began at 1:16.

:0{ :|& }::

*The Map or The Territory*,  
Stéphanie Vilayphiou,  
2013.  
*Karta ili teritorij*,  
Stéphanie Vilayphiou,  
2013.

rije *Korijeni*, za koju je autor priznao da je u nekim ulomcima plagirao roman *Afrikanac*, koji je objavljen devet godina ranije). U suvremeno doba plagiranje se čini jednostavnijim nego ikada prije, osobito iskoristi li se prednost velikih skupova podataka (*big data*) kao što je Wikipedia, i uslijed toga je nastalo više kritičkih umjetničkih djela. Stéphanie Vilayphiou je umjetnica i dizajnerica koja istražuje način na koji besplatni softver može dovesti u pitanje fiksnost tiskane stranice nakon što se digitalizira, kao i cjelokupni diskurs o defenzivnim praksama zaštite autorskih prava, koja su se povijesno konsolidirala. Ona koristi razne vrste transformacijskog softvera kako bi proizvela sporne verzije književnih klasika. Tako je, na primjer, u svome umjetničkom radu *Karta i teritorij*<sup>11</sup> odabrala kontrolnu knjigu *Karta i teritorij* Michela Houellebecqa, koja je postala poznata i predmetom žestoke rasprave u Francuskoj zbog očitih citata iz Wikipedije, koje ni autor ni nakladnik nikada nisu priznali. Umjetnica je uzela digitalizirani tekst knjige i programirala softverski filter koji pronalazi svaku rečenicu (ili dio rečenice) u milijunima digitaliziranih tekstova koje sadrži Google Books, pronalazeći iste sljedove riječi u drugim knjigama. Tako je u vizualnom pogledu knjiga u potpunosti promijenjena u slijed citata nalik na digitalni kolaž (s izvornim autorskim tiskanim kontekstom u pozadini), čime definitivno gubi i posljednji trag originalnosti. Vilayphiou je elegantno utjelovila svoju oštru ironiju u funkcionalnom (digitalnom) mehanizmu, koristeći Googleovu industrijsku zbirku tekstova i vješto proširujući medijalna svojstva jezika pomoću mreža. Na taj način ona naposljetku dovodi u pitanje originalnost i autorstvo pomoću softverskih automatizama, pretvarajući ih u kolektivno mišljenje koje je moguće pratiti i tehnološki pokazati.

Drugi primjer umjetničke prakse koja namjerno koristi djela drugih ljudi u specifičnom kontekstu jest Traumawienov ciklus *Ghostwriter*<sup>12</sup>. Ta bečka skupina napravila je virtualnu akciju s vlastitim softverskim robotima koja je prikupila i stavila na Amazon.com stotine elektronskih knjiga s tekstom ukradenim iz komentara na videa na YouTubeu, što su sami nazvali "auto-kanibalističkim" modelom. Elektronske knjige imaju sasvim klasični format džepnog izdanja, budući da su spontane, instant knjige, koje preusmjeravaju beskonačni niz komentara u specifičan format i zamrzavaju ih u vremenu. Ova akcija očito rekontekstualizira izvorna značenja, ugrađujući ih u nov scenarij i nov književni oblik: iz različitih osobnih komentara, koji nisu nužno međusobno povezani, u jedan jedini, kontinuirani i ponekad nadrealni dijalog. Ali trebali bismo također zabilježiti što se događa u prijelazu iz jednog medija u drugi, jer spontanost i ponekad čak naivnost teksta, nakon što se oblikovao u knjigu, poprima službeni karakter formata u koji je prenesen.

<sup>11</sup> <http://bcc.stdin.fr/LaCarteOuleTerritoire/>

<sup>12</sup> <http://traumawien.at/prints/ghostwriters>

language through the networks. She's ultimately questions originality and authorship through software automatisms, turning them into trackable and technically demonstrable collective thinking.

Another example of artistic practice deliberately using other people's writings in a specific context is Traumawien's *Ghostwrite*<sup>12</sup> series. The Viennese group made a virtual action with their own software robots which compiled and uploaded hundreds of e-books to Amazon.com with text stolen from the comments on YouTube videos, in what they called an "auto-cannibalistic" model. The e-books sport a very classic paperback layout as they were spontaneous instant books, redirecting the endless flow of comment in a specific form and freezing them in time. This action is obviously re-contextualizing the original meanings, setting them in a new scenario and in a new literal shape: from various personal comments not necessarily relating to each other, into a single continuous and sometimes surreal dialogue. But we also note what happens in the passage from one medium to another, so the spontaneousness and sometimes naivete of the text once rendered as a book assumes the official character of the layout it's put into.

The 'big data' access paradigm is embedded in practices like the above mentioned, and the imagination of the software programmer is the only limit to what kind of results and new (digital and printed) forms can be consequently created.

### 3. Printing as a risky strategy

In the end of the 2000s there have been a few famous and dramatic cases of sensitive information leaks: Wikileaks and its small galaxy of information-wants-to-be-free 'heroes' (Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden) publishing secret or classified information from anonymous sources, and Aaron Swartz and his brave act of freeing the copyrighted academic knowledge of JSTOR<sup>13</sup> (Swartz committed suicide in 2013). The leaks' transmission and acquisition has been totally digital, but then traditional media has been involved to make this information "public" (and implicitly to somehow certify the scale of the action), as if the official media have an innate 'authority', including the ones based on a printed page (so mainly the newspapers). Beyond those huge cases, there are other cases of using print as a tool for liberating secret information.

Carl Malamud is an activist committed to dealing with the fact that vital parts of US law are secret and that you're allowed to read them only paying a quite high amount of money. He has founded the Public.Resource.Org<sup>14</sup> organization through which he digitizes, and eventually re-publishes public domain materials in the United States. He has uploaded public domain videos on YouTube, but he has also scanned, OCRed and re-published in print codes like the "Public safety codes of California" or the "District of Columbia Official Code" including in print a statement that says "being law, any claim about their copyright by the authorities is 'null and void.'" Answering the question "why print copies" he says that the

12 <http://traumawien.at/prints/ghost-writers>

13 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Tech\\_\(newspaper\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tech_(newspaper))

14 <https://public.resource.org/>

Paradigma pristupa temeljenih na velikim skupovima podataka (*big data*) inherentna je praksama kao što su upravo navedene, i imaginacija softverskog programera jedino je ograničenje za to kakvi rezultati i nove (digitalne i tiskane) forme mogu nastati uslijed toga.

### 3. Tisak kao riskantna strategija

Krajem prvog desetljeća 21. stoljeća došlo je do nekoliko čuvenih i dramatičnih slučajeva curenja osjetljivih informacija, kao što su Wikileaks i njegova malena galaksija “junaka” vođenih idejom da informacija želi biti slobodna (Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden), koji su objavili tajne ili strogo povjerljive informacije iz anonimnih izvora, ili Aaron Swartz sa svojim hrabrim činom oslobađanja zaštićenog akademskog znanja na JSTOR-u<sup>13</sup> (Swartz je 2013. počinio samoubojstvo). Prijenos i stjecanje otkrivenih informacija bili su sasvim digitalni, ali su uključeni i tradicionalni mediji kako bi se te informacije učinile “javnima” (a implicitno i kako bi se na neki način odredili razmjeri akcije), kao da službeni mediji imaju neki urođeni “autoritet”, uključujući i one koji se temelje na tiskanoj stranici (dakle, prvenstveno novine). Osim tih čuvenih slučajeva, postoje i drugi koji koriste tisak u svrhu oslobađanja tajnih informacija.

Carl Malamud je aktivist posvećen borbi protiv činjenice da su ključni dijelovi američkog zakona tajni i da ih možete pročitati samo ako za to platite prilično visoku svotu novca. On je osnovao organizaciju Public.Resource.Org,<sup>14</sup> koja digitalizira i naposljetku iznova objavljuje građu iz javne domene u SAD-u. Objavio je više videa iz javne domene na kanalu na YouTubeu, ali je također skenirao, obradio OCR-om i iznova objavio u tiskanom izdanju zakonike kao što su “Zakoni države Kalifornije o javnoj sigurnosti” ili “Službeni zakonik Okruga Columbije”, uključivši u izdanje izjavu koja kaže da je, “budući da se radi o zakonu, svako autorsko pravo vlade ‘nevažee i ništavno’.” Na pitanje “zašto tiskani format” odgovorio je da tiskano izdanje ograničava distribuciju, bez “nuspajava neograničenog kopiranja” koje plaši obične ljude i pravnike, što njegovu akciju ipak čini donekle prihvatljivom.

U ovom slučaju tisak je postao zakonskim strateškim medijem prava na distribuciju zbog svojih sporih standarda umnožavanja, kao što su novine za Wikileaks, što je dio mudre strategije koja uzima u obzir različite uloge i težinu raznih pojedinačnih medija kako bi izvršila određene zadatke.

<sup>13</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Tech\\_\(news-paper\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tech_(news-paper))

<sup>14</sup> <https://public.resource.org/>

print edition limits distribution with no “side effect of infinite copy” that scares standard and legal people, so making his efforts somehow still acceptable.

In this case print is turned into a legally strategic medium of distribution right because of its slow duplication standards, as newspapers are for Wikileaks, being part of a clever strategy that considers the different role and weight of the respective different media, in order to accomplish determined tasks.

#### 4. The library, ultimate cultural center vs. big data repository

“(Libraries) are nerve centers of intellectual energy and they’re based on sharing and distributing knowledge.”

Robert Darnton, Harvard University library director

The physical library is one of the crucial places where the discourse about the relationship between traditional and digital publishing takes place. On one side the global virtual library is closer than ever with Google spending millions of dollars to digitize millions of books, and with plenty of other efforts including some remarkably vast, independent and shared ones. On the other end, there are different signals about considering the library a historically valuable meeting and research place among citizens. Funding cuts and innuendos about its obsolescence in the digital era are also generating interesting creative reactions, like the one by the Toronto Public Library which launched a Fahrenheit 451-themed alternate reality

game where people were invited to play in the city through telephone calls with the motto “Join the literary resistance”<sup>15</sup>

The push on libraries is to “reinvent themselves” and their seminal role of the past (in the exchange of physical books) can effectively be rethought as a starting point for expanding point for expanding knowledge in various directions, creating less conventional models for that role. So beyond platforms like BookCrossing<sup>16</sup>, using a website platform and a simple social mechanism to share books in public places, the main question seems to be about the social role that the exchange of knowledge can implement. So there are efforts in building what can be called a “citizen library”. There are strategies on a small scale like the Little Free Libraries<sup>17</sup>, a few thousand wood boxes scattered around the world where people can take or leave books, or Ourshelves<sup>18</sup>, a San Francisco lending library open to everyone, with almost 300 members and 3.000 volumes, built around its community, that is planning to replicate its model in different other places around the city<sup>19</sup>. And if we take into account that Wikipedia has specific templates to add information to its pages about the availability of related content in local libraries<sup>20</sup>, a focused integration of content and physical exchange can be easily improved. The change of perspective of these initiatives is to rethink the library not as a centralized facility, but as one which stems from a community, which is then opening to many more possibilities. Digitalization of books here can be the perfect complement, for example, to dramatically expand access, especially to the book titles which are forgotten and that Google

15 <http://nomediaakings.org/games/take-your-seashells-out-of-your-ears.html>

16 <http://www.bookcrossing.com/>

17 <http://www.littlefreelibrary.org>

18 <http://ourshelves.org>

19 [http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681736/citizen-libraries-are-the-new-home-for-the-printed-word?utm\\_medium=referral&utm\\_source=pulsenews](http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681736/citizen-libraries-are-the-new-home-for-the-printed-word?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews)

20 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Library\\_resources\\_bo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Library_resources_bo)

#### 4. Knjižnica kao ultimativni kulturni centar naspram repozitorija velikih skupova podataka

“Knjižnice) su živčani centri intelektualne energije, a zasnivaju se na podjeli i distribuciji znanja.”

Robert Darnton, upravitelj knjižnice na Sveučilištu Harvard

Fizička knjižnica jedno je od ključnih mjesta gdje se odvija diskurs o odnosu tradicionalnog i digitalnog nakladništva. S jedne strane, globalna virtualna knjižnica bliža nam je nego ikada prije, pri čemu Google troši milijune dolara kako bi digitalizirao milijune knjiga, a postoje i mnogi drugi projekti, kako neovisni, tako i kolaboracijski, od kojih su neki frapantnog opsega. S druge strane, postoje različite naznake o tome da građani smatraju knjižnicu povijesno vrijednim mjestom za okupljanje i istraživanje. Rezanje budžeta i naklapanja o njezinoj suvišnosti u digitalnoj eri također dovode do zanimljivih i kreativnih reakcija, kao što je ona u kojoj je Toronto Public Library lansirala igru alternativne stvarnosti na temu Fahrenheita 451, u kojoj su građani pozvani da se uključe u igru širom grada putem telefonskih poziva sa sloganom “Pridružite se književnom otporu”.<sup>15</sup>

Pritisak na knjižnice da “moderniziraju” sebe i svoju ključnu ulogu iz prošlosti također se mogu učinkovito iskoristiti u procesu zamjene fizičkih knjiga kao polazišta za širenje znanja u raznim smjerovima, stvarajući manje konvencionalne modele u tu svrhu. Zato se osim platformi kao što je BookCrossing<sup>16</sup>, koja koristi mrežnu platformu i jednostavan društveni mehanizam kako bi se knjige dijelile na javnim mjestima, čini da je glavno pitanje ono o društvenoj ulozi koju razmjena znanja može odigrati. Stoga postoje inicijative da se izgradi nešto što bi se moglo nazvati “građanskom knjižnicom”. Postoje strategije manjih razmjera kao što su Little Free Libraries<sup>17</sup>, nekoliko tisuća drvenih kutija razasutih svijetom, gdje ljudi mogu uzimati ili ostavljati knjige, ili Ourshelves<sup>18</sup>, knjižnica u San Franciscu koja posuđuje knjige bilo kome i temelji se na lokalnoj zajednici, a ima gotovo 300 članova i 3000 svezaka, s planovima da se slične knjižnice uspostave na drugim mjestima širom grada<sup>19</sup>. A uzmemo li u obzir da Wikipedia na svojim stranicama ima posebne obrasce za dodavanje informacija o dostupnosti relevantnog sadržaja u lokalnim knjižnicama,<sup>20</sup> fokusirana integracija sadržaja i fizičke razmjene može se lako unaprijediti. Promjena perspektive u tim inicijativama je u tome da se transformira slika knjižnice iz centralizirane ustanove u mjesto koje će izvirati iz same zajednice i koje je stoga otvoreno za daleko više mogućnosti. Digitalizacija knjiga, na primjer, tu može biti savršena dopuna i dramatično proširiti pristup, osobito do onih naslova koji su već zaboravljeni i koje Google Books ne želi uključiti ili omogućiti pristup do njih iz razli-

15 <http://nomediakings.org/games/take-your-seashells-out-of-your-ears.html>

16 <http://www.bookcrossing.com/>

17 <http://www.littlefree-library.org>

18 <http://ourshelves.org>

19 [http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681736/citizen-libraries-are-the-new-home-for-the-printed-word?utm\\_medium=referral&utm\\_source=pulsenews](http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681736/citizen-libraries-are-the-new-home-for-the-printed-word?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=pulsenews)

20 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Library\\_resources\\_bo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Library_resources_bo)



Books won't include or give access to for different reasons. Then the responsibility of scanning and sharing this type of knowledge is of the people, who'd engage on a personal and independent level in building their own cultural history, preserving (physically) and sharing (digitally) all the knowledge that we think it's worth, as we've done with music since the early 2000s.

### **Conclusions.**

The historical importance of the printed page as a medium still has a great influence in cultural dynamics, it can be used to trigger innovative and radical processes together with the

vast resource and infinite programmability of the digital. Active and critical strategies can be then developed using the combined qualities of those two media. The most effective radical efforts have been historically supported by an innovative use of media and technologies, which has grounded the vision of new social and cultural models. The structural redefinition of the printed medium can then be a crucial opportunity to redefine our relationship with culture, both in contemporary and historical perspective.

čitih razloga. Tada odgovornost za skeniranje i dijeljenje te vrste znanja počiva na ljudima koji se trebaju angažirati na osobnoj i neovisnoj razini kako bi izgradili svoju kulturnu povijest te sačuvali (fizički) i podijelili (digitalno) sve znanje koje smatraju vrijednim, kao što to činimo s glazbom od početka 21. stoljeća.

### **Zaključak.**

Povijesna važnost tiskane stranice kao medija još uvijek uvelike utječe na kulturnu dinamiku, budući da se može upotrijebiti za poticanje inovativnih i radikalnih procesa u sprezi s golemim resursima i beskonačnom programibilnošću digitalnoga. Aktivne i kritičke strategije mogu se tada razviti koristeći kombinirana svojstva tih dvaju medija. Najučinkovitije radikalne inicijative povijesno su omogućene inovativnom uporabom medija i tehnologije, što je utemeljilo viziju novih društvenih i kulturnih modela. Strukturalna redefinicija tiskanog medija tu može biti ključna mogućnost za redefiniranje našeg odnosa prema kulturi, kako u suvremenoj tako i u povijesnoj perspektivi.

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**



# Mediji, secesija i recesija

**O**vaj tekst prati povijest *ravea*, ilegalnih zabava i prosvjeda te način na koji se ta povijest filtrirala kroz nezavisne medije (video, piratski radio, letke, izdavačke kuće, zinove i malotiražna izdanja). Na okruglom stolu u sklopu Cluba Transmediale 2013. na kojemu su sudjelovali neki od istaknutih protagonista plesne, teorijske i prosvjedne kulture s početka 21. stoljeća raspravljao je o “smrti *ravea*”.<sup>01</sup> Rasprava je krenula u iznenađujuće psihološkom, nostalgичnom i melankoličnom smjeru, sasvim različitom od materijalističkih ili forenzičkih pristupa kakvi se obično smatraju primjerenima za izučavanje leša. Tako i ovaj članak razmatra “osobna” otkrića i povijest angažmana pojedinca iz predgrađa koji je bio izložen različitim artikulacijama radikalnosti u međusobno povezanim kulturnim i političkim kontekstima toga vremena. Cilj je pokazati kako ni kultura ni osobno iskustvo nisu odvojivi od šireg ekonomskog okvira, kao ni od klasnog sastava, i kako su ti politički čimbenici itekako dostupni kroz materijalnu kulturu – medije. Članak završava refleksijama o sedimentaciji te povijesti u suvremenim medijima i političkoj kulturi.


**01** Za pojedinosti o okruglom stolu vidi: [http://www.ctm-festival.de/festival/program/event/2013/02/01/the\\_death\\_of\\_rave\\_pt\\_i\\_uk/](http://www.ctm-festival.de/festival/program/event/2013/02/01/the_death_of_rave_pt_i_uk/) (pristup 24. 06. 2013.)

**02** Vibealite, Mansfield, listopad 1993., [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iXxITil7Xc&list=PLpt2NTR68\\_TALE4-LV1g5\\_CUYO8SUGK1u](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iXxITil7Xc&list=PLpt2NTR68_TALE4-LV1g5_CUYO8SUGK1u) [(pristup 24. 05. 2013.) IZBRISANO]

Naša početna točka je 1993. godina i isječak koji nam dopušta da odmah odbacimo ideju kako *rave* kultura nije reflektirala političke i ekonomske uvjete koji su je omogućili. Na početku svog nastupa jedne noći u klubu Vibealite u Mansfieldu (Nottinghamshire), DJ Ratty i MC Robie Dee su na drzak i ironičan način odali počast nezaposlenim raverima: “Živjeli nezaposleni raveri i vlada koja im plaća da idu na *rave*!”<sup>02</sup> To upućuje na nekoliko stvari: kao prvo, da je visoka stopa nezaposlenosti bila dio te kulture; kao drugo, da je država podupirala nezaposlene u dovoljnoj mjeri da mogu izlaziti

Anthony Iles

# Media, Secession and Recession


 This paper traces a history of raves, illegal parties and protests in its percolation through independent media (video, pirate radio, flyers, record labels, zines, small press). At Club Transmediale 2013, a panel partly comprised of prominent contributors to oos dance, theory and protest culture discussed the 'Death of Rave'.<sup>01</sup> The discussion surprisingly took a psychological, nostalgic and melancholic turn, very distant from the materialist or forensic approaches usually considered appropriate to the study of a corpse. Instead this essay considers the 'personal' discoveries and employment history of a suburban self subject to differing articulations of radicality in interrelated cultural and political milieus of the time. It does so to argue that neither culture nor personal experience are separable from a wider economic framework, nor class composition and that these politi-

cal factors are very much accessible through material culture – media. The paper concludes with some reflections on the sedimentation of this history in contemporary media and political culture.

Our starting point is 1993 and a fragment that allows us to make a forthright dismissal of the idea that rave culture didn't reflect on the political and economic conditions of its possibility. At the beginning of their set at a club night, Vibealite in Mansfield Nottinghamshire, DJ Ratty and MC Robie Dee make an cheeky and ironic tribute to the unemployed ravers: "A big shout out to the unemployed ravers and the government who pays for them to go raving".<sup>02</sup> This indicates a few things, firstly that high unemployment was a part of the culture secondly the state supported those out of work sufficiently that they could go out of a weekend and lastly this was a source of humour and even irreverent pride.<sup>03</sup>

In 1993 I was turning 16. I lived in the suburbs of East London on the border of the

01 For details about this panel see: [http://www.ctm-festival.de/festival/program/event/2013/02/01/the\\_death\\_of\\_rave\\_pt\\_i\\_uk/](http://www.ctm-festival.de/festival/program/event/2013/02/01/the_death_of_rave_pt_i_uk/) (accessed 24/06/2013)

02 Vibealite, Mansfield, October 1993, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iXxITil7Xc&list=PLpt2NTR68\\_TALE4-LV195\\_CUY-OBSUgK1u](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iXxITil7Xc&list=PLpt2NTR68_TALE4-LV195_CUY-OBSUgK1u) [(accessed 24/05/2013) DELETED]

03 According to a Wikipedia article, "Unemployment in Britain rose from 1,600,000 to nearly 3,000,000 between April 1990 and February 1993", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early\\_1990s\\_recession](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_1990s_recession). Further detail and comparison between three recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91 and 2007-2008 can be found in Jamie Jenkins (Office for National Statistics), "The labour market in the 1980s, 1990s and 2008/09 recessions", *Economic & Labour Market Review*, Vol 4, No 8, August 2010.



Raving 89, Gavin Watson, 1989.

In from the USA out of Frankie Knuckles  
 Det Mix Studio  
**DAVE MORALES**

ISM PRISM  
 PRESENTS

**TOTALLY LEGAL AND UNDER COVER**

# RAINDANCE

**SATURDAY  
 16th SEPTEMBER**

**10,000 STRONG - DANCE 'TIL DAWN**  
 For coaches and meeting points  
 Listen to: **SUNRISE, LASER, CENTREFORCE**

★ SLI Beware Records	★ LINDEN C. Hypnosis	★ PAUL ANDERSON Love
★ TREVOR FUNG Land of Oz	★ JC Twilight Zone	★ COLIN DALE Legends
★ EVIL EDDIE Dungeons	★ GEORGE KELLY Centreforce	★ MAD AXE Sunrise
★ FABIO Fun City	★ CLEVELAND ANDERSON Tom Tom Club	★ GROOVE RIDER Rage

**Tickets Available NOW**  
 HIT AND RUN RECORDS - Walthamstow - 021 7422

<b>RED RECORDS</b> Beak Street & Peckham 724 2746	<b>G &amp; M RECORDS</b> Elephant & Castle 708 0988	<b>JUST FOR THE BEAT</b> Tottenham 885 2775
<b>SUMMIT RECORDS</b> Birmingham 021 953 7895	<b>MUSIC POWER</b> Ilford & Haringey 478 2090	<b>WIRED FOR SOUND</b> Mare Street 866 7001
<b>BLACK MARKET</b> Soho 437 0478	<b>POUR HOMME</b> Wetwyn 301 1629	<b>SOUL SENSE</b> Luton 0982 20423
<b>IN THE MIX</b> Leightonstone	<b>BLUE BIRD RECORDS</b> Edgware Rd & Stroutham 723 9090	<b>BOXER</b> Loughboon 908 4100

**ADVANCE £12.00**      **LOCATION GUIDE 0831 487 505**      **SAME DAY £15.00**

Flyer for Raindance Party in East London, Anon., 16 September 1989.  
 Flajer za parti Raindance u istočnom Londonu, anon., 16. rujna 1989.

county of Essex. The town I grew up in, Chingford, was a commuter town on the edge of Epping forest. Typically suburban, during the week a trainline took the majority of inhabitants back and forth from home to work, many inhabitants worked in financial services industries in the City of London. I, with many of my peers, developed a fierce desire to escape the rat race of this commuter life – to become something other than wage labour. This desire, though necessarily rarely fully articulated in these terms, manifested itself as so many tiny acts of rebellion against the conditioning of education, this value-formed canalisation of life, the refusal to reproduce class or to reproduce patriarchy. It was evident that the first thing we needed to escape was the spatio-temporal complex and soul-destroying rhythm of the commute to work and home to the suburban house that had been prepared for us.

One direction of escape was into the city where I'd go skateboarding with a small gang of malcontents. Another was into the forest where we used play as youngsters and later drink under the stars.. Sometimes we'd bump into strangers walking home from raves and outdoor soundsystem parties. One of these was probably Raindance – which had started in a giant circus tent in a football field at Jenkins Lane on the East London/Essex borders in September 1989 and later had a revival at Berwick Manor Hornchurch in 1997.<sup>04</sup> An important aspect of both these lines of flight was music, and in the woods we used to have a modest soundsystem of our own. Throughout the years 1992-1994 what I remember is sharing the stereo between two musical styles – Hardcore, or so-called 'Happy

Hardcore', fast electronic music with choppy synths and scattering beats, and Indy, or guitar music such as the Smiths, the Cure and then current bands such as the Happy Mondays, Charlatans and so on. The musical split corresponded to the two different types of schools we attended, with those into hardcore coming from state provided schools (free) and those into guitar music being from private school (which charged tuition fees). It wasn't a strictly class distinction since both parties had working class and middle class members, but as well as petty matters such as which cigarette brand each of us smoked, this was culturally how we recognised and distinguished ourselves for a while at least.

Around 1993 or 1994 my best friend played me a track by Origin Unknown, *Valley of the Shadows*, as you can see from the label, the record was pressed in Hornchurch, Essex about 4 miles from where I grew up. With sparse instrumentation, few piano riffs, vocals or recognisable synth stabs – driving bass, broken beats which seemed at once both slow and fast, it sounded completely different from anything I had heard up until that point. I asked my friend, Chris, what people were calling this music, he replied that they didn't have a name for it yet, he didn't know who'd made the track, people just said: "It's Dark...". It was the beginning of a major crossover, since until then the strength of reggae and dub in the UK had been something quite separate from house and techno, suddenly the two genres both began to merge and feed into each other.<sup>05</sup>

Soon I wasn't listening to music made with guitars anymore. I began to find different

04 See: <http://www.raindancer-avefestival.com> (accessed 24/06/2013)

05 John Eden tells an overlooked history of the initial hostility between dancehall reggae culture and the new craze for 'Acid', "London Acid City: When Two 8's Clash", <http://www.uncarved.org/blog/2004/06/88clash/>

vikendima; i kao treće, da su te okolnosti bile povod za humor pa čak i nepoćudan ponos.<sup>03</sup>

Te 1993. navršavao sam 16 godina. Živio sam u predgrađu istočnog Londona, na rubu pokrajine Essex. Stanovnici grada u kojemu sam odrastao, Chingforda, svakog su dana putovali s ruba šume Epping na posao u London. Bilo je to tipično predgrađe: radnim danom vlak bi prevezio većinu stanovnika od kuće do posla, jer mnogi stanovnici radili su u financijskom sketoru u londonskom Cityju. Kao i mnogi moji vršnjaci, razvio sam snažnu želju da izbjegnem tu vječitu utrku zaposlenika koji putuju na posao – da postanem nešto više od pukog nadničara. Ta želja, iako se, naravno, rijetko artikulirala baš tim riječima, očitovala se u obliku brojnih sitnih činova pobune protiv obrazovnog ustrojavanja, tog kanaliziranja života uvjetovanog etabliranim vrijednostima, i odbijanjem da reproduciram klasne ili patrijarhalne odnose. Bilo je jasno da je prvo od čega moramo pobjeći prostorno-vremenski sklop i bezdušan ritam svakodnevnog putovanja na posao i natrag kući u predgrađe koje nam je bilo namijenjeno.

Jedan od smjerova bijega bio je prema gradu, kamo bih odlazio na skateboarding s malenom bandom nezadovoljnika. Drugi je bio prema šumi, gdje smo se kao tinejdžeri igrali i kasnije pili pod zvijezdama. Ponekad bismo naletjeli na nepoznate ljude koji bi pješčili kući s *raveova* i *soundsystem* partija na otvorenom. Jedan od njih vjerojatno je bio Raindance – koji je započeo kao golemi cirkuski šator podignut na nogometnom igralištu u Jenkins Lane na granici istočnog Londona i Essexu u rujnu 1989., a kasnije, 1997. godine, je ponovno oživljen na lokaciji Berwick Manor Hornchurch.<sup>04</sup> Važan aspekt obiju linija bijega bila je glazba pa smo i u šumi imali vlastiti skroman razglas. Sjećam se da su se u razdoblju od 1992. do 1994. na našem stereo sistemu izmjenjivala dva glazbena stila – *hardcore* ili takozvani "*happy hardcore*", brza elektronska glazba iskrzanih sintova i razbacanog *beata*, i gitarska *indie* glazba poput Smithsa, Curea ili tada popularnih bendova poput Happy Mondaysa, Charlatansa i tako dalje. Ta glazbena podjela odgovarala je dvama različitim tipovima škola koje smo pohađali: oni koji su slušali *hardcore* bili su iz državnih (besplatnih) škola, a oni koji su voljeli gitarsku glazbu iz privatnih (koje su naplaćivale školarinu). Nije to bila strogo klasna podjela, budući da su obje strane imale pripadnike i iz radničke i iz srednje klase, ali baš kao i sitna pitanja tipa koju marku cigareta tko puši, bio je to način na koji smo se kulturno identificirali i razlikovali jedni od drugih, barem neko vrijeme.

Negdje 1993. ili 1994. najbolji prijatelj mi je pustio jednu stvar od benda Origin Unknown, *Valley of the Shadows*, i kako možete vidjeti na etiketi, ploča je snimljena u Hornchurchu u Essexu, oko 4 milje od mjesta gdje sam odrastao. Sa samo osnovnom instrumen-

03 Prema članku na Wikipediji, "Nezaposlenost u Velikoj Britaniji narasla je s 1.600.000 na gotovo 3.000.000 u razdoblju od travnja 1990. do veljače 1993.", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early\\_1990s\\_recession](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_1990s_recession). Daljnje pojedinosti i usporedba triju recesija 1980.-81., 1990.-91. i 2007.-2008. mogu se pronaći u: Jamie Jenkins (Ured za nacionalnu statistiku), "The Labour Market in the 1980s, 1990s and 2008/09 Recessions", *Economic & Labour Market Review* 4/8 (kolovoz 2010.).

04 Vidi: <http://www.raindancerevefestival.com> (pristup 24. 06. 2013.).



illegal raves, clubs and record shops by queuing for clubs, finding drugs, other parties, records, squatted spaces, finding pirate radio stations (like Touchdown 94.1 FM, Defection, Pulse, Rush) by simply spinning the dial, finding record shops through personal recommendations or simply drifting through the city – these media objects pointed to each other, overlapped, were found and charged with chance. A particularly important moment was when I found a shop called Ambient Soho stocking many white label records that carried the sounds that I liked and which also often came with zines and sometimes in sleeves with lists of URLs on the back. I found an important text for my own self-understanding written by Howard Slater through exactly these channels, through a record label called Praxis which was linked to a zine called *Datacide* which published Howard Slater’s writing and had put out a vinyl edition of Howard’s zine *Break/Flow*. This media was incessantly reflecting upon the conditions of its own making and the milieu that was making it:

post-media activity is not the outcome of a discursive resolution, which would only lead to another discourse, but is the process that allows contradictions to be pushed in the direction of enigmas and provocative alloys. It allows for experimental positions without co-ordinates, it drifts off the map, flees from forced identification (and forced subjectivisation) and takes with it the masks and tools that would enslave it. And so, auto-theorisation is a constant vigilance, a controlled loss, a permutability of the

rational and the unconscious. A processing of the self-revealing social process. Being both screen and projector, receiver and sender, silent and voluble, being the margins of a centre that doesn’t exist it occupies a liminal position that, in continually being dispersed, coincides and overlaps with a post-media practice whose overall rhythms are broader (a breadth that can turn to history and precursors).<sup>06</sup>

There was a sense of extending one’s small circle of communication and one’s perceptual equipment through this intersection of media. This also suggested that you too could seize these media, vinyl, radio, sound, print and to use, redistribute and make similar connections. A sense of exodus, secession and sedition was ever present in the names of venues, tracks and artist names. Cheeky irreverent humour, in-jokes and subversion were an important part of this. Perhaps the phenomena of humour and the class-cultural content of it is most evident in the late-1980s early 1990s zine *Boys Own* (“the only zine which gets right on one matey”) which shared a readership across football fans, ravers and gay scenes.<sup>07</sup> It’s also the makers of *Boy’s Own* who most consciously stress the class and spatial dynamics of the new culture they were part of:

Acid house, with its origins in the casual world of beach-loving, E-smuggling hooligans, was when the suburbs stole the reins of popular culture from the middle class art school grads who’d been hanging on to them since the late ’60s.<sup>08</sup>

06 Howard Slater, “Post-Media Operators: Sovereign and Vague”,

07 “Boy’s Own: A history”, <http://www.residentadvisor.net/feature.aspx?1139> (accessed 24/06/2013)

08 *Boy’s Own the Complete Fanzines 1986-92* (sampler), [http://www.djhhistory.com/sites/default/files/BoysOwnSampler02.pdf](http://www.djhistory.com/sites/default/files/BoysOwnSampler02.pdf) (accessed 24/06/2013)

tacijom, nekoliko akorda na klaviru, vokalima i prepoznatljivim upadima sinta, tutnjajućim basom i izlomljenim beatovima koji su se činili istodobno brzi i spori, zvučala je sasvim drugačije od svega što sam ikada čuo. Pitao sam prijatelja Chrisa kako se ta glazba naziva, i odgovorio je da za nju još nisu izmislili ime, i da ne zna tko je snimio tu stvar, naprosto se govorilo: “Ovo je mračno...”. Bio je to početak jedne od važnijih fuzija, budući da je do tada snaga *reggaea* i *duba* u Velikoj Britaniji bila sasvim nešto odvojeno od *housea* i *techna*, a sada su se odjednom ta dva žanra počela stapati i ugrađivati jedan u drugi.<sup>05</sup>

Ubrzo više nisam slušao gitarsku glazbu. Počeo sam pronalaziti razne ilegalne *raveove*, klubove i prodavaonice ploča, stajao sam u redu pred klubovima, bilo je tu droge, drugih partija, ploča, skvotova, piratskih radio stanica (kao što su Touchdown 94.1 FM, Defection, Pulse, Rush), i to sasvim nasumično, pronalazeći prodavaonice ploča putem osobnih preporuka ili naprosto lutajući gradom – jer su ti medijski predmeti vodili jedan k drugome, preklapali su se, pronalazili i bili ispunjeni slučajem. Osobito važan trenutak bio je kada sam pronašao prodavaonicu ploča po imenu Ambient Soho, koja je držala mnoge ploče koje nisu bile objavljene pod etiketom i na kojima je bio zvuk koji sam volio, a često su se prodavale uz zino-ve ili u omotima na čijoj poledini su se nalazili popisi mrežnih stranica. Pronašao sam jedan tekst Howarda Slatera koji je bio važan za moj osobni razvoj, i to upravo tim kanalima, kroz izdavačku kuću po imenu Praxis, koja je bila povezana sa zinom *Datacide*, koji je pak objavljivao njegove tekstove, a objavio je i vinilsko izdanje Howardova zina *Break/Flow*. Ti mediji neprestano su promišljali vlastite uvjete nastanka i kontekst u kojemu su nastajali:

Postmedijska aktivnost nije ishod neke diskurzivne odluke, što bi naprosto dovelo do daljnjeg diskursa, nego je proces koji dopušta proturječja u smjeru zagonetki i provokativnih spojeva. Ona dopušta eksperimentalne pozicije izvan koordinata, izlazi izvan zemljovi-  
da, bježi od nasilne identifikacije (i nasilne subjektivizacije) i odnosi sa sobom maske i sredstva koja bi je porobila. I zato je autoteoretizacija neprestana budnost, kontrolirani gubitak, izmjenjivost racionalnog i nesvjesnog. Procesuiranje samorazotkrivajućeg društvenog procesa. Ona je istodobno platno i projektor, prijemnik i odašiljač, nijema i rječita, kao margine nekog središta koje ne postoji, i zauzima liminalnu poziciju koja se, budući da se neprestano rasipa, poklapa i preklapa s postmedijskom praksom čiji su opći ritmovi širih dimenzija (a ta širina oslanja se na povijest i na prethodnike).<sup>06</sup>

05 John Eden govori o zanemarenoj povijesti početnog neprijateljstva između *reggae* kulture iz plesnih dvorana i nove manije *acida*: “London Acid City: When Two 8’s Clash”, <http://www.uncarved.org/blog/2004/06/88clash/>.

06 Howard Slater, “Post-Media Operators: Sovereign and Vague”.


Bio je to osjećaj širenja vlastitog uskog kruga komunikacije i vlastitog osjetilnog aparata kroz to susretanje medija. To je također zna-



Collage of late-1980s UK newspaper hysteria over Acid House from *Vice.com*, [http://www.vice.com/en\\_uk/read/margaret-thatcher-war-on-rave-acid-house-boys-own?utm\\_source=vicefb](http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/margaret-thatcher-war-on-rave-acid-house-boys-own?utm_source=vicefb)

Kolaž histeričnih napisa u britanskim novinama o Acid Houseu, preuzeto s *Vice.com*.

**SNIFFIN' GLUE REVISITED ...**



**NOW GO AND FORM A BAND!**

*Sniffin Glue Revisited*, Anon., *Boy's Own*, circa 1988/1989.

čilo da možete uzeti te medije, ploče, radio, zvuk, tisak, i da ih možete koristiti, distribuirati dalje i uspostaviti daljnje slične veze. Osjećaj izgnanstva, odvajanja i pobune bio je neprestano prisutan u imenima klubova, pjesama i umjetnika. Drzak humor bez imalo poštovanja, insajderski humor i subverzija bili su važan dio svega toga. Možda su fenomen humora i njegov klasno-kulturni sadržaj najočitiiji u zinu *Boy's Own* s kraja 80-ih i početka 90-ih godina ("jedini zin koji te odmah lupi, frende"), čije se čitateljstvo sastojalo od nogometnih navijača, *ravera* i *gay scene*.<sup>07</sup> Autori zina *Boy's Own* također su izrazito svjesno naglašavali klasnu i prostornu dinamiku nove kulture kojoj su pripadali:

*Acid house*, koji potječe iz ležernog svijeta huligana koji se izležavaju na plaži i šveraju eks, nastao je kada su predgrađa otela uzde popularne kulture iz ruku studenta umjetničkih akademija porijeklom iz srednje klase koji su ih držali još od kraja 60-ih godina.<sup>08</sup>

Put do prvog prosvjeda kojem sam ikada prisustvovao pronašao sam tako što sam pokupio letak čekajući u redu pred jednim klubom. Bio je to prosvjedni marš protiv Zakona o krivičnom postupku i javnom redu, koji se održavao u Londonu 9. listopada 1994. Nije mi bilo sasvim jasno o čemu se radi, ali znao sam da će ondje biti razglas na otvorenom i automatski sam osjetio da je politički prosvjed logičan korak dalje nakon alternativne kulture polulegalnih i ilegalnih zabava.

Osamdesete godine započele su s konzervativnom vladom Margaret Thatcher i visokom stopom nezaposlenosti. Tijekom čitavog desetljeća i početkom 90-ih opća kultura bila je obilježena odbijanjem rada (*dropping out*) i nepokornom radničkom klasom koja se žestoko protivila reformama socijalne države i uništavanju industrije koje je provodila Margaret Thatcher. Kako bi se premijerkinim kohortama u procvatnoj financijskoj industriji omogućilo da špekuliraju s imovinom u privredi i javnim službama, tisuće ljudi ostalo je bez posla ili je prisiljeno na nesigurno zaposlenje, ugostiteljstvo je propadalo, a veliki dio industrijskih kompleksa ispražnjen je ili namjerno ostavljen da propadne. Jedan od rijetkih ustupaka vlade Margaret Thatcher bio je taj što je ostavila relativno netaknutom pomoć za nezaposlene, kao i socijalne stanove za osobe bez prihoda ili s niskim prihodima. To je omogućilo nastanak živih subkultura, potaknutih koliko koliko prihvatljivom socijalnom pomoći, koje su doslovce živjele (skvotale) i družile se u materijalnom kršu koji su iza sebe ostavile premijerkinine mjere. Nakon što je 1990. okončana njezina vladavina, konzervativna vlada ostala je na vlasti, a kada su izblje-djele kratkotrajne blagodati izazvane deindustrijalizacijom, započelo je razdoblje ekonomske stagnacije. Nakon što se digla medijska

07 "Boy's Own: A History", <http://www.residentadvisor.net/feature.aspx?1139> (pristup 24. 06. 2013.).

08 *Boy's Own the Complete Fanzines 1986-92* (isječci), <http://www.djhistory.com/sites/default/files/BoysOwn-Sampler02.pdf> (pristup 24. 06. 2013.).

I found my way to the first demonstration I ever went on by picking up a flyer in the queue outside a club. It was an Anti-Criminal Justice Bill March in London 9 October 1994. I didn't really know what it was about, but I knew there was going to be an outdoor sound system and I sensed automatically that political protest was a logical step from hanging out in an underground culture of semi-legal and illegal parties.

The 1980s had begun with a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher and high unemployment. For the following decade and into the 1990s the general culture had been characterised by the refusal of work (dropping out) and a recalcitrant working class who had fiercely opposed Thatcher's reforms of the welfare state and destruction of industry. In order to allow Thatcher's cohorts in the booming financial industries to asset strip industries and public services thousands were thrown into unemployment, or precarious work, public housing was run down, vast swathes of industrial real estate was made empty or deliberately run down. One of Thatcher's government's few concessions was to leave relatively untouched unemployment and housing benefits for the unwaged and low waged. This led to lively subcultures, supported by a reasonable state allowance, literally living (squatting) and socialising, in the material detritus left by Thatcher's measures. After her reign ended in 1990 the Conservative government remained in power and, as the brief boon from deindustrialisation faded, economic stagnation set in. With the media uproar about the party scene, free festivals etc. it was time to take on the subculture, to

discipline and re-division the class. The preamble to this had been a series of hard confrontations with people organising free parties and illegal raves. The group who seemed to draw most of the flack was Spiral Tribe, who after organising a series of parties, some on military land 'Torpedo Town', drew the attentions of police (see Spiral Tribe's *Calendar of Police Harrassment 1991-1992*).

[The Conservative government faced] the problem of class rule in the new economic reality of global finance capital.[...] The problem they face which seems to be defying any easy resolution is simply the need to impose austerity, the need to attack the gains of an entrenched working class, without destroying the fragile Conservative social consensus represented by the 'Essex Man' phenomenon. With the dream of a property-owning democracy sinking into the nightmare of debt, the consensus is rapidly becoming unravelled, but UK plc cannot retreat. What better tonic than a good old attack on those firmly outside of the deal, the marginalized, whose exclusion the Conservative deal was predicated upon, to stiffen up resolve in the ranks for those attacks which threaten to recompose the class. But even such an apparently uncomplicated weapon has been threatening to blow up in the faces of those trying to use it.<sup>09</sup>

The Criminal Justice Bill was presented to Parliament late in 1993 and introduced a swathe

<sup>09</sup> Aufheben, "Kill or Chill – An Analysis of the Opposition to the Criminal Justice Bill", *Aufheben* Issue #4, Summer 1995, <http://libcom.org/library/kill-chill-aufheben-4> (accessed 24/06/2013)



'BOYS OWN'  
THE ONLY FANZINE  
THAT GETS RIGHT  
ON ONE MATEY!

Good MORROW MATEYS...

NOT much time to stop and chat, just a few words (after several issues) on the thinking behind BOYS OWN, prompted by certain accusations from people who are possibly a little hard of Thinking.

Accusation ONE: Racism: Bollocks! THE BOYS OWN writing team is a multi-racial experience.

Accusation Two: Homosexuality: None of the BOYS OWN team are dinner MASTERS, however I once slept with a geezer who was. This was AFTER a business meeting at "FRESH" and was purely a career move... "Well at least we got an ad out of it"

Accusation Three: sexism: o.k. it's a fair cop guv'nor, the mag's written by chaps (despite trying to recruit female type writers). It is at this point I can suggest a top periodical penned by Ladies, the one, the very only 'FRESH AIR'. A top Fanzine put together by people who look better in a bra than we do!

Accusation four: BOYS OWN is written by FOOTBALL HOOLIGANS. This is nonsense, two are CONFIRMED Cowards, whilst the other two were recently seen handing out flowers at the NORTH STAND gate...

A Final Note Mateys... BOYS OWN is all about Peace love and having Fun.

LURVE THE OUTSIDER  
— X —

SPIRAL TRIBE'S CALENDAR OF POLICE HARRASSMENT AT FREE PARTIES - 1991-1992

- 14.8.91 - CHELTENHAM, GLOS.  
23 arrests for 'theft of generator and intent to supply controlled drugs'.  
NO CHARGE
- 6.10.91 - THE SCHOOLHOUSE, LONDON NW10  
Large police presence using threatening terror tactics to ensure illegal  
eviction. NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 31.10.91 - HALLOWE'EN FREE PARTY, TURNBRIDGE WELLS, KENT  
Police used illegal action (lies and threats) to stop music.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 9.12.91 - ASCOT FREE FESTIVAL, BERKS.  
Police raid site during departure of sound systems. 3 arrests for  
'possession of controlled drugs' - vitamin pills and tobacco.  
NO CHARGE
- ENAS/NEW YEAR - BOUNDHOUSE, LONDON NW1  
4 free parties provide 1000 meals for homeless. Police attempt illegal  
confiscation of equipment without noise abatement order.  
NO CONFISCATION - NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- JAN 92 - BATTLEBRIDGE ROAD, LONDON WC1  
Several illegal raids by police - no reasons, no warrants.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 29.2.92 - SUNBESS FARM, KINGE LANGLEY, HERTS.  
Police prevent access to free party causing undeterred party goers to  
cross motorway and railway lines endangering life.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 1.3.92 - GROUNDWILL FARM, SWINDON, WILTS.  
32 arrests for 'potential breach of the peace'. Police damage vehicles  
during towing, no recompense.  
NO CHARGE
- 4.4.92 - WAREHOUSE, WELWYS GARDEN CITY, HERTS.  
200 mixed unit police forced entry - abusive and threatening. Voiced  
One woman beaten up, voiced complaints at this assault led to 2 arrest.  
NO CHARGE
- 17 - 19.4.92 - WAREHOUSE, PARK ROYAL, LONDON SW10  
Blackmailing tactics during week and forced entry by riot police at end  
of party attacking and injuring 1-700 party goers. Unprovoked.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 25.4.92 - CHORHAM COMMON, SUSSEX  
50 riot police storm site seizing and damaging equipment. Further action  
threatened until all vehicles escorted out of county.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 7.5.92 - SELSLEY, STROOD, GLOS.  
Public ordered off live-in site after peaceful free party on adjacent  
common. 25 vehicles escorted 30 miles out of county.  
NO ARRESTS - NO CHARGE
- 21.5.92 - CASTLEINGTON, WORCS.  
Vehicles singled out on departure and impounded with equipment, personal  
effects and money. 13 arrests for 'causing public nuisance'. Bail  
conditions to report 3 times per week until court case 21.7.92.  
4 vehicles and trailers, personal effects, money and Spiral rig still

buka o partijanskoj sceni, besplatnim festivalima i slično, došlo je vrijeme za obračun sa subkulturom, za discipliniranje i novu preraspodjelu klasnih odnosa. Uvod u taj proces bio je niz teških sukoba s ljudima koji su organizirali besplatne zabave i ilegalne *raveove*. Skupina koja je, kako se čini, primila na sebe veći dio paljbe bila je Spiral Tribe, koja je organizacijom niza zabava, od kojih su neke održane na vojnom posjedu "Torpedo Town", privukla pozornost policije (vidi: Spiral Tribe, *A Calendar of Police Harrassment 1991-1992*).

[Konzervativna vlada suočila se s] problemom klasne vladavine u novim ekonomskim okolnostima globalnog financijskog kapitala. [...] Problem s kojim su suočeni, a koji izgleda ne dopušta lako rješenje, jednostavno je potreba da se nametnu stroge mjere, potreba da se napadnu dobra koja uživa ušančena radnička klasa, a da se pritom ne uništi krhki konzervativni društveni konsenzus izražen u fenomenu "čovjeka iz Essex". Dok san o demokraciji s privatnim vlasništvom tone u noćnu moru dugovanja, konsenzus se rapidno raspada, ali britanska financijska klika ne može se povući. Nema boljeg lijeka od dobrog starog napada na one koji su sasvim izvan sporazuma, na marginalizirane, na čijem se isključenju i zasniva konzervativni sporazum, ne bi li se time zbilo redove pred napadima koji prijete da preustroje klasne odnose. Ali čak i takvo naizgled nekomplikirano oružje prijete da će opaliti u lice onima koji ga pokušaju upotrijebiti.<sup>09</sup>

Zakon o krivičnom postupku i javnom redu predstavljen je u Parlamentu krajem 1993. godine i uveo je niz mjera koje su pogađale slobodu okupljanja, poticanje na štrajk, litalice i novu *rave* kulturu. Taj je zakon ujedinio raznoliku subkulturu aktivista, *ravera*, prosvjednika protiv izgradnje cesta i litalice kako novog tako i starog kova koji su shvatili da će novi zakon kriminalizirati i njihovu kulturu i materijalna sredstva reprodukcije (u ovom slučaju stanovanje i/ili sivu ekonomiju oko *rave* partija). Pokret nije imao mnogo veze s bilo kakvim ljevičarskim strankama ili organizacijama i uglavnom se s njima nije niti pokušavao povezati.

Taj se pokret na neki način može smatrati paradigmom klasne borbe u razdoblju koje je uslijedilo nakon povlačenja socijaldemokracije: neometan ikakvom snažnom posredničkom silom i, kao takav, relativno nekoherentan u nastojanjima da izrazi svoje zahtjeve, ali i potencijalno eksplozivan. Čini se da se krećemo prema situaciji u kojoj tradicionalna sredstva integriranja borbe i njezinih subjekata – to jest ljevica – postaje sve nesposobnija zastupati borbu koja se događa izvan sfere proizvodnje. To povlačenje socijaldemokracije i samo je posljedica nove globalne stvarnosti.<sup>10</sup>

09 Aufheben, "Kill or Chill – An Analysis of the Opposition to the Criminal Justice Bill", Aufheben Issue #4 (ljetno 1995.), <http://libcom.org/library/kill-chill-aufheben-4> (pristup 24. 06. 2013.).



of measures addressing freedom of assembly, picketing, travellers and the new rave culture. It united a diverse subculture of activists, ravers, anti-roads protestors and both 'new age' and traditional travellers who understood that the new law would criminalise both their culture and material means of reproduction (in this case housing and/or the grey economy around raves). The movement had very little to do with any left parties or organisations and generally did not seek to make alliances with them.

The movement may be considered in some ways paradigmatic of class struggle in the era following the retreat of social democracy: unhindered by any powerful mediating force and, as such, both relatively incoherent in its attempts to express its demands and potentially explosive. We seem to be moving towards a situation where the traditional means of recuperation of struggles and integration of its subjects – the 'left' – is finding itself increasingly incapable of representing struggles occurring outside of the productive sphere. This retreat of social democracy is itself a consequence of new global realities.<sup>10</sup>

What this looked like on the street when I turned up to my first demo was a mess, there were travellers, people with dreadlocks, dogs everywhere, small bicycle powered sound systems very few banners and very very little party political regalia. People were drunk, rowdy, dancing and attacking the cops from the beginning to the end (especially if it looked like

they were threatening the sound systems). There was very little sense that we were on a 'march' from a to b, nor that there was a politically symbolic destination where we hoped to arrive and deliver our message. Instead the movement was the party and the party/movement was the message. This was as good an introduction to politics as any to me and I didn't see a need for 'formal' political organisations then nor now. The demo ended with a major riot as people occupied Hyde park and tried to bring large sound systems in trucks into the park. The police lost their cool and sent mounted police on horseback charging through the park. I remember booming techno and riderless horses reeling through a major 'royal' central London park. An aspect which complicated the crowd dynamics was that some of those organised around the *Freedom network* who had been involved in the initial organisation of the demo had stressed the need to "keep it fluffy" i.e. to keep levels of violence towards the cops and property destruction to a minimum. This took on a vigilante dimension in the clashes which arose and people from this group took to daubing 'violent' protestors with pink spray paint. Needless to say this was useful to the cops later as they cleared up and tried to arrest isolated protestors, they went for those with pink paint on their clothing. Given the chaos this was a pretty bad tactic, many who'd done nothing were arrested. There was a retort in the form of an infamous pamphlet put out by the anarchist group Class War entitled "Keep it Spikey" given out on the day of the demo before the riot and later reproduced in its entirety by national newspaper, *The Sun*. This hope-

10 Ibid.

Način na koji je to izgledalo na ulici kada sam se pojavio na svome prvom prosvjedu bio je kaos: bilo je tu luralica, ljudi s *dreadovima*, posvuda su bili psi, maleni razglasi pokretani pomoću bicikla, bilo je vrlo malo transparentata i još manje političkih obilježja. Ljudi su bili pijani i bučni, plesali su i napadali policajce od početka do kraja (osobito ako se činilo da se približavaju razglasima). Nije se baš mogao steći dojam da “marširamo” od točke A do točke B ili da postoji neka politički simbolična destinacija kamo se nadamo stići i predati svoju poruku. Umjesto toga, pokret je bio zabava, a zabava/pokret bili su poruka. Bio je to za mene podjednako dobar uvod u politiku kao i bilo koji drugi, i nisam vidio, kao što ni danas ne vidim, nikakve potrebe za “formalnim” političkim organizacijama. Prosvjed je završio velikim neredima kada su ljudi zauzeli Hyde Park i pokušali uvesti velike razglase na kamionima. Policija je izgubila živce i poslala konjicu, koja je galopirala kroz park. Sjećam se tutnjanja tehno-glazbe i konja bez jahača koji su kružili središnjim, “kraljevskim” parkom Londona. Element koji je zakomplicirao dinamiku mase bio je taj da su neki od onih koji su bili organizirani u “Freedom Network” i otpočetak uključeni u organizaciju prosvjeda isticali potrebu da se “ostane mek”, odnosno da se minimalizira nasilje prema policiji i uništavanje imovine. To je rezultiralo pojavom samozvanih čuvara u sukobima koji su “nasilne” prosvjednike prskali ružičastim sprejem. Nepotrebno je reći da je to kasnije bilo od koristi policiji kada su raščistili teren i pokušali uhititi izolirane prosvjednike, jer su se naprosto oborili na one s ružičastom bojom na odjeći. S obzirom na kaos, bila je to prilično loša taktika i uhićenje su mnogi koji ništa nisu učinili. Suprotnost je bio zloglasni pamflet koji je objavila anarhistička skupina “Class War” pod naslovom “Ostanite naoštreni”, a koji se dijelio na dan prosvjeda prije nego što su izbili nemiri i kasnije je u cijelosti objavljen u britanskim novinama *The Sun*. Nadam se da to donekle pokazuje koliko je prosvjed bio heterogen, što vrijedi za taj prosvjed, još dvostruko više vrijedi za same *rave* zabave.

Ono što ujedinjuje te skupine na takav način da su postale metom tolike mržnje vlade jest činjenica da je svima njima, iako su možda daleko od toga da svjesno objave rat kapitalu, zajedničko odbacivanje etike rada i života podređenog nadničarenju. Kao takve, one predstavljaju alternativu životu provedenom u očajničkoj potrazi za poslom koji i treba učiniti nepoželjnim.<sup>11</sup>

Devedesete godine obilježio je početak razdoblja “ponovnog name-tanja rada”. Točnije rečeno, bila je to opća transformacija od industrijskog carstva prema globalno umreženom pružatelju usluga koju je pokrenula Margaret Thatcher. U toj tranziciji 90-ih *rave* i

10 Isto.

11 Isto.

fully gives some indication of how heterogeneous the protest was and what is true for the protest was doubly true for rave parties in themselves.

What unites these groups in such a way that they have become such hate targets of the government is that, although they may be a long way from consciously declaring war on capital, they share a common refusal of the work-ethic, of a life subordinated to wage labour. As such, they pose an alternative to the life of desperately looking for work, which must be made unattractive.<sup>11</sup>

The 1990s marked the beginning of the period of the 're-imposition of work'. More specifically the full shift which Thatcher had begun from an industrial empire to a globally networked service provider. The 1990s was this transition, the means of rave and technoculture were a combination of technologies, spaces and income which had been the outcome of devalorisation. Vinyl, Radio, Loudspeakers, Trucks, Empty Buildings, these were the technologies of a period of industrial production and mass culture. What did it mean that throughout this period of the late 1980s and 1990s people, hundreds of thousands of people across the country were literally exhausting themselves each weekend and into the working week? What energies had been unleashed, where had they come from and what threat did it pose that these energies could not be productively employed in industry? What were those gestures, where people appeared to be mechanising themselves in time

with the new rhythms of a digitally accelerated life? Was this a practice for a flexible monadic future? Or, was it an acting out, an exorcism and exercise in defamiliarisation, self-appropriation of self-alienation?

Spatially, rave had begun as an inner city phenomenon in small exclusive clubs, swiftly shifting to the periphery (beyond the M25) of cities, and to rural situations, largely to escape the attentions of the police. At the beginning of the 1990s it came back to the inner cities in clubs and squats, the streets and again back out into dispersion to the edges of cities where warehouses or cheap venues were available. Interestingly this meant inner city kids exploring the rural countryside, much as their grandparents had in the late-19th and early 20th century. There were strong elements of suburban culture and many of the records and artists I knew of were working in Essex, Hackney, Brighton and Bristol. There was also a strong culture of anonymity ("Origin Unknown"), secrecy and humour ("faceless techno bollocks") as well as strongly decentralised elements. The internet, as I began to use it in the 2000s, was synonymous with the futurity of this rich subculture, but also was to be the means and infrastructure for the new working environment being developed.

Increasingly through the 1990s and especially after the Criminal Justice Bill had become the Criminal Justice Act those on the dole found themselves on the one hand under tougher conditions as a New Labour government introduced so-called 'welfare to work' conditions and stronger disciplinary apparatus around benefits. On the other it began to be possible to find white collar casual or flexible

11 Ibid.

tehno-kultura bili su kombinacija tehnologije, prostora i prihoda koja je proizašla iz procesa devalorizacije. Ploče, Radio, Zvučnici, Kamioni, Prazne zgrade – to su bile tehnologije razdoblja industrijske proizvodnje i masovne kulture. Što je značilo to što su se tijekom čitavog tog razdoblja kasnih 80-ih i ranih 90-ih tisuće ljudi širom zemlje doslovce iscrpljivali svakog vikenda pa dijelom i tijekom radnog tjedna? Kakva se to energija oslobađala, odakle je došla i kakvu je prijetnju predstavljala za onu energiju koja se mogla produktivno iskoristiti u industriji? Kakve su to bile geste u kojima se činilo da se ljudi mehaniziraju u skladu s novim ritmovima digitalno ubrzanog života? Je li to bila praksa za fleksibilnu monadsku budućnost? Ili je to bila predstava, egzorcizam i pokušaj defamilijarizacije i samopronalaženja u samootuđenju?

U prostornom smislu *rave* je započeo kao fenomen iz središta grada, nastao u malenim, ekskluzivnim klubovima, ali se brzo proširio (preko M25) na periferiju gradova i u ruralne krajeve, uglavnom kako bi izbjegao budnom oku policije. Početkom 90-ih vratio se u središte gradova, u klubove i skvotove, na ulice, i zatim je krenuo natrag, rasipajući se na rubove gradova, gdje se moglo doći do jeftinih skladišta i hala. Zanimljivo je da je to značilo da su mladi iz središta grada počeli istraživati ruralna područja, baš kao što su to njihovi djedovi činili krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća. Bilo je tu snažnih elemenata suburbane kulture i velik dio ploča ili umjetnika koje sam poznao djelovao je u Essexu, Hackneyju, Brightonu ili Bristolu. Bila je to također kultura stroge anonimnosti (“Origin Unknown” - “Porijeklo nepoznato”), tajanstvenosti i humora (“faceless techno bollocks” - “anonimna tehno koještarija”), sa snažnim elementom decentralizacije. Internet, koji sam počeo koristiti početkom ovog stoljeća, bio je sinonim za budućnost te bogate subkulture, ali je također postao sredstvo i infrastruktura novog radnog konteksta u nastanku.

Tijekom 90-ih godina i osobito nakon što je Zakon o krivičnom postupku i javnom redu stupio na snagu, oni koji su živjeli od socijalne pomoći našli su se s jedne strane u teškoj situaciji kada je nova laburistička vlada uvela program “s potpore na posao” sa strožim disciplinarnim aparatom u pogledu socijalne pomoći. S druge strane, sada je bilo moguće pronaći finije, ležernije i fleksibilnije poslove u Londonu zahvaljujući procvatu komunikacija, financijskih službi, marketinškog sektora, kurirskih službi i slično. Budući da je skvotanje bilo sve više kriminalizirano, a stanarine su skočile, pritisak je bio uspješan i učinkovit, kao i komercijalizacija onoga što je tijekom kasnih 80-ih i čitavih 90-ih ostalo relativno samoorganizirani oblik kulture (iako se još uvijek vrtio golem novac u svojoj ekonomiji droga, klubova itd.) Upravo je taj pritisak teorijski kolektiv Aufheben u to vrijeme sažeo kao tranziciju iz “autonomije soci-

work in London’s booming communications, financial services, advertising sectors, or couriering etc. As squatting became increasingly criminalised and rents rose the squeeze was successful and effective, as was the commercialisation of what had throughout the late-1980s and 1990s remained relatively self-organised form of culture (not that there was not money to be made in the grey economy of drugs, clubs etc.) It is this pressure which Aufheben summed up at the time as the transition from *Dole Autonomy Versus The Reimposition of Work*. It marked a successful counter-revolution and one which still rolls on. Having successfully attacked the level of working class reproduction via welfare, successive governments have gone on to remove free education and other benefits which were an important source of youth autonomy and a barrier between those who hoped to stay out of wage labour as long as possible and the new flexibilised McJobs on offer.

The lack of an unemployed movement today is despite a relatively high level of non-representational political activity among those on the dole in recent years; indeed, the dole is the very basis for a number of the most vigorous direct action movements. The energies of the natural opposition to the attacks on benefits (the unemployed and the politically active) are currently being channelled in other directions. Workfare is being introduced in the UK, not because the unemployed have become ‘acquiescent’, but because a potentially powerful opposition prefers – misguidedly in our view – to

fight over other issues or to seek individual solutions, rather than to defend the conditions that make some of their campaigns and activities possible.<sup>12</sup>

12 Aufheben, *Dole Autonomy versus the Reimposition of Work*, 1998, <http://libcom.org/library/dole-autonomy-aufheben> (accessed 24/06/2013)

Leaving university at the end of the 1990s, one of the last students for whom the state provided the costs of tuition and a maintenance grant, I was immediately unemployed. In between periods on the dole I took a spate of casual jobs for catering companies who served business functions in the city and an early cyber cafe in Soho, the Global Cafe. The only flat I could afford was way east from the centre in East Ham and on my way home from work late at night I called anonymous ‘party lines’ and followed directions to illegal parties which took place in the deindustrialised belt of Canning Town, Stratford and Hackney, an area which in recent years was cleared for the 2012 London Olympics.

Towards the end of the 1990s I began to witness a convergence of the small media I had been following around a small project space called the Info Centre. The space, run by artists Henrietta Heise and Jakob Jakobsen, brought together situationist-inspired journals, publications and small zines such as *Inventory*, London Psychogeographical Association, Association of Autonomous Astronauts, *Break/Flow*. A low-key invitation card would announce “We have brewed beer”. The Info Centre hosted a reading room of these publications and others and I often visited to read back issues and pick up new issues and posters. I became close to the people behind *Inventory*, later writing for the journal and with the help of member, Dam-





*Smash This Puny Existence*, Inventory, Hanway Street, London, photo: Max Reeves, 2001.



*Murad Qureshi EP*, Break/Flow, 1998.



*Inventory FM*, Inventory, circa 2005.



*Info Centre*, Jakob Jakobsen & Henrietta Hesse, London, circa 1999.



jalne pomoći u ponovno nametanje rada”, uspješnu kontrarevoluciju koja još uvijek traje. Nakon što su uspješno utjecale na razinu reprodukcije radničke klase smanjenjem socijalne pomoći, vlade su jedna za drugom odlučile ukinuti besplatno obrazovanje i druge povlastice koje su bile važan izvor autonomije mladih i barijera između onih koji su se nadali da će ostati izvan sustava rada i nadnica dokle god je to moguće, te novih, fleksibilnijih McJobova.

Danas nedostaje pokret nezaposlenih unatoč tome što je posljednjih godina zamjetna relativno visoka razina nereprezentacijske političke aktivnosti među onima koji žive od socijalne pomoći – štoviše, potpora nezaposlenima osnova je niza izrazito energičnih pokreta direktne akcije. Energija prirodne oporbe protiv napada na povlastice (a to su nezaposleni i politički aktivni) trenutno se kanalizira u drugim smjerovima. Velika Britanija uvela je program “workfare”, i to ne zato što su nezaposleni sada “pomirljivi”, nego zato što potencijalno snažna oporba više voli – iako po našem mišljenju pogrešno – boriti se za druge stvari ili tražiti pojedinačna rješenja umjesto da brani uvjete koji uopće omogućuju neke od njihovih kampanja i aktivnosti.<sup>12</sup>

Napustio sam sveučilište krajem 90-ih godina kao jedan od posljednjih studenata kojima je država platila školovanje i dio životnih troškova, i odmah sam bio nezaposlen. Između razdobljâ na socijalnoj pomoći povremeno bih uzeo neki posao za ugostiteljske tvrtke koje su opsluživale poslovne klijente u središtu grada i za jedan od prvih cyber-kafića u Sohou, Global Cafe. Jedini stan koji sam si mogao priuštiti bio je daleko na istoku od centra grada, u East Hamu, i na putu kući u sitne sate slijedio bih anonimne “partijanske putokaze” i upute koje bi me dovele do ilegalnih zabava koje su se odvijale u deindustrijaliziranom pojasu Canning Towna, Stratforda i Hackneyja, na području koje je proteklih godina raščišćeno za Olimpijadu u Londonu 2012.

Pred kraj 90-ih počeo sam primjećivati okupljanje manjih medija koje sam pratio oko malenog projektnog prostora po imenu Info Centre. Vodili su ga umjetnici Henrietta Heise i Jakob Jakobsen, a okupljao je situacionistički usmjerene novine, publikacije i malene zinove kao što su *Inventory*, London Psychogeographical Association, Association of Autonomous Astronauts i *Break/Flow*. Skromna pozivnica obznanila bi: “Imamo svježeg piva”. Info Centre imao je čitaonicu za spomenute i druge publikacije i često sam je posjećivao kako bih čitao starije brojeve i pokupio nova izdanja i plakate. Zbližio sam se s ljudima koji su izdavali *Inventory*, a kasnije sam pisao za taj časopis i zajedno s Damianom Abbottom kao suradnikom napravio jednokratnu jednodnevnu piratsku radio emisi-

12 Aufheben, “Dole  
Autonomy versus the Reim-  
position of Work” (1998.),  
[http://libcom.org/library/  
dole-autonomy-aufheben](http://libcom.org/library/dole-autonomy-aufheben)  
(pristup 24. 06. 2013.).



ian Abbott, setting up a one-off one day pirate radio broadcast.<sup>13</sup> Somewhere along the line I came across *Mute* and began finding texts by writers I followed turning up on the *Mute* website. The collision of critical thought about technology, extra-parliamentary politics, music, film, art and theory felt both completely both a little broader than the arcane and hermetic publications I had found interesting up to this point and there was a sense of an expanding field in which other reader/writers were making similar connections. In March 1999 I attended a performative street installation by *Inventory* called "Smash This Puny Existence". The event took the form of an open newspaper/billboard whereby the group had flyposter an entire alley stretching in an L-shape between Oxford Street and Tottenham Court Road and stood at either end of the street holding "Golf Sale" signposts directing passers-by through the literary diversion. The same day and about half a mile down the road there was an all day 'post-media flea market' called Expo-Destructo: post-media pressure.<sup>14</sup> *Inventory*, *Mute*, *Break/Flow*, *Reclaim the Streets*, *Backspace* and many other groups took part in the flea-market. In a sense the two events, a print publication which had taken to the street and a flea-market of internet sites and online cultures summed up the uncanny and unbounded dynamics being explored in media in London at the time. I was by then a regular internet user and having come to it from the street I was lived the conviction that the two spaces were interrelated. The convergence noted above had its epiphany in many ways in June the same year with the Carnival Against Capital coordinated by *Reclaim the*

*Streets*. *Backspace*, a media or hack lab was the key link providing much of the technological infrastructure (web hosting and archiving) for many of these groups, and media artists, but also formed an important social and working space.<sup>15</sup> The festive protest realised all the aspects of a disorganised street party with a very clear and universal target: capitalism, and in this case the very formidable edifice of finance capital as it had taken form in the City of London, London's financial district. Though it was not until the following year I would be fully unemployed, working three jobs and studying and still only being able to afford to live at my sister's house far from the centre of the city it was not a stretch of the imagination to connect the ascendancy and confidence of the financial powerhouse of the City contributing to the squeeze on living conditions of London's inhabitants. Moreover, the sense that not only did we not have any respect for the rules, wealth and power of this highly 'secure' zone of the city using it as our party space, wrecking and disturbing it with weird frequencies and out of control bodies also felt like a visceral retort to high finance's arid and sterile organisation of space. Whilst J18 put capitalism on the agenda, then and after there were serious questions about the residual lifestylism of the movement which led to this now renowned event. Just as *Aufheben* strongly criticised the inability of this activist movement to confront the

13 Craig Martin and I conceived of this project in response to an invitation from Cubitt's curator Polly Staple. Typically none of us knew anything about the radio equipment that Damian helped us install on the roof of the gallery. <http://cubittartists.org.uk/2002/05/25/broad-cast/>. The idea to work with radio came straight from my teenage suburban experience of listening to radio pirates and a performance *Inventory* had put on <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/endless-sonic-mania-inventory-fm> and I reviewed for *Mute*, one of my first written articles and the first for *Mute*.

14 Expo-Destructo, <http://bak.spc.org/iod/destructo/flea-market.html>

15 I'd come across *Backspace* a few times in this period, especially since many of the rudimentary, text and animated gif-heavy sites I visited linked off from *Backspace*'s home page, but probably with not much of an idea what it was until I started visiting the physical space just before it closed. One more important spatial dynamic to note was *Backspace*'s proximity, just near to Tower Bridge, to both central London, south and East London. A quick look at <http://bak.spc.org/> will give you access to an archive website pretty much as it was in 1998/1999.

ju.<sup>13</sup> Negdje u to doba naišao sam na *Mute* i počeo na toj mrežnoj stranici pronalaziti tekstove autora koje sam pratio. Spoj kritičkih ideja o tehnologiji, izvanparlamentarnoj politici, glazbi, filmu, umjetnosti i teoriji činio se ondje znatno širim od hermetičnih publikacija za uski krug čitatelja koje sam do tada smatrao zanimljivima i imao sam osjećaj širenja polja na kojemu su drugi čitatelji i autori uspostavljali slične veze. U ožujku 1999. posjetio sam performativnu uličnu instalaciju *Smash This Puny Existence* koju je postavio *Inventory*. Događaj je imao formu otvorenih novina/panoa, pri čemu je skupina oblijepila čitavu stražnju ulicu koja je u obliku slova L povezivala Oxford Street i Tottenham Court Road i stala na oba kraja ulice držeći putokaze “golferska rasprodaja” kojima su prolaznike usmjeravali kroz književnu zaobilaznicu. Istoga dana, oko pola milje dalje niz cestu cijeli dan je stajao natpis “postmedijski buvljak” po imenu “Expo-Destructo: postmedia pressure”.<sup>14</sup> *Inventory*, *Mute*, *Break/Flow*, *Reclaim the Streets*, *Backspace* i mnoge druge skupine sudjelovale su na tom buvljaku. U određenom smislu ta su dva događaja, objavljivanje tiskovina s kojim se izašlo na ulicu i buvljak mrežnih stranica i kultura sažela čudnu i nekonvencionalnu dinamiku koju su u to vrijeme istraživali londonski mediji. U to vrijeme već sam redovito koristio internet, a budući da sam došao do njega s ulice, živio sam u uvjerenju da su ta dva prostora međusobno povezana. Spoj koji sam ranije spomenuo dospio je do trenutka epifanije na više načina u lipnju iste godine, kada je održan *Carnival Against Capital* koji je koordinirala skupina *Reclaim the Streets*. *Backspace*, medijski ili hakerski laboratorij, bio je ključna spona koja je osiguravala veći dio tehnološke infrastrukture (mrežni prostor i arhiviranje) za mnoge od okupljenih skupina i medijskih umjetnika, ali je bio i važan prostor za susretanje i rad.<sup>15</sup> Taj svečani prosvjed ispunio je sve aspekte dezorganizirane ulične zabave sa sasvim jasnom i univerzalnom metom, a to je bio kapitalizam, u ovom slučaju poprilično pozamašno uporište financijskog kapitala kakvo se formiralo u Cityju, financijskoj četvrti Londona. Iako sam tek od iduće godine bio sasvim nezaposlen, a u ovo vrijeme radio sam na tri privremena posla i studirao, a ipak si nisam mogao priuštiti više od toga da stanujem kod sestre, daleko od središta grada, nije trebalo mnogo mašte da se povežu uspon i samouvjerenost financijskog bastiona Cityja i pritisak na životne uvjete londonskih žitelja. Štoviše, osjećaj da mi ne samo da nismo uopće poštivali pravila, bogatstvo i moć te izrazito “sigurne” zone grada, nego smo je koristili kao prostor za partijanje, razarajući i uzbujujući ga čudnovatim frekvencijama i nekontroliranim tijelima, također se doživljavao kao odgovor iz dubine duše na suhu i sterilnu organizaciju prostora karakterističnu za visoke financije. Dok je prosvjed J18 (18. lipnja) stavio na dnevni red kapitalizam i tada i

13 Craig Martin i ja zamislili smo taj projekt kao odgovor na poziv Polly Staple, kustosice Cubitta. Znakovito je da nijedan od nas nije znao ništa o radijskoj opremi koju nam je Damian pomogao instalirati na krovu galerije. <http://cubittartists.org.uk/2002/05/25/broad-cast/>. Ideja o radiju došla je ravno iz mog tinejdžerskog iskustva u predgrađu, kada sam slušao piratske stanice i performans koji je *Inventory* postavio na <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/endless-sonic-mania-inventory-fm>, a ja sam napisao recenziju za *Mute*, jedan od svojih prvih članaka i prvi za *Mute*.

14 Expo-Destructo, <http://bak.spc.org/iod/destructo/flea-market.html>.

15 Nailazio sam nekoliko puta na *Backspace* u to vrijeme, osobito zato što su mnoge od rudimentarnih, tekstualnih i animiranih stranica kratkih gif-slikama koje sam u to vrijeme posjećivao bile linkovi s glavne stranice *Backspacea*, ali vjerojatno nisam imao konkretnu ideju o tome što je to dok nisam počeo posjećivati fizički prostor netom prije njegova zatvaranja. Još jedna važna prostorna dinamika koju valja spomenuti bila je lokacija *Backspacea*, nedaleko od Tower Bridgea, dakle blizu centralnom, južnom i istočnom Londonu. Pogled na stranicu <http://bak.spc.org/> dat će vam pristup arhivskoj stranici, koja je uglavnom onakva kakva je bila 1998./1999.

removal of its means of social reproduction – unemployment benefit, housing benefit, criminalisation of squatting and so on, the weaknesses of it in the new landscape of the UK plc. were patently clear in the movements sudden disappearance in the 2000s. Which is not to suggest that the tactics developed by RTS under the spell of the rave movement haven't continuously been used to great effect.<sup>16</sup> Banning a few essential critical remarks to the footnotes, I'd like to move from history to the present, considering what remains worthwhile discussing in the legacy I have sketched for my conclusion.<sup>17</sup>

The situations we have seen developing in recent years with mass mobilisations in North Africa, Europe, US, South America and West Africa have shown some commonality with the cultural predilections of both rave and the political movements associated with it. The logic of occupation, reterritorialisation of space (take overs of the city and central urban spaces), music, poetry and diverse iterations of internet memes producing complex feedback between the street and the net. Often it has been both difficult and somewhat pointless to attempt to discern where culture ends and politics begins. These events have taken the form of youth revolts, but also, more generally, revolts of wageless life.<sup>18</sup> They have activated a 'Surplus humanity' at different points in a class spectrum which encompasses the peripheral life of a casualised lumpenproletariat, elements of a factory proletariat for whom the social democratic class deal is now far from reciprocal and sections of the educated proletarianised middle class. Each successive revolt has thrown the existing

stability of means, use, uselessness, misuse, contingency/chance into question. In a revolt when people use whatever is available 'use' itself is changed. As in William Gibson's famous dictum from the story *Burning Chrome*: "The Street Finds Its Own Use for Things." A mainstream media approach has tended to pose new technology, particularly social media, as instrumental to these revolts but this dogma not only orientalises such movements but also tends to subdue more complex mediations.<sup>19</sup>

In the revolts of our own times we are increasingly seeing the suspension of the normal ordering of objects and behaviours, new relations come to the fore and they find their material to hand. New uses derive from and extend new and unforeseen relations. What shapes do these apparently spontaneous iterations of 'social form' comprise? When people use bread as media to communicate their lack of the basic foodstuff, when they point a baguette as a weapon at the cops, when looters use a mannequin leg to break a shop window to impose some asset relocation from below we are talking about media as impure means: those means which amidst a capitalist crisis of valorisation make themselves available to use and misuse in these intense moments of social revolt, combination and communication. Whatever gets employed and distributes the signal is the media. This at least suggests that heretofore, so-called media activists have

16 The following pair of articles reflect an interesting struggle over the forms of authenticity attributed to music in a recent protest situation: Paul Mason, "The Dubstep Rebellion", [http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2010/12/9122010\\_dubstep\\_rebellion\\_\\_br.html](http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2010/12/9122010_dubstep_rebellion__br.html), Dan Hancox, "This is our Riot Pow", <http://danhancox.blogspot.de/2010/12/this-is-our-riot-pow.html>. The Deteritorial Support Group's text, "All the Memes of Production" reflects some interesting problems for the transformation of a wayward cultural movement into a political movement, <http://libcom.org/library/all-memes-production-deteritorial-support-group>

17 Excellent criticisms of J18 and the general tendencies explored by Reclaim the Streets-style activism can be found in *Reflections on J18*, <http://www.afed.org.uk/online/j18/index.html> A particularly swinging critique is that of 'lifestylism': "'anti-capitalism' has predicated itself on the assumption of radical expressivity, the pivotal moment of any Reclaim The Streets event is the arrival of a smuggled in soundsystem. [...] for them cultural manifestations in the streets are manifestations of resistance to capitalism. But radical

16 Sljedeća dva članka odražavaju zanimljiv spor oko oblika autentičnosti koji se pripisuju glazbi u nedavnim prosvjednim situacijama: Paul Mason, "The Dubstep Rebellion", [http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2010/12/9122010\\_dubstep\\_rebellion\\_-\\_br.html](http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2010/12/9122010_dubstep_rebellion_-_br.html); Dan Hancox, "This is our Riot Pow", <http://dan-hancox.blogspot.de/2010/12/this-is-our-riot-pow.html>. Tekst skupine Deteritorial Support "All the Memes of Production" govori o nekim zanimljivim problemima u transformaciji osebnog kulturnog pokreta u politički pokret: <http://libcom.org/library/all-memes-production-deteritorial-support-group>.

17 Odlična kritika prosvjeda J18 i općenitih tendencija koje je istraživao aktivizam u stilu Reclaim the Streets može se pronaći u: *Reflections on J18*, <http://www.afed.org.uk/online/j18/index.html> Osobito jetka kritika upućena je *lifestyle*-izmu: "antikapitalizam se oslanja na pretpostavku radikalne ekspresivnosti, ključni trenutak svakog pokreta Reclaim The Streets je dolazak prošvercanog razglaša. [...] za njih su kulturne manifestacije na ulicama manifestacije otpora prema kapitalizmu. No radikalna ekspresivnost samo je završni lak na proizvodu koji je dugo putovao pokretnom trakom, i zašto bi taj posljednji proces trebalo toliko više cijeniti od ostalih? Zastupati antikapitalističku kulturu u uvjerenju da će se ona "proširiti" i naposljetku svrgnuti kapital znači brkati kulturni sadržaj i proizvodnu formu; antikapitalizam je fragment pop kulture i funkcionira kao takav; on ne može nadići svoje granice, koje su očite i u repetitivnoj i ekskluzivnoj naravi njegovih događaja." Monsieur Dupont, *Nihilist Communism*, <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/monsieur-dupont-nihilist-communism> (pristup 24. 06. 2013.).

kasnije javljala su se ozbiljna pitanja o natruhama *lifestyle*-izma u tom pokretu koji je doveo do tog danas čuvenog događaja. Baš kao što je Aufheben oštro kritizirao nesposobnost aktivističkog pokreta da se suprotstavi dokidanju njegovih sredstava društvene reprodukcije – potpore za nezaposlene, socijalnog stanovanja, kriminalizacijom skvotova i tako dalje – njegova slabost u novom pejzažu britanskih financija sasvim je jasno izašla na vidjelo kada su ti pokreti naglo nestali početkom 21. stoljeća. Time nikako ne želim dovesti u pitanje da su taktike koje je razvio RTS pod utjecajem raverskog bile i dalje korištene uz dobre rezultate.<sup>16</sup> Nekoliko ključnih kritičkih opaski prebacit ću u bilješke kako bi se sada pomaknuo s povijesti na sadašnjost i razmotrio u zaključku što je ostalo vrijedno rasprave u nasljeđu koje sam ukratko prikazao.<sup>17</sup>

Situacije kakvima svjedočimo posljednjih godina, s masovnom mobilizacijom u Sjevernoj Africi, Europi, SAD-u, Južnoj Americi i Zapadnoj Africi, pokazuju određene zajedničke crte s kulturnim sklonostima *ravea* i političkih pokreta koji se s njime povezuju. To su logika zauzimanja i reteritorializacije prostora (preuzimanja kontrole nad gradom i središnjim urbanim prostorima), glazba, poezija i razne iteracije internetskih mema, čime se stvara složena povratna veza između ulice i interneta. Često je i teško i ponešto besmisleno pokušavati razdvojiti gdje prestaje kultura, a počinje politika. Ti događaji poprimili su oblik omladinskih prosvjeda, ali i općenitije, prosvjeda života lišenog prihoda.<sup>18</sup> Oni su aktivirali ono "suvišno čovječanstvo" na različitim točkama klasnog spektra koje seže od života na periferiji kakvim živi lumpenproletarijat sveden na djelomično radno vrijeme, preko elemenata tvorničkog proletarijata za koji je socijaldemokratski klasni sporazum sada daleko od razmjernog, do dijelova obrazovane, proletarizirane srednje klase. Svaki daljnji prosvjed doveo je u pitanje postojeću stabilnost sredstava i njihovu upotrebu, neupotrebljivost, zloupotrebu i kontingenciju/slučajnost. U pobuni u kojoj ljudi koriste sve što im je na raspolaganju mijenja se i sam pojam "upotrebe". Kao u čuvenoj izreci Williama Gibsona iz priče *Burning Chrome*: "Ulica pronalazi vlastitu upotrebu za stvari".<sup>19</sup> Pristup srednjestrujaških medija obično pretpostavlja da je nova tehnologija instrument tih pobuna, osobito društveni mediji, ali ta dogma ne samo što orijentalizira takve pokrete, nego također teži suzbijanju složenijih oblika medijacije.


U pobunama našeg doba sve češće vidimo suspenziju normalnog poretka stvari i formi ponašanja, gdje u prvi plan izlaze novi odnosi i pronalazi se svježja građa. Nove upotrebe nastaju iz novih i dotad neviđenih odnosa i šire ih dalje. Kakve oblike obuhvaćaju te naizgled spontane iteracije "društvene forme"? Kada ljudi koriste kruh kao medij kako bi izrazili pomanjkanje osnovnih živežnih na-



*J18 Carnival Against Global Capital,*  
Anon., London, 18 June 1999.

*J18 karneval protiv globalnog kapitala,* anon., London, 18. lipnja 1999.

expressivity is only a final layer of varnish on a product that has had a long trip down a conveyor belt, why should this last process of many bevalued so highly? To advocate an anticapitalist culture in the belief that it can be 'spread' and will eventually overthrow capital is a confusion of cultural content for productive form; anti-capitalism is a fragment of pop culture and functions as such, it cannot escape its confines, even down to the repetitious and exclusive nature of its events." Monsieur Dupont, *Nihilist Communism*, <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/monsieur-dupont-nihilist-communism> (accessed 24/06/2013)



*Never Mind the Ballots Reclaim the Streets, Reclaim the Streets, flyer for two day festival and protest, London 12-13 April, 1997.*  
*Never Mind the Ballots Reclaim the Streets, Reclaim the Streets, flajer za dvodnevni festival i prosvjod, London 12-13. travnja 1997.*

18 "The destination of the unemployed, of the 'reserve army of labour', was to be called back into active service. The destination of waste is the waste-yard, the rubbish heap". "The production of 'human waste', or more correctly wasted humans... is an inevitable outcome of modernization"; "refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants are 'the waste products of globalization'". Zygmunt Bauman quoted in Michael Denning, "Wageless Life", *New Left Review* 66, November-December 2010, p.96.





**A Tunisian demonstrator, Fred Dufour/AFP/Getty Images, Tunis, 18 January 2011.**

**Tunizijski demonstrant, Fred Dufour/AFP/Getty Images, Tunis, 18. siječnja 2011.**



**People take clothes from a looted store near a supermarket, in La Gazella, Tunis, AFP/Getty, 15 January 2011.**

**Ljudi uzimaju odjeću iz pokradenog dućana nedaleko od supermarketa u La Gazelli, Tunis, AFP/Getty, 15. siječnja 2011.**



"Tear gas makes us high," Taksim Square Istanbul, Anon., 2013.

"Suzavac nas samo diže", trg Taksim u Istanbulu, anon., 2013.

18 "Cilj nezaposlenih, te 'rezervne armije rada', bio je da ih pozovu natrag u aktivnu službu. Cilj smeća je smetlište, gomila otpada". "Proizvodnja 'ljudskog otpada', točnije propalih ljudi... neizbježna je posljedica modernizacije"; "izbjeglice, azilanti, imigranti su 'otpadni proizvodi globalizacije'". Zygmunt Bauman, citat u: Michael Denning, "Wageless Life", *New Left Review* 66 (studeni-prosinac 2010.), str. 96.

19 "Pitanje nije vodi li internet u oslobođenje ili potčinjenost: od svoga nastanka on uvijek proizvodi i jedno i drugo. To je dijalektika interneta i jedan aspekt uvijek je povezan s drugim, jer internet je forma koju je danas poprimio kapitalizam, a kapitalizam je i sam kontradikcija u procesu. [...] U kapitalizmu sve funkcionira na taj način: potrošnja oslobađa i porobljuje, donosi oslobođenje, ali i novu potčinjenost, i krug kreće ispočetka, samo na višoj razini. [...] borba bi se trebala sastojati u poticanju praksi oslobođenja koje treba suprotstaviti praksama potčinjavanja. To se može postići samo ako prestanemo gledati na tehnologiju kao na autonomnu silu i shvatimo da je oblikuju i pokreću vlasnički odnosi, odnosi moći i proizvodni odnosi." Wu Ming, "Fetishism of Digital Commodities", <http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/wumingblog/?p=1895>.

20 Ultras Ahlawy pjevaju "Oh Council of Bastards", [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XvnIOzX64I&feature=share&list=PLpt2NTR68\\_TALE4-LV1g5\\_CUYO8SUGK1u](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3XvnIOzX64I&feature=share&list=PLpt2NTR68_TALE4-LV1g5_CUYO8SUGK1u) (pristup 01. 07. 2013.).

mirnica, kada upere baget kao oružje prema policajcima, kada pljačkaši tijekom nemira koriste nogu lutke iz izloga kako bi razbili staklo i nametnuli preraspodjelu sredstava odozdo, govorimo o medijima kao o nečistom sredstvu: sredstvu koje se usred kapitalističke krize proizvodnje vrijednosti nudi za upotrebu i zloupotrebu tijekom intenzivnih trenutaka društvene pobune, povezivanja i komunikacije. Što god se može upotrijebiti i prenositi signal jest mediji. To ukazuje kako su do sada takozvani medijski aktivisti pogrešno postavljali pitanje vlasništva nad medijima. Budući da su svi mediji (čak i u konzervativnom smislu) proizvod društvenog rada – rada onih koji rade – sve se to i podruštvljuje i istodobno nam se oduzima. Mi doslovce ne uspijevamo uživati plodove i bogatstvo svoga rada. Mediji se podruštvljuju na način da nam oduzimaju moć. Stoga nije nužno ukazivati na ono što bi trebalo biti "slobodno" od kapitalističke kontrole, nego kako i kada ćemo uzeti te stvari natrag, kako i kada će ljudi uspostaviti kontrolu nad svojom samomedijacijom putem uređaja, kako će modulirati dane signale. Osobno tvrdim da je to neka vrsta suviška, koji se ne može niti silom zadržati kod kuće niti se može privatizirati i prodati. Očito je da će s jednog gledišta višak koji je aktivan u društvenim pokretima gotovo sigurno i kasnije davati građu za nove oblike komodifikacije. No to nije nužno jedini način gledanja na stvari, jer u novim oblicima koji nastaju u ciklonu današnjih pobuna, kao što su čudnovati ritualizirani ples i pjesma nogometnih navijača Al-Ahlawyja, ljudi se sami pretvaraju u komunikacijske uređaje, mimetički se samootuđuju i postaju strojevi kako bi otvorili prostor kroz koji može proći nešto novo.<sup>20</sup> To opisuje nove koncentracije i kombinacije energije, nosi sa sobom vlastitu povijest i vlastiti način autorefleksije. To je rezultat naše nedovršene sadašnjosti i njezinih radikalnih medijacija.

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**



posed the question of ownership of media falsely. Since all media (even in the conservative sense) are the product of social labour – the labour of those who work – and all of this is both socialised and taken away from us. We literally do not get to enjoy the fruits, and wealth of our labour. These media are socialised in such a way as to disempower us. Therefore it is not necessary to pose what is ‘free’ of capitalist control, but rather how and when we take these things back, how and when people control their self-mediation through devices, how they modulate the given signals. It is, I would argue, some kind of surfeit which cannot either be disciplined to stay at home, nor privatised and sold. Obviously, from one perspective the surplus active in social movements will almost certainly also later provide material for new forms of commodification. But, this is

not necessarily the only way of seeing things, rather, in the new shapes invented in the cyclone of present revolts, such as the strange ritualised dancing and chanting of Al-Ahlawy’s football supporters, people turn themselves into communications devices, through mimesis they self-alienate and become machinic in order to open a space through which something new can pass.<sup>20</sup> It describes novel concentrations and combinations of energies, it carries its own history and its own mode of self-reflection with it. This is the working out of our interminable present and its radical mediations.

19 “The question is not whether the net produces liberation or subjugation: since its creation, it has always been producing both things. That’s the net’s dialectics, one aspect is always together with the other, because the net is the form capitalism has taken nowadays, and capitalism itself is the contradiction in process. [...] Under capitalism, everything works like this: consumption sets free and enslaves, it brings about liberation that is also new subjugation, and the cycle starts over on a higher level. [...] struggle should consist in fostering practices of liberation to be played against the practices of subjugation. This can be done only if we stop considering technology as an autonomous force and realize that it is moulded and driven by property relations, power relations, and production relations.” Wu Ming, “Fetishism of Digital Commodities” <http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/wumingblog/?p=1895>

20 Ultras Ahlawy chanting “Oh Council of Bastards”, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Xvn1OzX64l&feature=share&list=PLpt2NTR68\\_TALE4-LV1g5\\_CUY-O8SUgK1u](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Xvn1OzX64l&feature=share&list=PLpt2NTR68_TALE4-LV1g5_CUY-O8SUgK1u) [accessed 01/07/2013]





# Raditi filmove politički

*Upućujem ovo svim filmašima koji prihvaćaju ograničena, društveno određena pravila o jasnoći ekspozicije, i koji misle da se filmovi moraju služiti usvojenim vokabularom kako bi bili "uvjerljivi". U osnovi, želimo reći: Vi svojim radom, kakvi god bili vaši razlozi, kakav god bio vaš pretpostavljeni "sadržaj", samo podupirete i potičete ovo društvo; vi ste dio mehanizama koji održavaju stabilnost putem reintegracije; vaši filmovi pomažu da se sve održi na okupu; i naposljetku, kakvi god bili vaši drugi opisi, vi ste već izabrali stranu. Shvatite: vaš smisao za red i formu već je politički izbor.*

Robert Kramer, Newsreel, 1968.

**U** studentskim danima znala sam gledati "teške" filmove Jean-Luca Godarda, Chrisa Markera i Haruna Farockija. Kada sam odustala od doktorata kako bih se bavila medijskim aktivizmom, moje zanimanje za avangardni film pretvorilo se u nešto poput neugodnog priznanja, budući da je iskazivalo određenu intelektualnu povlaštenost, ili pak želju da pobjegnem od aktualne stvarnosti, koja se činila sasvim drugačijom od 60-ih i 70-ih godina, ili još gore – fetišizaciju paradigmi "starih medija". No nakon 2005., kada sam počela osjećati sve veću nelagodu zbog stavova u mrežama medijskih aktivista u koje sam bila uključena – i kada je s pojavom YouTubea poziv na otvorenu participaciju i transformaciju potrošača u proizvođače počeo sličiti na liberalno-demokratsku, kapitalističku utopiju – neke od tih starih, prašnjavih ideja iz 70-ih godina ponovo su mi se učinile zanimljivima. Osobno mi je najinspirativniji od tih anakronizama bila Godardova razlika između raditi političke filmove i raditi filmove na politički način, što je djelovalo kao pomak fokusa

Joanne Richardson

# Making Films Politically

*To all filmmakers who accept the limited, socially determined rules of clarity of exposition, who think that films must use the accepted vocabulary to "convince," we say, essentially: You only work, whatever your reasons, whatever your presumed "content," to support and bolster this society; you are part of the mechanisms which maintain stability through re-integration; your films are helping to hold it all together; and finally, whatever your other descriptions, you have already chosen sides. Dig: Your sense of order and form is already a political choice.*

Robert Kramer, Newsreel, 1968

● I used to watch "difficult" films by Jean-Luc Godard, Chris Marker and Harun Farocki in graduate school. After I quit my PhD to become a media activist, my interest in avant-garde film turned into something of an embarrassing confession, as if it betrayed a sign of intellectual privilege, or a desire to escape from a current reality that seemed very different from the 1960s and 70s, or even worse - a fetishizing of the paradigms of "old media." But after 2005, when I started to feel a growing unease with the assumptions of the media activist networks I was involved with - and when, in the wake of YouTube, the call for open participation and the transformation of consumers into producers began to look like a liberal democratic, capitalist utopia - some of the old, dusty ideas from the 1970s began to take on an interesting hue again. For me, the most inspiring of these anachronisms was Godard's distinction between making political

sa sadržaja djela na njegov modus proizvodnje – shvaćen veoma široko kao nešto što obuhvaća transformaciju forme, stila, tehnika, kao i stvarnih odnosa proizvodnje djela i njegove recepcije.

Raditi političke filmove obično se shvaća u smislu dvaju polova na koje se stavlja naglasak u različitim povijesnim trenucima:

(1) “Političko” u političkoj režiji najčešće se definira u smislu sadržaja ili priče, koja je kombinacija određene teme (na primjer, političke borbe protiv potlačenosti) i one vrste ugla ili perspektive pomoću kojih se ta tema artikulira. U tom kontekstu biti politički režiser pretpostavlja neku vrstu ne-neutralnosti, u rasponu od umjerenog angažmana do gnjevne militantnosti. Ono što je pritom ključno jest uspostava antihegemonijskog diskursa predstavljanjem manjinskih perspektiva koje odstupaju od stvarnosti konsenzusa i dovode u pitanja prevladavajuće norme. U ovom shvaćanju pridjeva “političko” čujemo odjeke Rancièreova fundamentalnoga razumijevanja “političkoga” kao neslaganja, kao raskida s disciplinirajućim poretkom ili s dominantnom interpretacijom koja organizira način na koji se gleda na stvari, što se smije reći i koji su vidovi ispravnog ponašanja. U ovom shvaćanju “političkoga” također možemo vidjeti preklapanje s konceptom “radikalnoga” – pri čemu se implicira da spomenuti raskid nije neka kozmetička promjena na površini, nego pokušaj da se prodre duboko, do samih korijena, kako bi se preispitala sama osnova dominantne interpretacije koja organizira materijalni svijet.

U povijesnom smislu, ovo shvaćanje političke režije u kontekstu sadržaja i artikulacije vidljivo je u militantnoj filmskoj tradiciji koja se javila 50-ih godina prošlog stoljeća s klasičnim antikolonijalnim filmom Alaina Resnaisa i Chrisa Markera *Statues Also Die*, a nastavila se 60-ih i 70-ih, osobito s Godardovom i Guerinovom “Groupe Dziga Vertov” te Solanasovom i Getinovom skupinom “Cine Liberación”. Militantni film isticao je svoj kontinuitet u odnosu na starije tradicije militantnog tiska, kao i sovjetske agit-prop režije. Iako je naglašavao antihegemonijsku poruku koja je prekida la status quo, nastavio je primjenjivati tradicionalne oblike obraćanja i privilegirati intelektualce kao stručnjake, čime je održavao strukturalne hijerarhije znanja. Često je zapadao i u najgore krajnosti u svojoj militantnosti. Valja se podsjetiti da je taj termin prvi put korišten kako bi se opisali Božji vojnici koji su branili kršćansku vjeru u srednjem vijeku. Militantni revolucionari 60-ih i 70-ih godina prošlog stoljeća bili su nelagodno slični svojim nekadašnjim rođacima: vjerovanje u neku uzvišenu stvar, beskompromisna nepopustljivost, osjećaj da je ono što čine ispravno jer posjeduju apsolutnu istinu, želja da se osvoji i obrati, te prešutni avangardizam njihove misije da prosvijetle mase.

films and making films politically, which had the effect of shifting the focus from the content of a work to its mode of production - understood in a very broad sense as incorporating a transformation of form, style, montage techniques, as well as the actual relations of producing the work and its reception.

Making political films has commonly been understood in terms of two poles, which have been emphasized during different historical moments:

(1) The “political” in political filmmaking is most often defined in terms of the content or story, which is a combination of a particular subject matter (for example, a political struggle against oppression) and the kind of angle or perspective through which it is articulated. In this context being a political filmmaker signals a form of non-neutrality, ranging from tempered engagement to rabid militancy. What is essential is the creation of a counter-hegemonic discourse by presenting minoritarian perspectives that depart from consensus reality and challenge prevailing norms. In this understanding of the adjective “political” we can hear echoes of Ranciere’s substantive notion of “the political” as dissensus, as a rupture with the police order or the dominant interpretation that organizes how things are seen, what can be said, and modes of proper conduct. In this understanding of “political” we can also see an overlap with the concept of “radical” – the implication is that the rupture is not a cosmetic change on the surface, but an attempt to dig back to the roots, to question the very foundation of the dominant interpretation that organizes the sensible.

Historically, this understanding of political filmmaking in terms of content and articulation is visible in the militant film tradition that emerged during the 1950s with Alain Resnais and Chris Marker’s classic anti-colonialist film *Statues also Die*, and continued into the 1960s and 70s, most famously with Godard and Guerin’s Dziga Vertov Group and Solanas and Getino’s Cine Liberación group. Militant film positioned itself in continuity both with older traditions of the militant press and with Soviet agit-prop filmmaking. Although it emphasized a counter-hegemonic message that broke with the status quo, it continued to adopt traditional modes of address and to privilege intellectuals as experts, thereby maintaining structural hierarchies of knowledge. And it often fell prey to the worst excesses of militancy. It’s useful to recall that militancy was first used to describe the soldiers of God defending the Christian faith during the middle ages. The revolutionary militants of the 1960s and 70s bore an uncanny resemblance to their older relatives: a belief in a supreme cause, an uncompromising intransigence, a sense of righteousness about possessing the ultimate truth, a desire to conquer and convert, and an implicit vanguardism about their mission to enlighten the masses.

(2) The second sense in which political filmmaking has been understood is in reference to its medium and the inherent possibilities of its technological apparatus for democratization by breaking the barriers between experts and amateurs and between active producers and passive consumers. This approach to political filmmaking focuses on the proc-

(2) Drugi smisao u kojem se shvaća političko režiranje odnosi se na njegov medij i inherentne sposobnosti njegova tehnološkog aparata da provede demokratizaciju rušenjem barijera između stručnjaka i amatera te između aktivnih proizvođača i pasivnih potrošača. Taj pristup političkoj režiji usredotočen je na procese koji daju moć običnom čovjeku omogućujući mu da direktno sudjeluje u proizvodnji te vidi društvenu promjenu kao nešto što se ne stvara (samo) antihegemonijskim diskursima nego i mijenjanjem samog procesa proizvodnje. Taj fokus na procesu proizvodnje podsjeća na prefigurativnu politiku koja se često povezuje s anarhizmom, iako se ne može svesti na nj – to znači ne samo spekulirati o tome kako bi novo društvo trebalo izgledati nakon revolucije nego i uspostaviti društvene odnose i oblike organizacije koji su potrebni da bi se to novo društvo već stvorilo u mikrokozmosu. To shvaćanje pridjeva “političko” približava se Castoriadisovu fundamentalnom razumijevanju “političkoga” kao kreativnog čina instituiranja, kao kolektivnog pothvata ljudi koji stvaraju vlastite institucije i reguliraju vlastito sudjelovanje u društvenoj domeni. U tom kontekstu gesta radikalnosti nije samo stvar zadiranja sve do korijena i rušenja temelja, nego je to kreativan proces stvaranja novih korijena kroz nehijerarhijsku samoorganizaciju; to je kolektivno uspostavljanje novih želja, zakona i društvenih formacija.

U povijesnom smislu to novo shvaćanje političkoga odgovaralo je prijelazu s militantne režije na video aktivizam kao rezultatu ideološke krize – kako dokumentarnog filma, tako i militantnosti – u kombinaciji s pojavom novih tehnologija. Tijekom 60-ih godina dokumentarna tradicija počela je dovoditi u pitanje posrednički pogled redatelja i produkcijskog aparata u njihovu nastojanju da predstavite stvarnost. Američki direktni film nastojao je postići vjerniju reprezentaciju, neku vrstu čiste transparentnosti, tako što je sačuvao redateljevu ruku vodilju, ali je sveo njegovu subjektivnu perspektivu i stil na minimum. Za razliku od toga, francuski *cinéma vérité* ubacio je kameru i redatelja direktno na ekran, skrećući pozornost na neizbježnost kamere i na konstruiranu narav svake reprezentacije. Još radikalniji eksperimenti pokušali su sasvim ukinuti reprezentaciju dajući običnom čovjeku oruđe za stvaranje vlastitih slika. Logični rezultat odbacivanja medijacije bio je nestanak redatelja kao autora i umijeća specijalizacije. Bolje zahvatiti stvarnost naposljetku je značilo demokratizirati proizvodnju slika koja je sada bila svima dostupna. Iako je bilo hibridnih eksperimenata poput skupina “Medvedkine” Chrisa Markera i američkih kolektiva “Newsreel”, koji su nastojali dati proces proizvodnje slika u ruke ljudima, ali su zadržali staru tehnologiju filma, želja za demokratizacijom najčešće je išla ruku pod ruku s tehnološkim inovacijama – počevši od razvoja prijenosne video kamere 60-ih godina pa sve do današnjih novih



esses that empower ordinary people through their direct participation in production, and sees social change as created not (only) through counter-hegemonic discourses but by altering the process of production itself. The focus on the production process invokes a prefigurative politics that is often associated with anarchism but not reducible to it - it means not just speculating about how a new society should look after the revolution but instantiating the social relations and organizational forms necessary to already create that new society in microcosm. This understanding of the adjective "political" comes close to Castoriadis' substantive notion of "the political" as a creative act of instituting, as a collective undertaking by people to create their own institutions and to self-regulate their participation in the social field.

In this context, the gesture of radicality is not just about digging back to the roots and dismantling the foundation, it is a creative process of laying down new roots through non-hierarchical self-organization, it is a collective positing of new desires, laws and social formations.

Historically this different understanding of the political corresponded to a shift from militant filmmaking to video activism, which was the result of an ideological crisis - of documentary film as well as militancy - coupled with the emergence of new technologies. During the 1960s, the documentary tradition began to question the mediating gaze of the filmmaker and of the apparatus of production in its attempt to represent reality. American direct cinema sought to achieve a truer representation, a kind of pure transparency, by preserving the guiding hand of the filmmaker but sub-

tracting his subjective perspective and style as much as possible. By contrast, French *cinéma vérité* inserted the camera and the filmmaker directly into the screen, drawing attention to the inevitability of mediation and the constructed nature of all representation. More radical experiments sought to abolish representation altogether by giving ordinary people the tools to produce their own images. The logical result of rejecting mediation was the disappearance of the filmmaker as author and of the artifice of specialization. Better capturing the real ultimately meant democratizing the production of images by placing it within everyone's reach. Although there were hybrid experiments like Chris Marker's *Medvedkine* groups and the American Newsreel collectives, which sought to place the process of image production in the hands of the people but retained the old technology of film, the desire for democratization most often went hand in hand with technological innovations - beginning with the development of portable video in the 1960s and continuing into the present with new forms of online distribution. An important precedent in this history was the National Film Board of Canada's 1968 initiative to send filmmakers armed with the newly invented Sony portapack to teach slum dwellers and native American Indians to produce their own narratives. This was followed by a wave of video activism in the US, with the most famous examples including collectives like the Raindance Corporation and community media centers like Downtown Community Television Center and Paper Tiger Television, which trained thousands of people to become video activists. A second

oblika internetske distribucije. Važan presedan u tom povijesnom razvoju bila je inicijativa Kanadskog nacionalnog filmskog odbora 1968. godine da se pošalje redatelj, oboružane novoizumljenim Sonyjevim portapackom, kako bi podučili stanovnike slamova i američke Indijance proizvodnji vlastitih naracija. Nakon toga uslijedio je val video aktivizma u SAD-u, gdje su među najpoznatijim primjerima bili kolektivi kao što su "Raindance Corporation" i društveni medijski centri kao "Downtown Community Television Center" i "Paper Tiger Television", koji su obučili tisuće ljudi za video aktivizam. Drugi pomak dogodio se krajem 80-ih i početkom 90-ih godina kada je video aktivizam doživio procvat zahvaljujući jeftinoj potrošačkoj elektronici kao što su bile video kamere i video rekorderi, koji su prvi put omogućili običnom čovjeku, barem u teoriji, da sve "uradi sam". Nakon toga uslijedio je treći pomak uslijed rođenja interneta, točnije s dostupnošću online-platforni za video distribuciju, počevši od platforme Indymedia 1999. godine pa sve do daleko popularnijeg YouTubea 2005. (iako je važno napomenuti, kad ih spominjemo jedan uz drugog, da postoje važne razlike između tih dvaju modela u pogledu odlučivanja i vlasništva).

Za razliku od militantnog filma, video aktivizam nastojao je potaknuti revolucionarnu promjenu tako što će pretvoriti gledatelje u proizvođače i ukinuti razliku između stručnjaka koji stvaraju kulturu i njezinih pasivnih potrošača. Još od 60-ih godina najveći cilj video aktivizma bio je dati tehnologiju u ruke "narodu". To je također rezultiralo raznim slabostima i ograničenjima, od prevladavajuće uporabe repetitivnih, stilistički konvencionalnih slika koje isto izgledaju i stapaju jedna u drugu, do toga da su pitanja o formi, stilu, montaži i recepciji pala u drugi plan kao manje važna, kulminirajući u pretjeranom naglasku na transformacijskim potencijalima same tehnologije. Prenapuhana nadanja koja su se oslanjala na tehnološku inovaciju postala su sasvim očita s halabukom koja je okruživala Web 2.0, kapitalistički model zasnovan upravo na veličanju otvorene participacije koja je nekada bila karakteristična za video aktivizam i kasniji medijski aktivizam koji je okruživao rođenje interneta. Masovni pogon korisnika YouTubea koji su radili besplatno, direktno pridonoseći njegovoj vrijednosti, nije dobila ni djelić te vrijednosti kada je Google kupio YouTube za 1,65 milijarde dolara. Nadzor je bio uglavnom jednosmjernan (na početku korisnici čak nisu mogli niti skidati video), a vlasništvo nad infrastrukturom i pravila korištenja ostala su u rukama korporacijskog monopola. Takva iskrivljena aktualizacija obećanja medijskog aktivizma pokazala je da nije dovoljno imati oruđe pa da se nešto "uradi sam". Puko stavljanje sredstava za proizvodnju u ruke pasivnog potrošača neće automatski uzdrmati tlačiteljske odnose moći. Trebalo je postaviti dodatna pitanja.

shift took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when video activism exploded as the result of cheap consumer electronics like camcorders and video players, which for the first time made it truly possible, at least in theory, for ordinary people to “do it themselves.” This was followed by a third shift after the birth of the internet, and more specifically with the availability of online platforms for video distribution, starting with Indymedia in 1999 and in a much more widespread form with YouTube in 2005 (although mentioning them as a continuum, it’s important to note that there are significant differences between these two models in terms of decision making and ownership).

In contrast to militant film, video activism sought to provoke revolutionary change by turning spectators into producers and eliminating the difference between experts who create culture and its passive consumers. Ever since the 1960s, the highest goal of video activism has been placing the technology in the hands of “the people.” This has also resulted in several weaknesses and limitations, ranging from the dominant use of repetitive, stylistically conventional images that tend to look the same and blur into one another, to downplaying questions about form, style, montage and audience reception as less important, and culminating in an exaggerated emphasis on the transformational potentials of the technology itself. The inflated hope pinned on technological innovation became most obvious with the hype surrounding Web 2.0, a capitalist model based exactly on the celebration of open participation that had been characteristic of video activism and the later me-

dia activism surrounding the birth of the internet. The massive factory of YouTube users who worked for free and directly contributed to its value didn’t receive any share of that value when Google bought YouTube for \$1.65 billion. The control was mostly one-directional (at the beginning users couldn’t even download videos) and the ownership of the infrastructure and rules of use remained in the hands of a corporate monopoly. Such a distorted actualization of the promise of media activism showed that it wasn’t enough to have the tools to “do it yourself.” Simply putting the means of production into the hands of the passive consumer would not automatically shatter oppressive relations of power. There were still other questions to be asked.

It was in attempt to ask these other questions that I turned to leftist experimental film from the 1960s and 70s. Although Godard’s imperative to make film politically came from the period when he worked as part of the militant Dziga Vertov Group, which he subsequently criticized for having produced “Marxist-Leninist garbage,” the best examples of making film politically are found in his later collaborations with Anne-Marie Mieville. What’s striking about his films with Mieville is their distance both from militant filmmaking and the newly emerging video activism. *Here & Elsewhere* is especially interesting because it deconstructs one of his earlier Dziga Vertov Group films, *Until Victory*, which was shot in 1970 as the Palestinian Liberation Organization was preparing for a revolution. “We went to Palestine a few years ago,” Godard says. “To make a film about the coming revolution. But who is this we,

Upravo sam se u nastojanju da postavim ta druga pitanja okrenula ljevičarskom eksperimentalnom filmu iz 60-ih i 70-ih godina. Iako je Godardov nalog da treba režirati politički potjecao iz razdoblja kada je djelovao kao član militantne “Groupe Dziga Vertova”, koju je kasnije kritizirao da je proizvodila “marksističko-lenjinističko smeće”, najbolji primjeri režiranja na politički način mogu se pronaći u njegovim kolaboracijama s Anne-Marie Mieville. Ono što fascinira u njegovim filmovima s Mievilleovom je njihov odmak od militantne režije baš kao i od novonastalog video aktivizma. Film *Here & Elsewhere* osobito je zanimljiv jer dekonstruira jedan od njegovih ranijih filmova nastalih sa Skupinom Dziga Vertov: *Until Victory*, koji je snimljen 1970. godine dok je Palestinska oslobodilačka organizacija pripremala revoluciju. Otišli smo u Palestinu prije nekoliko godina, kaže Godard. Željeli smo napraviti film o predstojećoj revoluciji. Ali tko smo to mi, sada? Zašto smo otišli onamo, ili drugamo? Nevidljivi pripovjedač priznaje: “Po povratku u Francusku ne znaš što bi s tim filmom... proturječja eksplodiraju, uključujući i tebe.” Godard priznaje da on i Gorin nisu pokušali napraviti film o onome što su Palestinci stvarno činili, nego o onome što su oni kao redatelji željeli reći. “Učinili smo isto što su činili i mnogi drugi. Napravili smo slike i previše pojačali ton... Uvijek taj isti zvuk, i uvijek preglasan: Prag, Montevideo, svibanj '68 u Francuskoj, u Italiji, kineska Kulturna revolucija... ton je bio tako glasan da je naposljetku ugušio glas koji se želio dobiti iz slike.” *Here and Elsewhere* je kritika načina na koji se militantnost režira kao političko kazalište, od propagandističkih zvukova do prikrivanja neslaganja kako bi se prikazala lažna slika naroda ujedinjenog u borbi. Film također preispituje suučesništvo aktivističkih režisera koji organiziraju ton i slike na specifičan način kako bi prikazali “pravu” političku poruku i time omeli kritičko mišljenje. U razdoblju u kojem je dominirala politika poruke (izjave, proglassi, obznane rata) film *Here & Elsewhere* traži politiku pitanja.

Rađenje političkih filmova oslanja se na metafizičku koncepciju reprezentacije, na naturaliziranu interpretaciju odnosa slike i stvarnosti na koju se ta slika odnosi. Za razliku od toga, raditi filmove politički znači istraživati kako slike pronalaze svoje značenje i izokretati pravila reprezentacije. To znači izazivati gledatelje da postanu politička bića, da razmisle o svome odnosu prema slikama i o vlastitoj poziciji u odnosu na moć. Godardova uporaba priloga “politički” dijelom se poklapala s novom paradigmatom koja se javila u francuskoj ljevici 60-ih godina, a koja je promatrala političko kao raskid s hegemonijskom interpretacijom svijeta ili kao pokušaj uspostave novih oblika proizvodnje, a time implicitno i novih društvenih odnosa. No tu postoji i važna razlika. Uporaba riječi “politički” kao priloga podrazumijeva više od raskida s etabliranim poretkom

here? Why did we go there, elsewhere?" The voiceover confesses, "back in France you don't know what to make of the film ... the contradictions explode, including you." Godard admits that he and Gorin had tried to make a film not about what the Palestinians were really doing but about what they as filmmakers had wanted to say. "We did what many others were doing. We made images and we turned the volume up too high ... Always the same sound, always too loud: Prague, Montevideo, May '68 in France, Italy, Chinese Cultural Revolution ... so loud that it ended up drowning out the voice that it wanted to get out of the image." *Here and Elsewhere* is a critique of how militancy is staged as a political theater, from its propagandistic sounds to its covering up of disjunctions in order to present a false image of the people united in struggle. The film also interrogates the complicity of activist filmmakers who organize sound and images in a particular way to present a "correct" political message and thereby inhibit critical thinking. In an era dominated by a politics of the message (statements, communiqués, declarations of war), *Here & Elsewhere* searches for a politics of the question.

Making political films relies on a metaphysical conception of representation, a naturalized interpretation of the relations between the image and the reality it refers to. By contrast, making films politically means investigating how images find their meaning and disrupting the rules of representation. It means provoking the viewers to become political animals, to reflect on their relation to the images and on their own position *vis a vis* power. Godard's use of the adverb "politically" partly over-

lapped the new paradigm that emerged among the French left in the 1960s, which viewed the political as a rupture with the hegemonic interpretation of the world or as an attempt to institute new forms of production and, implicitly, new social relations. But there's also a significant difference. The use of the word "politically" as an adverb implies more than just a rupture with the established order or the instantiation of a new poesis of autonomy. As an adverb, it is a way of doing things, a particular way of destabilizing or instituting. It questions the voice that would oppose hegemony with a counter-hegemony, and the authority of an autonomous self that would institute new laws out of its own abundant creativity. It is a second-order critique that always asks from what position does one speak, what are the possibilities and limits of the medium that conveys that discourse, what gives the discourse its aura of authority, can a representation ever become a political act, and can a film provoke social change simply by showing revolutionary images? This is an understanding of the political as a moment of instability, of perpetual undecidability, as something that is always temporary, fragile and provisional. It means recognizing that in the search to start again from zero, there is no foundation and no root to be uncovered.

In contrast to the ideological intransigence of militant film and the desire for pure immediacy and direct participation of video activism, there has been a third tendency that emerged on the margins of the avant-garde, which included filmmakers such as Godard and Mieville, Chris Marker, Harun Farocki, Peter Watkins and Trinh Minh-ha. This third tenden-

ili jednokratnog ozbiljenja nove stvarajacke moći autonomije. Kao prilog, to je način na koji se nešto čini, specifičan način destabilizacije ili instituiranja. Taj prilog dovodi u pitanje glas koji bi se usprotivio hegemoniji antihegemonijom, kao i autoritet autonomnog sebstva koji bi uspostavio nove zakone iz vlastite obilne kreativnosti. To je kritika drugog reda, koja uvijek pita s koje se pozicije govoriti, koje su mogućnosti i ograničenja medija koji prenosi neki diskurs, što daje tom diskursu njegovu auru autoriteta, može li reprezentacija ikada postati političkim činom i može li jedan film izazvati društvene promjene naprosto pokazivanjem revolucionarnih slika? To je shvaćanje političkoga kao momenta nestabilnosti, trajne neodredivosti, nečega što je uvijek privremeno, krhko i probno. To znači priznati da u potrazi koja će krenuti od nule nema temelja i nema korijena koji bi se otkrio.

Za razliku od ideološke nepopustljivosti militantnog filma i želje za pukom neposrednošću i direktnom participacijom video aktivizma, postojala je i treća tendencija, koja se javila na rubovima avangarde, a koja je uključivala redatelje kao što su Godard i Mies van der Roep, Chris Marker, Harun Farocki, Peter Watkins i Trinh Minh-ha. Ta treća tendencija krenula je od početne postavke video aktivizma – naime da ono što treba promijeniti nije samo sadržaj, nego i sam način proizvodnje – ali je tu promjenu načina proizvodnje shvaćala na daleko složeniji način nego što bi bila demokratizacija proizvodnje i pretvorba potrošača u proizvođača. U vlastitim videima pokušala sam elaborirati značenje te složenosti slijedeći pet različitih smjernica:

## 1. Intersubjektivni odnosi:

U sasvim doslovnom smislu, raditi film politički znači preispitati njegov cjelokupni način proizvodnje - počevši od organizacije intersubjektivnih odnosa onih koji proizvode to djelo. To znači dovesti u pitanje hijerarhije znanja i podjele rada u procesu proizvodnje, naravno odnosa redatelja i onih koje on predstavlja, kao i odnos onoga tko "režira" i onih koji izvode, što se obično smatra manje važnim. Transformacija tih hijerarhija podrazumijevala bi da se proces proizvodnje učini istinski kolaboracijskim tako što će se uključiti drugi subjekti u dijalog umjesto da se govori za njih ili da ih se instrumentalizira kao sredstvo za komunikaciju unaprijed zamišljene poruke.

Godine 2004. napravila sam dva videa o nacionalizmu u Rumunjskoj, u suradnji s tinejdžerima, kao dio video-aktivističkog projekta pod naslovom *Stvarne fikcije*. Gledano unatrag, čini mi se da sam time što sam se usredotočila uglavnom na uključivanje ne-

cy began from the initial premise of video activism - namely, that what must be changed is not merely the content but the mode of production itself - but it understood the change of the mode of production in a much more complex sense than democratizing production and turning consumers into producers. In my own video work, I've attempted to elaborate the meaning of this complexity along 5 different trajectories:

### 1. Intersubjective relations:

In the most literal sense, making film politically means interrogating its entire mode of production, starting with the organization of intersubjective relations between those who produce the work. It means questioning the hierarchies of knowledge and divisions of labor of the production process, the nature of the relation between the filmmaker and those who are represented, and the relation between the one who "directs" and those who perform what is usually seen as the less important work. Transforming these hierarchies would entail making the process of production genuinely collaborative by involving other subjects in a dialogue rather than speaking for them or instrumentalizing them as a means to communicate a preconceived message.

In 2004, I made 2 videos about nationalism in Romania in collaboration with teenagers as part of a video activist project called *Real Fictions*. In retrospect, it seemed to me that by focusing predominantly on involving non-experts in the process of production other important elements,

such as questions about representation, form and audience reception, were neglected. Formally the videos were typical documentaries, and although they were collaboratively produced, there was a clear boundary between those of us who collaborated to make the works and the subjects who were represented in them. This boundary was deliberately subverted in *Reconstruction* (2009), a work about the repression of the anti-NATO events in Bucharest in 2008. The video was a collaboration with the anti-NATO activists and the artist group h.arta, who had organized and participated in the events. In contrast to the earlier project, the subjects who were represented were also the ones who made the work. *Reconstruction* was filmed over a three-day workshop, during which ten protagonists were simultaneously actors, audience and directors. They took turns speaking before the camera, giving each other instructions and commenting on their performance. They discussed their memories in a group and wrote the script together. In one memorable discussion, several people admitted that what happened wasn't just the fault of the Romanian authorities and began to analyze their own organizational mistakes. The video functioned like a Brechtian learning play, in which the actors were transformed through the process of collaboration and gained new insights about themselves. Although *Reconstruction* wasn't a video activist project in the strict sense - only one person out of the ten worked with me on the filming and editing (so only a minority had their "hands" on the technology) - it was the collaborative project that felt the most flat and non-hierarchical, in the sense of

stručnjaka u proces proizvodnje zanemarila druge važne elemente, kao što su pitanja reprezentacije, forme i recepcije publike. U formalnom pogledu bili su to tipični dokumentarci, i iako su bili proizvedeni kroz suradnju, postojala je jasna granica između onih među nama koji su surađivali kako bi napravili te radove i subjekata koji su u njima bili predstavljeni. Ta je granica namjerno izokrenuta u filmu *Rekonstrukcija* (2009.), koji se bavi režimskim suzbijanjem prosvjeda protiv NATO-a u Bukureštu 2008. godine. Video je bio napravljen u suradnji s aktivistima protivnicima NATO-a i umjetničkom skupinom h.arta, koja je organizirala događaje i sudjelovala u njima. Za razliku od ranijih projekata, subjekti koji su ovdje bili predstavljeni bili su istodobno i autori rada. *Rekonstrukcija* je snimana tijekom trodnevne radionice, tijekom koje je desetak protagonista također djelovalo kao glumci, publika i redatelji. Izmjenjivali su se pred kamerom, dajući jedni drugima upute i komentirajući međusobno izvedbe. Zatim su grupno raspravljali o svojim sjećanjima i zajedno napisali scenarij. U jednoj osobito zanimljivoj raspravi nekoliko je osoba priznalo da ono što se dogodilo nije bila isključivo krivnja rumunjskih vlasti te su počeli analizirati vlastite organizacijske propuste. Taj je video funkcionirao poput Brechtovog poučnog komada u kojem glumci prolaze kroz transformaciju tijekom procesa suradnje i stječu nove spoznaje o sebi samima. Iako *Rekonstrukcija* nije bila video-aktivistički projekt u pravom smislu riječi – samo je jedna osoba od deset radila sa mnom na snimanju i montaži (tako da je samo manjina imala svoje “prste” u tehnologiji) – bio je to kolaboracijski projekt koji se doimao doista glatkim i nehijerarhijskim u tom smislu što je dopuštao da “sadržaj” direktno govori za sebe. Bio je prisutan i element reprezentacije, budući da je video bio reinscenacija (i preispitivanje) događaja koji se odvio u prošlosti, ali također je to bio i čin prezentacije, budući da je iznio nove diskurse i nove odnose među sudionicima.

## 2. Reprezentacija:

Dokumentarni film tradicionalno se shvaća kao mimeza, kao prezentacija “samog predmeta” (Bazin) koja je “ravnodušna prema svim posrednicima” (Barthes). No nakon krize dokumentarne forme 60-ih godina prošlog stoljeća, koja je u biti bila kriza reprezentacije, postalo je prejednostavno naprosto izokrenuti njezine pretpostavke te ustvrditi nečistoću i neizbježno iskrivljavanje svake medijacije. Dovođenje u pitanje realnosti reprezentacija ne znači dignuti ruke od svega i osuditi sve slike kao inherentno pokvarene – naprotiv, stvar je u finim razlikama između različitih vrsta reprezentacije. Problem je u određenom načinu proizvodnje slika koji ih naturaliziraju.



allowing the “content” to directly speak for itself. There was an element of representation since the video was a re-staging (and re-examination) of an event that happened in the past, but it was also an act of presentation, a bringing forth of new discourses and new relations among the participants.

## 2. Representation:

The documentary has traditionally been understood as mimesis, as a presentation of “the object itself” (Bazin) that is “indifferent to all intermediaries” (Barthes). But after the crisis of the documentary-form in the 1960s, which was essentially a crisis of representation, it has become too simple to merely invert its presuppositions and assert the impurity and inevitable distortion of all mediation. Questioning the reality effects of representations doesn’t mean throwing up our hands and denouncing all images as inherently corrupt - on the contrary, the point is to be able to make subtle distinctions between different types of representation. The problem is a certain way of producing images that naturalizes them by hiding their construction or barges us with such emotional force that it diminishes our capacity to think. A critique of mediation means admitting the subjectivity of perspective and asking how our own ideologies and inherited ideas influence the general frame that creates meaning. It means questioning what is happening behind the scenes and not taking the perspective that organizes the meaning of the work as a given, as a simple truth. This questioning has taken two main directions: the

counter-documentary, which uses the conventions of the documentary-form in order to subvert them from the inside by laying them bare and depriving them of their force, and the essay film, which doesn’t directly challenge the authority of documentary, but sidesteps it by inventing a different type of discourse. Back in 1940, Hans Richter portrayed the filmic essay as overcoming the limitations of the documentary precisely because it wasn’t strictly bound to facts, documents or chronological time and gave free reign to the imagination, making use of idiosyncratic stories, daydreams, fables, and other hybrids that tested the boundaries between fiction and truth. In this sense, the role of the essay-form is to destabilize notions of objectivity, the authority of documents, the voice of the subject and the naturalized relation between images and reality.

I began experimenting with the essay-form with *In Transit* (2008), a diary of a journey through Romania during the year of its EU accession, which reflects on the meaning of transition and how it functions through a series of erasures: of history, of identities and of thought itself. But while the narrative criticizes these erasures, it is not from the purity of an outside. Several citations invoke the private archive films of Peter Forgacs, which criticize the distortions of official history in order to oppose it with authentic private histories. *In Transit* shows how private histories are themselves impure because memory functions like a dream-work that erases connections and creates new associations. It makes use of childhood stories, family photographs and poetic texts, all of which have the possibility to provoke strong emotional responses. But it frus-

zira prikrivajući njihovu konstrukciju ili nas blokira s takvom emocionalnom snagom da to umanjuje našu sposobnost mišljenja. Kritika medijacije znači dopustiti subjektivnost perspektive i zapitati se na koji način naše vlastite ideologije i naslijeđene ideje utječu na opći okvir koji stvara značenje. To znači preispitati što se događa iza scene, a ne zauzeti gledište koje organizira značenje nekog djela kao unaprijed dano, kao jednostavnu istinu. To preispitivanje krenulo je u dvama glavnim smjerovima, a to su antidokumentarac, koji se služi konvencijama dokumentarne forme kako bi ih izokrenuo iznutra, ogoljavajući ih i lišavajući ih njihove snage, i esejski film, koji ne dovodi direktno u pitanje autoritet dokumentarca, nego ga zaobilazi izumom drugog tipa diskursa. Već je 1940. Hans Richter prikazao filmski esej kao vrstu koja prevladava ograničenja dokumentarnog filma upravo zato što nije strogo vezana uz činjenice, dokumente ili kronološko vrijeme, nego otvara prostor za maštu, koristeći se idiosinkratskim pričama, sanjarenjima i drugim hibridnim formama koje dovode u pitanje granice između fikcije i istine. U tom smislu, uloga esejske forme je da destabilizira ideje objektivnosti, autoriteta dokumenata, glas subjekta i naturalizirani odnos slika i stvarnosti.

Počela sam eksperimentirati s esejskom formom u filmu *In Transit* (2008.), dnevniku o putovanju Rumunjskom u godini njezina pristupa Europskoj Uniji, koji promišlja značenje tranzicije i načina na koji ona funkcionira kroz niz brisanja: povijesti, identiteta i samog mišljenja. No iako naracija kritizira ta brisanja, ona to ne čini sa stajališta izvanjske čistoće. Nekoliko citata podsjećaju na privatne arhivske filmove Petera Forgacsa, koji kritiziraju iskrivljavanje službene povijesti suprotstavljajući mu autentične, osobne povijesti. *In Transit* pokazuje kako su i te osobne povijesti nečiste, budući da sjećanje funkcionira poput snova koji brišu veze i stvaraju nove asocijacije. Film se koristi pričama iz djetinjstva, obiteljskim fotografijama i pjesničkim tekstovima, koji redom imaju sposobnost izazvati snažne emocionalne reakcije. No mogućnost sentimentalnog poistovjećivanja ometa se pomoću sredstava otuđenja koja skreću pozornost na vlastitu konstruiranost. Osjećaj udaljenosti stvara se pomoću diskontinuiteta zvuka i slike te priznanja naratora o neizvjesnom podrijetlu (pa stoga i neautentičnosti) korištenih dokumenata. Istodobno stvarajući i prekidajući želju za poistovjećivanjem, *In Transit* traži od publike da se odmakne i razmisli o svome odnosu prema slikama koje je upravo vidjela. Jedino s te kritičke distance moguće je probiti se kroz gomilu ruševina koje su ostale nakon brisanja prošlosti i otkriti tragove izgubljenih stvari. Bez te udaljenosti osobni memoari mogu postati jednako ideološki i manipulacijski kao i službena povijest.

trates the possibility of a sentimental identification through estrangement devices that call attention to their construction. A sense of distance is created through sound-image discontinuities and the narrator's admission of the uncertain origins (and hence the inauthenticity) of its documents. By simultaneously creating and breaking the desire for identification, *In Transit* asks the audience to step back and reflect on their relation to the images they've just seen. It is only from this critical distance that it becomes possible to dig through the pile of ruins that are left by the erasures of the past and to uncover the traces of things that have been lost. Without this distance, private memoirs can easily become as ideological and manipulative as official history.

*Letter from Moldova* (2009) was my second essay film, which invoked a specific dialogue with Chris Marker's earlier travelogue about Soviet communism, *Letter from Siberia*. *Letter from Moldova* is a story of a journey to Moldova told through ten letters that ruminate on the collapse of the Soviet Union, the meaning of post-communism, and the uneasy proximity between post-colonialism and nationalism. The video uses an epistolary form and addresses the viewer as "you" to create a sense of identification, but this is subsequently broken at several points in the narrative. The rupture of identification aims to bring to light the problematic nature of travelogues and their tacit assumptions of cultural superiority by portraying journeys to "the East" as journeys back in time. *Letter from Moldova* reveals the limits of the tourist gaze through the narrator's own misunderstandings and prejudices about the Russians, which have

been a commonplace of Romanian culture since the 1960s. The use of photographs, family histories and a personal form of address, while creating an emotional bond with the narrator, also highlight the instability of the authorial voice - the "I" that emerges by the end of the story is fragmented and uncertain, ultimately confessing that her images of Moldova reflect her own biases, and that personal memory and collective memory are both subject to fabrication.

### 3. Form:

It is the authority of the voice coupled with the specific arrangement of images and sounds that creates a feeling of immersion and identification in a film. A montage of association adds concordant images and voices to create a sense of a homogenous totality.

There are no gaps or discontinuities, the story flows smoothly and the audience is easily drawn into the universe of the film. By contrast, if the form is disjunctive, made up of elements that don't seem to fit, the message becomes ambiguous or even contradictory, disrupting the sense of immersion and the process of identification. These disruptions provoke jolts of discomfort that require the audience to intervene, to take an active part in constructing the meaning of the work.

My first use of disjunctive montage was in *Made in Italy* (2006), a video about the delocalization of capital and the migration of labour made in collaboration with the Italian collective Candida TV. We wanted to avoid making an activist film that would portray the struggle of the working class in a unified voice.

*Letter from Moldova* (2009.) bio je moj drugi esejski film, koji je asociirao na konkretan dijalog s ranijim putopisom Chrisa Markera o sovjetskom komunizmu, *Letter from Siberia*. *Letter from Moldova* je priča o putovanju kroz Moldovu, ispričanom kroz deset pisama u kojima se promišlja o slomu Sovjetskog Saveza, značenju postkomunizma i nelagodnoj bliskosti između postkolonijalizma i nacionalizma. Video koristi epistolarnu formu i obraća se gledatelju u drugom licu kako bi stvorio dojam poistovjećivanja, ali to se onda prekida na nekoliko mjesta u naraciji. Svrha tog prekida u poistovjećivanju je iznijeti na vidjelo problematičnu narav putopisa i njegove prešutne pretpostavke o kulturnoj superiornosti tako što prikazuje putovanja na "Istok" kao putovanja unatrag kroz vrijeme. *Letter from Moldova* otkriva granice turističkog pogleda kroz nesporazume u koje zapada sama pripovjedačica i njezine predrasude o Rusima, koji su opće mjesto u rumunjskoj kulturi još od 60-ih godina. Uporaba fotografija, obiteljskih povijesti i forma osobnog obraćanja također ističu nestabilnost autorskog glasa – "ja" koje se javlja na kraju priče fragmentirano je i nesigurno te pripovjedačica naposljetku priznaje da njezine slike Moldove odražavaju njezinu vlastitu pristranost te da su i osobno sjećanje i kolektivno sjećanje podložni fabulaciji.

### 3. Forma:

Autoritet glasa u spoju sa specifičnim poretkom slika i zvukova ono je što stvara osjećaj uronjenosti i poistovjećivanja u filmu. Montaža asocijacija dodaje odgovarajuće slike i glasove kako bi se stvorio osjećaj homogene cjeline. Nema lomova ni diskontinuiteta, priča teče glatko i publika je lako uvučena u univerzum filma. Za razliku od toga, ako je forma disjunktivna, sastavljena od elemenata za koje se čini da ne pripadaju zajedno, poruka postaje dvoznačna ili čak proturječna, razbijajući osjećaj uronjenosti i prekidajući proces poistovjećivanja. Ti lomovi uzrokuju udare nelagode koji publiku tjeraju da intervenira, da aktivno sudjeluje u konstrukciji značenja djela.

Prvi put sam upotrijebila disjunktivnu montažu u filmu *Made in Italy* (2006.), video radu o delokalizaciji kapitala i migraciji radne snage koji sam napravila u suradnji s talijanskim kolektivom Candida TV. Željeli smo izbjeći da to bude aktivistički film koji bi prikazivao borbu radničke klase s jedinstvenog stajališta. *Made in Italy* predstavlja sudar različitih perspektiva – vlasnika talijanskih tvrtki u Rumunjskoj, vođa sindikata, radnika i imigranata – te o publici ovisi kako će se snaći u tim proturječnim porukama s kojima je suočena i izvući vlastite zaključke. U filmu *Two or Three Things about*

*Made in Italy* presents a clash of different perspectives - owners of Italian companies in Romania, trade union leaders, workers and migrants - and it's up to the audience to navigate through the contradictory messages they are presented with and draw their own conclusions. *Two or Three Things about Activism* (2008) went a step further - it was not only composed of a multitude of contradictory voices but attempted to subvert the conventions of documentary through its narrative and structure. The video begins as a traditional documentary, with a richness of sound and images, immersing the audience in the stories of 13 Romanian activists, from anarchists to human rights NGOs. After 20 minutes, the picture starts to disintegrate, becoming increasingly fragmented - all background images are eliminated and the cuts between the words of the protagonists become visible, drawing attention to the necessary omissions of any attempt to represent the voice of its subjects. It highlights that the cuts, and the decision of what is included and what is left out, are acts of creative license based on the author's particular agenda. The disjunctive form contributes to the overall goal: the video seeks to become a tool for discussion and self-reflection. It doesn't try to represent Romanian activism, but to intervene in it from the inside.

*Red Tours* (2010, with David Rych) tried to push the form of the counter-documentary to its limits. The video investigates the dialectic between tourism and collective memory in various statue parks, museums and staged re-enactments of communism in the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and Lithuania. The narrative emerges through three stories told from

different perspectives that mirror various documentary approaches: the first part is told through the authorial, didactic voice and fixed camera angle of a militant film, which presents the "truth" behind today's neoliberal dismissals of communism as kitsch or absolute terror; the second part is a subjective travel essay, with the camera following a melancholic and self-critical narrator who walks in solitude, reflecting on how self-colonization has turned east Europeans into tourists of their own history; and the third part is a form of direct cinema that unfolds through the words and gestures of the tourists themselves, with the camera inserted at eye-level in the middle of the crowd. By juxtaposing these multiple voices and styles, *Red Tours* calls attention to the documentary as a technology that produces its own truths rather than representing an unobstructed window to reality.

One of the specific aims of using the multiple narratives and styles was to break the sense of a diegetic totality - the space-time continuity that gives any film a sense of wholeness and immerses the audience in its universe. As soon as the viewer begins to sink comfortably into one of the stories of *Red Tours*, the perspective shifts and the viewer is transported into a different world. During many screenings of the video, the comments of the audience focused on the disorientation they experienced as the stories and perspectives kept shifting. Sometimes there were vehement debates as viewers identified with one of the three perspectives and ended up arguing against each other, at other times there were criticisms directed against us as the authors for failing to provide a coherent message that could guide audienc-

*Activism* (2008.) otišla sam korak dalje – jer on se nije samo sastojao od mnoštva proturječnih glasova, nego je nastojao izokrenuti konvencije dokumentarnog filma kroz naraciju i strukturu. Video započinje kao tradicionalan dokumentarni film, s bogatstvom zvukova i slika, uranjajući publiku u priče 13 rumunjskih aktivista u rasponu od anarhista do NGO-a za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Nakon 20 minuta slika se počinje rastakati i postaje sve više fragmentirana – sve pozadinske slike su eliminirane i počinju se primjećivati rezovi između riječi protagonista, privlačeći pozornost na nužni izostanak svakog pokušaja reprezentacije glasa subjekata. Time se ističe činjenica da su rezovi, kao i odluka o tome što će se uključiti, a što izostaviti, čini novi kreativne samovolje zasnovane na autorovu specifičnom planu. Ta disjunktivna forma pridonosi cjelokupnom cilju: video nastoji postati sredstvom rasprave i autorefleksije. On ne želi zastupati rumunjski aktivizam, nego intervenirati u nj iznutra.

*Red Tours* (2010., s Davidom Rychom) nastojao je dovesti formu antidokumentarca do samih granica. Taj video istražuje dijalektiku između turizma i kolektivnog sjećanja u različitim parkovima s kipovima, muzejima i glumljenim rekonstrukcijama komunizma u Češkoj, Njemačkoj, Mađarskoj i Litvi. Naracija se odvija kroz tri priče iz različitih perspektiva, koje odražavaju različite dokumentarne pristupe: prvi dio priča se autorskim, didaktičkim glasom i iz fiksiranog kuta kamere karakterističnog za militantni film, koji otkriva “istinu” iza današnjeg neoliberalnog odbacivanja komunizma kao kiča ili apsolutnog terora; drugi dio je subjektivni putopis, s kamerom koja slijedi melankoličnog i samokritičnog pripovjedača koji šeće u osami, razmišljajući o tome kako je autokolonizacija pretvorila Istočne Europljane u turiste kroz vlastitu povijest; a treći dio je neki oblik direktnog filma kroz riječi i geste samih turista, s kamerom na razini oka usred gomile. Supostavljajući više glasova i stilova, film *Red Tours* skreće pozornost na dokumentarni film kao na tehnologiju koja proizvodi vlastite istine umjesto da bude neometani prozor u stvarnost. Jedna od specifičnih svrha korištenja višestruke naracije i stila bila je razbiti osjećaj dijegetskog totaliteta – prostorno-vremenskog kontinuiteta koji svakom filmu daje dojam cjeline i uranja publiku u njegov univerzum. Čim gledatelj počne udobno tonuti u jednu od priča filma *Red Tours*, perspektiva se mijenja i gledatelj se prebacuje u drugačiji svijet. Tijekom brojnih prikazivanja filma komentari publike bili su usredotočeni na dezorijentaciju koju su osjećali dok su se priče i perspektive neprestano mijenjale. Ponekad bi došlo do žestokih debata jer bi se gledatelji poistovjetili s nekom od triju perspektiva i na kraju bi se međusobno posvadili, a ponekad bi kritizirali nas kao autore jer nismo uspjeli ponuditi koherentnu poruku koja bi vodila publiku kroz čitav taj labirint. U tom pogledu svrha videa je da ostane inherentno

es through the maze. In the last instance, the aim of the video is to remain inherently open and incomplete, waiting to be actualized through the discussions it provokes.

#### 4. Reception:

All of the relations highlighted above - between the subjects that collaborate to produce the work, between the images and the reality they purport to represent, and between the form and content of the film - also function to create a specific type of relationship to an audience. Questioning the reality effects of images, using a disjunctive form and various estrangement devices - like sound-image discontinuity, interruption of natural time sequences and multiple diegesis - all tend to break the feeling of immersion and to provoke the audience to have doubts, to entertain questions and to reflect on their relation to the images. The refusal to supply a clear and easily digested message is a provocation for the audience to analyze, dissect, critique, reflect, and create their own narrative in response. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who is now remembered as one of the key protagonists of May '68, once suggested making a detoured leftist western, by preserving the original images of a western but changing the dialogue. Godard replied that if the detoured western preserved a traditional Hollywood form and created a typical relationship of passive spectatorship, it wouldn't matter if the altered content was leftist or not. If the audience was sitting back and being swept along into a fairy tale, even one with a leftist message,

they would learn nothing about their specific situation, their relation to power and their capacity to disengage from ideological conditioning and think for themselves. Today it seems that many militant films and activist videos still come across as fairy tales with a leftist message. And in this sense, rather than creating the possibility for critical thought, they inhibit it. A work that makes the audience uncomfortable and demands that they step back and reflect - or criticize, or disagree, or even walk out in defiance - is more genuinely activist than a work of agit-prop that manipulates the emotions of the audience and encourages it to act in accordance with its message.

#### 5. Ownership:

Many artists and filmmakers whose work is "made politically" in the above sense have still not posed the question of the ownership and distribution of their work, or how certain institutions can alienate these relations by placing them outside their control. Today there's a widespread consensus that copyright has been perverted to benefit corporations rather than the authors for whom it was originally intended. But no such golden age of copyright ever existed. In a text entitled "Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anti-Commons" (2006), Dmytri Kleiner and I analyzed the genealogy of copyright, which, ever since its inception in the period of Romanticism, has been used as a legal tool to transform art works into commodities and turn a profit for the owners of capital. Despite these problematic origins, authors are still flattered by their association with the myth of the crea-

otvoren i nepotpun, u očekivanju da ga se aktualizira kroz rasprave koje izaziva.

#### **4. Recepcija:**

Svi ovi odnosi koje sam istaknula – između subjekata koji surađuju kako bi proizveli djelo, između slika i stvarnosti koju one navodno predstavljaju te između forme i sadržaja filma – također služe stvaranju specifičnog tipa odnosa prema publici. Preispitivanje učinka slika u predočavanju stvarnosti te korištenje disjunktivne forme i raznih sredstava otuđenja – poput diskontinuiteta zvuka i slike, prekidanja prirodnih vremenskih sekvenci i višestruke dijegeze – imaju tendenciju razbiti osjećaj uronjenosti i natjerati publiku da posumnja, da postavlja pitanja i promišlja svoj odnos prema slikama. Nespremnost da se ponudi jasna i lako probavljiva poruka provocira publiku kako bi analizirala, secirala, kritizirala, promišljala i stvorila vlastitu naraciju kao odgovor.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, kojega se danas pamti kao jednog od ključnih protagonista svibnja '68, jednom je predložio da se napravi parodija na ljevičarski vestern tako što će se sačuvati izvorne slike, ali sa izmijenjenim dijalogom. Godard je odgovorio da ako taj parodirani vestern bude sačuvao tradicionalnu holivudsku formu i stvorio tipični odnos pasivnog gledanja, više neće biti važno je li izmijenjeni sadržaj ljevičarski ili ne. Bude li publika samo sjedila, ponesena u bajku, pa bila to i bajka s ljevičarskim sadržajem, ona neće naučiti ništa o svojoj specifičnoj situaciji, svome odnosu do moći i svojoj sposobnosti da se oslobodi ideološke uvjetovanosti i razmišlja svojom glavom. Danas se čini da još uvijek mnogi militanтни filmovi i aktivistički video radovi stižu do publike kao bajke s ljevičarskom porukom. U tom smislu, umjesto da stvore mogućnost za kritičko mišljenje, oni ga ustvari sprečavaju. Djelo koje će uznemiriti publiku i zahtijevati od nje da zastane i razmisli – ili da kritizira, usprotivi se ili čak ode u znak protesta – autentičnije je u svome aktivizmu od djela agitacijske propagande koje manipulira emocije gledatelja i potiče ih da djeluju u skladu s njegovom porukom.

#### **5. Vlasništvo:**

Mnogi umjetnici i filmaši čiji su radovi “rađeni na politički način” u gore navedenom smislu još uvijek nisu postavili pitanje vlasništva i distribucije djela, ili načina na koji određene institucije mogu otuđiti te odnose stavljajući ih izvan njihove kontrole. Danas postoji



tive genius, turning a blind eye to how it is used to justify their exploitation. Copyright pits authors against each other in a war of competition for originality, and its effects are not simply economic - it also naturalizes a certain process of knowledge production, delegitimizes the idea of a common culture and cripples social relations. Even after the so-called death of the author, these dynamics continue into the present - cultural producers are discouraged from sharing their work or contributing to a common pool of creativity. Instead, they jealously guard their "property" from others, who they view as spies and thieves lying in wait to snatch their original ideas. This is a vision of culture created in capitalism's own image. As long as a book, a work of art, a piece of music or a film is copyrighted and can't be disseminated freely, as long as it circulates primarily through dominant cultural institutions and is accessible only to an elite type of audience, it is doomed to remain trapped in a system that constrains its power and renders its critique ineffective. In this expanded context, making films politically would mean not acquiescing to the dominant system of copyright by making one's work accessible online, freely usable and recyclable, and acknowledging both the giants and everyday heroes on whose shoulders any "original invention" necessarily stands. It would mean promoting the collective ownership of culture by affirming: nothing is prohibited, I'm grateful if you thank me for what you receive, but you're free to use it as you like, without restraints.

The imperative to "make films politically" can still be seen as a provocative starting point, signaling a need to move beyond

the content of political engagement and consider how modes of production, forms of organization, methods of articulating meaning and the ownership of culture all form part of an interconnected whole that must be disrupted and changed in its entirety. And this insight is not specific to film - it can be extended to other cultural forms and be brought up to date. New means of production and distribution as a result of cheap electronics and online platforms, an increasing awareness of the constraints of the intellectual property regime, and a widespread concern with non-hierarchical forms of organization have all radicalized the insights of the 1960s and 70s. The best-known example of this radicalization has been the Indymedia network, whose most interesting feature is not its open participation (which it shares with commercial online platforms), but its mode of organization by consensus and the shared ownership of the content and infrastructure by its users. Unfortunately, many of the texts and videos disseminated through Indymedia often look like counter-propaganda that preach to the converted. Perhaps Godard's most important legacy for our own time is to call attention to the fact that beyond any radicalization of the processes of production and organization, it is also necessary to go back to zero and ask how meaning is created, who activists speak for, how the aura of authority is produced, how images and sounds are assembled to convey a particular message, and what type of social relations all of these practices make possible or deny.

gotovo opći konsenzus oko toga da su autorska prava izopačena tako da donose korist korporacijama, a ne autorima kojima su izvorno bila namijenjena. No takvo zlatno doba autorskih prava nikada nije niti postojalo. U tekstu pod naslovom “Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anti-Commons” (2006.) Dmytri Kleiner i ja analizirali smo genealogiju autorskih prava, koja su sve od početaka u razdoblju romantizma korištena kao pravno sredstvo za transformaciju umjetničkih djela u robu koja će donijeti profit vlasnicima kapitala. Unatoč tim problematičnim počecima, autorima još uvijek laska povezanost s mitom kreativnog genija i stoga su slijepi za načine na koje se to koristi kako bi se opravdalo njihovo izrabljivanje. Autorska prava huškaju autore jedne na druge u natjecateljskom ratu za originalnost, a posljedice toga nisu samo ekonomske naravi – tu se naturalizira i određeni proces proizvodnje znanja, delegitimizira ideja zajedničke kulture i sakate društveni odnosi. Čak i nakon takozvane smrti autora ta se dinamika nastavila do naših dana – proizvođače kulture obeshrabruje se u nastojanjima da podijele svoj rad ili pridonesu zajedničkim rezervama kreativnosti. Umjesto toga, oni ljubomorno čuvaju svoje “vlasništvo” od drugih, na koje gledaju kao na špijune i kradljivce koji vrebaju u zasjedi kako bi prigrabili njihove originalne ideje. To je vizija kulture stvarene na sliku i priliku kapitalizma. Dokle god neka knjiga, umjetničko djelo, glazbeni komad ili film budu podložni autorskim pravima i ne budu se mogli slobodno distribuirati, dokle god budu cirkulirali prvenstveno kroz dominantne kulturne institucije i budu dostupni jedino elitnom tipu publike, osuđeni su na to da ostanu zarobljeni u sustavu koji ograničava njihovu moć i čini njihovu kritiku neučinkovitom. U tom proširenom kontekstu raditi filmove politički značilo bi ne pokoriti se dominantnom sustavu autorskih prava, i to objavljivanjem svoga rada na internetu, tako da se može slobodno koristiti i reciklirati, i odavanjem priznanja divovima, ali i svakodnevnim junacima na čijim ramenima nužno počiva svaki “originalni izum”. To bi značilo zastupati kolektivno vlasništvo nad kulturom tvrdnjom: ništa nije zabranjeno, zahvalan sam ako mi zahvališ na onome što si dobio, ali slobodno to koristi kako želiš, bez ograničenja.

Nalog “raditi filmove politički” još uvijek se može smatrati provokativnim polazištem koje upućuje na potrebu nadilaženja sadržaja političkog angažmana i razmatranja načina na koji modusi proizvodnje, oblici organizacije, metode artikulacije značenja i vlasništvo nad kulturom čine dio isprepletene cjeline koja se mora razbiti i promijeniti u cijelosti. I ta spoznaja nije specifična za film – ona se može proširiti na druge kulturne forme i aktualizirati. Nova sredstva za proizvodnju i distribuciju koja su rezultat jeftine elektronike i internetskih platformi, sve veće svijesti o ograničenjima



koja nameće režim intelektualnog vlasništva i sve intenzivnijeg bavljenja nehijerarhijskim oblicima organizacije radikalizirala su spoznaje iz 60-ih i 70-ih godina prošlog stoljeća. Najpoznatiji primjer takve radikalizacije je mreža Indymedia, čija najzanimljivija značajka nije otvorenost participacije (koja joj je zajednička s komercijalnim internetskim platformama) nego način organizacije putem konsenzusa i zajedničkog vlasništva njezinih korisnika nad sadržajem i infrastrukturom. Nažalost, dobar dio tekstova i video materijala koji se distribuiraju putem te mreže često djeluje kao antipropaganda koja propovijeda već obraćenima. Možda je Godardovo najvažnije naslijeđe za naša vremena to što je skrenuo pozornost na činjenicu da je u pozadini svake radikalizacije procesa proizvodnje i organizacije također nužno vratiti se na nulu i zapitati se kako se stvara značenje, u čije ime govore aktivisti, kako se proizvodi aura autoriteta, kako se slažu slike i zvukovi u prenošenju određene poruke i koji tip društvenih odnosa sve te prakse omogućuju ili niječu.

**PERIPHERY, OPPOSITION,  
APPOPRIATION**

**PERIFERIJA, OPOZICIJA,  
APROPRIJACIJA**



# Pogled u svijet kineskog interneta: o hibridnim video taktikama

**O**no što se u Kini smatra radikalnim drugdje možda i ne bi bilo takvo. Čini se da termin “radikalno” može biti prilično ambivalentan i ovisiti o kontekstu. Pa kakav je onda taj specifični kineski kontekst? U Kini ne postoje medialabovi kakve je devedesetih godina Soros financirao u Budimpešti, Sofiji ili Ljubljani, baš kao što ne postoje ni novi, nezavisni medijski prostori.<sup>01</sup> Prema tome, trenutno nema fizičkih prostora u kojima bi se ljudi mogli okupljati kako bi se bavili digitalnom kulturom. Komunikacija se odvija samo na internetu, putem Weiboa – kineskih mikroblogova s funkcionalnošću sličnom Twitteru. Za razgovor između vršnjaka ili interesnih skupina tu je aplikacija WeChat,<sup>02</sup> naprednija verzija WhatsAppa, koja preuzima vodstvo jer korisnici mogu komunicirati putem tekstualnih i zvučnih poruka – a za govor treba manje vremena nego za tipkanje kineskih ideograma. Jedna kineska prijateljica rekla mi je kako se već boji da bi vlada mogla ugaziti aplikaciju zbog njezine popularnosti među Kinezima<sup>03</sup> i u inozemstvu.<sup>04</sup> Ona smatra da je taj način komunikacije veoma sličan Facebooku i stoga ima potencijal za organizaciju masa. No budući da je WeChat kineski izum, vjerojatno ga neće blokirati.

Postoji nekoliko kolaborativnih radnih prostora za one koji se bave nekom kreativnom djelatnošću, kao i radionice za blogere i online sjednice za one koji rade na području internetskih medija, ali one su pretežno poslovno orijentirane – tu ne kruži nikakva subverzivna ili kritička energija. Nakon poteškoća pri pronalazanju lokacije za godišnju Blogersku konferenciju 2009. godine u Šangaju nije bilo daljnjih izdanja tog putujućeg simpozija. Na kraju filmskog dokumentarca *High Tech, Low Life* (Steven Maing, 2012.),<sup>05</sup> koji

**01** U Pekingu ćete pronaći novi prostor umjetničkih medija, Yuanfen, galeriju i program stipendiranih boravaka u okrugu 798, službenoj umjetničkoj četvrti, koje vodi jedan Microsoftov zaposlenik. Taj je program daleko od kritičke mrežne kulture. <http://www.yuanfen-art.com/>

**02** WeChat je razvio Tencent, kineska tvrtka koja također upravlja instant messengerom Tencent QQ i mikroblogerskim servisom Weibo QQ. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tencent>

**03** U srpnju 2013. WeChat je imao oko 400 milijuna korisnika u Kini. Liao Danlin, “DIY media”, *Global Times* (23. lipnja 2013.). <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/790920.shtml#>. Ud\_GK1OLohY



# Screenshots of China's Internet: About Hybrid Video Tactics

● What is considered radical in China might not be radical elsewhere. It seems “radical” can be quite an ambivalent term, depending on context. So what is this specific Chinese context about? There are no Soros-funded media labs in China as there were in the 1990s in Budapest, Sofia or Ljubljana, nor are there any independently run new media spaces.<sup>01</sup> So there are at present no physical spaces in which people might gather to deal with digital culture. Communication happens online on Weibo – Chinese microblogs with features similar to Twitter. For chats among peers or interest groups, the app WeChat,<sup>02</sup> an enhanced version of Whatsapp, is taking over because users can communicate via text and voice messages – talking takes less time than typing Chinese characters. A Chinese friend said that she is already afraid that the government might switch off

the app because of its popularity among Chinese people<sup>03</sup> and abroad.<sup>04</sup> She figured its hardly different from Facebook and therefore has potential for people to organize themselves. As WeChat is a Chinese invention, it seems unlikely that it will be blocked.

There are a few collaborative working spaces for people in the creative field, and workshops taking place for bloggers, and networking meetings among people working in the online media business; this is more of a business-oriented format – no subversive or critical energies around. After struggles with finding a location for the annual Bloggers Conference in 2009 in Shanghai, there were no further editions of this travelling conference format. At the end of the documentary film *High Tech, Low Life* (Steven Maing, 2012<sup>05</sup>), which I will look at below, there are scenes at the

01 In Beijing you will find Yuanfen new media art space, a gallery and residence program in 798, the official art district, run by a Microsoft employee. The program is far from critical net culture. <http://www.yuanfenart.com/>

02 WeChat is developed by Tencent, a Chinese company that also runs the instant messenger Tencent QQ and the microblog service Weibo QQ. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tencent>

03 In July 2013 WeChat had about 400 million users in China. Liao Danlin, “DIY media”, *Global Times*, 23 June 2013. [http://www.global-times.cn/content/790920.shtml#Ud\\_GK1OLohY](http://www.global-times.cn/content/790920.shtml#Ud_GK1OLohY)

ću analizirati nešto kasnije, vidimo prizore s blogerske konferencije koja je održana 2009. godine u Lianzhouu, a na kojoj su, između ostalih, sudjelovali blogeri Isaac Mao i Zola. Obojicu ću još spominjati u ovom tekstu.

Prije nego što pređem na primjere – “pogled” u svijet kineskog interneta – željela bih napomenuti da o temi pišem s dvostruke udaljenosti – geografske i jezične. Stoga moja analiza ovisi o prijevodima, u kojima su mi pomogli kineski prijatelji ili pak mrežne usluge kao što su stranice koje donose izbor iz vijesti i diskusija na Weibou i drugim društvenim mrežnim stranicama te ih prevode na engleski. Među najaktivnijima su urednici stranica *Ministry of Tofu*, *Tea Leaf Nation* i *Shanghaiist*. Svaki od njih ima sasvim drugačiji pristup. *Shanghaiist* je prilično sklon spektaklu, te nudi izbor iz društvenih medija po uzoru na tabloide, *Ministry* naglašava svoj humoristički profil, a ništa manje važan nije ni *Tea Leaf Nation*, koji objavljuje izrazito artikulirane i ozbiljne vijesti. Ondje pišu hongkonško-američki novinari koji izvrsno barataju mandarinskim. Tako kineski jezični balon postaje dostupan strancima.

## Jezični balon

Čini mi se da je 2013. godine rasprava o kineskom internetu koja se odvija na engleskom jeziku dosegla zanimljivu točku na kojoj Zapadni komentatori pišu kako je Komunistička partija ugradila internet u svoj politički sustav daleko bolje nego što se očekivalo. Samo dvije godine ranije, prema međunarodnom tisku i televizijskom izvještavanju, blogovi su u Kini bili tako popularni da se očekivalo da će iz takvih internetskih aktivnosti proizaći snažan demokratizacijski pokret. Barem je to bilo ono čemu su se nadali Zapadni mediji, koji su vjerovali da obećavajući potencijal digitalnih tehnologija kao što su *weblog*, *podcast* i Skype još nije u potpunosti iskorišten. Istodobno su američke tvrtke kao što su Microsoft i Cisco surađivale s kineskom vladom u borbi protiv “disidentskog govora” nudeći svoje tehnologije kako bi se stvorio učinkovit vatrozid i nadziralo javno mnijenje.

Rebecca MacKinnon, nekadašnja novinarka za CNN Asia, spisateljica i suosnivačica blogerske platforme Global Voices, izjavila je prošle godine u jednom intervjuu: “Weibo bi čak mogao pomoći Komunističkoj partiji da iznova centralizira političku vlast na račun lokalnih službenika i regionalnih vlada, koje su tijekom posljednjih triju desetljeća ekonomske reforme stekle veću neovisnost od Pekinga. Weibo tvrtke redom su smještene u prijestolnici i moraju se pokoravati naredbama središnje vlasti. Uspon Weiboa stvorio je krug u kojemu se javnost sve više potiče da koristi društvene medije

04 U srpnju 2013. WeChat je izjavio da ima 70 milijuna korisnika izvan Kine. *China Daily* (3. sropanja 2013.), [http://europe.china-daily.com.cn/business/2013-07/03/content\\_16717554.htm](http://europe.china-daily.com.cn/business/2013-07/03/content_16717554.htm)

05 “High Tech, Low Life. Censorship. New Media. And China’s first citizen reporters”. Redatelj: Steve Maing, producentica: Trina Rodriguez, SAD 2012., 88 min. <http://hightechlowlifefilm.com/>

blogging conference of 2009 in Lianzhou, with, among others, bloggers Isaac Mao and Zola. Both will be mentioned again in this text.

Before moving on to my examples – ‘screenshots’ of the Chinese internet – I want to clarify that I write on my subject with a double distance – a geographical and a linguistic distance. Hence my approach depends on translation, either by Chinese friends or web services such as websites selecting news and discussions from Weibo and other social media sites and translating these into English. Among the most active ones are the editors of *Ministry of Tofu*, *Tea Leaf Nation* and *Shanghaiist*. Each has quite a different editorial approach. *Shanghaiist* seems drawn to the spectacular, making a tabloid style selection from social media, the *Ministry* emphasises its humorous perspective and last but not least *Tea Leaf Nation* publishes the most articulated and serious reports. *Tea Leaf Nation* is run by Hong Kong-American journalists fluent in Mandarin. So the Chinese language bubble becomes accessible to outsiders.

### Language bubble

It appears to me that in 2013 the English language debate dealing with the Chinese internet has reached an interesting point at which Western commentators write that the Communist Party has incorporated the internet into its political context much better than they had expected earlier. No more than two years ago, according to international press and TV reports, blogging was so popular in China that an influential democratization movement was expected to arise as a result of these online activities. At least that’s what

the Western media hoped for, believing that the promising potential of digital technologies such as weblogs, podcasts and Skype had not yet been fully exploited. At the same time American firms such as Microsoft and Cisco cooperate with the Chinese government to combat the “discourse of dissent” and offer their technologies to provide an effective firewall and control public opinion.

Rebecca MacKinnon, a former CNN Asia journalist, writer and *Global Voices* co-founder, last year explained in an interview “If anything, Weibo may even help the Communist Party re-centralize its political power at the expense of local officials and regional governments, which over the past three decades of economic reform have gained greater autonomy from Beijing. The Weibo companies are all headquartered in the capital and are required to take orders from the central government. The advent of Weibo has created a cycle in which the public is increasingly emboldened to use social media to report on localized abuses by individual officials, with some reason to hope that once the central government is alerted to the problem justice will prevail.”<sup>06</sup> A practice of criticizing and blaming in public which might go back to a Maoist tradition of self-criticism.

According to MacKinnon, some scholars argue that the internet has brought a “monitory democracy”<sup>07</sup> to China, because the internet enables citizens to monitor the behavior of officials – particularly local ones – and document abuses. While, one would have to add, also being monitored in doing so. MacKinnon claims she has seen Chinese officials make the

04 In July 2013 WeChat is said to have 70 million users outside China. China Daily, 3 July 2013. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-07/03/content\\_16717554.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-07/03/content_16717554.htm)

05 *High Tech, Low Life. Censorship. New Media. And China’s first citizen reporters*, directed by Stephen T. Maing, producer Trina Rodriguez, USA 2012, 88 min. <http://hightechlowlifefilm.com/>

06 <https://china-digitaltimes.net/2012/04/the-not-so-great-fire-wall-of-china/>

07 “Eight Questions: Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘Consent of the Networked’”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 22 February 2012. <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/22/eight-questions-rebecca-mackinnon-consent-of-the-networked/>

kako bi izvještavala o zloporabi vlasti pojedinih službenika na lokalnoj razini, uz donekle opravdanu nadu da će središnja vlast, bude li obaviještena o problemu, provesti pravdu.”<sup>06</sup> A ta praksa kritiziranja i iznošenja optužbi u javnosti vuče korijene iz maoističke tradicije samokritike.

Prema Rebecci MacKinnon, neki znanstvenici tvrde kako je internet donio u Kinu “nadzornu demokraciju”,<sup>07</sup> budući da omogućuje građanima da nadziru ponašanje službenika – osobito lokalnih – i dokumentiraju zloporabu. I to tako, valjalo bi dodati, da se pritom nadzire i građane dok to čine. MacKinnon tvrdi kako zna za izjave kineskih službenika o tome kako se zahvaljujući Weibou i društvenim medijima Kina već demokratizira te joj stoga nisu potrebni višestranački izbori ili neovisno sudstvo.

Časopis *The Economist* komentirao je u jednom novijem članku pod nazivom “China’s internet. A Giant Cage”: “Ne samo da je kineska autoritarna vlast preživjela internet, nego se država čak pokazala veoma vještom u prilagođavanju te tehnologije vlastitim ciljevima, što joj je omogućilo da još bolje kontrolira društvo i time posluži kao primjer drugim represivnim režimima. Kineskim privatnim internetskim tvrtkama, koje su velikim dijelom klonovi zapadnih, dopušteno je djelovati tako dugo dok ne odstupaju od partijske linije.”<sup>08</sup> *The Economist* zaključuje kako “internet tjera partijsku jezgru da bude učinkovitija u svojoj autoritarnosti.”

U knjizi *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* profesor azijskih kultura na Sveučilištu Columbia Guobin Yang preispituje načine na koje valja suditi o tome što se događa na internetu. Tako u završnom poglavlju piše: “Najvažniji proces... je neslužbena demokracija građana. Internetski aktivizam je mikrokozmos novog građanskog aktivizma u Kini i jedna od njegovih najvitalnijih struja. U tom smislu internetski aktivizam obilježio je širenje građanske demokracije, demokracije odozdo”.

Želimo li biti pesimisti, mogli bismo reći da Zapad, sa svojim paradigmama i vrijednostima, razmišlja na način koji je potpuno promašen kada se radi o kulturnoj produkciji u Kini. To je osobito očito u kontekstu televizijskih emisija kao što su *Supergirl* ili *Voice of China*, koje su napravljene po uzoru na *American Idol* i u kojima milijuni Kineza sudjeluju u procesu odlučivanja slanjem SMS-a, što se tumačilo kao prvi znak procesa demokratizacije (iako bismo to prije interpretirali kao pervertirani oblik demokracije i zabave). Stoga predlažem da se ta pojava nazove “Shanzhai demokracijom” po uzoru na Byung-Chul Hana i njegovu proširenu interpretaciju termina Shanzhai.<sup>09</sup> Vratit ću se još na taj aspekt problema.

06 <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/04/the-not-so-great-firewall-of-china/>

07 “Eight Questions: Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘Consent of the Networked’”, *The Wall Street Journal* (22. veljače 2012.), <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/22/eight-questions-rebecca-mackinnon-consent-of-the-networked/>

08 “China’s Internet: A giant cage”, *The Economist* (6. travnja 2013.), <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-Internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled>

09 Byung-Chul Han, *Shanzhai. Dekonstruktion auf chinesisch* (Berlin: Merve, 2011.).

case that thanks to Weibo and social media China is already democratizing so it doesn't need multi-party elections or an independent judiciary.

*The Economist* magazine comments in a recent article entitled "China's internet. A giant cage": "Not only has Chinese authoritarian rule survived the internet, but the state has shown great skill in bending the technology to its own purposes, enabling it to exercise better control of its own society and setting an example for other repressive regimes. Chinese private internet companies, many of them clones of Western ones, have been allowed to flourish so long as they do not deviate from the party line."<sup>08</sup> *The Economist* concludes, "the internet requires the party centre to be more efficient at being authoritarian."

In his book *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online*, Guobin Yang, a professor for Asian Cultures teaching at Columbia University, challenges the way to judge what is happening online. Yang notes in his concluding chapter, "The most important development ... is citizens' unofficial democracy. Online activism is a microcosm of China's new citizen activism, and it is one of its most vibrant currents. In this sense, online activism marks the expansion of grassroots, citizen democracy".

If one was feeling pessimistic, one might say that the West, with its paradigms and values, is thinking in terms that entirely miss the point when it comes to cultural production in China. This becomes especially apparent in the context of the TV programme *Supergirl* or *Voice of China*, modelled on *American Idol*, in which millions of Chinese citizens took part in the decision-making process by sending

text messages, which was interpreted as the first sign of a democratic process (we might tend to read this appraisal as a perverted form of democracy and entertainment). This is the reason that I use the term "a Shanzhai democracy", referring to Byung-Chul Han and his extended interpretation of Shanzhai<sup>09</sup>. I will return to this idea later.

### Poor man's expression

My three examples make use of appropriation and subversion of the state's official visual presentation. Even though the tactical use of images and visuals in each video varies, the last example seems to be informed by the tactics appropriated in the previous video clips.. The first, a scene from the documentary film *High Tech, Low Life* (Stephen Maing, 2012) shows an old Chinese man's analog technique of using poster-sized images of Chinese leaders to symbolically protect a citizen's interest. The second, a spoof by Chinese microfilmer Hu Ge, makes fun of the Chinese party as a slow provincial organization using the typically slow and repetitive style of state television reports. The last example also quotes CCTV by imitating a news studio setting. A migrant worker uses this scenario to "officialize" her petition.

Back to the first example: *High Tech, Low Life* accompanies two of China's early amateur reporters doing their work equipped with laptops, cell phones, flashlights, cables and digital cameras. Both Zhou Shuguang aka Zola and the older Zhang Shihe aka Tiger Temple<sup>10</sup> travel to document and publish local struggles on their blogs. They develop skills to navigate

08 "China's internet: A giant cage", *The Economist*, 6 April 2013. <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-Internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled>

09 Byung-Chul Han, *Shanzhai. Dekonstruktion auf chinesisches*. Merve, Berlin 2011

10 <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/10/citizen-journalist-blogger-tiger-temple-laohu-miao-eaaeoea%E2%88%ABo/>

Moja tri primjera koriste aproprijaciju i subverziju službene vizualne reprezentacije kineske države. Iako se u svakom videu može pronaći drugačija taktička uporaba slika i vizualnih elemenata, posljednji primjer je, kako se čini, oblikovan taktikama koje predstavljaju prethodni video spotovi koje ću spomenuti. Prvi je prizor iz dokumentarnog filma *High Tech, Low Life* (Stephen Maing, 2012.), koji prikazuje staru kinesku tehniku korištenja plakata s likovima kineskih vođa kako bi se simbolički zaštitili interesi građana. Drugi primjer, parodija kineskog mikrofilmaša Hua Gea, ismijava kinesku partiju kao tromu provincijsku organizaciju koja koristi karakteristično spor i repetitivan stil izvještavanja na državnoj televiziji. Posljednji primjer također citira CCTV oponašajući situaciju u redakciji za vijesti, gdje jedna migrantska radnica koristi taj scenarij kako bi učinila svoju molbu “službenom”.

Vratimo se prvom primjeru: *High Tech, Low Life* prati dvojicu kineskih izvjestitelja-amatera iz ranog razdoblja koji obavljaju posao opremljeni prijenosnim računalima, mobitelima, baterijskim svjetiljkama, kablovima i digitalnim kamerama. Zhou Shuguang, drugim imenom Zola, i stariji Zhang Shihe, drugim imenom Temple,<sup>10</sup> putuju kako bi dokumentirali i objavili vijesti o lokalnim sukobima na svojim blogovima. Pri zastupanju ljudskih prava razvili su vještinu izbjegavanja cenzure kineskog interneta i rizika političkog progona.

Zola<sup>11</sup> izvještava o nekom stanovniku Pekinga kojemu će srušiti kuću radi predolimpijske izgradnje 2008. Osobito je zanimljiva vizualna strategija tog čovjeka: pričvrstio je plakate koji prikazuju kineske vođe Denga Xiaopinga, Mao Ce-Tunga i Hua Jintaoa, koji je u vrijeme nastanka filma bio kineski predsjednik, na vanjske zidove kuće kako bi je zaštitio od državnih vlasti, što je prilično dijalektički pristup u borbi za očuvanje vlastitih interesa. On je upotrijebio slike najutjecajnijih i najsnažnijih ličnosti kineske prošlosti i predstavio ih kao “zaštitni oklop” protiv razaranja i izgradnje profitabilnih objekata. Na neki način, Zola djeluje kao amplifikator i “digitalizator” onoga što se događalo na licu mjesta, budući da objavljuje lokalne probleme na internetu i dijeli sukob sa širom javnošću. Ovaj konkretni prizor pokazuje blogere kao angažirane novinare – ali ne angažirane za interese vlade, nego za ciljeve naroda – i zagovornike siromašnih ljudi koji nemaju ni sredstava ni znanja da podijele svoju borbu sa širom javnošću, ali ipak primjenjuju tradicionalne vizualne strategije kako bi obranili svoj privatni prostor.

10 <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/10/citizen-journalist-blogger-tiger-temple-laohu-miao-eaeoea%E2%88%AB0/>

11 Zola je odigrao glavnu ulogu u iznošenju slučaja “kuća-klina” u javnost, pri čemu je pokazao “zaigranost i pomanjkanje poštovanja” koji su “tipični za novi stil internetskog aktivizma”. Epizoda s kućom-klinom dogodila se u ožujku i travnju 2007., kada su kineski “građani interneta” prosvjedovali u znak podrške vlasnicima trošne kuće koju su privatni developeri odlučili srušiti. Kuća-klin je kineski termin za bilo koje zdanje gdje vlasnik tvrdoglavo odbija isprazniti svoj posjed unatoč pritisku velikih developera. U slučaju da developer ne može otkupiti posjed od vlasnika radovi se uglavnom odvijaju dalje tako da se projekt promijeni i gradi se oko zdanja. Kada se to dogodi, zdanje je službeno postalo ‘kuća-klin’.

China's internet censorship regulations and avoid the risk of political persecution while supporting people's rights.

Zola<sup>11</sup> reports about a resident in Beijing whose house will be torn down as a result of construction for the 2008 Olympic games. Of particular interest is this resident's visual strategy of pinning posters of Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong and Hu Jintao, (the Chinese President when filming took place), to the outside walls of his house to protect it against state authorities, a quite dialectic approach in negotiating his interests. He uses the images of the most influential and powerful faces in China's past and present as "protection shields" against demolition and the construction of real-estate projects. In a way, Zola acts as an amplifier and "digitizer" of what happened on site by publishing local issues online and sharing the conflict with a wider public. This particular scene shows bloggers acting as embedded journalists – not embedded in relation to government issues, but rather with people's agendas – and advocates of poor people who don't have the means and knowledge to share their struggles with a wider public, but who appropriate traditional visual strategies to defend their private space.

## Censorship

It seems impossible to talk about the Chinese internet without looking into censorship.

When it comes to reports on internet censorship, blocking websites, deleting specific content or throttling internet speed, China is alongside such countries as Syria, Jordan and Turkey. The harshest

intervention happened with the much discussed Bo Xilai case in 2012. It started with rumors of a coup at the top of the Communist Party, preceded by events to which Bo Xilai was central. The former head of government in Chongqing had operated his own policies: commercial-free television programmes, Maoist songs and fighting against mafia-like structures. Apparently, he himself was involved with these groups: there was a supposed connection between the death of a British entrepreneur and Bo's wife. Finally, one night a Ferrari accident happened in Beijing caused by his eccentric son Bo Guagua.<sup>12</sup> At the time, the State Council Information Office (or as Zola has put it, "unknown, relevant departments") and the Ministry of Public Security blocked any Weibo posts over the weekend. The site was accessible, but nobody was allowed to post new messages, not even V-members, so called 'verified users'. In a lexicon of parodic expressions under "ChInternet" it states: "the internet with Chinese characteristics" – referring to official socialism with Chinese characteristics, which basically means a one party system with a capitalist economy.

"Apparently" and "probably" are the fabric that China's microblog news are made of. Speculation is fueled by a lack of information – Bo Xilai matters were closed to the public. That the state takes Weibo rumors seriously was demonstrated weeks later: two major services had been frozen for three days for a "check-up". An old-school term for disciplinary action. The popular blogger and racing driver Han Han wrote shortly after the re-acti-

11 Zola played a key role in bringing the "nail house" case to national attention, displaying "a sense of playfulness and irreverence" that "exemplif[ies] the new style of online activism". The nail house episode took place between March and April 2007, as Chinese netizens rallied behind the owners of a shabby house due for demolition by private developers. A nail house is the Chinese term for any building where an owner stubbornly refuses to vacate his or her property in the face of a large development. If the developer is unable to buy the owner out, the development is usually carried forward with design alterations to work around the building. If this occurs, the building is officially a 'nail house'.

12 Cf. Vera Tollmann, "Könnte, sollte, anscheinend", *Der Freitag*, 11 April 2012. <http://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/konnte-sollte-anscheinend>



Stills from *High Tech, Low Life*, Stephen T. Maing, USA 2012, 88 min.

Kadrovi iz filma *High Tech, Low Life*, Stephen T. Maing, SAD 2012., 88 min.



vation “[The Blackout] has nothing to do with the clean up of rumors, it’s about proving State Power: if I can make comments disappear for three days, I can also make you lose your little Weibos altogether.”<sup>13</sup>

So when it comes to “sensitive” events or politically charged dates like the 4th of June, the day when 24 years ago the Chinese army fired on occupiers and protesters in Tiananmen Square – since then there has been no popular occupation of public space – the internet is filtered. Users cynically call 4th June the internet maintenance day.<sup>14</sup>

### Monitoring censorship

I would briefly like to introduce several monitoring websites run by individuals and institutions that are operating in Hong Kong, Berkeley in California and anonymously (not to be confused with the hacker group Anonymous), which collect censored words and expressions and give advice on how to navigate the web without being overly affected by government intervention. The Great Fire<sup>15</sup> is managed anonymously, but has an advisory board with members such as the previously mentioned Rebecca MacKinnon, and blogger, entrepreneur and researcher Isaac Mao, both regular voices when it comes to reflecting online matters in China. A Western project is China Digital Times<sup>16</sup> – “CDT is supported by the Counter-Power Lab out of the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley.” Among its editors are Americans, Chinese and Chinese-Americans. Part of their service is a regularly updated list of so-

called ‘don’t mentions’, the infamous Grassmudhorse dictionary<sup>17</sup> and a Google spreadsheet<sup>18</sup> which lists sensitive Sina Weibo search terms regularly updated since 2011. A less detailed listing but in a reader friendly layout can be found on Blocked on Weibo<sup>19</sup>, a one person student initiative. The Hong Kong University operates a type of Weibo backup and stores deleted Weibo posts in a database, the China Media Project.<sup>20</sup> As well as editorial services for non-native speakers, the people behind the website claim to archive those Weibo posts that are censored by the Chinese internet censoring department.

As an addition to the archive, students of computational journalism are developing a search engine called Weibosuite.<sup>21</sup> The group is three (data) journalists based in Hong Kong, one is Australian, the other two are Hong Kong nationals, one of whom is a former analyst and trader. They are developing an “Image-to-Chinese-to-English-converter”, a tool which allows non-native speakers to ‘read’ text uploaded as an image file – another tactic to circumvent censorship, or at least to gain time.

“Sina Weibo users often express writing as attached image files – far more than in social media used by English speakers. Maybe it’s the pictorial nature of Chinese writing, maybe it’s a cultural thing, or perhaps even a way to try to get around government censors. So this tool allows you to extract the text out of an image

13 <http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/04/chinas-twitter-comes-roaring-back-after-govt-blackout/>

14 Besides the date and the location, such terms as “today” and “tomorrow” were reported as being on the blacklist. There have been rumors about a JASMINE REVOLUTION in 2011, but at the appointed day and time in Wangfujing, Beijing’s shopping street, mostly Western journalists showed up to observe what was happening. They were by themselves, as the correspondent of a big German newspaper confirmed later. The Jasmine revolution remained an expectation, an unfulfilled prophecy.

15 <http://greatfire.org>

16 <http://chinadigitaltimes.net>

17 Going back to a popular word play on Weibo’s phonetic misspelling of “Fuck your Mother.” The dictionary compiles all kinds of slightly misspelled words to avoid censorship and keep communication open.

18 Google spreadsheet from China Digital Times: [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AqeB7wrWjgw\\_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFfV2rWS1p-MEtYcEE](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AqeB7wrWjgw_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFfV2rWS1p-MEtYcEE)

19 <http://blockedonweibo.tumblr.com/>

## Cenzura

Čini se nemoguće govoriti o kineskom internetu, a da se ne pozabavimo pitanjem cenzure.

Kada se radi o izvještajima o internetskoj cenzuri, blokiranju mrežnih stranica, brisanju određenih sadržaja ili ometanju brzine prijenosa podataka, Kina je među zemljama kao što su Sirija, Jordan ili Turska. Najoštrija intervencija dogodila se u slučaju Boa Xilaia 2012. godine, o kojemu se mnogo raspravljalo. Započela je govorcanjima o prevratu na vrhu Komunističke partije, a kojima su prethodili događaji u čijem je fokusu bio Bo Xilai. Nekadašnji predsjednik vlade u Chongqingu provodio je vlastitu politiku s televizijskim emisijama bez reklama, maoističkim pjesmama i borbom protiv mafijaških struktura. Navodno je i sam bio upetljan u mafiju: govori se da je postojala veza između smrti britanskog poduzetnika i Boove supruge. Naposlijetku je tijekom jedne noći došlo do prometne nesreće s Ferrarijem u Pekingu, a koju je uzrokovao ekscentrični sin Bo Guagua.<sup>12</sup> U to su vrijeme informbiro Državnog vijeća (ili, kako piše Zola, “nepoznati, relevantni odjeli”) i Ministarstvo javne sigurnosti blokirali sve postove na Weibou preko vikenda. Stranici se moglo pristupiti, ali nitko nije mogao objavljivati nove poruke, čak niti V-članovi, takozvani verificirani korisnici. U leksikonu parodijskih izraza pod “Chinternet” stoji sljedeće: internet s kineskim obilježjima – što aludira na službeni socijalizam s kineskim obilježjima, dakle na jednostranački sustav u kombinaciji s kapitalističkom ekonomijom.

12 Usp. Vera Tollmann, “Könnte, sollte, anscheinend”, *Der Freitag* (11. travnja 2012.), <http://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/konnte-sollte-anscheinend>

13 <http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/04/chinas-twitter-comes-roaring-back-after-govt-blackout/>

14 Osim datuma i lokacije, i termini kao što su “danas” i “sutra” navodno su na crnoj listi. Tako su 2011. godine kružile glasine o Revoluciji jasmína, ali u dogovoreni dan i vrijeme u Wangfujingu, trgovačkoj četvrti Pekinga, uglavnom su osvanuli Zapadni novinari kako bi promatrali što se događa. Nitko drugi nije se pojavio, kako je kasnije potvrdio dopisnik jednih velikih njemačkih novina. Revolucija jasmína ostala je puko očekivanje i neostvareno proročanstvo.

“Naizgled” i “vjerojatno” materijal je od kojega se sastoje vijesti na kineskim mikroblogovima. Do spekulacija je došlo zbog pomanjkanja informacija, jer stvari vezane uz Boa Xilaija bile su zatvorene za javnost. Činjenica da država ozbiljno shvaća govorcanja na Weibou pokazala se tjednima nakon toga: dva glavna servisa zamrznuta su na tri dana radi “provjere”. Disciplinarna mjera u stilu stare škole. Popularni blogger i vođa automobilskih utrka Han Han napisao je netom nakon reaktivacije: “[Prekid rada] nema nikakve veze s brisanjem glasina, nego se tu radi o dokazivanju Državne Moći: ako vam mogu oduzeti komentare na tri dana, mogu vam također sasvim oduzeti vaše male Weibo.”<sup>13</sup>

Stoga, kada se radi o “osjetljivim” događajima ili politički relevantnim datumima kao što je 4. lipnja, dan na koji je prije 24 godine kineska vojska pucala na prosvjednike koji su zauzeli trg Tiananmen – otada više nije zauzet nijedan javni prostor – internet se filtrira. Korisnici su cinično nazvali 4. lipnja danom radova na održavanju interneta.<sup>14</sup>

that contains Chinese writing. Then you can copy and paste the Chinese writing, or have a look at what a rough translation is in English.”<sup>22</sup>

Surround App,<sup>23</sup> the least developed tool among the ones mentioned here, offers translations of Weibo posts plus Weibo features such as comments and retweets. At the time of writing this text, Surround App is in beta version.

## Tactics

So it is soon evident that tactics are used on both sides, both by the observer and the observed. Let’s consider in what sense there could be signs of tactical media on the “ChiInternet” starting with François Jullien’s notion of the potential of the situation.<sup>24</sup> The ability to opt out of the certain circumstances means that this strategy is simply a tactical approach. Such a way of thinking is very coherent, even if it initially leads us to see “our” expectations from a distance (Jullien talks about a European ‘we’, which is a result of Western theory). The strategist is therefore acting out of the situation, not of a situation that he or she has previously modelled, but rather from the present situation in which he or she find themselves and within which they try to figure where the potential could be and how to exploit it. This brief mention of Jullien is to show different contexts.

Here one can speak also of disciplining strategies based on tacticality – and to make this differentiation is to walk on shaky ground. New tactics are always evolving. Among those that are

displayed in “old” results – with keywords such as “Tiananmen Square incident”, searches are returning plenty of results, but all the listed links are about the Tiananmen Square incident of 1976 rather than current debates and opinions.

There is also the regularly encountered tactic of delay. With some search terms it takes much longer for search results to show up – if there are any at all. Similarly with some websites, the browser window is lost in loading and the main body of the window remains white. Last but not least there is the tactic of deception: A “Sorry, no results can be found” message appears. On Weibo a V-users-only censorship also exists, which means public figures, so called V-users, are expected to follow the rules. China’s new approach to censoring the 4<sup>th</sup> June incident is part of a trend of more subtle filtering of the Chinese internet, designed to decrease awareness of censorship among internet users. For example, researchers have found that when Sina<sup>25</sup> censors certain posts on Weibo, they remain visible to the user who posted, leaving users unaware that they are being censored.

## Mocking CCTV

I will take a closer look at two examples that mirror the scope of video activities on the Chinese internet beyond citizen reporting as introduced in the documentary *High Tech, Low Life*. The first is CCAV<sup>26</sup> by Hu Ge. CCAV stands for China Central Adult Video and is a mockery of the state television channel CCTV. A group

20 <http://cmp.hku.hk/>

21 <http://weibo-suite.com/>

22 Ibid.

23 <http://www.surroundapp.asia>

24 Cf. François Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*. University of Hawaii Press 2004

25 Sina is the company that runs Weibo, the microblogging website.

26 Hu Ge, – News on the hour, 2008, 7’24 min. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv8JA4mimi\\_A](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv8JA4mimi_A)

## Nadgledanje cenzure

Željela bih ukratko predstaviti nekoliko mrežnih stranica za nadgledanje cenzure kojima upravljaju razni pojedinci i institucije sa sjedištima u Hong Kongu, Berkleyju u Kaliforniji i anonimno (što se ne smije brkati s hakerskom skupinom Anonymous), koje prikupljaju cenzurirane riječi i izraze te daju savjete o tome kako navigirati internetom, a da se ne bude previše podložan vladinim intervencijama. The Great Fire<sup>15</sup> je pod anonimnim upravljanjem, ali ima savjetodavni odbor s članovima kao što su već spomenuta Rebecca MacKinnon te blogger, poduzetnik i znanstvenik Isaac Mao, oboje itekako prisutni kada se radi o promišljanju internetskih pitanja u Kini. Od zapadnih projekata valja spomenuti *China Digital Times*<sup>16</sup> – “CDT ima podršku Counter-Power Laba na Fakultetu za informacijske znanosti Kalifornijskog sveučilišta u Berkeleyu”. Među njegovim urednicima ima Amerikanaca, Kineza i Sino-Amerikanaca. Dio njihovih usluga je i redovito osvježavan popis takozvanih “ne spominji to”, ozloglašeni rječnik Grassmudhorse<sup>17</sup> i tablica<sup>18</sup> na Googleovom servisu koja navodi cenzuirane termine za tražilicu Sina Weibo, a koja se redovito osvježava od 2011. godine. Nešto manje detaljan popis, ali u pristupačnom formatu, može se pronaći na stranici *Blocked on Weibo*,<sup>19</sup> inicijativi jednog jedinog studenta. Sveučilište u Hong Kongu održava neku vrstu sigurnosne kopije Weiboa, pohranjujući izbrisane postove na Weibou u posebnu bazu podataka po imenu *China Media Project*.<sup>20</sup> Osim uredničkih usluga za one koji nisu izvorni govornici kineskog, osoblje te stranice tvrdi kako arhivira one postove s Weiboa koje je cenzurirao Odjel za cenzuru kineskog interneta.

Kao dodatak arhivu, studenti računalnog novinarstva razvijaju tražilicu koju su nazvali Weibosuite.<sup>21</sup> To su trojica (istraživačkih) novinara koji žive u Hong Kongu, jedan Australac i dvojica lokalnih momaka, od kojih je jedan bivši analitičar i mešetar. Uz to, njih trojica rade na takozvanom “Pretvaraču slike na kineski pa na engleski”, oruđu koje osobama koje ne govore kineski omogućuje da “pročitaju” tekst koji se učita kao slika – što je još jedna taktika zao-bilaženja cenzure ili barem dobivanja na vremenu.

“Korisnici Sina Weiboa često izražavaju riječi pomoću privitaka sa slikama – daleko više nego što je to slučaj u društvenim medijima koje koriste engleski govornici. Možda se radi o slikovnoj naravi kineskoga pisma, a možda je to stvar kulturne tradicije, možda čak i način da se zaobiđe državna cenzura. Ovo oruđe vam omogućuje da ekstrahirate tekst iz slike koja sadrži kineske ideograme. Nakon toga možete kopirati i prenijeti kineski tekst ili pak pogledati što bi on otprilike značio na engleskom.”<sup>22</sup>

15 <http://greatfire.org>

16 <http://chinadigitaltimes.net>

17 To se odnosi na popularnu igru riječi, gdje se Weibo može fonetski napisati tako da znači “jebi si majku”. Rječnik sadrži sve moguće lagano iskrivljene riječi kako bi se izbjegla cenzura i održala komunikacija.

18 Googleova tablica, China Digital Times: [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/ccc?key=0Aqe87wrWj9w\\_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFF-VzJrWS1pMEtYcEE](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/ccc?key=0Aqe87wrWj9w_dFpJWjZoM19BNkFF-VzJrWS1pMEtYcEE)

19 <http://blockedonweibo.tumblr.com/>

20 <http://cmp.hku.hk/>

21 <http://weibosuite.com/>

22 Ibid.

of men and women sit at a round table, smoking and talking about minor issues and making fun of technocratic political solutions. Names and dates change – xxx – and the local officials wear a red sleeve badge and a green coat, both of which make reference to Maoism, still relevant today for people in public service jobs who are low down in the hierarchy and still wear these symbolic items of clothing.

In Beijing today, the red sleeve badge says “security patrol” and is commonly used by elderly volunteers from neighborhood committees (the lowest level of governance). These badges appear in the streets when major Party meetings or important events are about to happen as a way to monitor public security or prevent anything odd from going on in public.

The badge in Hu Ge’s video clip simply says “monitor”. It seems the director wants to refer to an atmosphere of “being watched”.

During the Maoist revolution, this was the symbol for role models, while today a practical meaning remains but there is no obvious ideological one.

“Using political terminology and bureaucratic jargon in the style of CCTV, Hu anchors a news report on the residents’ annual meeting, discussing various daily housing issues in a shared apartment that resonates with current social problems in China. The format of the program and the use of familiar clichés and jargon satirize what George Orwell in his book *1984* (1961) called “newspeak”, a fictional language that helps to maintain systematic political control by making alternative thinking impossible.”<sup>27</sup>

## Migrant worker viral video

Hu Ge’s *CCAV* helps us to understand the context of the next video,<sup>28</sup> even though this work uses CCTV aesthetics in a different way. A woman stands in a mock-up studio, with a backdrop image showing a Chinese building. Looking directly at the camera, Miao politely addresses her “comrades” in China’s Petition Department (信访部门), demanding for herself and her “farmworker brothers” aggregate compensation of RMB 3.5 million (about US\$560,000) in connection with a construction project. The migrant worker imitates the language of a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry and demands their unpaid wages. The woman uses the typical rhetoric of the Xinhua News Agency – a formalized political language. Usually such workers would travel to the Petition Department in Beijing to claim their rights.<sup>29</sup> This worker makes her demand public by uploading the video to Youku, a Chinese video platform similar to Youtube.

Throughout the film a low voice can be heard prompting the speaker. This almost unnoticeable intervention proves that other people have helped with writing the text and recording the video. In an interview with China National Radio the migrant worker stated that she did not understand every word she said.

In her book *China on Video*, Paola Voci explains, “Smaller screens such as the DV camera, the computer monitor – and, within it, the internet window – and the cell phone display screen have created new public spaces where many long-standing divisions between high-brow and low-brow, mainstream and counter-culture, conventional and experimental are dissolving and being reinvented.”<sup>30</sup>

27 Hongmei Li, *Parody and Resistance on the Chinese internet*, Routledge, London and New York 2011, p.7

28 Uploaded on Youku with the descriptive title “Migrant worker imitates a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry and by this means reclaims her wages”

29 Cf. Petition, documentary by Zhao Liang, 2009, 120 min. <http://hcl.harvard.edu/hfa/films/2010janmar/petition.html>

30 Paola Voci, *China on Video. Smaller-Screen Realities*, Routledge Oxford, London and New York 2010

Surround App,<sup>23</sup> najslabije razvijeno oruđe među ovima koje sam spomenula, nudi prijevod postova na Weibou plus mogućnost komentiranja i dijeljenja. U trenutku dok pišem ovaj tekst postoji samo kao beta-verzija.

## Taktika

Postaje očito da i promatrač i promatrani koriste određene taktike. Pogledajmo sada u kojem smislu bismo mogli prepoznati naznake taktičkih medija na “Chinternetu”, polazeći pritom od ideje Françoisa Julliena o potencijalu situacije.<sup>24</sup> Kao mogućnost da se sebe izuzme iz određenih okolnosti, ova je strategija naprosto jedan taktički pristup. Takav način razmišljanja veoma je koherentan, čak i ako nas u početku navodi da promatramo “svoja” očekivanja iz određene udaljenosti (Jullien govori o europskome “mi”, koje je rezultat Zapadnih teorijskih odluka). Strateg stoga ovdje djeluje na osnovi konkretne situacije, dakle ne situacije koju je prethodno zamislio, nego aktualne situacije u kojoj se našao i u kojoj treba razabrati gdje bi mogao biti neki potencijal i kako ga iskoristiti. Ovaj kratki spomen Julliena služi kako bi se istaknula različitost konteksta.

Ovdje bismo mogli govoriti zapravo o strategijama discipliniranja koje su taktičke naravi – iako to razlikovanje znači upustiti se na sklizak teren. Nепrestano se razvijaju nove taktike. Među te taktike ubraja se prikazivanje “starih” rezultata - kao što je primjerice slučaj s pretraživanjem prema ključnim riječima “incident na trgu Tiananmen”, koje daje mnoštvo rezultata, ali se prikazani linkovi listom odnose na incident na trgu Tiananmen 1976. godine, a ne na aktualne debate i mišljenja. Zatim je tu česta taktika usporavanja. Kod pretraživanja prema određenim pojmovima treba daleko više vremena da se pojave rezultati pretrage – ako se uopće i pojave. Isto se događa s nekim mrežnim stranicama, gdje preglednik zastane prilikom učitavanja stranice pri čemu pozadina ostaje bijela. I naposljetku, tu je jednako važna taktika lažne informacije: pojavi se poruka “Nažalost pretraživanje nema rezultata”. I na Weibou postoji cenzura specijalno za V-korisnike, što znači da se od javnih ličnosti, takozvanih V-korisnika, očekuje da u svakom slučaju poštuju pravila. Nova cenzura Sine u pogledu incidenta 4. lipnja je dio trenda da se kineski internet filtrira suptilnije kako bi se smanjila svijest korisnika o postojanju cenzure. Na primjer, znanstvenici su uočili da kada Sina<sup>25</sup> cenzurira određene postove na Weibou, oni ostaju vidljivi korisniku koji ih je objavio, što znači da korisnici uopće nisu svjesni da ih se cenzuriralo.

23 <http://www.surroundapp.asia>

24 François Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking* (University of Hawaii Press, 2004.).

25 Sina je kompanija koja stoji iza mikroblogging servisa Weibo.



Stills from *News on the hour*, Hu Ge, China 2008, 7'24 min.

Kadrovi iz *News on the hour*, Hu Ge, Kina 2008., 7'24 min.

## Ismijavanje CCTV-a

Sada ću pobliže razmotriti dva primjera koji predstavljaju opseg video aktivnosti na kineskom internetu gdje se ide dalje u građanskom izvještavanju od onog kakvog prezentira ranije spomenuti dokumentarac *High Tech, Low Life*. Prvi je CCAV<sup>26</sup> autora Hua Gea. CCAV je kratica za China Central Adult Video i ovaj film ismijava državnu televiziju CCTV. Skupina muškaraca i žena sjedi za okruglim stolom, puši i razgovara o nevažnim pitanjima, rugajući se tehnokratskim političkim rješenjima. Imena i podaci variraju – “xxx” – a lokalne odgovorne osobe nose crvenu oznaku na rukavu i zelene jakne, što asocira na maoizam.

U današnjem Pekingu crvena oznaka na rukavu označava “sigurnosnu patrolu” i obično je koristi neka vrsta postarijih dobrovoljaca u odboru gradske četvrti (što je najniža razina uprave). Te oznake pojave se na ulici svaki put kada se treba dogoditi neki važan partijski sastanak ili događaj kako bi se nadzirala javna sigurnost i spriječilo svako sumnjivo događanje u javnosti. Na oznakama u videu Hua Gea naprosto piše “nadzor”. Čini se da je redatelj želio naznačiti atmosferu “promatranosti”. Tijekom maoističke revolucije ona je bila simbol uzornih građana, ali čini se da danas nema nikakvo očigledno ideološko značenje, samo praktično.

“Koristeći političku terminologiju i birokratski žargon u stilu CCTV-a, Hu nudi vijesti o godišnjem sastanku stanara, gdje se raspravlja o raznim svakodnevnim problemima zajedničkog stanovanja na način koji izražava aktualne društvene probleme u Kini. Format emisije i uporaba poznatih klišea i žargona satiričan je komentar na ono što je George Orwell u romanu 1984 (1961.) nazvao “newspeak”, fiktivni jezik koji pomaže održavanju sustavne političke kontrole tako što onemogućuje alternativno razmišljanje.”<sup>27</sup>

## Megapopularni video o migrantskom radniku

26 Hu Ge, *News on the hour*, 2008., 7'24 min. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv8JA4mmi\\_A](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv8JA4mmi_A)

27 Hongmei Li, *Parody and Resistance on the Chinese Internet* (London: Routledge i New York, 2011.), str. 77.

28 Objavljeno na Youku s opisnim naslovom “Radnica-migrantica oponaša glasnogovornicu Ministarstva vanjskih poslova i na taj način zahtijeva isplatu nadnica”.

Primjer CCAV-a Hua Gea pomaže nam da razumijemo kontekst sljedećeg video primjera,<sup>28</sup> iako se on služi estetikom CCTV-a na drugačiji način. Vidimo ženu kako stoji u lažnom studiju s pozadinskom slikom koja prikazuje neku kinesku zgradu. Pogleda uprtog direktno u kameru, Miao se ljubazno obraća svojim “drugovima” u kineskom Odjelu za molbe (信访部门), zahtijevajući za sebe i svoju “braću poljoprivrednike” skupnu kompenzaciju od 3,5 milijuna RMB (oko 560.000 američkih dolara) u vezi s nekim projektom izgradnje. Migrantska radnica oponaša jezik glasnogovornice Ministarstva vanjskih poslova i na taj način zahtijeva isplatu nadnica. Koristi formulacije koje pripadaju tipičnoj retorici novinske agencije Xinhua.



优酷

# 民工工资讨薪新闻发布会

民工讨薪发言人：苗翠花

女士们先生们，信访部门的同志们，大家上午好。

Still from *Miao Cuhua, Migrant worker imitates a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, and in this way claims back her wages*, China 2012, 4'06 min.

Kadar iz videa "Miao Cuhua, radnica-migrantica oponaša glasnogovornicu Ministarstva vanjskih poslova i na taj način zahtjeva isplatu nadnica", Kina 2012., 4'06 min.

Radi se o formaliziranom političkom jeziku. Obično bi se radnici poput nje zaputili u Odjel za molbe u Pekingu kako bi tražili svoja prava.<sup>29</sup> Ova radnica učinila je svoju molbu javnom tako što je stavila video na Youku, kinesku video platformu nalik na Youtube.

U jednom trenutku čujemo zvižduk koji je ohrabruje iz pozadine. Ta gotovo neprimjetna intervencija pokazuje kako su joj drugi pomogli s pisanjem teksta i snimanjem videa. U intervjuu za Kineski nacionalni radio sezonska radnica je izjavila da ne razumije baš svaku riječ koju je izrekla.

U knjizi *China on Video* Paola Voci je napisala sljedeće: “Manji ekrani kao što su DV kamera ili kompjuterski monitor – a unutar njega prozor s internetom – kao i ekran mobitela stvorili su nove javne prostore gdje se ukidaju i transformiraju mnoge dugotrajne razlike između visoke i niske kulture, mainstreama i alternativne kulture, konvencionalnog i eksperimentalnog.”<sup>30</sup>

Autor bloga *Tea Leaf Nation* David Wertime primjećuje: “To je umjetnost performansa, parodija, duh društvenih medija i očajnički vrisak – sve u jednom. Ako je nužan bilo kakav dodatni dokaz o moći društvenih medija, eto ga ovdje: neplaćena kineska sezonska radnica napravila je megapopularan video u kojemu oponaša službenicu kineskog Ministarstva vanjskih poslova zahtijevajući neisplaćenu nadnicu koja joj pripada.”

Zatim se pojavljuje muškarac u formi nađene snimke koji glumi novinara iz izmišljene “Novinske agencije za potraživanje nadnica” (讨薪社), stojeći pred digitalnim transparentom na kojemu piše “Neisplaćivanje radničkih nadnica šteti [društvenom] skladu”. Novinar postavlja radnici Miao niz unaprijed uvježbanih pitanja.

Tu bi se ustvari moglo raditi o opozicijskoj uporabi onoga što je Joshua Neves nazvao ambijentalnim video kulturama: “Zgusnuti otisak” video medija, “otisak koji se proteže mnogo dalje od osobnih računala te *streaming* i p2p mreža. To uključuje i formalne ili službene signale i ekrane – poput onih u grafici Vision Media – kao i neformalne zone kakve stvaraju on- i off-line video, DV pokreti i razne participacijske kulture. Takav pristup također uzima u obzir način na koji se video prostor isprepliće s prostorima cirkulacije i uporabe.”<sup>31</sup> Ono što Neves kaže o video uputama također vrijedi za video sezonske radnice: to nije samo “komunikacija putem videa, nego i sa videom.”<sup>32</sup>

### Mikrofilm i stvarnost na manjim ekranima

“U stara vremena režiranje filmova bilo je privilegija elite. No digitalna tehnologija ukinula je razliku između elite i običnog čovjeka. Sada i oni iz nižih slojeva društva mogu sudjelovati u stvaranju filmova, pri čemu ne postoje nikakva stroga pravila vezana uz estetske ili

29 Usp. Petition, dokumentarni film Zhaoa Lianga, 2009., 120 min., <http://hcl.harvard.edu/hfa/films/2010janmar/petition.html>

30 Paola Voci, *China on Video. Smaller-Screen Realities* (London i New York: Routledge, 2010.).

31 “In Chinese Migrant Workers’ Viral Video, Glimmers of Digital Activism’s Future”, David Wertime (10. listopada 2012.), Tea Leaf Nation, <http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/10/in-chinese-migrant-workers-viral-video-glimmers-of-digital-activisms-future/>

32 Joshua Neves, “Video Theory”, predavanje na Video Vortexu #9, Sveučilište u Lüneburgu, 2013.

*Tea Leaf Nation's* writer David Wertime observes, "It's performance art, parody, social media genius, and a desperate cry for help all in one. If any further proof of social media's power were necessary, it's arrived: An underpaid Chinese migrant worker has made a viral video in which she mimics an official in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) while asking for her own unpaid salary."

A man playing a reporter from the imaginary "Wage-Seeking News Agency" (讨薪社) then appears in a found footage montage-style work, standing before a digital banner reading "Not Paying Workers Their Wages Harms [Social] Harmony." The reporter asks Miao, the worker, a number of rehearsed questions.

This might actually be the oppositional use of what Joshua Neves has called ambient video culture: The "thickening footprint" of video media, "a footprint that extends far beyond personal computers, streaming and p2p networks. This includes both formal or official signals and screens – like those captured in the

Vision Media graphic – as well as informal zones animated by on- and offline video, DV movements, and diverse participatory cultures. Such an approach also considers how video space, and spaces of circulation and use are intertwined."<sup>31</sup> What Neves states about video tutorials could also count for the migrant worker's video: "communicating not simply via video, but with video."<sup>32</sup>

### Microfilm and Smaller-Screen Realities

"In the old times, filmmaking was the privilege of the elite. But digital technology has blurred the line between the elite and the grassroots. Now, those at the bot-

tom can also participate in film creation, with no strict requirements for aesthetic or technological demands," commented Shi Chuan, a professor of film and television at Shanghai University, as quoted in the state newspaper *China Daily*.<sup>33</sup>

Microfilm is literally translated from the Chinese name for this category, "Wei-Dianying." "Wei" means micro, "dianying" means film. The duration is short, it usually lasts between 30 seconds and 5 minutes and tells a scripted, mostly funny or romantic story. Microfilms are aimed at entertainment and the professionalization of video making. So not exactly what the migrant worker's film is about with its hidden tongue-in-cheek tactic.

Among the mainstream videos of "self-advertising, another form of what commentators in China have referred to as wow-ozhuyi (me-me-ism) or wowow-ozhuyi (me, me, me-ism)"<sup>34</sup>, one can still also find activism and social engagement as Paola Voci writes. The video featuring a migrant worker is proof. It even goes beyond activism and social engagement by using visual forms usually found in parody videos like CCAV. "Smaller-screen movies rely on a variety of strategies such as preference for genre blending, emphasis on brevity, playfulness, and open-ended and fragmented formats."<sup>35</sup> In that sense it can be considered a hybrid video.

### What is Shanzhai?

In China, "original" means a constant rearrangement and rewriting, continual change.

31 Joshua Neves, "Video Theory", lecture at Video Vortex #9, Lüneburg University, 2013

32 *ibid.*

33 Raymond Zhou, "Microfilm will be coming shortly to a screen near you." *China Daily*, 21 May 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/entertainment/2012-05/21/content\\_15342357.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/entertainment/2012-05/21/content_15342357.htm)

34 Paola Voci, *China on Video. Smaller Screen Realities*, p. 84

35 Paola Voci, *ibid.*, introduction

tehnološke zahtjeve”, izjavio je Shi Chuan, profesor filma i televizije na Sveučilištu u Šangaju prema navodu u državnim novinama.<sup>33</sup>

“Mikrofilm” je doslovni prijevod kineskog termina koji se koristi za tu kategoriju: “Wei-Dianying”. “Wei” znači “mikro”, a “dianying” znači film. Takav film traje kratko, obično između 30 sekundi i 5 minuta, i prenosi uglavnom neku smiješnu ili romantičnu priču zasnovanu na scenariju. Svrha mikrofilmova obično je zabaviti ili profesionalizirati video umjetnost. Dakle, to nije baš ono o čemu se radi u slučaju filma sezonske radnice i njegove prikriveno ironične taktike.

Ipak, među mainstream videima “samoreklamiranja, još jednog oblika onoga što su komentatori u Kini nazvali wowozhuyi (ja-izam) ili wowowozhuyi (ja, ja, ja-izam)”,<sup>34</sup> nalazimo i aktivizam i društveni angažman, kako piše Paola Voci. Video sa sezonskom radnicom može se smatrati dokazom. On čak nadilazi aktivizam i društveni angažman, budući da koristi vizualne forme koje se obično mogu naći u parodijskom videu kao što je CCAV. “Filmovi za manje ekrane oslanjaju se na niz strategija kao što su preferiranje mješavine žanrova, naglasak na kratkoći, zaigranost, otvoreni kraj i fragmentirani formati.”<sup>35</sup> U tom smislu oni se mogu smatrati hibridnim videom.

## Što je to Shanzhai

U Kini originalno znači neprestano preslagivanje i prerađivanje, neprestana promjena. Kineske umjetničke tehnike definirane su modularnošću te je i kinesko slikarstvo modularno.

Shanzhai je kineska ekonomska (pa stoga i kulturna) tehnika koja se uglavnom odnosi na tržište kreativnih krivotvorenih proizvoda, ali i na nekomercijalne projekte kao što su video parodije na službeni višesatni novogodišnji program na kineskoj televiziji, koji ima najviši rejting (što je uglavnom rezultat velikog broja kineskih TV gledatelja, ali ipak govori o popularnosti koju taj zabavni program ima među gledateljstvom i o važnosti koju ima u rituelu proslave Nove godine). To je također napad na kontrolu državnih medija, subverzivan čin usmjeren protiv monopola i staromodnog stila (u emisiji su: vojnici, epizode u autobusu, skečevi).

Evo nekih primjera: među krivotvorinama koje možete pronaći na tržnicama i u malim trgovinama nalaze se sve moguće vrste iPhonea s natpisima kao što su “Made in Shenzhen” ili “Designed by Apple”, zatim “iPhone 5” u vrijeme dok je Apple još uvijek prodavao “iPhone 4” i tek dizajnirao “iPhone 5”, ili pak “iPhone Air” za koji ne postoji originalna verzija, a u pogledu dizajna oslanja se na dizajn modela Appleova prijenosnika s početka 21. stoljeća. Kineski

33 Raymond Zhou, “Microfilm will be coming shortly to a screen near you”, *China Daily* (21. svibnja 2012.), [http://www.china-daily.com.cn/entertainment/2012-05/21/content\\_15342357.htm](http://www.china-daily.com.cn/entertainment/2012-05/21/content_15342357.htm)

34 Paola Voci, str. 84.

35 Paola Voci, *China on Video. Smaller-Screen Realities*, uvod.

Chinese techniques of creation are defined by modules, Chinese painting is modular.

Shanzhai is a Chinese economic (and cultural) technique and mainly describes the market for creative fake products, but also non-commercial projects such as video parodies of the official annual hours-long New Year show on Chinese television, which has the highest ratings (primarily due to the large TV audience in China though it still underlines the popularity of this show among viewers and how much it seems to belong to the New Year ritual). These parodies are also an attack on the control of state media, a subversive act directed against the monopoly and old-fashioned style.

Among the fakes you will find in the markets and small shops are many versions of the iPhone with inscriptions like "Made in Shenzhen" or "Designed by Apple", the "iPhone 5", when Apple was still selling "iPhone 4" and designing "iPhone 5", or the "iPhone Air" of which there is no original. The design references that of an Apple laptop from the early 2000s. Chinese users are ahead of their time. People who cannot afford a smartphone use their mobile phones to connect to the internet, Shanzhai products being cheap and adaptable to local needs. For example, most mobile phones have slots for two SIM cards and correspondingly two keys to answer incoming telephone calls. China has no mobile phone network covering the whole country, so many commuters, for example migrant workers, need two SIM cards.

In 2011 Xinhuanet had already proclaimed a "post-Shanzhai era". "The price cut of branded cell phones and the public's growing intellectual property protection (IPR) awareness contribut-

ed to the decline of 'Shanzhai'. But the heaviest blow came from China's determination to enhance IPR protection and develop indigenous innovation, said Tang."<sup>36</sup> (Tang Ruijin, the secretary general of Shenzhen Mobile Communication Association.)

### Shanzhai – radical economy?

In 2011 photos of fake Apple stores caused excitement among Western internet users (and Apple clients). A brand-loyal female consumer from the U.S. discovered the shops in the southern Chinese city of Kunming and posted photos on her blog. Under the headline "Are you listening, Steve Jobs" the zealous American had betrayed the shops to the one she calls the "manufacturer God". Only small details such as the shop window caption "Apple Store" and the poor structural condition of the stores made the blogger, by the name of Bird Abroad, sceptical. Otherwise, everything was right: the wood of the store furniture, the blue of the vendors' T-shirts, materials and the functions of the products.

The American blogger living in China was entirely familiar with Shanzhai and the Chinese understanding of what copies could stand for. The next step would be to recognize those non-licensed "Apple Stores" as part of the Shanzhai phone industry: counterfeit shops complete the marketing for successful fake products in China.

Why is it possible to produce Shanzhai phones? This is due to the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology which abolished the licensing of portable devices such as mobile phones in October 2007. At that

<sup>36</sup> "China's innovation drive in a 'post-Shanzhai' era", *Xinhua News*, 11. ožujka 2011., [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-03-11/c\\_13772769.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-03-11/c_13772769.htm)

igrači su ispred svoga vremena. Na taj način na internet se mobilnim telefonima spajaju oni koji si inače ne bi mogli priuštiti pametni telefon, budući da su shanzhai proizvodi daleko jeftiniji i prilagođeni lokalnim potrebama. Na primjer, većina ih ima utore za dvije SIM kartice i u skladu s time dvije tipke za odgovaranje na dolazne pozive. Kina nema mobilne mreže koja bi pokrivala čitavu zemlju i mnogi svakodnevni putnici poput sezonskih radnika moraju imati dvije SIM kartice.

Xinhuanet je već 2011. obznanio dolazak “post-shanzhaiske ere”. “Pad cijena brendiranih mobitela i sve veća svijest o zaštiti intelektualnog vlasništva u društvu pridonijeli su opadanju popularnosti ‘Shanzhaija’. No najveći udarac zadala je odlučnost Kine da poveća zaštitu autorskih prava i razvije domaću inovaciju, kako je izjavio Tang.”<sup>36</sup> (Tang Ruijin, generalni tajnik tvrtke Shenzhen Mobile Communication Association.)

### Shanzhai – radikalna ekonomija?

Godine 2011. korisnike interneta na Zapadu (i kupce Appleovih proizvoda) uzbunile su fotografije lažnih Appleovih dućana. Jedna američka potrošačica odana brendu otkrila je dotične dućane u južnokineskom gradu Kunmingu i objavila je fotografije na svome blogu. Pod naslovom “Slušaj li, Steve Jobs” gorljiva Amerikanka odala je dućane “Bogu-proizvođaču”. Samo su malena odstupanja u natpisu “Apple Store” na izlogu i bijedno infrastrukturno stanje dućana pobudile sumnju kod blogerice zvane Bird Abroad. Inače je sve bilo u redu: drveni namještaj u dućanu, plava boja majica na prodavačima, a svakako i materijali i funkcije proizvoda.

Američka blogerica koja živi u Kini bila je u potpunosti upoznata sa središnjim konceptom kineskog shvaćanja onoga što te kopije predstavljaju: Shanzhai. Iduća misao bila bi priznati te nelicencirane “Apple Stores” kao iduću razinu shanzhaiske telefonske industrije: krivotvorene trgovine upotpunjuju marketing uspješnih lažnih proizvoda u Kini.

Zbog čega je bilo moguće proizvoditi Shanzhai telefone: njihov uspjeh može se zahvaliti kineskom Ministarstvu industrije i informacijske tehnologije, koje je u listopadu 2007. ukinulo licenciranje prijenosnih uređaja kao što su mobiteli. Otprilike u isto vrijeme tajvanska tvrtka MediaTek izumila je *all-in-one* čip za mobitele, što je dovelo do ekstremnog smanjenja troškova proizvodnje. Male i fleksibilne Shanzhai tvrtke počele su dijeliti troškove istraživanja i razvoja – specifičnost proizvodnje ovog modela je u tome što se tehnologija tretira kao *open source*. Tako tvrtke mogu imati dobit čak i ako proizvedu mali broj telefona.

36 “China’s innovation drive in a ‘post-Shanzhai’ era”, *Xinhua News*, 11 March 2011, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-03/11/c\\_13772769.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-03/11/c_13772769.htm)

time, the Taiwanese company MediaTek had invented the all-in-one mobile phone chip, which led to a serious reduction in production costs. Small and flexible Shanzhai companies began to share the costs of research and development – the specific production of this model is that technology is treated as open source. So even with small numbers companies make profit.

The point of the Chinese copy is therefore an economic one. Shanzhai culture was first read in Western media as a subversive gesture against state authorities. It has now deployed its international appeal in the economic sector through the open-source philosophy, China-specific applications and a high rate of production. The benefit of Shanzhai is that ordinary people can use technologies that were previously only available to China's wealthier citizens because Shanzhai has localized global production. And the further the Shanzhai products move from the original products, the more unique the copies become – until they reach the status of originals – in a Western sense.

## A Shanzhai democracy?

Byung-Chul Han has a broader definition of the Shanzhai concept. According to Han, Shanzhai operates with an intensive formation of hybrids. From his perspective, Maoism was itself a kind of Shanzhai Marxism. Given the lack of workers and industrial proletariat in China, Mao undertook a transformation of the original Marxist doctrine. In its hybrid capabilities, Chinese communism has appropriated turbo-capitalism over the past 30 years. So can we also speak of a Shanzhai democracy?

Svrha kineske kopije stoga je ekonomska. Shanzhai kultura isprva se u Zapadnim medijima tumačila kao subverzivna gesta protiv državnih vlasti, a sada uživa međunarodne simpatije u ekonomskom sektoru zbog svoje *open source* filozofije, specifično kineskih aplikacija i visoke proizvodne stope. Prednost Shanzhaija je u tome što običan čovjek može koristiti tehnologije koje si mogu dopustiti samo bogataši, budući da je Shanzhai lokalizirao globalnu proizvodnju. I što se više Shanzhai proizvodi udaljuju od izvornih proizvoda, tim neovisnijima postaju njihove kopije – dok ne dosegnu status originala. U Zapadnom smislu te riječi.

### **Shanzai demokracija?**

Byung-Chul Han je iznio širu, sveobuhvatniju definiciju koncepta Shanzhai. Prema Hanu, Shanzhai djeluje na način intenzivnog oblikovanja hibrida. S njegova gledišta, maoizam je i sam bio neka vrsta Shanzai marksizma. Budući da u Kini nije bilo radništva i industrijskog proletarijata, Mao je transformirao izvorni marksistički nauk. U svojim hibridnim mogućnostima kineski je komunizam usvojio turbo-kapitalizam tijekom posljednjih 30 godina. Pa možemo li onda govoriti i o Shanzai demokraciji?

Prijevod s engleskoga: **Marina Miladinov**





# Dinamika kulture. Što možemo naučiti od Raymonda Williamsa?

## Pojam kulture kod Raymonda Williamsa

**D**va su međusobno isključiva načina definiranja alternativne kulture. Uobičajeno razumijevanje alternativne kulture definiciju zadržava u okvirima nekonvencionalnog životnog stila, vrste kulturalnog nasljeđa hipi pokreta, refleksije kontra-kulture itd. Takvo razumijevanje alternativne kulture u Hrvatskoj jasno je prisutno u nazivlju koje uvode institucije, prije svih Ministarstvo kulture i Ured za obrazovanje, kulturu i sport grada Zagreba. Dominantna kultura devedesetih alternativnu kulturu opisuje kao “urbanu kulturu”, “kulturu mladih” ili složenim sintagmama poput “popularna kultura i off-programi”. Imenovanje alternativne kulture mehanizam je neutralizacije političkih konflikata prisutnih u različitim definicijama termina “kultura”. Primjerice, na mjesto političkog ili ekonomskog jaza dominantna kultura smiješta generacijski jaz (“kultura mladih”), diskurzivno marginalizira (terminom “off-kultura”) ili pojednostavljuje – prikazujući alternativnu kulturu kao životni stil (“urbana kultura”).

Antonio Gramsci, talijanski aktivist i filozof, opisao je dinamiku političke hegemonije upravo kao neutralizaciju. U Zapadnim društvima, hegemonija nije nametnuta nasiljem, nego se ona uspostavlja kroz proces pregovora o značenjima (Gramsci, 1971). Revolucije su moguće samo kada konsenzus izostaje. “Prirodni”, “normalni” poredak ili “spontani” pristanak, tvrdi Gramsci, rezultat je strukturalne dinamike, društvenih pregovora oko općeg smjera društvenog života (Gramsci, 1971:12). Kako bi se premostilo te mehanizme (neutralizaciju i kvazi-normalizaciju vrijednosti), moramo

# The Dynamics of Culture. What Can We Learn from Raymond Williams?

## Raymond Williams's notion of culture

● There are two mutually exclusive ways to define an alternative culture. A common definition locates it within the parameters of an unconventional lifestyle, a sort of cultural heritage of the hippy movement, a reflection of counter-culture, etc. Such an understanding of an alternative culture in Croatia is clearly present in the terms imposed by Croatian institutions, primarily the Ministry of Culture, and Zagreb's City Office for Education, Culture and Sport. The dominant culture during the 1990s described alternative culture as an "urban culture", a "youth culture", or with compound syntagms such as "popular culture and off-programs". Prescribing names to the alternative cultures serves as a mechanism for the neutralization of political conflicts present in various

definitions of the term 'culture'. For example, dominant culture imposes a generational gap in place of a political or economic gap ("youth culture"), discursive marginalization (through the term *off-culture*) or simplification by presenting alternative culture as a lifestyle (*urban culture*).

Antonio Gramsci, the Italian activist and philosopher, described the dynamics of political hegemony exactly in terms of neutralization. In Western society, hegemony is not established through violent acts, but through a process of negotiations about meanings (Gramsci, 1971). Revolutions are possible only when such consensus is absent. What seems a "natural" and "normal" order, or "spontaneous" consent, claims Gramsci, is the result of a structural dynamic by which the general direction of social life is negotiated (Gramsci, 1971:12). In order to bypass these mechanisms (neutralization and quazi-normalization of values), we have to activate the second approach towards alternative culture: the perspective of a Gramscian neo-Marxist understanding of society, and insist on a conflictual character of culture.

01 Ova intervencija kritičke teorije, Gramscija, Luisa Althussera, kulturalnih studija, u sukobu je s marksističkom interpretacijom ideologije koja se čita iz Marxove teorije odraza (a koju postavlja u *Predgovoru za 'Prilog kritici političke ekonomije'*), prema kojoj je ono što se zbiva u nadgradnji samo odraz onoga što se zbiva u bazi (sredstvima za proizvodnju i proizvodnim klasnim odnosima). U *Njemačkoj ideologiji* stoji: "Misli vladajuće klase u svakoj su epohi vladajuće misli, tj. klasa koja je vladajuća materijalna sila društva, istovremeno je njegova vladajuća duhovna sila." Louis Althusser (francuski filozof koji je svoja najvažnija djela napisao šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina), naprotiv, naglasak stavlja na "relativno neovisni" ideološki aparat države, dakle na nadgradnju. Ideologija je relativno neovisna od baze, jer je ideologija, kao lažna svijest, prije svega imaginarna identifikacija. Takva imaginarna identifikacija, koju Althusser naziva *interpelacijom*, je rezultat nadgradnje.

upogoniti drugačije razumijevanje alternative, gramscijansko, neomarksističko viđenje društva, te ustrajati na konfliktnom obilježju kulture. Teoretičar i osnivač kulturalnih studija Raymond Williams pristupa alternativnoj kulturi s tog gledišta u eseju "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory" (Williams, 1980). Williams nudi važnu definiciju kulture kao bojnog polja. No, u svojoj interpretaciji, ističe kako se pregovori ne odvijaju u sferi deklarativne politike, nego u sferi zdravog razuma.

Williams predlaže formulu socijalnog dinamizma između dominantnih i podređenih skupina. Prema toj formuli u Zapadnim demokracijama sve su skupine u stalnom međusobnom odnosu, čak i one koje igraju ulogu alternativne kulture. Williams razlikuje "rezidualne i emergentne oblike, i to alternativnih i opozicijskih kultura" (1980:40). Rezidualne kulture se "žive i prakticiraju na temelju taloga (ostatka) – kulturalnog i društvenog – neke prethodne društvene formacije" (1980:40). Gdje bi klasični marksizam insistirao na dvama oblicima kulture, dominantnoj i podređenoj, Williams predlaže udvajanje podređenih kultura, koje naziva "emergentnima". Razlika između dviju vrsta emergentnih kultura je ključna. Dok opozicijske emergentne kulture neprestano stvaraju "nova značenja i vrijednosti, nove prakse, nova znamenja i iskustva", a kako bi promijenile društveni poredak i stekle moć; alternativne kulture stvaraju "drugačiji način života" no kako bi "ih se ostavilo na miru". Bez obzira na snagu sukoba između opozicijskih i vladajućih, opozicijske kulture nikada neće "prijeći granice središnjih djelatnih i vladajućih definicija" (Williams, 1980:31–49). Drugim riječima, dok opozicijska kultura cilja smijeniti vladajuće, alternativa nudi sasvim drugačiji oblik kulture.

Gramscijanska teorija ideologije smjestila je alternativne i opozicijske kulture u središte društvenog dinamizma. Teorija ideologije kulturu definira kao dinamičko polje u kapitalističkom društvu. Proces kooptacije, apropijacije alternativnih oblika tako postaje važan dio dinamike kapitalizma<sup>01</sup>. Taj je proces pogonska snaga dominantnog oblika ideologije danas. Kako bi bila učinkovita, primjećuje Žižek, svaka hegemonijska univerzalnost treba uključiti *barem dva* partikularna sadržaja: "autentični" popularni sadržaj i njegovu 'distorziju' putem odnosa prema dominaciji i eksploataciji" (1999:194). Alternativna kultura, u svojem najčišćem obliku predstavlja onaj kulturalni višak koji ne može biti asimiliran ili neutraliziran. Ipak, alternativna kultura, kao emergentna snaga dominantnog poretka, biva asimilirana u obliku emergentnih opozicijskih kultura. Tako opozicijska emergentna kultura prisvaja neke elemente alternativne kulture, ali u obliku koji je dominantnom sustavu manje-više prihvatljiv. S obzirom na ovaj dinamizam, neprestanu redefiniciju odnosa između dviju kulturalnih skupina,

A theoretician and founder of cultural studies, Raymond Williams approaches alternative culture from this point of view in his essay *Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory* (Williams, 1980). In his interpretation, Williams pointed out that negotiations are not taking place in the sphere of declaratory politics, but in a sphere of common sense.

Williams proposes a formula for social dynamism between the dominant and subordinated groups. According to his formula all groups in Western democracies are always related to each other, even if they play the role of an alternative culture. Williams distinguishes between the “residual and emergent forms, both of an alternative and of an oppositional culture” (1980:40). The residual cultures are “lived and practiced on the basis of the residue – cultural as well as social – of some previous social formation” (1980:40). Where classical Marxism would have only seen two types of cultures, the dominant and the subordinate, Williams proposes a duplication of subordinate cultures, which he defines as “emergent cultures”. The difference between two types of emergent cultures is crucial. While oppositional emergent cultures constantly create “new meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences” for the sake of changing the social order and gaining power, an alternative culture creates “a different way of life” in order to “be left alone”. Regardless of the degree of internal conflict between the oppositional and dominant cultures, oppositional culture will never “go beyond the limits of the central effective and dominant definitions” (Williams, 1980:31–49). In other words, while oppositional culture

aims at overthrowing the ruling culture, the alternative offers completely different forms of culture.

Gramscian theory of ideology positioned the alternative and oppositional cultures at the center of social dynamism. The theory of ideology defined culture in capitalism as a dynamic field. The process of co-optation and appropriation of alternative forms of life became an important part of the dynamic of capitalism.<sup>01</sup> Slavoj Žižek in his hegelian-lacanian elaboration of hegemony detects the process as a driving force of today’s dominant mode of ideology. In order to be effective, writes Žižek, every hegemonic universality has to incorporate at least two particular contents: “the ‘authentic’ popular content and its ‘distortion’ by the relations of domination and exploitation” (1999:194).

An alternative culture, in its purest form, is a cultural surplus that cannot be assimilated or neutralized. However, an alternative culture, as an emergent force of dominant order, is assimilated in a form of emergent oppositional cultures. Thus, oppositional emergent culture appropriates some elements of an alternative culture, but in a form that is more or less adoptable by the system. Due to dynamism and constant re-definition of the relations between existing cultural groups, it is not possible to define any culture as a constant authentic alternative. While an alternative culture carries an authentic subversive force, it also concurrently has the potential for re-eval-

<sup>01</sup> This intervention of critical theory, Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and other cultural studies, is confronted with a Marxist interpretation of ideology, foremost Marx’s reflection theory (elaborated in the *Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy*). According to this theory, what happens in the superstructure is only a reflection of the base (productive forces and class relations in production). In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels write: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.” Louis Althusser (the French philosopher who wrote his most important works during the 1960s and 1970s), on the other hand, emphasizes the “relative autonomous” ideological state apparatus, i.e. superstructure. Ideology is relatively autonomous from the base, because the ideology, as false consciousness, is first and foremost imaginary identification. That imaginary identification, Althusser calls it “interpellation”, is a result of the superstructure.

nemoguće je definirati bilo koju kulturu kao konstantnu autentičnu alternativu. Iako je alternativna kultura subverzivna, ona je isto tako stalno vrelo preoblikovanja, nove reteritorijalizacije vladajućeg poretka. Ipak, apriorijacija alternativne kulture može se odviti samo u obliku distorzije temeljnih alternativnih pozicija. Emergentne opozicijske kulture nikada ne preispituju temelje dominantne kulture. Takav je poredak jedino moguć u navodno “post-ideologij-skom” univerzumu kasnog kapitalizma. U tom poretku hegemonija je “pojavní oblik, formalna distorzija/premještanje ne-ideologije” (Žižek, 1999:185). Te distorzije osnažuju postojeći hegemonijski poredak Zapadnih demokracija. Tako temeljni materijal kapitalističke entropije, koja kako bi osigurala *status quo* traži stalnu reformaciju i inovaciju, paradoksalno postaju ne rezidualne već novonastajuće kulture, koje imaju osigurati da se u Zapadnim neoliberalnim društvima ništa supstancijalno ne mijenja.

### **Novi društveni pokreti i neoliberalna država**

Situacija u Hrvatskoj primjer je socijalnog dinamizma između različitih kultura. Za vrijeme devedesetih alternativna je kultura definirana u odnosu na opozicijske i dominantne kulture. Nacionalizam i rat drže alternativnu kulturu u poziciji autentične margine. No prije je potrebno opisati situaciju u zapadno-europskim društvima, jer će tu matricu slijediti i Hrvatska. U to se vrijeme tzv. novi društveni pokreti (feminističke grupe, ekološke grupe, skvoteri, mirovne grupe i drugi), oblikovani početkom osamdesetih, već inkorporiraju u dominantne kulture zapadno-europskih društava (Tomić-Kolodrović, 1993). One se pak također reformiraju prema određenim društvenim, poetičkim, političkim i ekonomskim ciljevima emergentnih kultura. Ipak, postoji ogroman jaz između deklarativnih i pragmatičnih ciljeva. Deklarativni ciljevi su demokratizacija – povećavanje broja sudionika, popularizacija kulture, uključivanje periferije i nerazvijenih urbanih zajednica, socijalizacija manjina itd. Središte inkluzivnih politika su rodne, nacionalne i klase razlike. (Isti će se ciljevi u hrvatskim kulturnim strategijama pojaviti tek nakon 2000. godine.)

Primjerice, 2000. nizozemska kulturna strategija naslovljena *Kultura kao konfrontacija (Cultuur als confrontatie)* već ima duboko ukorijenjene ciljeve koji se tada u hrvatskoj politici tek pojavljuju na horizontu. Propagira se humanističke ideje – prije svega pluralizam i participativnost (Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2001). Ipak, inkorporacija emergentnog pluralizma je artikulirana vokabularom ekonomske stabilnosti. Ta je inkluzija definirana kao potreba da se oblikuju “samoodržive” kulture. Istraživanja pokazuju kako je veća

uation and re-territorialization of the dominant order. Nevertheless, appropriation of an alternative culture can only be done in the form of a distortion of fundamental alternative positions. The emergent oppositional cultures never question the fundamentals of dominant culture. It is the only possible order in the newly established late capitalist society. In this order hegemony is a "form of appearance, the formal distortion/ displacement, of non-ideology" (Žižek, 1999:185). These distortions straighten an existing hegemonic order in Western democracies. What have become the material of capitalist entropy, which in order to retain the status quo needs constant reformation and innovation, are not residual cultures, but emergent cultures reassuring us that in Western neoliberal societies nothing will change.

### **New social movements and the neoliberal state**

The situation in Croatia is an example of social dynamism between different cultures. During the nineties alternative culture was defined through its relation to oppositional and residual cultures. Nationalism and war held alternative culture in the position of an authentic margin. But first of all, it is important to describe the situation in Western European societies, since Croatia will follow that matrix. In Western Europe so-called new social movements (feminist groups, ecological groups, squatting groups, groups for peace, etc.), which had formed at the beginning of 1980s were incorporated into the mainstream (Tomić-Kolodrović, 1993) during the 1990s. The mainstream was also

reformed according to the specific social, poetical, political and economic goals of the emergent culture. However, a huge gap exists between declarative and pragmatic goals. The declarative goal was democratization – increasing the number of participants, the popularization of culture, the inclusion of marginalized and under-developed urban communities, the socialization of minority groups and others. Gender, national, and class differences became the focus of inclusive politics. (The same goals would become important in Croatian cultural strategies only after 2000.)

For example, in 2000 the Dutch cultural strategy titled *Culture as Confrontation* [*Cultuur als confrontatie*] already included emergent goals. It propagated humanist ideals – mainly pluralism and participation (Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2001). However, the inclusion of emergent pluralism was articulated using the vocabulary of economic stability. This inclusiveness is formulated as the need to structure "self-sustainable" culture. Research has shown that the subject that participates in some form of amateur culture is more likely to be an energetic consumer of culture. At that time in the Netherlands, around six million people participated in some sort of amateur culture. For example, the organization *Netherlands Association for Amateur Theatre* had around 2000 groups.

In other words, removing the boundaries between institutional and non-institutional culture was an integral part of neoliberal economic policies. Following the downfall of the welfare state in the 1980s, Western European countries underwent a process of commodifying public space and closing the common. In

vjerojatnost da će subjekt koji participira u nekom obliku amaterske kulture biti i agilni konzument kulture. U Nizozemskoj u to doba oko šest milijuna ljudi sudjeluje u nekom obliku amaterske kulture. Nizozemsko udruženje amaterskih kazališta, primjerice, broji oko dvije tisuće skupina.

Drugim riječima, brisanje granica između neinstitucionalne i institucionalne kulture dio je neoliberalne ekonomske politike. Nakon krize države blagostanja osamdesetih godina prošlog stoljeća, zapadno-europske zemlje prolaze kroz proces komodifikacije javne sfere. U takvom ekonomskom okviru, emergentne kulture igraju važnu ulogu u legitimaciji tog procesa. Država podupire kulturne programe, a ne institucije, što konačno rezultira jačanjem utjecaja kapitala na kulturu u cjelini. Deklarativan pluralizam insistira na inkorporiranju ideja i kulturalnih normi manjinskih kultura, sve dok te norme i ideje nisu u sukobu s temeljima ekonomske politike. Ta se univerzalizacija desila kao inkorporacija autentičnih alternativnih ideja u obliku opozicijskih kultura. Primjerice, Nizozemska u to vrijeme ima sedam godišnjih nagrada za popularnu glazbu, a tri za jazz; Belgija financira američku turneju svojeg crust-punk sastava *Hiatus*. U Hrvatskoj Austrijski kulturni forum financijski podržava medijske umjetničke projekte, dok njemački Goethe institut u suradnji s Centrom za umjetnost i medijske tehnologije iz Karlsruhea (Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie Karlsruhe) predstavlja novo-medijsku umjetnost. Riječ je o heterogenim primjerima koji svi demonstriraju različite stupnjeve opozicijskog angažmana koji može postati kasnije dio dominantne kulture.

Osamdesetih u Hrvatskoj i u drugim jugoslavenskim republikama alternativna kultura ima specifičan status. Inga Tomić Koldrović naglašava kako tada postoje dvije vrste alternativne kulture. Prva je “atomizirana alternativnost”, individualni oblici otpora. Druga su “alternativne inicijative” koje su se pojavljivale uglavnom u sklopu socijalističkih institucija. U tom se specifičnom kontekstu inkorporacija alternative u dominantnu matricu može promatrati kao specifična dinamika legalnosti i legitimacije. Benjamin Perasović o odnosu alternativnih organizacija prema socijalističkim institucijama govori kao odnosu legalnosti i legitimnosti – socijalističke institucije su grupama pružale legalni okvir, dok su grupe Savezu socijalističke omladine nudile legitimitet u trenucima poljuljane vjerodostojnosti (Perasović, 2001).

Za vrijeme devedesetih alternativne grupe nastavljaju sa svojim djelovanjem. Postoji određen kontinuitet u povijesti društvenih pokreta. To je svakako bio slučaj sa Slovenijom gdje je projekt “demilitarizacije Slovenije” rezultirao otvaranjem jednog od najvažnijih alternativnih kulturnih centara regije – tzv. Metelkove – kompleksa koji je nastao u bivšim zgradama kasarni JNA<sup>02</sup>. U Hrvatskoj

02 Slovenija devedesetih nasljeđuje bogatu tradiciju sukoba koji su “omekšali” socrealističku paradigmu i banalizirali ideološke ikone: tzv. ljubljanska “afera 4. Reich” – proganjanje snažne punk scene zbog navodnih pronacističkih obilježja; suđenje dvojici urednika Mladine zbog odavanja vojne tajne; skandal sa štafetom čiji dizajneri priznaju utjecaj nacističkih plakata i slika na njihov rad; kao i grupa Leibač koja koristi provokativne neonacističke simbole.



such an economic framework, emergent culture played a significant role in legitimizing this process. The state supported cultural programs rather than state institutions, which finally resulted in increasing the influence of capital on culture as a whole. Declarative pluralism incorporates the ideas and cultural norms of minority cultures as long as they do not interfere with the fundamental economics of contemporary capitalism. This universalization happened through the incorporation of alternative ideas in the form of oppositional culture. For example, the Netherlands had seven annual prizes for popular music and three for jazz music; the Belgian government financed the American tour of its crust punk band Hiatus. The Austrian cultural forum in Croatia financed media art programs, and Germany's Goethe Institute in Zagreb presented their new media arts in collaboration with the Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie Karlsruhe. These are heterogeneous examples that all demonstrate different levels of oppositional engagement that can be incorporated into the mainstream.

During the eighties Croatia and others Yugoslav republics had specific forms of alternative culture. Inga Tomić Koludrović stresses the fact that there were two types. The first being the "atomized alternative", an individual form of resistance. The second were the "alternative initiatives", part of the socialist institutions. In this specific context, the inclusion of the alternative into a dominant matrix can be analyzed as a specific dynamic of legality and legitimacy. Benjamin Perasović explained how socialist institutions provided the legal framework for alternative groups, while these

groups provided legitimacy for the already shaken authenticity of the Socialist Youth League (Perasović, 2001).

During the nineties ex-Yugoslav alternative groups continued their activities and there was a degree of continuity with historical social movements. At least this was the case with Slovenia, where the project of 'demilitarization of Slovenia' resulted in the opening of Metelkova, one of the most important alternative centers in the region, in a complex that occupied former military buildings.<sup>02</sup> In Croatia, the 'working group' *Svarun* organized protests against nuclear plants, petitions for bicycle tracks, and raised the issue of the conscientious objector – an individual who has claimed the right to refuse to perform military service (Perasović, 2001). These actions were directly related to 1980s new social movements.

### The specificity of the 1990s in Croatia

However, to a large extent, emergent cultures were marginalized during the war, while the residual cultures related to nation and tradition flourished. Croatian emergent cultures of the transitional 1990s had three specific characteristics. Firstly, Benjamin Perasović stresses that activism became the most common form of an alternative culture (green groups, squatters, movements for minority rights, women's rights, national minorities, the rights of same sex couples, etc.).

Secondly, in the 1990s oppositional culture in Croatia lost its ground. After the Socialist Youth League of Croatia ceased to exist,

<sup>02</sup> Slovenia inherited a tradition of conflicts that 'softened' the socialist paradigm and ideological icons. The so-called Ljubljana "4th Reich affair" – included the persecution of the punk scene for its allegedly pro-Nazi character; the prosecution of two editors of the journal *Mladina* for revealing military secrets; a scandal with designing "štafeta" [Relay of Youth baton] whose designers admitted that they were under the influence of Nazi posters; the use of provocative neo-Nazi symbols by the pop group Laibach.

u to vrijeme postoji “radna grupa” Svarun koja je organizirala prosvjede protiv gradnje atomskih centrala, peticije za biciklističke staze, a po prvi puta je u nas uvela pitanje “prigovora savjesti” (Perasović, 2001). Takvi su primjeri izravno povezani s novim društvenim pokretima osamdesetih.

## Specifičnost devedesetih u Hrvatskoj

Ipak, u najvećoj mjeri, emergentne su kulture marginalizirane u Hrvatskoj za vrijeme rata, dok su rezidualne kulture povezane s nacijom i tradicijom cvjetale. Tri su specifična obilježja hrvatskih emergentnih kultura za vrijeme tranzicijskih devedesetih. Prvo, kako ističe Benjamin Perasović, aktivizam je najčešći oblik alternativnih kultura (zeleni, skvoteri, pokreti za prava manjina – ženska prava, prava istospolnih zajednica, nacionalnih manjina itd.)

Drugo, za vrijeme devedesetih u Hrvatskoj, opozicijske kulture gube temelje. Nakon rasformiranja Socijalističkog saveza omladine Hrvatske, ne postoji jaka organizacija koja bi bila u mogućnosti štiti alternativnu kulturu. Alternativne skupine nastavljaju sa svojim djelovanjem organizirajući benefit koncerte i skupljajući članarinu. Veliki dio sredstava dolazi iz stranih organizacija (najčešće Instituta Otvoreno društvo). Tako je drugo temeljno obilježje alternative devedesetih, priključivanje do tada opozicijskih skupina. Mnoge su opozicijske grupe marginalizirane, pa postaju alternativne. Iako je riječ o projektima *mainstream* poetika. Primjerice projekti Damira Bartola Indoša<sup>03</sup>, projekti Centra za dramsku umjetnost poput *Akcije Frakcije*, kazališna skupina BADco., festival *Earwing No Jazz*, te kompletna strip scena su marginalizirani do te mjere da se više ne mogu oblikovati kao opozicijske kulture. Opozicijske skupine poput SCCA (Centar za suvremenu umjetnost), CDU (Centar za dramsku umjetnost), Faktuma, i drugih, oblikuju “paralelne institucije” koje djeluju kao alternativa dominantnoj kulturi. Takve alter-institucije (termin je naravno oksimoronski) čuvaju i promoviraju suvremene umjetničke izričaje, u vremenu kada rezidualne kulture intenziviraju djelovanje. Opozicijske kulture nisu funkcionirale kao opozicijske u doslovnom smislu Williamsova termina, s obzirom da su one štitele ono što bi se jednostavno moglo definirati kao suvremena umjetnost u Hrvatskoj. Ipak, to su alternativne vrijednosti u vrijeme kada vlada nacionalizam, patrijarhat, konzumerizam.

Treće je obilježje emergentnih kultura tek kasnije postalo vidljivo. Riječ je o održavanju javne sfere, koja je danas ugroženija nego što je bila devedesetih. Iako je to bilo vrijeme utemeljenja liberalizma u ekonomiji koje se zbivalo velikim dijelom u obliku pri-

03 Indošev Parainstitut počinje djelovati tek nakon dvije tisućite, no devedesetih Indoš djeluje s nekim drugim projektima (kao npr. njegova frakcija Kugla glumišta, kao i Kuća ekstremnog muzičkog kazališta).

there was no other financially powerful organization to protect alternative culture. Alternative groups continued to exist by organizing benefit concerts and collecting membership fees. The majority of funding came from foreign organizations (mostly the Open Society Institute).

Some of the oppositional groups were marginalized, and became alternative, although they had a mainstream ethos. For example, projects by Damir Bartol Indoš,<sup>03</sup> projects by Centre for Drama Art such as *Akcija Frakcija*, theatre group BADco., *Earwing No Jazz festival* and the entire comic book scene were all marginalized to such an extent that they could no longer organize themselves as oppositional. Oppositional groups such as the SCCA (Center for Contemporary Art), CDU (Centre for Drama Art), Faktum, and others, created “parallel institutions” that functioned as an alternative dominant culture. Such alter-institutions (the term itself is an oxymoron) preserved and promoted contemporary artistic expression in the years when residual cultures intensified their activities. The oppositional cultures did not function as oppositional in the precise sense of Williams’s use of the term, as they protected what could be defined simply as contemporary Croatian art. Nevertheless, those were the alternative values at a time of nationalism, patriarchal relations, and the promotion of consumerist culture. The third specific characteristic of emergent cultures became visible much later. This was the preservation of the public sphere, which is threatened today more than it was in the 1990s when ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital took place. This was a time of establishing lib-

eral economic models through the privatization of the public sphere. Unintentionally, the positive result of the marginalization of culture was the preservation of cultural institutions established in socialist Yugoslavia.

In 2001, the ratio of financial support between cultural institutions in the city of Zagreb (wages, maintenance, etc.) and cultural projects was 76 to 24, which shows a level of institutional stability in relation to other Western European models (*Strategy for cultural development*, 2001). Today the Croatian government is finally limiting the public sector, applying the same model of capitalist restructuring as that used in other European countries during the eighties and nineties. The Zagreb Student Center is the most obvious example. The Center was devastated (its cultural program was limited, workers lost their jobs), but structurally this cultural sector was conserved as the best relict of socialism. Emergent cultures play an important role in the process of liberalizing cultural institutions, as well as other institutions that were preserved during the nineties (primarily educational institutions). In today’s Croatia public-private partnerships limit the public sector. For cultural institutions this takes the form of outsourcing programs, and forcing partnerships with organizations that are self-sustainable, in contrast to the socialist policy of maintaining publicly financed institutions and workers.

Paradoxically, some groups that were oppositional during the 1990s (that is, more or less alternative, and participated in the restoration of contemporary values in art), now participate in a commodification of culture (fol-

03 Indoš’s Parainstitute opened only after 2000, but Indoš was active throughout the 1990s through other projects (e.g. his faction of Kugla-theatre and DB Indoš - House of Extreme Music).

vatizacije, u vrijeme kada je ipak provedena “prvotna akumulacija kapitala” u Hrvatskoj, nenamjerno, kao pozitivna posljedica marginalizacije kulture neke kulturne institucije utemeljene u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji, ostaju očuvane. Omjer financijske pomoći između financiranja kulturnih institucija u gradu Zagrebu (plaće, održavanje, itd.) i programa 2001. godine je 76 naprema 24, što pokazuje stabilnost javnog sektora u odnosu na zapadno-europske zemlje (*Strategija kulturnog razvitka*, 2001.). Danas se u Hrvatskoj odvija ona kapitalistička restrukturacija koja se u europskim zemljama već zbivala osamdesetih i devedesetih godina.

Zagrebački Studentski centar je najbolji primjer. Studentski centar je devastiran, kulturni program je minimiziran, radnici su otpušteni, ali strukturalno tzv. sektor kulture je konzerviran kao jedan od najvažnijih relikata socijalizma. U procesu liberalizacije kulturnih institucija, kao i drugih institucija koje su sačuvane tijekom devedesetih (prije svega obrazovnih institucija), emergentne kulture igraju važnu ulogu. U Hrvatskoj danas privatno-javno partnerstvo ograničava javni sektor. U kulturnim institucijama se to zbiva putem *outsourcinga* i ustrajavanja na suradnji s institucijama koje su samoodržive, što je u sukobu s konceptom javnog financiranja institucija i radnika u kulturi. Paradoksalno, neke grupe, koje su devedesetih bile opozicione (a u većoj ili manjoj mjeri i alternativne, poput navedenih skupina koje su inzistirale na vrijednostima suvremene umjetnosti) sada sudjeluju u komodifikaciji kulture (slijedeći tako zapadno-europske modele, primjerice nizozemski), dok se tradicionalne kulture (poput sektora kulture u Studentskom centru) u progresivnoj liberalizaciji pokazuju tvrdim orahom, opirući se liberalizaciji javnog sektora. Naravno, ne valja zanemariti kako je stabilnost javnog sektora za vrijeme devedesetih jednim dijelom posljedica toga da su ti javni sektori stavljeni u službu legitimacije novonastale nacionalne države, pa su na taj način također legitimirali u svoje doba, odnosno odvrćali pažnju od privatizacijske redistribucije društvenog vlasništva u drugim sektorima ili čak i sami sudjelovali u toj redistribuciji.

04 Prvi dokument nastaje 1998, riječ je o izvještaju sastavljenom prema zahtjevu Vijeća Europe: *Kulturna politika Republike Hrvatske: Nacionalni izvještaj*. 2001. godine ovaj je dokument dopunjen studijom *Strategija kulturnog razvitka* – što je dio nacionalnog projekta “Hrvatska u 21. stoljeću”. Najnoviji dokument koji je nastao 2002. godine – *Kulturne politike u Europi – Kompendij osnovnih činjenica i trendova*, nastao je u sklopu transnacionalnog projekta Vijeća Europe.

### **Nakon 2000. FAKI i/ili FAK?**

Nakon 2000. alternativna kultura je po prvi puta uključena u nacionalnu kulturnu strategiju i sistem javnog financiranja. Okupljena su vijeća za kulturu, među kojima i Vijeće za medijsku kulturu u sklopu Ministarstva kulture, a za financiranje programa alternativne kulture. Kultura je preuzela na sebe ulogu promicanja pluralizma, heterogenosti, demokracije i pro-europske orijentacije. Objavljen je i prvi dokument kulturne strategije<sup>04</sup> koji po svojem usmjere-

lowing Western European models, such as that of the Netherlands), while during the progressive liberalization, traditional cultures (such as the cultural sector in the Student Center) turn out to be an alternative element that resists any form of reformation. Of course, it has to be noted that the stability of the public sector during the 1990s is partially an outcome of the fact that this sector was put in the service of legitimizing the newly formed nation state. They also legitimized or masked privatized redistribution of social ownership in other sectors, or even took part in that redistribution.

### After 2000 – FAKI and/or FAK?

In 2000, for the first time alternative culture was incorporated into the national cultural strategy and system of public funding. A number of cultural assemblies were formed, among which the Assembly for Media Culture financed alternative programs. Culture assumed the role of legitimizing plurality, heterogeneity, democracy and 'pro-European' orientation. The first cultural strategy that was published strongly resembled the Dutch cultural strategy. The strategy of cultural development<sup>04</sup> stressed cultural pluralism (aesthetic and multicultural) and creative autonomy. The so-called "3D" concept was established in order to define three aims of culture: deetatization, decentralization and democratization. Power shifted from political to professional organizations (deetatization, the formation of national cultural Assemblies) or from the State to local institutions (decentralization), or the democratization of

culture was heralded. These topics reflect a global socio-political shift towards the second phase of economic and political liberalization in Croatia.

Culture was defined through the concept "and-and versus or-or" (*Strategy for cultural development*, 2001). The example of this shift was the Minister of Culture's decision in 2003 to fund films by Jakov Sedlar and Dalibor Matanić; the first promotes residual culture, the latter oppositional culture. This eclectic model legitimized itself through progress and "modernization" and "inclusiveness" (especially towards dissidents). In such relations authentic alternative models are declaratively included.

There were two interesting moments in this liberalization of culture. Firstly, although alternative culture received only 1% of the cultural budget in 2000 (*Strategy for cultural development*, 2001), paradoxically, residual culture, provoked by the financial cuts, addressed alternative culture, and not emergent oppositional culture as its enemy. *Jutarnji List* (20.11. 2002) published an abstract of a debate in the city's parliamentary council (Zagreb) under the title: "HSP and SDP: strict control of Močvara and Attack". The traditionally divided left and right wing parties united as typical residual cultures in order to criticize alternative culture.

Secondly, a newly established pluralist and participative movement emerged from oppositional culture (Croatian Writers Associations, Motovun Film Festival, etc.). At that time alternative culture shared some values with oppositional culture, primarily pluralization and participation. But these newly estab-

<sup>04</sup> The first document was released in 1998. It was a report produced at the request of the Council of Europe and was titled *Cultural politics of the Republic of Croatia: National report (Kulturna politika Republike Hrvatske: Nacionalni izvještaj)*. This document was supplemented by the study *Strategy for cultural development*, as part of the national project "Croatia in the 21st century". In 2002 a new document was published under the title *Cultural politics in Europe – Compendium of basic facts and trends*. This document emerged as part of a transnational project of the Council of Europe.

nju podsjeća na nizozemsku kulturnu strategiju. *Strategija kulturnog razvitka* naglašavala je kulturalni pluralizam (estetički i multikulturalni) i kreativnu autonomiju. U tzv. 3D konceptu deklarirani ciljevi kulturne politike postaju “deetatizacija, decentralizacija i demokratizacija”. Moć se premjestila s političkih na profesionalne organizacije (deetatizacija, okupljanje nacionalnih Vijeća) kao i s državnih na lokalne institucije (decentralizacija), a inzistira se na demokratizaciji kulture. Ovi ciljevi reflektiraju globalnu socio-političku promjenu prema drugoj fazi ekonomske i političke liberalizacije u Hrvatskoj. Kultura je definirana tzv. konceptom “i-i nasuprot ili-ili” (*Strategija kulturnog razvitka*, 2001). Primjer takvog pristupa ilustrira odluka ministra da 2003. godine financijski podrži filmove Jakova Sedlara i Dalibora Matanića, prvog kao promotora rezidualnih kultura, a drugog kao predstavnika opozicijskih kultura. Eklektičan model se legitimirao “progresom”, kao i “inkluzijom” (pogotovu inkluzijom disidenata). U takvim odnosima autentični alternativni modeli su deklarativno inkorporirani.

Dva su zanimljiva trenutka ove liberalizacije kulture. Prvo, iako je alternativna kultura 2000. financirana samo s 1% budžeta za kulturu (*Strategija kulturnog razvitka*, 2001), paradoksalno, rezidualna kultura, provocirana financijskim rezovima, alternativnu kulturu, a ne opozicijsku emergentnu, adresira kao svojeg neprijatelja. Tako *Jutarnji list* od 20.11. 2002. donosi sažetke rasprava skupštinskih odbora grada Zagreba između kojih i odbora za kulturu pod naslovom “HSP i SDP: stroga kontrola Močvare i Attacka”. Uobičajeno nesložne, lijeve i desne stranke, ujedinjuju se u kritici alternative.

Druga zanimljivost je da se novoutemeljeni pluralizam i ideja participativne kulture pojavljuje iz redova opozicijskih kultura (Hrvatsko društvo pisaca, Motovun film festival, itd.). U tom trenutku alternativna kultura dijeli neke vrijednosti s opozicijskom kulturom, prije svega pluralizam i participaciju. Ali su ove novoustanovljene vrijednosti kulture “distorzirane” neoliberalnim imperativima. Prije svega, spektakularizacija i profit direktne su posljedice tih imperativa.

Dvije su grupe, vrlo sličnih imena, FAKI i FAK, ilustracija tog jaza. FAKI, Festival alternativnog kazališnog izričaja, se definira srodno Williamsovoj definiciji alternativnih kultura. FAKI su “grupe i pojedinci koji prakticiraju kazališni izričaj, a nemoguće ih je svrstati u postojeći pravac”. Cilj je FAKI-ja da “šokira, upozorava ili naprosto komentira dominantnu kulturu kazališnim i srodnim jezicima”.<sup>05</sup> S druge strane FAK tvori grupa književnika koji su 2000. organizirali javna čitanja i promovirali suvremenu hrvatsku književnost. Bila je to opozicijska skupina koja je promovirala opozicijske, a djelomično i alternativne vrijednosti (što je očito već i odabirom imena), no spektakularizacija i festivalizacija dio su neoliberalnog

05 Citirano sa stranica festivala, [http://www.attack.hr/faki/index\\_en.html](http://www.attack.hr/faki/index_en.html).

lished cultural values were ‘distorted’ by neoliberal imperatives – populism and profit orientation being the main consequences. Two groups, with very similar names, FAKI and FAK, illustrate this gap: FAKI, Festival for Alternative Theatrical Expression, defines itself in a way that is similar to Williams’s definition of alternative cultures, as theater that is “impossible to fit [into] existing streams, directions or movements”. The aim of FAKI is to “shock, warn or simply comment on the dominant culture using the language of theater”.<sup>05</sup> On the other hand FAK is a literary group established in 2000 to organize public readings and promote contemporary Croatian literature. The latter was an oppositional group that promoted oppositional values (and also the alternative values implied by their name) but the promotion of spectacle and festivals is the thrust of the neoliberal understanding of culture. FAK was a group of writers that operated outside an institutional frameworks, with the often-precarious status of working as journalists for Croatian newspapers. FAK defined Croatian art within the “cultural dominant of late capitalism” (Postnikov 2012:37).

We can also see the transition if we examine the case of the magazine *Arkzin*, which began as a fanzine for the anti-war campaign in 1991 (Vidović, 2012). *Arkzin* “questioned and criticized actual politics, and published contra-information about the violation of human rights that took place at the time, but was censored in the mainstream media” (Janković, 2010, from Vidović, 2012). *Arkzin* not only followed international events (such as the important festival Next 5 Minutes that was invisible in Croatia) and promoted

tactical media but also genuinely worked on questioning the structure and principles of the internet and other such media.<sup>06</sup> Re-defining the fundamental decentralized structure of the internet and reaffirming the capitalist logic of centralized production and distribution is a long process that *Arkzin* anticipated in the early days of the internet.

There are many examples that can back up this model and this second one is also arbitrarily chosen. The case of *Arkzin* clearly shows that during the 1990s alternative culture, to some extent, promoted values that in Western European countries were already culturally dominant (liberalization, human rights, the promotion of the internet, the promotion of emergent industries, etc.). As an authentic alternative culture, *Arkzin* was never incorporated into dominant culture, but its design became mainstream, at least in an emergent cultural form (the journal *Godine Nove*, later *Plan-B*, and others). Not only is design in Croatia influenced by *Arkzin*, but also some of the magazine’s content and layout has been co-opted by mainstream publishing. For example, *Arkzin*’s column Gen X presented young unconventional individuals from the scene. Today such a column, with a similar layout, can be found in the mainstream newspaper, *Jutarnji list*.

<sup>05</sup> Quoted from FAKI’s web site ([http://www.attack.hr/faki/index\\_en.html](http://www.attack.hr/faki/index_en.html)).

<sup>06</sup> Igor Marković, who established new media theory in Croatia, for example, explored the ways in which cases of prosecuting network activists were manipulated to include suggestions of paedophilia and piracy to legitimize possible restrictions.



Fotografao Aladin iz Kikinde, iz arhiva Attacka, FAKI 5, 2002. godine

Photo by Aladin from Kikinda, from Attack's archive, FAKI 5, 2002.



## Bibliography

- Council of Europe/ERICarts (2001), *Cultural policies in Europe: a compendium of basic facts and trends*, (URL: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net>).
- Gramsci, Antonio (1971), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Lawrence & Wishart, London
- Perasović, Benjamin (2001), *Urbana plemena. Sociologija subkultura u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada
- Postnikov, Boris. 2012. *Postjugoslavenska književnost?* Zagreb: Sandorf.
- Tomić-Koludrović, Inga (1993) "Alternativna kultura kao oblik otpora u samoupravnom socijalizmu", *Društvena istraživanja* 6-7, 2
- Strategy for cultural development*, Croatian Ministry of Culture, project *Croatia in 21st century*, 2001, Zagreb
- Vidović, Dea (2012) *Development of Emerging Cultures*, PhD in Theory and History of Literature, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb
- Williams, Raymond (1980) "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory" in *Problems in Materialism and Culture*. London: Verso, Rpt. as *Culture and Materialism*. London: Verso, 2005. pp. 31-49
- Žižek, Slavoj (1999), *The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London, New York: Verso

## Bibliografija

- Council of Europe/ERICarts (2001) *Cultural policies in Europe: a compendium of basic facts and trends*, (URL: <http://www.culturalpolicies.net>).
- Gramsci, Antonio (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Lawrence & Wishart, London
- Perasović, Benjamin (2001) *Urbana plemena. Sociologija subkultura u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada
- Postnikov, Boris. 2012. *Postjugoslavenska književnost?* Zagreb: Sandorf.
- Tomić-Koludrović, Inga (1993) "Alternativna kultura kao oblik otpora u samoupravnom socijalizmu", *Društvena istraživanja* 6-7, 2 (4-5)
- Strategija kulturnog razvitka* (dio projekta *Hrvatska u 21. stoljeću*), Zagreb
- Vidović, Dea (2012) *Razvoj novonarastajućih kultura*, doktorat na poslijediplomskom studiju Književnosti, izvedbenih umjetnosti, filma i kulture, Filozofski fakultet u Zagrebu
- Williams, Raymond (1980) "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory." *Problems in Materialism and Culture*. London: Verso, reprint, Culture and Materialism. London: Verso, 2005. 31-49.
- Žižek, Slavoj (1999) *The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, London: New York, Verso

razumijevanja kulture. Bila je to grupa pisaca koji su djelovali u ne-institucionalnom okruženju, najčešće prekarnog statusa, novinari u hrvatskom tisku. No, kako primjećuje Postnikov, FAK je prije svega definirao hrvatsku umjetnost kao “kulturalnu dominantu kasnog kapitalizma” (Postnikov 2012:37).

Drugi primjer, donekle također arbitrarno odabran, no primjera je mnogo, je *Arkzin*, časopis koji je 1991. godine pokrenut kao fanzin anti-ratne kampanje (Vidović, 2012). *Arkzin* je “propitivao i kritizirao aktualnu politiku te donosio i tzv. kontra-informacije o kršenjima ljudskih prava koja su se događala, a koja su službeni mediji potpuno cenzurirali” (Janković, 2010, iz Vidović, 2012). *Arkzin* nije samo pratio internacionalne događaje (poput primjerice važnog, no u nas potpuno nevidljivog, festivala *Next 5 Minutes*) i promovirao taktičke medije, već je i autentično djelovao na propitivanju strukture i principa interneta i drugih medija.<sup>06</sup> Redefiniranje temeljne decentralizirane strukture interneta i reafirmacije kapitalističke logike centralizirane proizvodnje i distribucije je dugi proces koji je *Arkzin* anticipirao u rano doba interneta. Slučaj *Arkzina* jasno pokazuje kako je alternativna kultura, u određenoj mjeri, za vrijeme devedesetih promovirala vrijednosti koje su u zemljama zapadne Europe vrijednosti dominantne kulture (liberalizacija, ljudska prava, promocija interneta, promocija emergentnih industrija, itd.). Kao autentična alternativna kultura, sam *Arkzin* nikad nije inkorporiran u dominantnu kulturu, ali je arkzinovski dizajn postao mainstream, bar u obliku emergentnih kultura (magazin *Godine Nove*, kasnije *Plan-B*, itd.). Ne samo da je dizajn u Hrvatskoj pod utjecajem *Arkzina*, već je i struktura, a djelomično i sadržaj *Arkzina* ko-optiran u mainstream. Primjerice, *Arkzinova* kolumna Gen X predstavljala je mlade nekonvencionalne individue sa scene. Danas se takva kolumna, slične strukture i sadržaja, može naći u srednjostrujaškim novinama *Jutarnji list*.

06 Igor Maković koji je uveo novomedijску teoriju u nas, primjerice, istražuje načine na koje slučajevi proganjanja mrežnih aktivista manipuliraju s pedofilijom i piratstvom kao legitimacijama mogućih restrikcija. (Primjerice, članak, “Luther Blissett. Pedofilija kao pretekst za lov na vještice”.)



# Masovni spam

**T**aktički mediji, često se spominje Lovinkovo prvo definiranje na konferenciji Next 5 Minutes 1993. u Amsterdamu, predmet su raznih konsenzusa oko značenja. Većina definicija u uporabi, naime, logički obuhvaća teritorij koji je više izvanjski nego imanentan djelovanju. Među taktičke medije najčešće se ubraja se niz formi djelovanja poput reverzibilnog programiranja, backtivism (u smislu povlačenja podataka zasnovanog na Back Orificeu), haktivizma, digitalne otmice itd. (Raley 2009). U ovom izlaganju osvrnut ću se međutim na nešto jednostavnije i popularnije prakse u novim medijima koje se mogu primijeniti i taktički – i to prvenstveno na spam – te na sustave umrežavanja, dokumentiranja, informiranja i dezinformiranja, no ovoga puta u popularno-komercijalnom obliku društvenih mreža. Zahvatit ću tako i problematiku formiranja grupe i njenu mikrosociologiju, važnu u kontekstu elektroničkog građanskog neposluha (*electronic civil disobedience*), i to u mreži Facebook, koja je popularna među hrvatskim aktivistima mlađe generacije. Preciznije, osvrnut ću se na korištenje različitih zona konsenzusa na osnovu kojega se profilira grupa. U tom pogledu, opisat ću akciju koju je poduzela grupa stanara Dioklecijanove palače u Splitu. Nakon opisa akcije analizirat ću socijalnu dinamiku grupe u kontekstu teorije Critical Art Ensemblea o grupnom autoru. Prethodno bih željela sumirati neke od svojih teza o masovnom umjetniku, na koje bi nadovezala ovo izlaganje, posebno stoga što sam slične metode formiranja grupnog autora već locirala upravo na prostoru grada Splita, o kojemu će i sada biti riječ.

# Mass Spamming



Tactical media, as they seem to have been first defined by Lovink at the Next 5 Minutes conference in Amsterdam in 1993, have been subject to various attempts at achieving a consensus about their meaning. Most definitions, in fact, quite logically cover a territory that is external rather than inherent to their activity. One mostly includes here various forms of activity such as reversible programming, backtivism (in terms of data acquisition based on Back Orifice), hacktivism, digital abduction, etc. (Raley 2009). In this paper, however, I will speak of somewhat simpler and more popular practices in the new media, which can also be applied tactically – primarily spamming –, and of the system of networking, documentation, information, and disinformation, for my purposes viewed in the popular and commercial context of social networks. I will thus also touch

upon the issue of group formation and group micro-sociology, which is important in the context of electronic civil disobedience, especially on Facebook, which is so popular among the Croatian activists of the younger generation. More precisely, I will discuss the use of various zones of consensus on the basis of which a group is profiled. In this context, I will describe an action undertaken by a group of people living in urban infills made onto Diocletian's Palace in Split. Having described the action, I will analyse the social dynamics of the group in the context of Critical Art Ensemble's theory on the group author. But first of all, I would like to summarise some of my own hypotheses on the mass artist as the basis of this paper, especially because I have observed similar methods applied in forming the group author in the city of Split.

## Kolektivno vs. anonimno

U tekstu *Anonymous Artist, Nameless Hero, Unknown History*, objavljenom u sklopu zbornika *East Art Map*, dala sam pregled razvoja od modernističkih pseudonimnih, preko socijalističkih alternativnih i grupnih radova, sve do pojave masovne umjetnosti, tj. umjetnosti u kojoj autor ne može biti jasno detektiran niti mu je to namjera (Peraica 2006). Prilike socijalističkog sustava na ovim prostora, uz zakašnjelu recepciju postmodernih teorija autorstva, stvaraju sasvim drugačije efekte od onih koje predviđa postmoderna teorija.<sup>01</sup> Naime, za razliku od postmodernog odricanja autorstva ovdje – uvjetovano povijesnim iskustvima radničkih umjetničkih kolektiva – na primjerima iz Hrvatske, a posebno Splita može se otkriti kontinuitet. Upravo to postaje jasno iz splitskog slučaja stabla oblijepljenog žvakaćim gumama pred splitskim Kliničko-bolničkim centrom koji sam obradila u tom tekstu, ili akcijama grupe navijača Torcida splitskog nogometnog prvoligaša Hajduka. Na sličan način kao što se formira sporadičan autor, kojeg se ne može detektirati, funkcioniraju i autorstva spamiranja kao kolektivne akcije. Naime, tek rijetke osobe mogu znati tko je poimence sudjelovao u danoj akciji. Ipak, ni te osobe ne mogu znati redi li se o istim osobama ili avatarima.

Ove teze navodim kako bih u ovom izlaganju dala naznake o mogućnosti formiranja fleksibilne grupe aktivista / umjetnika, za razliku od fiksnih formacija koje definira Critical Art Ensemble u svojem prijedlogu ćelijskih organizacija (*cell organisation*), koje u kritici s aspekta individualnosti kritizira i Mark Dery (Dery 1999). U narednom dijelu opisati ću socijalnu dinamiku i djelovanje Facebook grupe Get Getanima, koja se formirala 2011. No prethodno valja vidjeti gdje postoje raniji primjeri ovakvih akcija.

## UNESCO spam

01 Vidi pr.: Barthes, R. (1977). "The Death of the Author", u *Image - Text - Music*. New York, Hill and Wang; Foucault, M. (1977). "What is an Author?", u *Language, Counter Memory, Practice*. Oxford, Blackwell. Burke, J. M. (1989). *The death and return of the author : criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida*. University of Edinburg; Derrida, J. (1995). *On the Name*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Godine 2011. u kontekstu stvaranja mnogih inicijativa za obranu javnog prostora u Hrvatskim gradovima podigla se i nevelika populacija stanara Dioklecijanove palače. Iako je inicijativa zasnovana na obrani *de facto* privatnog vlasništva, ugroženog od strane kapitala koji potiskuje stare običaje i dobre prakse življenja, gentrificirajući prostor u turistički sadržaj i prostor ekskluzivnih vila, po pitanju reakcije i nije bilo velikih razlika od inicijativa Za Marjan ili Srđ je naš!, osim što su stanari Palače odlučili eksploatirati nove medije nešto više od drugih grupa. Za razliku od postavljanja jednosmjerne Facebook stranice, stanari Dioklecijanove palače osnivaju grupu Get Getanima, danas zatvorenu i sa striktnim pravilima po-

## Collectively vs. anonymously

In my article "Anonymous Artist, Nameless Hero, Unknown History," published in the *East Art Map* volume, I have offered an overview of evolution from the modernist pseudonymous artworks to the socialist alternative and group ones, all the way down to the emergence of mass art, i.e. art in which the author cannot be clearly identified, and where it is not even their intent (Peraica 2006). The socialist regime in this region, with its belated reception of the postmodern theories of authorship, has led to completely different effects from those foreseen by postmodernist theory.<sup>01</sup> Namely, unlike the postmodernist rejection of authorship – determined by the historical experience of workers' art collectives – examples from

Croatia, especially Split, reveal certain continuity. It becomes evident in the case of a tree covered in chewing gums in front of the Clinical and Hospital Centre in Split, which I dealt with in the aforementioned article, or in actions undertaken by Torcida, a group of football supporters of the first-league team Hajduk. The authorship of spamming as a collective action functions in a similar way as in the creation of a sporadic author, who cannot be detected. Only rare individuals will know who exactly participated in the given action, and even those can never be sure whether the named participants are real persons or just avatars.

I am mentioning these hypotheses in order to indicate the possibilities of forming a flexible group of activists/artists, unlike the fixed formations as defined by Critical Art Ensemble in their proposal of cell organization, likewise

criticized by Mark Dery from the perspective of individuality (Dery 1999). In the continuation of this text, I will describe the social dynamic and activity of a Facebook group called "Get Getanima," which was formed in 2011. But first, I would like to mention some of the earlier examples of such actions.

## Spamming UNESCO

In 2011, at a moment when numerous initiatives for the protection of public space emerged in Croatian cities and towns, a rather small population of people living in the area of Diocletian's Palace in Split also raised their voices. Even though this initiative aimed at defending private property, threatened by capital that suppresses the old customs and lifestyles, gentrifying the area into a tourist destination and a district of exclusive villas, the reactions were not much different from those of initiatives such as "Za Marjan" or "Srdj je naš!" except that the inhabitants of Diocletian's Palace decided to use new media more intensely as compared to the other groups. Instead of creating a one-directional Facebook page, the inhabitants of Diocletian's Palace initiated an open Facebook group called "Get Getanima," which is nowadays closed and observing a strict netiquette. Contrary to a Facebook page, where only a single person or a small group of people can write, while others can merely comment, creating a group proved more beneficial in terms of participation and discussion of a larger number of users.

<sup>01</sup> See e.g. R. Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in: *Image - Text - Music* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977); M. Foucault, "What is an Author?" in: *Language, Counter Memory, Practice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977); J.M. Burke, *The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1989); J. Derrida *On the Name* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

našanja. Za razliku od stranice, na kojoj samo jedan ili tek nekoliko piše, a drugi mogu samo komentirati, grupa se pokazuje zanimljivijom za sudjelovanje i diskusiju većeg broja sudionika.

#### FOTOGRAFIJE

U postovima prednjače fotografije e se iz redova 450 članova grupe profilira najmanje dvadeset, a najviše pedeset stalnih izvjestitelja, koji danonoćno prate i pokrivaju prostor cijele Palače iz raznih kutova. Fotografije i videa se često prosljeđuju medijima. Jedan od pamtljivijih slučajeva prijenosa podataka u otvorene medije iz zatvorene grupe je svakako video turista koji upražnjavaju seksualni odnos na javnom mjestu, kojega na naslovnica prenose gotovo sve dnevne novine.<sup>02</sup> No, obzirom da grupa nema urednika, već samo moderatore, događa se da mediji prenose i ulične vijesti koje nisu provjerene – poput smrti jednog od viđenijih Getana – još uvijek živog, Drage Žile, dosežući tako felinijevske razmjere burleske.<sup>03</sup>

#### SPAM

Get Getanima je također Facebook grupa koja okuplja članove za buduću akciju. No, izbor akcije nikada nije bilo fizičko okupljanje. Razlog tome je što su adresati akcije zapravo bile internacionalne organizacije, poput UNESCO-ovog Centra za svjetsku baštinu, čije sjedište je u Parizu, a koji je zatražio od Grada Splita Plan upravljanja starom gradskom jezgrom. Ovu obavezu je Grad Split, po staroj logici maskiranja javnih pitanja, privatnom nagodbom odlučio dati Giori Solaru i Shahar Solar, izraelskim arhitektima koji su za sam projekt primili značajna sredstva. No, već po objavi Solarovog rada na stranicama grada, postalo je jasno kako će procesi konzerviranja baštine dovesti do konzerviranja, a time i ubijanja života centra grada. Prema novim uvjetima, koje predlaže nacrt, život stanara se mogao umnogome iskomplicirati, prvenstveno u smislu financijskih obaveza, dok su se prava koja su im se garantirala kao stanarima tj. vlasnicima prostora smanjila.

Na predloženi plan prvo je reagirala udruga Građanska inicijativa Split (GIST), odašiljajući niz kritika pismenim putem, ali i otvarajući prostora diskusije. U namjeri da spriječi prihvaćanje ovakvog Plana Dalibor Popović je na sjednici Gradskog vijeća istaknuo i neuključivanje u izradu nacrtu stanara stare gradske jezgre, što su objavili i mediji. Grupa Get Getanima nastaje kao reakcija potaknuta ovom izjavom te u kratkom vremenskom periodu podiže broj stanara u digitalnom prostoru na nekoliko stotina, a u obranu građanskih prava uključuje i temu prava vlasništva, koja ovu inicijativu razlikuju od drugih navedenih.<sup>04</sup>

Veliki broj članova uputiti će i peticiju direktoru Centra za svjetsku baštinu UNESCO-a Kishoreu Raou, pozivajući se na aksiome su-

02 "Seks u centru Splita, Torcida nagradila Australijance pljeskom", *24 sata*, 17.8.2012., <http://www.24sata.hr/reporteri/seks-u-centru-splita-torcida-nagradila-australce-pljeskom-277965>

03 "Drago Žila je živ, Splićani oplakali omiljenog gradskog čistača ribe no Joško Bačić ima još posla na peškariji", *Slobodna Dalmacija on-line izdanje*, 2.2.2013., <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Split/tabid/72/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/201240/Default.aspx>

04 Splićane isključujete iz palače, *Slobodna Dalmacija*, 27.10.2010., <http://slobodnadalmacija.hr/Split/tabid/72/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/119581/Default.aspx>



## PHOTOGRAPHS

The Facebook posts are dominated by photographs. Among the 450 group members, between 20 and 50 permanent reporters have been profiled, they observe and cover the entire space of Diocletian's Palace from various angles, day and night. Photographs and videos are often forwarded to the media. One of the more prominent cases of forwarding information from a closed group into the mass media was certainly that of two tourists having sex in a public place, which was published by almost all daily newspapers on their cover pages.<sup>02</sup> But since the group has no editor, only moderators, it can happen that the media publish a piece of street news that has not been ascertained – such as the death of a popular Getan who is still very much alive, Drago Žila, which has reached the proportions of a Felini-type burlesque.<sup>03</sup>

## SPAMMING

"Get Getanima" is also a Facebook group preparing their members for a future action. However, physical gathering has never been their choice of action. One of the reasons is the fact that the action's addressees are actually international organizations such as UNESCO's World Heritage Centre, with its headquarters in Paris, which had demanded from the City of Split to provide a plan of managing the old city centre. The City of Split, following its old logic of camouflaging public issues, decided to award the project without a public tender to Giora Solar and Shahar Solar, architects from Israel who received a considerable amount of money for the project. However, immediately after Solar's plan was published on the city's webpage, it became clear

that the processes of preserving the heritage would also lead to the preservation, and thus killing, of life in the city centre. According to the new regulations foreseen by the plan, life of the citizens would become very complicated, primarily in terms of financial burden, while the rights granted to them as tenants or owners of property would be considerably diminished.

The first to react to the proposed plan was the Civic Initiative Split (GIST), which sent off a number of objections in writing, and also opened up space for discussion. Determined to prevent the implementation of the Plan, Dalibor Popović emphasized at the meeting of the City Council that the citizens living in the old city centre had not been consulted in the drafting of the Plan, a statement that also appeared in the media. "Get Getanima" was created in reaction to that statement, and after a short while the number of citizens meeting in that digital space grew to several hundred, and to defend their civil rights they raised the issue of their property rights too, a circumstance that distinguishes this initiative from all the others which I have mentioned before.<sup>04</sup>

A large number of members sent a petition to the director of World Heritage Centre at UNESCO, Kishore Rao, quoting the requirements of citizen participation endorsed by UNESCO generally, and the protection that it grants to the monument that goes by the motto "1700 years long continuity of life". But as the President of World Heritage

02 "Seks u centru Splita, Torcida nagradila Australce pljeskom" [Sex in the centre of Split, Torcida awarded the Australians with applause], *24 sata* (August 17, 2012), <http://www.24sata.hr/reporteri/seks-u-centru-splita-torcida-nagradila-australce-pljeskom-277965>

03 "Drago Žila je živ, Splićani oplakali omiljenog gradskog čistača ribe no Joško Bačić ima još posla na peškariji" [Drago Žila is alive, the citizens of Split mourned after their favourite fish cleaner, but Joško Bačić still has things to do at pescaria], *Slobodna Dalmacija online edition* (February 2, 2013), <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Split/tabid/72/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/201240/Default.aspx>

04 "Splićane isključujete iz palače" [You are excluding the citizens of Split from the Palace], *Slobodna Dalmacija* (October 27, 2010), <http://slobodnadalmacija.hr/Split/tabid/72/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/119581/Default.aspx>



Besides the gentrification process, which has infected most cities and towns, Diocletian's Palace, similar to Venice and Dubrovnik, is additionally subject to a process of emigration that is characteristic of locations protected by UNESCO. (photo: Atelier Perajica, 2012)

Osim gentrifikacijskog procesa koji zahvaća većinu gradova, Dioklecijanova palača, slično Veneciji i Dubrovniku, prolazi i kroz procese iseljavanja karakteristične za gradove pod zaštitom UNESCO-a. (foto: Atelier Perajica, 2012.)



**Diocletian Palace is a unique monument in which people have been living for 1700 years”**  
(photo: Atelier Perajica, 2012)

Dioklecijanova palača je jedinstveni spomenik u kojem život traje 1700 godina  
(foto: Atelier Perajica, 2012.)

djelovanja koje zagovara UNESCO općenito i na zaštitu koju UNESCO daje spomeniku pod definicijom "1 700 godina kontinuiteta života". No, kako je odgovor predsjednika Centra za svjetsku baštinu kasnio, stanari su se odlučili, uz pomoć drugih inicijativa, srušiti server samoga UNESCO-a šaljući u samo jednoj noći stotine emailova.

Niz autora e-mailova, bilo da se radi o pismima ili *copy-paste* sadržaju, poslao je e-mail istodobno na više adresa u UNESCO-ovu središnjicu. Većina e-mailova koja se vratila bila je *copy-paste* sadržaj istog teksta prevedenog pomoću Google Translate, no među onima koja su prošla našla su se i neka pisma. Zanimljivo, ured UNESCO-a je svima poslao potvrdu o primitku e-maila s jednakim odgovorom, te jedan generički email svima koji su pretpostavljeni autori ovog digitalnog događaja.

Uvidom u ovaj popis, može se ustvrditi da je među potpisnicima sudjelovao ogroman broj aktivista i s područja Zagreba, zajedno sa stanarima Dioklecijanove palače. Među njima se našla i današnja ministrica kulture Andreja Zlatar Violačić. Isti dan, direktor UNESCO-a je poslao odgovor stanarima zaželjevši im dobrodošlicu. Od toga dana, niz inicijativa i udruga je u stalnom kontaktu sa UNESCO-vim uredom u Parizu, što prije nije bio slučaj.

## Mikrosociologija

Zbog ovakve mikrosocijalne klime svakako je lakše reagirati. Posebnu pogodnost ovakva grupa našla je u korištenju novih medija, prvenstveno društvene mreže Facebook, no paradoksalno, grupa se nije razvila sve dok se od otvorene grupe, koju je mogao čitati bilo tko, nije zatvorila, čime je unijela intimnost i osjećaj povjerenja među susjedima. Međutim, zatvaranje grupe dovelo je uskoro do problema, vezano uz pojedinačnu, ali i institucionalnu paranoju, upravo na način kako to opisuje CAE (Ensemble 2004).<sup>05</sup>

Iako većina potpisnika peticije sasvim sigurno nikada nije čula za Critical Art Ensemble i "taktičke medije", njihove teorije danas su dio institucionalizirane prakse aktivističkog djelovanja. U radnim bilješkama *Observations on Collective Cultural Action* Critical Art Ensemble opisuje upravo ovaj tip akcije i angažmana kroz termine *mikrosociologije* (Ensemble 1998).<sup>06</sup> Autorica Rita Raley dodatno će obraditi ove teze (Raley 2009).

Mikrosociologija definira male samoorganizacijske jedinice koje su sposobne djelovati na način koji nije jednoznačno niti poznata politička niti umjetnička akcija. Grupa koja djeluje je jasno povezana interakcijom. U slučaju Getana, radi se o fizičkoj povezanosti grupe susjeda koja sa sobom nosi cijeli niz specifičnosti zatvorene zajednice, i to:

05 Nekoliko članova pozvano je na obavijesne razgovore vezano uz pisanja na grupi. Jedna osoba, isključena iz grupe zbog spamiranja i privatne zlouporabe, policiji je prijavila da joj se prijeti ne bi li time nanijela štetu zajednici.

06 Tekst objavljen i kao poglavlje u Critical Art Ensemble (2004). *Digital resistance: explorations in tactical media*. New York, N.Y., Autonomedia ; London : Pluto. Segmenti teorije mogu se pronaći i u ranijim radovima Critical Art Ensemblea (1994). *The electronic disturbance*. Brooklyn, N.Y., Autonomedia. Critical Art Ensemble (2003). *Electronic civil disobedience : and other unpolar ideas*. New York, Autonomedia.

Centre delayed in answering, the citizens decided, with the help of other initiatives, to crash the server of UNESCO by sending hundreds of e-mails in a single night.

A number of e-mails, be it original letters or copy-paste content, arrived simultaneously at several addresses at UNESCO's headquarters. Most e-mails that were bounced were the copy-paste versions of the same text, translated with the help of Google Translate, but among those that managed to get through there were several genuine letters. It is interesting that UNESCO's office sent the same answer to everyone, in which it acknowledged having received the e-mail, and a generic e-mail to those who were the supposed authors of this digital event.

This list reveals that there was a large number of activists from the Zagreb area among the participants, who assisted the inhabitants of Diocletian's Palace in their endeavour. Among them, one should mention the present Minister of Culture, Andreja Zlatar Viočić. That same day UNESCO's director sent an answer to the citizens, wishing them welcome. From that day, a number of initiatives and associations have been in permanent contact with UNESCO's office in Paris, which had not been the case before.

### Micro-sociology

In such a micro-social climate it is certainly easier to react. A particular advantage for such a group is the possibility of using new media, primarily Facebook's social network, but paradoxically, this group could not evolve before it changed its status from an open group, ac-

cessible to everyone, into a closed one, which created a sense of trust and closeness among the neighbours. However, closing the group soon caused problems, which were related to individual and also institutional paranoia, precisely in the way described by CAE (Ensemble 2004).<sup>05</sup>

Even though most signers of the petition have certainly never heard of Critical Art Ensemble and "tactical media," their theories are part of the institutionalized practice of activism. In their working notes called "Observations on Collective Cultural Action," CAE describe precisely this type of action and engagement, calling it *micro-sociology* (Ensemble 1998).<sup>06</sup> Rita Raley later elaborated on their hypotheses (Raley 2009).

Micro-sociology defines small, self-organized units that are capable of action in a way that is neither outspokenly political nor artistic. The acting group is also in manifest interaction. In case of the Getani, it is the physical connectedness of a group of neighbours, which implies a number of specificities typical of a closed community, such as:

1. Physical enclosure of the community within thick walls of the monument complex of Diocletian's Palace, with common characteristics of the space within walls such as low ceilings, constructions from various epochs, narrow streets – elements that all define the relationship between public and private, in terms of intense use of public space (piazzetas) and the non-existence of privacy (because of old building methods and extremely narrow streets);

05 Several members were summoned for interrogation because of what they wrote in the group. Somebody who had been excluded from the group for spamming and abuse for personal interest, reported being threatened to the police in order to harm the community.

06 The text was also published as a chapter in Critical Art Ensemble, *Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media* (New York: Autonomedia; London: Pluto, 2004). Segments of the same theory can also be found in the earlier writings of Critical Art Ensemble, such as *The Electronic Disturbance* (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1994) or *Electronic Civil Disobedience: And Other Unpopular Ideas* (New York: Autonomedia, 2003).

1. Fizičke zatvorenosti zajednice debelim zidovima unutar prostornog kompleksa Dioklecijanove palače – s posebnim prostornim odlikama unutrašnjeg dijela, kao što su gradnje niske katnosti, iz različitih vremenskih slojeva, uske ulice – elementi koji redom definiraju odnose privatno-javno, u smislu izrazitijeg korištenja javnog prostora (pjaceta) te nepostojanja privatnosti (zbog stare gradnje i preuskih ulica);
2. Povijesne zatvorenosti zajednice unutar povijesnog sklopa Dioklecijanove palače u odnosu na stanovništvo izvan zidina – s nizom slojeva (važnim za sam grad, za pokrajinu, za državu, no naposljetku i za svjetsku baštinu, na čijem je popisu), koja se pozitivno etablira u socijalni model prihvaćanjem naziva “Getani”;<sup>07</sup>
3. Ekonomske vrijednosti koju formira povijesna zatvorenost zajednice (ad2) – u smislu eksploatacije prostora u svrhe turizma, promocije, tržišta nekretnina itd., a koja je supstancijalno različita od ekonomske vrijednosti prostora izvan prostornih okvira Geta (ad1), pri čemu ta ekonomska vrijednost povezuje stanare kako na nivou ponosa vrijednošću, tako i zaštite u slučajevima pokušaja invazije;
4. Tradicijskog tipa života – zbog snažne prostorno-vremenske i ekonomske vrijednosti, a naposljetku i stigme koja mistificira prethodno navedene karakteristike u niz objeda o životu unutar Palače, koje često završavaju klevetama da stanari nemaju sanitarne čvorove ili da su, najčešće, prostitutke i narkomani. Zatvorena zajednica stvara vlastite socijalne odnose, bilo brakom, kumstvima ili nasljeđivanjem.<sup>08</sup>

**07** Naziv Get prvotno se koristio za prostor kojeg su u XVIII. stoljeću naselili španjolski Židovi, u blizini današnjeg Židovskog prolaza i ulice Srid Geta. Naziv je preuzet iz Venecije, koja također formira Ghetto. No, za razliku od venecijanskog Ghettoa, splitski se samo dva puta zatvorio od ostatka grada. Naziv Get se širi tijekom XX. stoljeća kao stigma na cijeli sjeverni prostor Palače (do Stare pjacete), a u posljednjim godinama medijski je prišivak i za ostatak prostora Palače.

**08** Kompilacija članaka se može naći na [Del.icio.us](https://delicious.com/getani) <https://delicious.com/getani>

**09** Critical Art Ensemble (1998). “Observations on Collective Cultural Actions”, u *Art Journal* 57(2): 72-85., p. 75.

Zasnovana na fizičkoj povezanosti, povijesnim i ekonomskim vezama, grupa se pokazala čvršćom od neke druge grupacije. No, upravo kao što je opisano u CAE tezama o elektroničkom građanskom neposluhu, grupa je prolazila krize, prva od kojih je bila postizanje kritične mase.

#### “KRITIČNA MASA”

Critical Art Ensemble u navedenom eseju upozorava na problem postizanja kritične mase kao mogućnosti eksplozivnog raspada grupe: “Problem koji izgleda vječno pogađa kolektivno organiziranja je katastrofa koja nastupa kada grupa dosegne kritičnu masu. Kada grupa dosegne tu točku, ona nasilno aktivno eksplodira dok na kraju ništa ne ostane od organizacije.”<sup>09</sup> I uistinu, grupa stanara koja je potpisivala peticije odvojila se u malu grupu politički angažiranih pojedinaca zainteresiranih za djelovanje u realnom prostoru, a ne širenje grupe, dok je istodobno, kao reakcija, veličina Facebook grupe za dvostruko porasla – s 200 na današnjih gotovo 450 članova,

2. Historical enclosure of the community within the ancient complex of Diocletian's Palace as compared to the housing conditions outside the city walls – with a number of layers (important for the city as such, the region, the country, and eventually for the world heritage, as it is on its list), positively affirmed as a social model by adopting the name of "Getani" ("ghetto dwellers");<sup>07</sup>
3. Economic value created by the historical enclosure of the community (ad2) – in terms of exploiting the space for tourism, promotion, real-estate market, etc. – which is substantially different from the economic value of the space beyond the borders of Get (ad1), whereby that economic value connects its inhabitants, both on the level of being proud of the value and in protection against any attempts of invading the district;
4. Traditional way of life – owing to the great spatial-temporal and economic value, and eventually also the stigma that mystifies these features into a series of libels about the life within the Palace, such as that its inhabitants live in houses without sanitary facilities or that most of them are prostitutes and drug addicts. An enclosed community is bound to create its own social relations, be it by marriage, godparenthood, or inheritance.<sup>08</sup>

Based on that physical closeness, and the historical and economic ties, the group has proved to be more closely interconnected than most other communities in the city. But as CAE's hypothesis on electronic civic disobedience would predict, the group has passed through various crises, the first of them related to achieving a critical mass.

## "CRITICAL MASS"

In the abovementioned essay, Critical Art Ensemble indicates the problem of achieving a critical mass as a possibility of explosive dissolution of the group: "One problem that seems to plague collective organization is the catastrophe of the group reaching a critical mass. When the point is reached, the group violently actively explodes, and little or nothing is left of the organization."<sup>09</sup> Indeed, the group of tenants who were writing the petitions splintered off into a smaller group of politically engaged individuals interested in becoming active in real space instead of expanding the group, whereas as a reaction, the size of the Facebook group doubled – from 200 to the present-day 450 members, mostly people who live in the Palace. In the same process, the group turned from open into closed, making it possible to achieve an intimate social climate.

The Facebook group has continued to be active in virtual and real space alike, by organizing gatherings without direct political action. Their activities include various performative actions.

## PERFORMATIVE ACTIONS

The first performative action, which took place during one of the "festa" or non-protest traditional gatherings, was the making of a joint family photograph, which included more than eighty tenants positioned around a single table. The second, which took place on the same day, was the re-enactment of the photographs published earlier by *Slobodna Dalmacija*, which documented the life of people within

<sup>07</sup> The name "Get" was first used for the area inhabited by the Spanish Jews in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in the vicinity of today's Židovski Prolaz (Jewish Passage) and Srid Geta (Central Ghetto). The name was borrowed from Venice, which likewise had a ghetto, but unlike the Venetian one, the ghetto in Split was only twice closed away from the rest of the city. The name became popular during the 20<sup>th</sup> century as a stigma marking the entire northern area of the Palace (to Stara Pjaceteta), and in the recent years the media have been applying it to the rest of the Palace as well.

<sup>08</sup> A compilation of articles can be found at [Del.icio.us](http://Del.icio.us), <https://delicious.com/getani>

<sup>09</sup> Critical Art Ensemble, "Observations on Collective Cultural Actions," *Art Journal* 57/2 (1998): 72-85, p. 75.



**Autohtono stanovništvo Dioklecijanove palače, tzv. Getani, jače je socijalno povezano od drugih sredina pod udarom gentriifikacije, prvenstveno stoga što ga od ostatka grada dijele masivne zidine.**  
foto: Atelier Perajica, 2012.

The indigenous population of Diocletian Palace, the so-called Getani, are socially more closely connected than most other communities owing to the process of gentrification and the fact that they are separated from the rest of the city by massive walls.

photo: Atelier Perajica, 2012





The residents of Diocletian's Palace are characterized by their attachment to the monument, which serves as an inspiration for numerous legends and myths around particular locations, as well as a reason for very different names of parts of the Palace from those in official use. (photo: Atelier Perajica, 2012.)

Specifičnost stanara Dioklecijanove palače je upravo njihov odnos prema spomeniku, a koji razvija mnoge legende i mitove o pojedinim lokacijama, kao i sasvim različito nazivlje dijelova Palače od onoga u službenoj uporabi. (foto: Atelier Perajica, 2012.)

uglavnom stanara. U istom trenutku dok je gupa rasla, iz otvorne je prešla u zatvorenu, što je omogućilo intimni socijalni ambijent.

Facebook grupa nastavila je djelovati u medijskom i u realnom prostoru, organizacijama druženja, no ne i aktivnim političkim sudjelovanjem. U djelovanju se ističu razne performativne akcije.

#### PERFORMATIVNE AKCIJE

Prva od performativnih akcija, tijekom jedne od "fešta", nedemonstrativnih tradicionalnih okupljanja, je snimanje zajedničke, obiteljske fotografije, na kojoj sudjeluje preko osamdeset stanara, koji se namještaju oko zajedničkog stola. Druga, koja se odvija u istom danu je ponavljanje fotografija koje je nekada objavljivala Slobodna Dalmacija, o životu stanara unutar Dioklecijanove palače, dok je treća simulacija milenijskih fotografija Šime Strikomana, na kojoj stanari svojim tijelima ispisuju naziv svog životnog prostora – Get. Fotografije se putem Facebooka odašiljaju i tagiraju, demistificirajući i dekontaminirajući naziv grupe stanara – Getani.

Ipak možda najzanimljivija akcija događa se prigodom gostovanja predstavnika Europske komisije Paula Vandorena za vrijeme svečanosti dana grada Splita, odnosno dana zaštitnika Splita Svetog Dujma 2012. godine. Grupa stanara tada organizira omanju "grade-ladu", točno ispred već postojećih grafita protiv Europske unije, gdje slučajno u protokolarnoj pratnji prolazi i Vandoren. Stanari, vidjevši da ih promatra protokolarni skup, među kojim se našao i predstavnik gradskog ureda za zaštitu stare gradske jezgre, počinju "voltavati," tj. izvikivati okrenuti leđima, da se ne zna tko izgovara riječi, provociraju prisutne, pritom odabirući taktiku prije nego strategiju.

#### GRUPNA DINAMIKA

Nakon serije događaja, od originalne grupe se razilazi frakcija Dica splitskog Geta, koja se koncentrira na pučke zabave. Ona nastaje upravo kao kritika temeljne grupe koja počinje dobivati strukturu reorganizirajući se u Macchiavelianskom smislu. Manjina postavlja pitanja cilja same grupe, upravo na način koji u kritici CAE sugerira Mark Dery (Dery 1999).

Izvorna grupa Get Getanima ostaje vezana uz direktno objavljivanje fotografija, komentara i kritika i jaku vezu s medijima. Novonastala grupa je manja i pokretljivija, odnosno brža i efektivnija. Iako, CAE tvrdi da će se veća raspliniti zbog nedostatka intimnosti i interakcije, što u početku možda i jest problem, posebno kada je suočena s uspješnošću novonastale, dugoročno, situacija se mijenja, upravo zbog stvaranja *ćelijske organizacije* u moderiranju veće grupe. Nedostatak jasnog programa i cilja te zamor dovodi do goto-

Diocletian Palace, while the third was a simulation of the *millennial photos* by Šime Strikoman, in which the tenants used their bodies to form the name of their neighbourhood – Get. These photographs were disseminated and tagged on Facebook, demystifying and decontaminating the name of the group – Getani.

However, perhaps the most interesting action occurred during the visit of the EU representative Paul Vandoren on the occasion of the feast day of Split's patron St. Domnio and the celebrations organized by the city in 2012. A group of tenants organized a small "gradelada" exactly in front of the already existing anti-EU graffiti, which Vandoren also happened to pass by with his protocol suite. Seeing that the guests had noticed them, together with the representative of the Municipal Office for the Protection of Old City Centre, the tenants began shouting out provocations with their backs turned to the observers (action known as "voltavati") so that it was not clear who uttered the words, thus choosing a tactic over the strategy.

#### GROUP DYNAMICS

After this series of events, a faction called "Dica splitskog Geta" (Children of Split's Ghetto) splintered from the original group and focused on organizing popular parties. It was a critique of the original group, which had started to acquire a structure reorganized in a Machiavellian style. A minority thus questioned the aims of the group as such, just as suggested by Mark Dery in CAE's critique (Dery 1999).

The original group of "Get Getanima" remained committed to direct posting of photographs, comments, and criticisms, and

maintained a strong link to the mass media. The newly created group was smaller and more flexible, and thus also faster and more efficient. Although CAE predicts the dissolution of the larger group owing to the lack of closeness and interaction, which was indeed their initial problem, especially when faced with the success of the newly emerged group, the situation eventually changed owing to the creation of a *cell organization* of its moderators. The absence of a clear programme and goal, as well as the waning of the initial enthusiasm, practically destroyed the group that focused on popular parties, while the larger group introduced a whole series of organizational regulations.

The reasons for these regulations are obvious as the group is often subject to market-related and primarily political attacks. Owing to their large number, the citizens of Get are often approached as a potential constituency before elections. Here one can eventually observe the closing of circuit between the activist and promotional use of spamming. In response to these problems, the group has shifted its focus from offensive to aggressively defensive, endorsing:

1. Political autonomy (closed system)
2. Relativism towards political options (fundamental critique)
3. Radical critique of a "via via" type, in which a selected text of another author is quoted instead of the original, direct speech (use of arguments between the opposed sides in a debate, i.e. additional splitting of discourse).
4. Intense communication with the mass media.



**Nazivom Get se označavao samo dio Dioklecijanove palače kojega su od 17. stoljeća naseljavali Židovi. Tijekom 20. stoljeća termin se širi na čitav prostor kojega zatvaraju zidine Dioklecijanove palače, u početku pejorativno.  
(foto: Atelier Perajica, 2012.)**

The name Get was originally used only for the section of Diocletian's Palace inhabited by the Jews from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, it was extended to the entire space enclosed by the walls of the Palace, and was at first used pejoratively. (photo: Atelier Perajica, 2012)

Even though CAE has concluded that the electronic civic disobedience should be kept separate from the mass media, advising: "Use what is already available, give the media vultures nothing, and the only option for cooptation left is cannibalism (hence the proliferation of retro)", interaction with the mass media in terms of informing or even misinforming them through social networks seems to be of considerable help to the community of Getani.<sup>10</sup> Journalists open up space in which the community participates, presenting their problems and thus exerting a pressure through the media in order to have their problems solved, which again – although only during election campaigns – indeed occasionally leads to solutions.

This so far functional model of contestation against the processes of gentrification, especially the one under the protections by UNESCO, leads us to conclude that media activism, i.e. activism which includes presence in the media and engagement with the media, functions at the moment as a model of resistance, even in the context of the gentrification process which many critics consider inescapable (Lees et al., 2007).

10 Critical Art Ensemble, *Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media* (New York: Autonomedia; London: Pluto, 2004), 28.

vo potpunog nestanka grupe koja je orijentirana na pučke zabave, dok veća grupa unosi čitav niz organizacijskih pravila.

Razlog formiranju pravila je očit s obzirom da je velika grupa često predmetom marketinških, no primarno političkih ataka. Na grupu građana, zbog velikog broja, često se adresiraju poruke koje ih žele vrbovati kao birače. I tu, naposljetku, imamo zatvoreni krug aktivističke i marketinške upotrebe spama. Upravo zbog ovakvih problema, grupa mijenja fokus iz ofenzivnoga u agresivno defanzivni, zagovarajući:

1. političku neovisnost (zatvorenost sustava),
2. relativizam političkih opcija (temeljitu kritiku),
3. radikalnu kritiku "via via" u kojoj se prenosi odabrani tuđi tekst namjesto izvornog osobnog govora (upotrebljavanje argumenata između strana u diskusiji, odnosno dodatnim razdvajanjem diskursa),
4. intenzivno sudjelovanje u radu sa medijima.

Iako CAE zaključuje kako elektronički građanski neposluh treba držati dalje od masovnih medija, rekavši "[k]oristite ono što je već dostupno, ništa ne dajte medijskim grabežljivcima, tako da će jedina opcija za kooptaciju biti kanibalizam (zbog čega je i došlo do širenja retra)", interakcija s masovnim medijima, u smislu informiranja no i dezinformiranja putem društveni mreža čini se da je od velike pomoći za zajednicu stanara.<sup>10</sup> Novinari, naime, otvaraju prostor u kojem stanari sudjeluju, prezentiraju svoje probleme, a time stvaraju i medijski pritisak da se njihove probleme riješi, što opet – no isključivo u vrijeme izbora – donekle i rezultira rješavanjem njihovih problema.

Upravo zbog ovog, za sada funkcionalnog modela suočavanja s procesima gentrifikacije, posebno ovakve pod zaštitom UNESCO-a, može se zaključiti kako medijski aktivizam, koji uključuje medijsku prisutnost i angažman, za sada funkcionira kao model otpora, čak i u okolnostima gentfirikacije koje u veliki broj autora smatra neminovnom (Lees et al, 2007).

10 Vidi: Critical Art Ensemble (2004). *Digital resistance : explorations in tactical media*. New York, N.Y., Autonomedia ; London, Pluto. Str. 28.

## Bibliography

- Barthes, R. "The Death of the Author." In: *Image – Text – Music*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.
- Burke, J.M. *The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1989.
- Derrida, J. *On the Name*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Dery, M. *The Pyrotechnic Insanitarium: American Culture on the Brink*. New York: Grove Press, 1999.
- Critical Art Ensemble. *The Electronic Disturbance*. Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Observations on Collective Cultural Actions," *Art Journal* 57/2 (1998): 72-85.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Electronic Civil Disobedience: And Other Unpopular Ideas*. New York: Autonomedia. 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Digital Resistance: Explorations in Tactical Media*. New York: Autonomedia; London: Pluto, 2004.
- Foucault, M. "What is an Author?" In: *Language, Counter Memory, Practice*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.
- Lees et al. (ed.). *Gentrification*. Routledge, New York, and London, 2007.
- Peraica, A. "Anonymous Artist, Unknown Hero, Nameless Histories; Motif of Duchamp's variable x in Contemporary Croatian Art." In: *East Art Map Contemporary Art and Eastern Europe*. IRWIN. London: Afterall Publishing MIT Press Distribution, 2006.
- Raley, R. *Tactical Media*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.
- Steyerl, H. "Digital Debris: Spam and Scam," *October* 138 (Fall 2011): 70-80.

## Bibliografija

- Barthes, R. (1977). "The Death of the Author", u *Image - Text - Music*, New York, Hill and Wang.
- Burke, J. M. (1989). *The death and return of the author : criticism and subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida*, University of Edinburgh.
- Derrida, J. (1995). *On the Name*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Dery, M. (1999). *The pyrotechnic insaniarium: American culture on the brink*. New York, Grove Press.
- Critical Art Ensemble (1994). *The electronic disturbance*. Brooklyn, N.Y., Autonomedia.
- Critical Art Ensemble (1998). "Observations on Collective Cultural Actions", u *Art Journal* 57(2): 72-85.
- Critical Art Ensemble (2003). *Electronic civil disobedience: and other unpopular ideas*. New York, Autonomedia.
- Critical Art Ensemble (2004). *Digital resistance : explorations in tactical media*. New York, N.Y., Autonomedia ; London : Pluto.
- Foucault, M. (1977). "What is an Author?", u *Language, Counter Memory, Practice*. Oxford, Blackwell.
- Lees et al. (ur.) (2007). *Gentrification*. Routledge, New York, London.
- Peraica, A. (2006). "Anonymous Artist, Unknown Hero, Nameless Histories; motif of Duchamp's variable x in contemporary Croatian art", u *East Art Map Contemporary Art and Eastern Europe*. IRWIN. London, Afterall Publishing MIT Press Distribution.
- Raley, R. (2009). *Tactical media*. Minneapolis, Minn.; London, University of Minnesota Press.
- Steyerl, H. (2011). "Digital debris: Spam and Scam." u *October* jesen (138): 70-80.







Multimedijalni institut,  
Zagreb, 2013.